Compatibilism attempts to account for free will in a manner consistent with determinism. This stands in contrast to Libertarian Free Will, which denies determinism. Libertarians point to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), insisting that one can only be considered responsible for an act if one could possibly have chosen to act differently. If determinism is true (they say), then we could not have chosen differently – and therefore no one is responsible for their behavior. In this post, I will show that accountability is consistent with compatibilism.

By definition, a choice is a behavior in which a person has multiple options before them, and selects one. Choices are plausibly consistent with compatibilism because they are the product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses. At a point in time, memories, beliefs and dispositions are fixed. Impulses imply a seemingly random element to the choice, but not actually random. The impulse has a basis in one's attitude at the moment (e.g. optimistic, pessimistic, anger, happiness...) or related to an internal or external factor that triggers a transient memory or feeling. These factors plausibly collectively determine the decision - no alternative decision could have been made given the specific set of memories, beliefs dispositions, and impulses that were present at the time of the decision. For purposes of this discussion, we'll assume that there were deterministic causes of the prior memories, beliefs and dispositions as well (in general, a combination of nature and nurture).

Consider this scenario: a parent raises a child with a lack of discipline, essentially letting the child do whatever she pleases while shielding the child from any negative consequences. The child reaches adulthood and behaves irresponsibly, drinking to excess and driving. One day, the adult child is driving drunk and hits a bicyclist; the adult child drives away leaving the bicyclist on the road to die. The drunk driver chose to drive while drunk, and chose to drive off after hitting the bicyclist. These decisions were plausibly the deterministic result of her beliefs and dispositions. Under this assumption, is this adult child responsible, or is the parent who failed to teach the child discipline and responsibility? Does the prior cause (the poor parenting) negate the adult child’s responsibility? The driver’s sister testified that the poor parenting should at least mitigate responsibility somewhat. But I expect we all agree that the adult child is responsible and should be held fully accountable, even if we also bear the mother responsible for her failure as a mother. (This actually happened in Houston a few years ago).

With the above scenario in mind, here's two compatibilist accounts of responsibility:

1.The natural reaction to hearing about the drunk driver killing the bicyclist is a reactive attitude that the driver is guilty. In most cases, a perpetrator has a feeling of guilt after recognizing a consequence of a bad choice (e.g. the girl expressed this to friends, and it was these friends who reported the crime).These morally reactive attitudes are the basis of our moral responsibility practices. They are natural responses, not mere social convention. They are an aspect of interpersonal relations and expectations, and of our natural internal feelings. It is inconceivable that we would stop holding such people morally accountable or stop feeling guilty, even if it were somehow proven that determinism is true. Indeed, the fact that we have these attitudes contributes to our behavior, because we generally prefer to avoid guilt and social approbation, and enjoy pride and respect.

2. Could the drunk driver have done differently? Yes she could have, if she had held the strong belief that the risk of driving drunk was so great that it outweighed her impulse to do so. This could only have occurred had there been something different about the past (formation of that belief), but that's reasonable. Our choices are fully explainable as being the result of our personal beliefs and dispositions. As a thought experiment: In the actual world, you are presented with a choice between X and Y. You deliberate on the options, weighing pros &cons consistent with your background beliefs and dispositions, and you ultimately choose X (possibly influenced by some sudden impulse). Is there a possible world with an identical history to this one, so that you have exactly the same background beliefs, desires and impulses at the point at which the choice is presented - but you instead choose Y? If yes, then your choice is made for no reason (this seems to be what LFW gets you). If no, then your choice has been caused (consistent with determinism).

When she is released from prison, let’s hope the drunk driver will actually have learned this, and doesn’t repeat the risky behavior. Our beliefs and dispositions are part of what we are - we own the results, and this makes us accountable. We can learn new beliefs, and these will influence our behavior.

#1 and #2 are more or less independent, but in tandem they provide not only a coherent account of moral responsibility, they also explain why normal functioning people strive for generally moral behavior. We want to avoid guilt, fit in, and we want to avoid approbation by others. We CAN always do better, but it requires learning things. Social consequences (positive and negative) and internal guilt/pride provide incentives to learn what is needed to behave morally.