Indeed. Though I'm still trying to find the words for it. I'd say think of a conversation with a lover or a friend. Think of those two faces communicating and the complex play of meaning, the flexibility.
Or I like to think of my cat in her living complexity. I can analyze this or that sub-system, but her living complexity is something else. I am not saying to stop looking for better accounts. I don't think we can help. We just naturally synthesize accounts. And even we are part of this with our meta-accounts. — macrosoft
So, we agree that we can get some knowledge of pre-lingual thought/belief. That's good. Is there any good reason to hold that we cannot acquire knowledge of what all thought/belief consist in/of?
That certainly does not require omniscience.
— creativesoul
What comes to my mind is 'nothing is hidden.' We already live and experience these phenomena. Beyond that we can articulate them better with superior formal indications. — macrosoft
The critics point applies here when we consider what method of approach could lead us to such knowledge. We have to start at the conventional notions, all the ways we use the terms "thought" and "belief". We have to discover, determine, and/or otherwise clearly establish that they share the same set of basic elemental constituents. Then we have to consider this set of basic elemental constituents in a different light. — creativesoul
The critics point regarding the emphasis upon the fact that how we use the terms is an influencing factor upon meaning applies here when we consider what method of approach could lead us to such knowledge(of pre-lingual thought/belief). We have to start at the conventional notions, all the ways we use the terms "thought" and "belief". We have to discover, determine, and/or otherwise clearly establish that they share the same set of basic elemental constituents. Then we have to consider this set of basic elemental constituents in a different light.
Can we sensibly say that non-linguistic thought/belief consist of them as well? If not, then we surely have no good reason to call both sets of thought/belief by the same name.
That method begins by virtue of looking at all the different uses of the terms "thought" and "belief" in an attempt at discerning whether or not they share some set of common denominators that make them what they are. — creativesoul
Consisting of language or shared meaning is not acceptable, for pre-lingual thought/belief if there is such a thing, cannot consist of either.
Propositions?
Not on my view. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language — creativesoul
I'm not convinced there's a sharp line between language and non-language. For instances: a peace sign, a wink, a salute. Are these that different from 'hi' or 'uh' or 'hmmm'? — macrosoft
All utterance of "thought" and "belief" is predication. All statements of thought/belief is predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon a plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between different things. All use of "thought" and "belief" is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul
Shared meaning.
A plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between (the same or similar enough)different things.
That is the only line, and it's razor sharp. — creativesoul
Do you not see the unveiling? — creativesoul
All predication is existentially dependent upon a plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between different things. — creativesoul
I tried to slip into your worldview a little, and I realized something important (to me anyway.)
Semantic holism becomes important only as sentences get either complex or appeal to abstractions. — macrosoft
If I read you correctly, this underlined part takes into account the vagueness I'm interested in. We just ignore a certain vagueness as unimportant. If we search out some final exact meaning, we can't give it. Images are at work on the level of ordinary objects. Named images. — macrosoft
But if friendship and love, which themselves are only subjective realizations of the species, make out of singly imperfect beings an at least relatively perfect whole, how much more do the sins and failings of individuals vanish in the species itself, which has its adequate existence only in the sum total of mankind, and is therefore only an object of reason! Hence the lamentation over sin is found only where the human individual regards himself in his individuality as a perfect, complete being not needing others for the realization of the species, of the perfect man; where instead of the consciousness of the species has been substituted the exclusive self-consciousness of the individual; where the individual does not recognize himself as a part of mankind, but identifies himself with the species, and for this reason makes his own sins, limits and weaknesses, the sins, limits, and weaknesses of mankind in general. Nevertheless man cannot lose the consciousness of the species, for his self-consciousness is essentially united to his consciousness of another than himself. Where therefore the species is not an object to him as. a species, it will be an object to him as God. He supplies the absence of the idea of the species by the idea of God, as the being, who is free from the limits and wants which oppress the individual, and, in his opinion (since he identifies the species with the individual), the species itself. But this perfect being, free from the limits of the individual, is nothing else than the species, which reveals the infinitude of its nature in this, that it is realized in infinitely numerous and various individuals. — Feuerbach
Feuerbach, unlike Strauss, never accepted Hegel’s characterization of Christianity as the consummate religion is clear from the contents of a letter he sent to Hegel along with his dissertation in 1828.[7] In this letter he identified the historical task remaining in the wake of Hegel’s philosophical achievement to be the establishment of the “sole sovereignty of reason” in a “kingdom of the Idea” that would inaugurate a new spiritual dispensation. Foreshadowing arguments put forward in his first book, Feuerbach went on in this letter to emphasize the need for
the I, the self in general, which especially since the beginning of the Christian era, has ruled the world and has thought of itself as the only spirit that exists at all [to be] cast down from its royal throne. (GW v. 17, Briefwechsel I (1817–1839), 103–08)
This, he proposed, would require prevailing ways of thinking about time, death, this world and the beyond, individuality, personhood and God to be radically transformed within and beyond the walls of academia. — SEP
The content of correlation is sometimes easier to ascertain than others. — creativesoul
Do not conflate our report with what we're reporting upon. The latter is pre-lingul thought/belief and as such it is not existentially dependent upon the former. — creativesoul
The content of correlation is sometimes easier to ascertain than others.
— creativesoul
Ok. That makes sense. — macrosoft
That is where perception does not require being informed by language — creativesoul
Feuerbach made his first attempt to challenge prevailing ways of thinking about individuality in his inaugural dissertation, where he presented himself as a defender of speculative philosophy against those critics who claim that human reason is restricted to certain limits beyond which all inquiry is futile, and who accuse speculative philosophers of having transgressed these. This criticism, he argued, presupposes a conception that reason is a cognitive faculty of the individual thinking subject that is employed as an instrument for apprehending truths. He aimed to show that this view of the nature of reason is mistaken, that reason is one and the same in all thinking subjects, that it is universal and infinite, and that thinking (Denken) is not an activity performed by the individual, but rather by “the species” acting through the individual. “In thinking”, Feuerbach wrote, “I am bound together with, or rather, I am one with—indeed, I myself am—all human beings” (GW I:18). — SEP
Language/World???
Never considered it.
I could name of a few different dichotomies than are inherently useless for taking proper account fo that which is both... and is thus... neither. — creativesoul
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