We shouldnt, eye witness testimony is notoriously unreliable.

Isn't something considered natural, real, simply because eye witnesses see it occur or because we find an explanation within what we consider to be real?

We say the Sun is real because most of us see it. We say a sound is real even if few of us hear it because we have come up with an agreed upon explanation as to why some people hear it and others not (that we don't all hear the same range of frequencies). We say radio waves are real even if none of us see them because we have come up with an agreed upon explanation as to why we seem to generate electricity in antennas from a distance.

We say some events are supernatural simply because we haven't come up with an agreed upon explanation as to what made these events happen. Solar eclipses used to be considered supernatural. The ideas that clocks would run at a different rate in different places used to be considered supernatural. There are probably a lot of things that we consider supernatural today that we will see as real in the future.

The idea that consciousness could cause anything physical is seen as supernatural by many, because that would defy the laws of physics that they deem to be real and absolute, but it's very possible that in the future we find out that consciousness has a local influence on the 'laws' of physics.

It's also possible that some people are able to see things that others are not able to, but that we haven't come up yet with an agreed upon explanation as to why.

For instance, giant waves that seem to come from nowhere have been reported by seafarers for centuries, dismissed by scientists as fantasy until the late 20th century when they were found by scientists to be real (satellite images being examined by a NASA employee in the 90s I believe?) Now those previously imaginary eye witness accounts have been given a cloak of respectibility by scientists even though they can't explain why those waves exist.

"Hume's Abject Failure," by John Earman, argues that Hume's arguments against the belief in miracles are mistaken, but even if we grant that Hume's arguments are not convincing why should we believe that supernatural events ever occurred if the only reason for doing so is that there are claims that many eye-witnesses saw the event occur? — Walter Pound

If eye-witnesses claim something and we cannot immediately explain it, why should we in the first place assume it's supernatural?

There are still a lot of unexplained phenomenon, but that doesn't mean they are supernatural, somehow violations of the laws of nature. Rather the issue is that we don't know the laws of nature well enough and especially extremely rare phenomena are very difficult for science to handle.

Hume denies that it is rational to believe there are laws of nature, but he also denies that it is rational to believe that there have been events which circumvent the laws of nature. Why would he say this? Possibly because he thinks that the vast majority of the events which have been witnessed and documented are such that they seem to suggest there are laws of nature and that any recorded event which would seem to tell against the idea of laws of nature is more likely to have been an hallucination or a fabrication.

It would seem to be irrational to believe that an event occurred which we have not witnessed unless it is an event which has been more or less universally accepted as having occurred, but even then it seems that it would only be more rational to believe in such an event than it would be to believe in a poorly documented purported event which has not been more or less universally accepted as having occurred.

The most rational way would seem to be to provisionally accept the veracity of accounts of events which are well-documented and more or less universally accepted as having occurred.

Hume denies that it is rational to believe there are laws of nature, but he also denies that it is rational to believe that there have been events which circumvent the laws of nature. — Janus

From my remembrance of his writings, he only denies that it is decuctively rational to believe laws of nature. Yet he fully upholds that it is inductively (and I suppose he’d also agree with the more recent concept of “abductively”) rational to believe laws of nature. And he denies the veracity of miracles, i.e. events that do not conform to laws of nature, due to this very stance.

But yes, at the very least back in his days, many took deduction (i.e., arguments proven to be logically sound as well as logically valid) to be the only respectable form of rationality there is.

The most rational way would seem to be to provisionally accept the veracity of accounts of events which are well-documented and more or less universally accepted as having occurred. — Janus

Nicely said.

You could well be right; I have never studied Hume intensively. I had formed the impression, though, that his so-called 'problem of induction' consists in the thought that inductive belief is not rationally driven at all, but is a the outcome of mere habitual thinking, of a kind of deep-rooted instinctive expectation that the the future will be like the past.

I had formed the impression, though, that his so-called 'problem of induction' consists in the thought that inductive belief is not rationally driven at all, — Janus

I haven’t read the guy’s works for a long time now, so I admit to being somewhat fuzzy on the details. As to the problem of induction which he’s renowned for introducing, there’s often a difference between what one says (else, intends to convey) and what others interpret as having been said. However, even without rereading his works, I can say with confidence that if Hume didn’t believe in the value of any reasoning whatsoever—if he, for example, thought that even induction was or else led to bullshit—he’d never have spent so much time in writing a massive book that was carefully reasoned out, with thoughts and inferences that by his very own admission were often very taxing on him. Oh, and then also rewrite a summative form of the same content after it was universally booed or ignored by just about everyone. Though all this did eventually irk Kant enough to be interested in philosophy.

Not to overly beat a dead horse, but: It’s my way of trying to succinctly justify my confidence that Hume’s “problem of induction” was not viewed as problem by Hume as far as reasoning (rationality) goes —he after all was a, uhum, fallibilist, at least as I believe Peirce would of phrased it (he wasn’t one to engage in Cartesian-like skeptical hypotheses in search for some holy grail of absolute certainty). Instead, the “problem of induction” is often a problem to those who desire deductively sound conclusions—for it rationally illustrates the problems in obtaining the latter.

Yes, probably Hume may be interpreted as merely wanting to point out that it is not deductively certain that the future will be as the past. But on the other hand that point seems so obvious as to make one wonder why it has been taken to be such a startling insight. Perhaps the reason might be that those who piously believed the Laws of Nature reflect the Divine Will may have been led to think that the invariances of nature are indeed deductively certain; it would be illogical for God to contravene the Universal Laws He has created.

Perhaps the reason might be that those who piously believed the Laws of Nature reflect the Divine Will may have been led to think that the invariances of nature are indeed deductively certain; it would be illogical for God to contravene the Universal Laws He has created. — Janus

:grin: If this "God" has an ego, an "I", then is it the biggest ego that has ever existed or can exist? Such an, um, egoistic individual would likely want to be believed with deductive certainty, I'm imaging.

Yea, no, I gravitate toward the concept of an egoless consciousness ... ya know, mystical stulf akin to notions such as that of Nirvana. But, as we all know, this at least metaphysical possibility is not something can can be deductively proven.

Eh, against my better judgment, currently finding myself somewhat humorous, I'll post this post anyway.

Hi Walter Pound,
It seems like you’re doing something like this in your post:

You’re shifting the burden of proof to the miracle-believer. Instead of it being Hume’s responsibility to argue against believing in miracles, the miracle-believer should argue for believing in miracles. The question this begs is why? Why should the miracle-believer bear the burden of proof? I’d be interested to hear your reason.

After that, I think you have an argument going something like this:

1) The occurrences of miracles are established only through eye-witness testimonies. (In other words, people believe in miracles because eye-witnesses tell them about it)
2) But eye-witness testimonies are unreliable and shouldn’t be believed.
3) Therefore, we shouldn’t believe in miracles (1,2 HS)

I’d be interested to hear your defense of premise 2. It seems to me that eye-witness testimonies tend to be pretty reliable-- I deliver true eye-witness testimonies all the time. For example: that barn is red, the sun is rising, I saw Jim at the store, etc… Plus, eye-witness testimonies count as evidence in a court, so why not accept them as evidence for other beliefs?

Not sure if you’re familiar with Bayesian updating, but I think I can show this with some probability work. Let’s say you think the probability of miracle X happening is quite low- let’s just say there’s a 5% chance it happened. Well, if a witness tells you they saw miracle X happen, and you believe that person to be 80% reliable (even though they’re honest, their senses might have deceived them) then the updated probability of miracle X happening is about 17%. If another witness of the same reliability reports it to you, the new probability of X having happened is close to 46%, and so on. If miracle testimonies happen in that way, then it seems like enough reliable witnesses ought to increase the probability of the miracle happening enough to where you would be justified in believing it.

One note I thought of afterward:
It seems like most of our beliefs are based on testimony. I know the United States gained independence from England in 1776, but I wasn’t there. I know Zambia is in Africa but I’ve never been there. I know my friend is a psychology major even though I’ve never been to class with her. I know drinking arsenic is a bad idea, but I’ve never tried that. I know all these things through testimony.Iit seems like testimony is a pretty decent source of knowledge. It’s fallible, of course, but it seems like we rely on it constantly and are justified in doing so.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Rz9J6qXIzc

The statistics argument for the belief in miracles is refuted by this mathematician here.

The burden of proof is always on the person making claim x. Since christians and muslims try to convert skeptics, they carry the burden of proof of proving their respective beliefs.

Finally, you syllogism assumes that there are indeed witnesses for a miracle, but why even take for granted the claim that there were witnesses to a miracle?

Forming beliefs in the absence of any proof or evidence is never the greatest idea. Both W.K Clifford and Bertram Russell made this point.

I believe that Hume says it is wrong to believe in miracles unless the alternate explanations are even more improbable. We do usually choose the most probable explanation for everything in life. why should God catch an easy break?

The statistics argument for the belief in miracles is refuted by this mathematician here. — Walter Pound

I watched the video but honestly wasn't able to understand all of it. Could you explain to me how it contradicts or changes the situation about miracles I wrote in my first comment?

The burden of proof is always on the person making claim x. Since christians and muslims try to convert skeptics, they carry the burden of proof of proving their respective beliefs. — Walter Pound

That might be true in the situation you describe, but it seemed to me like you made the initial claim here. You seemed to be saying we aren't justified in believing in miracles based on eye-witness testimony, which is a claim, right? When you asked:

even if we grant that Hume's arguments are not convincing why should we believe that supernatural events ever occurred if the only reason for doing so is that there are claims that many eye-witnesses saw the event occur? — Walter Pound

,
isn't there an implicit claim that we shouldn't believe miracle testimonies because we shouldn't believe anything based solely on eye-witness accounts?

Finally, you syllogism assumes that there are indeed witnesses for a miracle, but why even take for granted the claim that there were witnesses to a miracle? — Walter Pound

I didn't assume there were eye-witnesses, you said there were eye-witnesses. You were wondering about eye-witness miracle testimonies, so I wrote about eye-witness miracle testimonies. I guess if you told me about a miracle you performed that had no witnesses, I wouldn't believe you since there weren't reliable, independent witness accounts to update/increase the probability of it having happened.

Do you have anything to say in defense of your argument I laid out against eye-witness testimony? Or are we agreed that eye-witness testimony can be a decent source of knowledge, like in the examples I listed. And if so, it seems like the miracle situation I described above could be right. Of course, you said the video you posted makes a solid argument against believing in miracles, so maybe if you can help me understand it I'll think otherwise.

I didn't assume there were eye-witnesses, you said there were eye-witnesses. — Empedocles

Nope, I said that there is a claim that miracle x occurred while many eye-witnesses were present. Never did I say that miracle x occurred and many eye-witnesses saw the miracle.

If 500 people said that they saw a UFO, then I would think that that is too many people for nothing to have occurred, but I wouldn't start believing in aliens. I would challenge their interpretation of what they saw; likewise, if 500 people told me they saw a man right from the dead, then I would ask if they had hard evidence that he was really dead?

Do you have anything to say in defense of your argument I laid out against eye-witness testimony? Or are we agreed that eye-witness testimony can be a decent source of knowledge — Empedocles

Eye-witness testimony is not as good as physical evidence. If someone accused you of being a rapist and they had DNA evidence, then the DNA evidence settles the question of whether you are a rapist or not; suppose that the DNA evidence turns out to belong to someone else, then the DNA evidence proves your innocence.

Finally, the statistic video seemed self-explanatory, but can you tell me which part confused you?

Nope, I said that there is a claim that miracle x occurred while many eye-witnesses were present. Never did I say that miracle x occurred and many eye-witnesses saw the miracle. — Walter Pound

Okay so I was thinking the claim was being made by the eye-witnesses that the miracle occurred, not that the claim was that many eye-witnesses saw a miracle. I was reading too fast, but I see that you said "there are claims that many eye-witnesses saw the miracle." Isn't the claim that matters the claim by the eye-witnesses? Isn't that eye-witness testimony the evidence that updates the prior probability?

Eye-witness testimony is not as good as physical evidence — Walter Pound

Right, I never said it's better than physical evidence, I was just saying it's a decent source of knowledge. And if we accept it as a source of knowledge in lots of other areas, why not for miracles?

Finally, the statistic video seemed self-explanatory, but can you tell me which part confused you? — Walter Pound

Since math isn't my strong suit, I'm confused by most of it lol. Maybe it's best to forget about the video for now

And if we accept it as a source of knowledge in lots of other areas, why not for miracles? — Empedocles

Regardless of whether one believes in spiritual realms or not:

If a miracle is defined as an event that is contradictory to natural laws, and if the principle of noncontradiction is considered to have ubiquitous application and presence, then the occurrence of a miracle (as metaphysical reality) would falsify the reality of the natural law(s) it is in contradiction with. Say the miracle is that walking on water (applicable to Christianity) or levitation (applicable to Hinduism where its stated that yogi once upon a time were able to levitate via meditation) or flight (applicable to ancient shaman where oral tradition has it that shaman were in ancient times seen by the villagers to fly over the village); regardless of case, the miracle will prove the law of gravity to be invalid as a natural law. Were this invalidity of the law of gravity to be factual, then logically chaos would result as consequence; e.g., without the natural law of gravity, what causal mechanism remains to prevent people from ascending into outer space haphazardly?

Addressed in spiritual terms:

There are many of a spiritual slant who will say that there are physical natural laws as well as non-physical natural laws of which we are yet ignorant. So, as an example: Were 500 people to all see a non-physical apparition and agree upon it as though it were physical, this could be accordant to non-physical laws of nature … without being contradictory to the physical laws of nature of which we already know. Still, this inter-personal experience shared by the 500 people a) would yet not be something objective in the sense of something that all co-existent beings hold a capacity to experience at will—and could thereby not be validated by any objective means, e.g. via science—and, here more importantly, b) it would not be an event that by definition contradicts known laws of nature (nor, one would reason, those laws of nature of which we have yet to discover)—i.e., it would not be a miracle as miracles have just been defined.

Point being that, in either scenario, were an event to occur at the expense of a preserved ubiquity of natural laws, then reality as we know it could only become chaotic at everyone’s expense due to the lack of stable natural laws by which our causal interactions are governed. If its factual that the natural laws don’t apply, then it would also be factual that existential chaos can result at any time for no reason … something that we do not observe and has never been recorded to occur.

Though this is only the outline of a concept, I nevertheless deem it to be a good enough explanation for why miracles—i.e., events that contradict natural laws—cannot be rationally upheld as real in any metaphysical sense.

But if one defines "miracle" not as an event that contradicts laws of nature but, instead, merely as an event for which we currently do not have an explanation for, these could be argued to be common enough. But then, the known laws of nature remain fully preserved.