Interesting take that Kripke has...

By virtue of talking about Moses in another possible world, all we've done is posit the exact same thing(Moses) into another set of circumstances(those of our own imagining). If it is - in part at least - the circumstances themselves that definitively determine what counts as Moses, then we've just committed an error in thought/belief by stipulating different circumstances to the 'same' thing. Different circumstances will produce different things when circumstances themselves are part of what definitively establishes identity.

That is the case with Moses.

Kripke showed the incoherency/self-contradiction that results from attempting to use particulars as a criterion for identity across possible worlds by showing that if we attribute different circumstances(possible worlds) to the same thing, we end up saying some thing both... was and was not... the thing that 'X'.

He wants to say that we only need the name to maintain identity across possible worlds, and that there is no problem with trivially stipulating different properties to that object. There is no problem with saying that Nixon may not have been president in 1970, and so it is intuitively clear that being president in 1970 is not necessary and/or essential to being Nixon. Being president in 1970 is not an essential property of Nixon.

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators. Certainly they seem to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above: although someone other than the u.s. President in 1970 might have been the U.S. President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon. In the same way, a designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever the object exists; if, in addition, the object is a necessary existent, the designator can be called strongly rigid. For example, 'the President of the U.S. in 1970' designates a certain man, Nixon; but someone else (e.g., Humphrey) might have been the President in 1970, and Nixon might not have; so this designator is not rigid.

In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

So, here Kripke clearly argues against the idea that all circumstances(properties) definitively establish identity(are essential). He does however, allow room for such essential properties by stipulating that essential properties are true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.

so what do you make of this, @Posty McPostface?

Postys on downtime. I hope others can contribute.

Honestly Banno, I am struggling to set aside my own position. It must be done in order to grasp what Kripke is getting at. One must also have a good grasp of all the notions(possible worlds semantics, a priori/a posteriori, and types of truth) that he is working with besides setting out his own theory of identity.

So: the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are per­ceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects.

This piques my interest. I agree to some extent. However, this assessment is already theory laden with notions that I reject for various reasons. Kripke is rejecting them as well as some of the conventional 'takes' based upon them, but he's also accepting them, in some strong sense, as useful(intuitive).

His distinctions, I think, are key to understanding his lectures on Necessity and Naming.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator. — creativesoul

I'm not quite sure. It seems to me that the rigid designator isn't the state of affairs here because those can be contingent. The rigid designator is who and not; what, when, where, how.

As to what instantiates a who in a state of affairs is another question worth exploring in my opinion, @Banno.

I think this goes back to your reply to my question about the "criteria of/for identity".

I'm currently on page 60 of the book.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator. — creativesoul

You can, with the actual indexical, produce an necessary, a posterior identity statement, like:

"The actual 1970 US president was Nixon."

Don't worry that there are possible worlds in which that statement, if spoken in that world, would be false. It's still true with respect to that possible world.

Right, Banno?

I think the answer to the question creativesoul brought up inadvertently can be found in this passage:

I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear. There is really not enough time to go into everything in great detail. I think, even in cases where the notion of rigidity versus accidentality of designation cannot be used to make out the difference in question, some things called definitions really intend to fix a reference rather than to give the meaning of a phrase, to give a synonym. Let me give an example. 7t' is supposed to be the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Now, it's something that I have nothing but a vague intuitive feeling to argue for: It seems to me that here this Greek letter is not being used as short for the phrase 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' nor is it even used as short for a cluster of alternative definitions of 7t', whatever that might mean. It is used as a name for a real number, which in this case is necessarily the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Note that here both ' 7t" and 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' are rigid designators, so the arguments given in the metric case are inapplicable. (Well, if someone doesn't see this, or thinks it's wrong, it doesn't matter.) — Kripke pg. 60

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.
— creativesoul

I'm not quite sure. It seems to me that the rigid designator isn't the state of affairs here because those can be contingent... — Wallows

I agree that the rigid designator in this example is Nixon. I didn't mean to imply otherwise.

Designators can be contingent. Kripke makes a point to distinguish between rigid designators and accidental/nonrigid ones. As you say, because possible world semantics allow us to change the circumstances(Kripke calls these 'properties') and retain the identity of Nixon(the object of thought).

I think this goes back to your reply to my question about the "criteria of/for identity".

I'm currently on page 60 of the book. — Wallows

I suggest that you back up and re-read the bit about the meaning of a name and the meaning of a reference(pg. 32, 33, 34). Kripke draws a distinction between the two. Theory laden... sigh. For me, understanding this takes setting aside pre-existing certainty about some things. the more I re-read, the clearer it seems.

Kripke is not offering a theory of the meaning of a name. He is arguing for a theory of reference. The two are not the same by any stretch.

"Nixon", as a referent, is adequate and necessary to identify and refer to this man. That holds good in all possible worlds. That is a theory of referent(what counts as such).

"Nixon", as a name, identifies this man and everything that makes this man who he is(surely some circumstances are irrevocable - say if this man has one hand as a result of warfare). That is a theory of the meaning of a name, and as such it does not hold good in all possible worlds. To quite the contrary, it is to change the circumstances while retaining the identity of an object of thought that makes possible world semantics what they are.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.
— creativesoul

You can, with the actual indexical, produce an necessary, a posterior identity statement, like:

"The actual 1970 US president was Nixon."

Don't worry that there are possible worlds in which that statement, if spoken in that world, would be false. It's still true with respect to that possible world.

Right, Banno? — frank

Yeah, I dunno about this take...

Seems to me that the very use of "actual" eliminates coherent use of possible world semantics.

Kripke, it seems to me, strongly believes that possible world semantics are intuitively useful. His strong assertion...

When you ask whether it is necessary or contingent that Nixon won the election, you are asking the intuitive question whether in some counterfactual situation, this man would in fact have lost the election. If someone thinks that the notion of a necessary or contingent property (forget whether there are any nontrivial necessary properties [and consider] just the meaningfulness of the notion) is a philosopher's notion with no intuitive content, he is wrong.

I do find it interesting that he allows for 'essential properties' in several ways but asks to set them aside...

So this notion Kripke invokes on page48...

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

...is quite intriguing by my lights. It not only allows the discussion of basic, foundational, and/or otherwise irrevocably important necessary elemental constituents, but he goes even farther and offers a special status for them(what counts as a strongly rigid designator)!

A rigid designator of an essential property can be called strongly rigid.

Perhaps it may be worth mentioning and/or asking ourselves the following...

Aren't we talking about the object of our thought when we're identifying and subsequently providing so-called "counterfactual" possible worlds scenarios in light of it? Aren't we then saying that after we identify this thing(this object of thought), whatever else we may say about it, if it is to qualify as being rigid, can only be strongly rigid.

Rigid designator. Strongly rigid designator. Accidental/nonrigid designator.

Circumstances(states of affairs that can be stipulated without changing the identity) can only be accidental/non-rigid designators.

Elemental constituents then - as a result of being necessary for the very existence of the thing being identified - remain intact across all possible worlds scenarios for a different reason than a name does.

If it is the case that all A's consist of B's, then there is no possible world scenario that can be coherently posited about A's without B's, for that would be to talk about something other than this A.

There are no apple pies in any meaningful possible world if there are no apples in that possible world. There are no apple pies without apples... not counterfactually, not sensibly, not intuitively...

"Apple" is a strongly rigid designator.

Where yat Banno?

:cool:

Yep.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/230677

Sittin' here puzzlin' over how you managed to get things so wrong, again.

Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object,

p.48.

One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators.

p.48

The apparatus of possible words has (I hope) been very useful as far as the set-theoretic model-theory of quantified modal logic is concerned, but has encouraged philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures.

p.48(n.)

And,

Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

p.49.

There's a need for something like a suspension of critique to get at what is being said in a philosophical work. — Banno

Yup.

Not that I have a dog in this race. But that's pretty much how I read philosophy in my first brush -- and how I read Kant the some-odd 7 years ago I started that reading group up.

Guess I'm just giving a thumbs up to this interpretive technique more than anything -- since it seems to be something that folks don't pick up on.

What have I written here that is incommensurate with anything you've quoted?

:brow:

Cheers.

I read Kripke as setting up a grammar that allows coherent discourse on modal issues. Hence it is especially important to recognise the way he seperate names from descriptions, necessity from the a priory and the analytic, and so on.

I've just no clear idea of what you mean here:

Kripke showed the incoherency/self-contradiction that results from attempting to use particulars as a criterion for identity across possible worlds by showing that if we attribute different circumstances(possible worlds) to the same thing, we end up saying some thing both... was and was not... the thing that 'X'. — creativesoul

My bolding.

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation?

'Cause we are about to start looking at contingent a priori truths. Here's were it gets interesting.

A truth is a priori if it is known without referring to experience.

Pre-Kripke, such truths were generally taken to also be necessary. This was doubtless because of an obsession with some few examples that backed this case up; mathematical and grammatical cliches such as 2+2=4 and bachelors are all of them unmarried.

The example, Kripke uses is Stick S, which is stipulated to be 1m long.

So, how long is S?

Well, the way we determine how long any stick is, is by holding it up agains S. We measure against S, and refer to that experience to determine the length of the new stick. That is, we use an a posteriori test.

But we can't do that in the case of S.

So our knowledge that S is one metre long is not a posteriori.

Hence, it is a priori.

And yet, S, that stick, might have been another length. It's length is contingent.

And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth.