OK, but any factor under the agent's control seems determinative, which falsifies LFW. — Relativist

It is widely recognized that there are two main aspects to free will: alternative possibilities and agent control. Most of those who affirm free will are obliged to account for both of these aspects, and libertarian free will advocates are no exception.

I'm referring to things as the actually ARE (as the exist), not merely what is measured. — Relativist

That's the problem here: Where shall be the difference?

It is widely recognized that there are two main aspects to free will: alternative possibilities and agent control. Most of those who affirm free will are obliged to account for both of these aspects, and libertarian free will advocates are no exception. — SophistiCat

Refer back to the thought experiment I described in my opening post. If I make a choice based on my prior beliefs and dispositions, isn't that choice under my control? That seems to be the case irrespective of whether our free will is libertarian or compatibilist. The point of divergence is the principle of alternative possibilities, not control.

If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? Why is he choosing Y instead of X? If there's a reason, that reason is determinative. If there's no reason, it's random - and QM indeterminism seems to fit that bill.

That's the problem here: Where shall be the difference? — Heiko

You earlier referred to Schroedinger's cat. A cat is not both alive and dead; it is one or the other - that is the ontological nature of the experiment. Until we open the box to see the cat's state, we're in a state of ignorance - which is epistemological.

Prior to the cat's death, it was indeterminate as to when the cat would be killed. That is ontological indeterminism. It's also epistemologically indeterminate, but that is not due to mere ignorance - it is due to the quantum uncertainty - the time is not predictable in principle.

Until we open the box to see the cat's state, we're in a state of ignorance - which is epistemological. — Relativist

This is what one might think - if the cat was anything else beside what we observe. But that would mean that it was more than it's worldly being, it's state in the world and how it affects the world. Hence it is said not to be epistemological, and the cat equally alive and dead. You see the ontological problem?

***edit** If a libertarian believes quantum indeterminacy is inadequate for LFW, despite it techincally meeting the terms of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), then please provide a re-worded PAP, or some other means of identifying LFW. — Relativist

Yes, this edit is an important addendum. Compatibilist philosophers who are impressed by so called Frankfurt cases hold that compatibilist freedom and responsibility are possible despite PAP being false. However, it's not only libertarian philosophers who endorse PAP, since not all compatibilist philosophers agree that Frankfurt cases show alternatives possibilities not to be a requirement for freedom. So, you are right that such compatibilist philosophers thereby have the burden of explaining in what sense there might be alternative possibilities open to free agents in the context of determinism. The most common way of discharging this burden (which is a step in the right direction albeit not entirely successful, in my view) is to develop a dispositional account of the "can" (or agential power) that is relevant to alternative possibilities.

The main idea is that, in the circumstances where an agent actually does A, although she could (counterfactually) have done B, the fact that the 'conditions' (where those 'conditions' include the agent's own mental states and dispositions) were such that she was determined to do A doesn't entail that she didn't have (at that time) the power to do B but merely that this power wasn't actualized. It is a tempting fallacy to infer from the fact that circumstances are such that an agent is determined to do A that, in those circumstances, the agent doesn't have the (unactualized) power to do something else. One good insight of compatibilism is the acknowledgement that some of the 'circumstances' (so called) that are 'internal' to the agent's own agential powers don't constitute constraints on her behavior at all but rather reflect (and enable) her own power of agency: that is, her power to choose which one among several options is, by her own lights (rational and moral) the right one to pursue. Hence we may say that the alternative possibilities that are genuinely open to the agent, at any given time, are the possibilities that are consistent with her general abilities, and her opportunities, such that it is only the agent's own power of practical reasoning that is responsible for one of them, in preference to another, being pursued.

If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? Why is he choosing Y instead of X? If there's a reason, that reason is determinative. If there's no reason, it's random - and QM indeterminism seems to fit that bill. — Relativist

The reason here is a motive, a motive that governs why one would choose one alternative over the others. But the motive itself is not any of the alternatives, which are instead means toward some end that the motive intends. Unless one can find an epistemic certainty for any alternative being best, all alternatives contemplated will hold likelihoods of being best means of obtaining the given end. The decision of which alternative to pursue, this as resulting effect, is then directly originated from the momentary constituency of the being in question as cause. The choice is then neither random—for it is guided/limited by the motive and the sum of alternatives one is aware of—nor is it determinate, for probabilities (i.e. some measure of uncertainty) are intrinsic to that which one willfully chooses. If no uncertainty in what to do is present, then neither will there be present the activity of making choices between alternatives--one here instead simply does what is deemed best.

For example, imagine a line segment with point A and C at the ends and point B at the center. The agent is at point B and intends to arrive at point C. But there’s an obstacle in the way. The alternative of going to point A is, in this situation, an invalid alternative—so it is rejected by default. Say that what one is left with is whether to go a long distance to the right of the obstacle—where there’s a risk of getting lost—or a short distance to the left of the obstacle—where there’s the danger of falling off of a cliff. What one chooses will be governed by the intention of obtaining the end pursued, but deciding which way is best is of itself, in this case, an effect directly caused by the agent at point B.

No better simple example currently comes to mind. But one result is that one here is metaphysically responsible for the choice one makes—and that the choice is neither random nor determinate.

A non-physicalist compatibilism affirms that a) no choice is possible in the complete absence of preexisting constraints—e.g. intentions and viable alternatives—that determine limitations of what can be and b) that the decision itself is neither determined via infinite chains of causation nor random—but is instead an effect directly originated by the agent.

You are basing your hypothetical on some specific interpretation of QM. For example, your view is consistent with the Many Worlds interpretation. This is a different subject. For this thread, I'm stipulating that QM entails ontological interdeterminacy.

I doubt this. The M.W.I. for example is just one attempt to explain how the cat can be equally alive and dead. First there is math....

But one result is that one here is metaphysically responsible for the choice one makes—and that the choice is neither random nor determinate. — javra

Why does your agent want to go to C? Did he choose so? Is this just "given"?

Why does your agent want to go to C? Did he choose so? Is this just "given"? — Heiko

It’s only a simplified example. The moment we choose our intentions is also when then become to us competing alternatives—themselves governed by other motives that, in this scenario, serve as meta-motives/intentions. This does lead into the question of whether or not there are metaphysical constraints on what we as sentient beings can intend—these then encompassing all of our worldly intentions. I believe that there are—and that, in so being, these metaphysical alternatives are for all intended purposes existentially predetermined. Evidencing this, however, is not an easy thing to do. But, otherwise, I’d imagine it would be turtles all the way down, so to speak.

If a reason is a reason there is no choice, right?

A reason can be a cause, a motive (which is basically a teleological cause), or an explanation. What are you addressing by “a reason”?

If you are addressing motives, my previous posts address how motives and choice are compatible.

It seems you are giving a modified account of LFW. Compatibilists believe in determinism. They just mean by “free will” that one is not being coerced by anyone else.

It seems you are giving a modified account of LFW. — Noah Te Stroete

Yes. From today's point of view I am.

I wanted to present the perspective I've mentioned since its uncommon today though very much accordant to positions held by David Hume—who, to my knowledge, was among the first (if not the first) to propose the stance of compatibility between determinism and metaphysically valid free will ... but this clearly not in the form it takes today wherein, as you say, "free will" merely implies acting in non-coerced ways.

I’m trying to wrap my head around what you’re saying and I’m stuck on this, viz. one has an intention to go to C but one may also have an intention to not fall off a cliff. So person chooses the long route. Or the person is pressed for time so she risks the cliff. Either way, this person’s intentions are determined by her aims; which are in turn determined by beliefs, memory, mood, and whatever need that has to be satisfied (collectively, brain or mental states). So how are these intentions not determinative?

Regarding traveling on a long path or next to a cliff, both getting lost on the path and falling off of the cliff would be detrimental to arriving at C—which is the end that one wants to obtain. Which alternative best facilitates the obtaining of the desired end is then governed by the end pursued.

Where one to want to wander off for the fun of it instead of reaching C, then getting lost on the long path would then become the alternative that best facilitated the wanted end. Etc.

However, because no alternative is known to be better than the rest with epistemic certainty, the uncertainty that results in due measure facilitates an indeterminacy in what one chooses, making the choice directly determined by the will of the agent—this in attempts to best arrive at the intended end.

E.g. maybe descending down the cliff would be a better way of wandering off for the fun of it.

This just expressed view does not however of itself prove the position of freewill here mentioned—for one can always get bogged in the many details of what is and what isn't determined.

Addressing how all aspects of mind are not determinate is also not in keeping with my views. Imo, some aspects of our minds are determinate, some have been acquired via our former choices in life, some are mutable by further choices we make, etc.

What I was addressing is only a perspective on the very activity of choice making. One in which there being a reason, i.e. a motive, for the choice does not in and of itself entail that the choice is thereby fully determinate.

Okay. My view is that our choices are fully determined by mental states (or brain states) of which we cannot be metaphysically responsible for. However, as long as one is not being coerced, then one can be said to be responsible for her choices in the conventional social sense. Take it for what it’s worth.

Hence we may say that the alternative possibilities that are genuinely open to the agent, at any given time, are the possibilities that are consistent with her general abilities, and her opportunities, such that it is only the agent's own power of practical reasoning that is responsible for one of them, in preference to another, being pursued. — Pierre-Normand

That is a reasonable clarification of the PAP. But isn't this still consistent with compatibilism? How could the agent have made a counterfactual choice through his own powers of reasoning? What rational factor is indeterminate?

I made a case for moral accountability under compatibilism here.

I agree with what you wrote in your essay. Nice job.

That is a reasonable clarification of the PAP. But isn't this still consistent with compatibilism? How could the agent have made a counterfactual choice through his own powers of reasoning? What rational factor is indeterminate? — Relativist

It's true that the agent couldn't, counterfactually, have made a different choice if the antecedent material conditions had been the same. But that doesn't guarantee determinism if determinism is understood as the doctrine that everything that happens (and not merely what happens at the physical level of description) is uniquely determined by the antecedent conditions and by universal laws of nature. What it is that happens may be an intelligible action. If this action is being materially realized by specific bodily motions (and specific neurophysiological processes, etc.), then part of what happens is that those low level processes happen to realize (or materially constitute) an intelligible action form of a specific type (which may, on different occasions, be materially realized differently).

But even if there are laws of nature that uniquely determine what low level material events follow from given antecedent material conditions, it doesn't follow that there also must be deterministic laws that determine what (kinds of) intelligible action forms it is that the consequent material events are instantiating. In fact, there can't be any such laws, or so would I be prepared to argue. From the standpoint of the laws of nature (or from the 'physical stance', as Dennett would say), the fact that an agent is performing an intelligible action of type A (keeping a promise to pay back a loan, say) rather than an action of a different intelligible type isn't something that can be determined by laws of nature even if the intelligible event (i.e. the action) supervenes on its material constitution base (i.e. the specific bodily motions, etc.) What the deterministic laws of nature dont specify at all is what (low level) material processes constitute what (high level) intelligible actions. It is rather an agent's reasons for acting that specifies what her bodily motions are intelligible exemplifications of (from the 'intentional stance', as Dennett would say).

If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? — Relativist

You gave one possible answer in your preceding paragraph:

If I make a choice based on my prior beliefs and dispositions, isn't that choice under my control? That seems to be the case irrespective of whether our free will is libertarian or compatibilist. — Relativist

That is indeed the line pursued by some libertarians. You control your choices in virtue of them being your choices. Control, according to this view, is not causal control.

There is agent causation it is just very minor. Determinism is the teaspoon dipping in and out of the sugar bowl, distributing it all around. We are very small creatures who can move one grain of sugar at a time if we use all of our will. So we can jump around between different spoons and we can move the occasional grain now and then.

I didn’t pay back my student loans, but that “choice” was fully determined by circumstances beyond my control. The stress of living in the ghetto where gunshots rang outside, drug deals in the parking lot outside my window, the paper-thin walls that made it impossible to differentiate outside voices from the voices inside my head; all contributed to my already fragile mind (I have schizoaffective disorder), fully determining my need to be proclaimed disabled and unable to work. In no possible universe given all of these factors as still holding true would I be able to work. So, I reject your view that “intelligible” actions are not fully determined.

If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? Why is he choosing Y instead of X? If there's a reason, that reason is determinative. If there's no reason, it's random - and QM indeterminism seems to fit that bill. — Relativist

As I mentioned in my post, you're controlling the unequal probabilities.

I think that focusing on moral responsibility simply confuses the issue.

We want to know whether choices are even possible. So focus on choices that have no moral implications, and whether we can make choices that don't have a bunch of reasoning behind them (because that confuses the issue, too).

As I mentioned in my post, you're controlling the unequal probabilities. — Terrapin Station

What does that mean? Describe the process you have in mind.

You've got four options. If the probabilities are equal, each has a 25% chance of being chosen. If the probabilties are unequal, there might be a 40% chance of A, a 30% chance of B, a 20% chance of C and a 10% chance of D.

It seems like we can bias probabilities in that way. So it's not just random, there's some element of control.

But you have mentally assigned the probabilities based on prior beliefs, and this determines your choice.