Well done. You give a very compelling argument. However, what implications does this have in your view wrt how we live our lives?

When I view a cube from any direction, at least two of the cube’s six faces will always be out of my view. For I must rotate the cube in order to see the hidden side. However, when I rotate the cube to view the hidden sides, at least two different faces (which were formerly visible) have now been obstructed by the now present faces. I am unable to see the entirety of the cube at once; however, I may be able to feel the entirety of the cube in my palm or if I trace my fingers around its edges and faces. I am, however, in possession of the Idea of the cube, I know how the cube can be put together as a whole from the contact with its parts. I have in mind a general Idea of how the cube is (through logical proofs), yet I am unable to perceive the cube in its entirety--relying solely on it being an Idea. — Fobidium

I don't think this is how perception works at all though. We don't look around at a world of mere surfaces, and then infer mentally that these surfaces form part of greater three-dimensional objects. I think it's more that we pre-theoretically inhabit a world of three-dimensional, meaningful *things*, with various uses and histories. There's a book to the right of me. I don't know this because I look over and visually perceive merely three surfaces of a rectangle like object, and then mentally infer the other three sides, and then infer that it's an object that can be opened, and then read. Instead, I am already embedded within a meaningful world of things and stuff, a class of which are books - things which are read. I brought this one at a garage sale. I use it as a mouse pad.

Do you need to simultaneously view every page at once, to know there's a story in there?

We don't look around at a world of mere surfaces, and then infer mentally that these surfaces form part of greater three-dimensional objects — Inyenzi

The inference is entirely unconscious. Of course we don’t piece together objects consciously (unless if we try to deconstruct them in the mind). I am merely describing the unconscious process of retaining an Object in the mind. We do not have a pre-conceived “world of stuff” (which would fall into the realm of Idea). All of which we know consciously comes from Ideas built from impressions.

All of which we know consciously comes from Ideas built from impressions. — Fobidium

Pointing out that this opinion is very contestable, if not directly contradictory to the nature of experience.

On the one hand, philosophies such as those of Kant have it otherwise. On the other, lesser animals are birthed with a priori notions of reality; e.g., a calf doesn’t struggle to run immediately after birth due to acquired impressions of what is. And so are human infants: e.g., without acknowledgedly crude yet nevertheless preconceived notions of reality, they’d starve to death.

I'd use the term "a prior knowledge" but I don't want to connote "consciously justified, true, belief".

You’re right about the “a priori” knowledge. I should have made that more clear. I am not denying it’s existance, rather I am saying that such “a priori” concepts serve as mechanisms which interact with impressions to form the Idea.

a calf doesn’t struggle — javra

Nor does it reflect on experience.

:up: Well stated OP. Quite similar in content and spirit to the opening paragraphs of World as Will and Representation.

Nor does it reflect on experience. — Wayfarer

True, no more than grown adults reflect on Kantian categories of experience--until they so contemplate. I'm arguing that both, however, know of reality via a prior notions of what is in the same sense of "innate knowns".



... though, of course, Kantian categories of experience are more metaphysical than a calf's instinctive knowns regarding its worldly context ... But then the calf too would hold the same Kantian categories of experience that humans hold so as to discern things such as distances and "before and afters", I'm thinking.

I'm arguing that both, however, know of reality via a prior notions of what is in the same sense of "innate knowns". — javra

Yes, but do calves or children 'know reality'? Isn't there a sense in which philosophy calls into question our innate or inherited sense of what that is? I mean, the important point about the perspective given in this OP, is the ineluctably subjective nature of experience. This isn't to say that all experience pertains only to me, or is idiosyncratic or subjective in the sense of pertaining only to one person. But it does highlight the way in which the mind 'constructs' or 'creates' reality, in the sense intended by Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung'. It exhibits 'critical self-awareness' which is all to often lacking in the words of those who generally contribute here :-)

Right on the money.

Yes, but do calves or children 'know reality'? — Wayfarer

My best reply is a semi-rhetorical question: do adult humans "know reality"? We certainly build constructs to explain what reality is and entails, and they typically are justified to be true beliefs, but given all the disagreements and various inconsistencies, can we affirm which model of reality is actually true without our opinions/biases getting in the way?

But it does highlight the way in which the mind 'constructs' or 'creates' reality, in the sense intended by Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung'. — Wayfarer

I have no issue with this, in and of itself. Yet I do uphold that, first, metaphysically and, secondly, physically, there is/are givens which are not 'created' but is instead are ontically determinate ... here holding notions such as that of "the Good" in mind ... and by no means concepts of a stringent causal determinism.

do adult humans "know reality"? — javra

asked Socrates. Parmenides replies.....

It is the reflective and creative nature of Idea which I seek to explore. “A priori” concepts are manifestations of the Idea. The Idea is not solely built from experience, some of its many instances take on the form of abstractions and concrete objects.

In case the point of the analogy was missed, animals and children hold confidence in “what is” just as we adults hold confidence in “what is”. They certainly have not contemplated the issue as much as the typical adult human—and yes, empirically speaking, more intelligent lesser animals given indications of thought, including that of object permanency and of theory of mind … to not address these matters via the evolution of the central nervous system. But then these contemplations we adult humans partake of can sometimes lead to pitfalls instead of improved knowledge.

Anyways, I’m affirming that in the sense of “holding functional confidence in what is”—for lack of better terms—yes, animals and children know reality. This in a worldly, and not metaphysical, way.

It is the reflective and creative nature of Idea which I seek to explore. — Fobidium

It a very interesting topic to me as well. Didn't intend to in any way derail it. Looking forward to reading the conversations. Wanted to clarify this.

I'm inclined to agree with the general flow of what you're saying but I'm having trouble getting past this statement,

We do not have a pre-conceived “world of stuff” (which would fall into the realm of Idea). — Fobidium

I think part of our genetic coding is to ensure a set of pre-conceived 'world of stuff' is prescribed in us e.g. certain physical and mental details.

They certainly have not contemplated the issue as much as the typical adult human—and yes, empirically speaking, more intelligent lesser animals given indications of thought, including that of object permanency and of theory of mind … to not address these matters via the evolution of the central nervous system. But then these contemplations we adult humans partake of can sometimes lead to pitfalls instead of improved knowledge. — javra

what [modern empiricism] speaks of and describes as "sense-knowledge" is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients -- sense-knowledge in which s/he has made room for reason without recognizing it. A confusion which comes about all the more easily as, on the one hand, the senses are, in actual fact, more or less permeated with reason in man, and, on the other, the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent. — Jacques Maritain

I think part of our genetic coding is to ensure a set of pre-conceived 'world of stuff' is prescribed in us e.g. certain physical and mental details. — BrianW

I think neo-darwinian 'explanations' for the nature of knowledge and ideas are wholly inadequate. Darwinian theory is concerned with the origin of species. To try and analyse the understanding in such terms is invariably reductionist, as it invariably entails a kind of reduction to 'what enhances survival'. Most of the crap pop-philosophy in today's world is built on just this.

Genetics is a science confined to the body not to the mind. Mind is something that can’t be adequately explained through biology, it is a species of science all it’s own (not so much psychology, as this field has been plagued by the Behaviorist and Cognitivist schools of thought). Our brain is a vessel for the Mind and is dominated by body’s capricious wants and brutish instincts, and survivalist tendencies.

But it does highlight the way in which the mind 'constructs' or 'creates' reality, in the sense intended by Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung'. — Wayfarer

It is the reflective and creative nature of Idea which I seek to explore. — Fobidium

Currently thinking of Schopenhauer’s Will and Representation, and in attempts to add to the general discussion of awareness and ideas as its creations, here’s a very rough outline of a general concept I’ve been working with.

Tmk, there are four logically possible types of actuality in relation to subjectivity:

1) Intra-subjectivity: That which is exclusively (intra-)personal; e.g., the contents of one’s imagination or of an experienced dream; this attribute in large part demarcates a personal mind.

2) Inter-subjectivity: That which is inter-personal; e.g., cultures, sub-cultures, and languages; these are constructed from a cohort of interacting minds which are in agreement as concerns meaning; more complexly, they include species-specific perceptual interpretations of what is often termed the objective world (e.g., humans’ implicit agreement on what particular things look like; dogs’ implicit agreement what particular things smell like; etc).

3) Dia-subjectivity: That which dia-personal, i.e. that subjective actuality which is equally applicable to all co-existent instantiations of awareness/will in simultaneous ways. Natural laws, the universals of numbers/quantity, causal processes, and the presence of particular objects all serve as examples of what is dia-subjective. While these are all apprehended via subjective faculties of (intra-subjective) minds, they again affect and effect all co-existing instantiations of will/awareness in the same way. As (1) demarcates personal minds, (3) demarcates physical objectivity.

4) Lastly, there’s the logical possibility of a reality that is perfectly non-subjective. Here would be found a metaphysically objective reality. One such possibility is what Aristotelians would term “the primordial final cause as an unmoved mover” and what Neo-Platonists would term, “the One” ... neither of which are about deity/deities.

To keep this brief, while at risk of potential incongruity, it is possible to think of Schopenhauer’s Will and Representation in a stratified manner: (3) is a product of all co-existent instantiations of (1)—via rough analogy, this in the same way that one geometric point is space-less but a multitude of geometric points creates an impartial space within with each point is located; (3) thereby serves as a solidified and perfectly impartial representation of Will/Awareness in general. Yet the solidified causal and natural laws of (3) is also what brings forth all instantiations of (1), from their/our birth to their/our worldly death—here fully including the causal relations between body and mind.

I know quite well that this outline is very far from comprehensive. All the same, in this general approach, the world as idea/representation to me makes more sense than addressing the same in a manner devoid of structure.

That's a really good analysis, especially the different perspectives on subjectivity, especially that idea of 'dia-subjectivity'. I haven't heard that before, did you devise that terminology? However I will take issue with the 'perfectly non-subjective'. In my view (which is basically Buddhist in this particular respect) objective and subjective are co-arising or dependent on each other; there is no object without subject, and no subject without object. Now, of course, from a naturalist perspective, that is problematical, as, again from that perspective, sophisticated subjects (such as ourselves) are very much latecomers on the cosmic stage. So what, they will ask, constituted the vast universe we now know existed for 14 billion years odd, prior to the advent of h. sapiens?

There's a passage in Bryan Magee's book on Schopenhauer which talks about this exact point, in the context of someone objecting to Kant on exactly this score.

'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'

Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was [that] the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood.

Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them which at first appear cogent, on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

So, it is worth recalling that Kant himself was both an 'empirical realist but a transcendental idealist'. As an empirical realist, he (like myself) would fully acknowledge the cogency of the scientific evidence of the age of the Universe, and so on. But unlike the scientific realist, he won't overlook the organising faculty which remains central to this understanding, even though science itself likes to say that it has removed this faculty from the picture. So even scientific understanding retains that element of subjectivity, even if it is 'generalised' and 'averaged out' to allow the proverbial 'view from nowhere'.

That's a really good analysis, especially the different perspectives on subjectivity, especially that idea of 'dia-subjectivity'. I haven't heard that before, did you devise that terminology? — Wayfarer

:blush: Thanks kindly. I was feeling a bit anxious about the post. Yes, “dia-subjectivity” is a term and concept that I’ve devised.

However I will take issue with the 'perfectly non-subjective'. In my view (which is basically Buddhist in this particular respect) objective and subjective are co-arising or dependent on each other; there is no object without subject, and no subject without object. — Wayfarer

I very much agree with what I've underlined--but am not so certain with the concept of objectivity being a synonym for the presence of objects.

Finding the adequate term that best conveys what is intended, this to a broad number of often different understandings, is difficult for me. To explain my reasoning for the terminology I’ve so far employed:

If you recall form a different thread some time back, I uphold that there are aspects of awareness wherein the object of awareness becomes undifferentiable from the subject of awareness—such that there is no duality between the two. Awareness of one’s own happiness and certitude are easy examples of these. Furthermore, impartiality, which is one sense of objectivity, to me nicely depicts egoless being/awareness. In practical terms—especially when we engage in the empirical sciences and the like—we can either intend to become more objective/impartial or not—but, paradoxically, becoming perfectly impartial/objective would entail the absence of self as a point of view. It would entail a literally selfless presence as being/awareness. And, as a yet different reason for the terminology, when differently addressed, we are all subjects first and foremost not to some king, god, government, etc. but to objectivity itself—from my frame of reference, objectivity as both dia-subjectivity and the metaphysical reality stipulated (upon which dia-subjectivity is reasoned to be contingent). Drastically deviate from objectivity and one’s existence in this world is eliminated. In fact, I find that evolution itself can be pithily expresses as conformity to objectivity over time given haphazard variations. (Here, it is not subjects v. objects but, instead, subjects to objectivity/impartiality as authority.) Lastly, if physical objectivity is dia-subjectivity, then it is the property of being impartially applicable to all beings; so "an object" can be here understood as that whose presence impartially affects all beings.

More metaphysically, I hold the presumption that this state of perfect egoless being is synonymous to Aristotle’s “teleological cause as unmoved mover” And that among numerous other terms and understandings of the same can be, at least potentially, the Buddhist concept of Nirvana—this when addressed from a different cultural vantage. My main point here being that, were this state to in fact be a metaphysically determinate aspect of existence, and were beings to be capable of someday actualizing this state of being in non-hyperbolical ways, then here all sense of subjectivity, of self, would vanish … and one would become perfectly impartial awareness (what I believe Neo-Platonist address by “the One”). Here, as with one’s own awareness of happiness or certainty, no duality could occur between object of awareness and subject of awareness. Yet the end result would be one of perfect impartiality—hence, of perfect objectivity in this sense of the term—wherein subjectivity ceases to be.

I guess I should add in a general way that if such state of being were possible, it would be very, very far away into the distant future. I remember the Dali Lama in a lecture stating that [even he] still has many thousands of lifetimes yet to live before obtaining Nirvana. Be this as it may.

So, if I’ve expressed myself cogently enough: I so far find it easiest to address all this by saying that this metaphysical reality is one of "non-subjective being". The terminology is of course not written in stone, but so far nothing else seems to better express the overall concept via the use of a single term.

Thanks for bringing it up this point of disagreement.

I very much enjoyed the quote and your comments on it, btw. I'm myself dealing with many of the same issues in terms of the philosophy I'm working on.

superb post. Your work is coming along really beautifully. Now you’ve explained your point, I think I am in agreement. (There’s a topic in comparative religion and philosophy about the distinction between ‘henosis’ as the kind of mystical union sought by Plotinus (and ‘orientals’ generally) and the ‘theosis’ of the Christian tradition proper, in which the soul (individual identity?) of the aspirant still remains distinct. In fact ‘henosis’ in that sense is basically regarded as a heresy. But I think for the purposes of this thread and indeed this forum, it’s rather an arcane distinction.)

There’s a topic in comparative religion and philosophy about the distinction between ‘henosis’ as the kind of mystical union sought by Plotinus (and ‘orientals’ generally) and the ‘theosis’ of the Christian tradition proper, in which the soul (individual identity?) of the aspirant still remains distinct. — Wayfarer

So, it would seem that @javra's perfect objectivity (impartiality) is, ironically, a form of cultural (collectivist versus individualist) bias.

My main point here being that, were this state to in fact be a metaphysically determinate aspect of existence, and were beings to be capable of someday actualizing this state of being in non-hyperbolical ways, then here all sense of subjectivity, of self, would vanish … and one would become perfectly impartial awareness (what I believe Neo-Platonist address by “the One”). — javra

Is this to say that all things which have awareness also have self awareness (said self awareness vanishing when perfectly impartial awareness is attained)?

A definition of awareness would be useful, because I cannot determine whether or not "being" is used equivocally (as "subject" obviously is).

So, it would seem that javra's perfect objectivity (impartiality) is, ironically, a form of cultural (collectivist versus individualist) bias. — Galuchat

Here focusing on the term “bias”: (perfect) impartiality can in certain contexts be synonymous to (perfect) fairness. And fairness is what most take to be the principle property of justice. It would be a long stretch to adequately argue this one out, but “fairness” is also commonly taken to entail aesthetics/beauty. Here wanting to say that impartiality is no more a bias than is the drive toward justice, for example. As a hypothesized absolute state of being that is metaphysically determinate, perfect impartiality would then serve as a metaphysical limitation on what can be—this at least as far as our human imaginations can conceive—a conceivable " absolute end-state of being" toward which one either aspires in the here and now in practical manners or else detests and acts against. Yet again, to me bias signifies lack of impartiality. And since none of us are perfectly impartial, we all hold some form of bias. If one so cares to argue, including that bias which aspires for a closer proximity to being devoid of bias.

Is this to say that all things which have awareness also have self awareness (said self awareness vanishing when perfectly impartial awareness is attained)? — Galuchat

This is indeed a very loaded question due to the connotations that self-awareness implicitly presents.

My short answer is “no”.

I’m currently finalizing three logical possibilities of self-awareness; I’ll express these so as to better answer your question. There’s nonreflective self-awareness; this is for all intended purposes a redundant means of addressing the basic constituency of any awareness, no matter how small or undeveloped, for here there is an innate distinction between the point of view concerned as different from that which it regards and interacts with as other. Then there’s conceptual self-awareness; this is when a first-person point of view entertains concepts of itself as a being; the concepts are nevertheless that which the given first person point of view regards and are thereby yet other relative to itself. Then there’s a third type of self-awareness which is what we ordinarily take it to be. I’m still searching for a more adequacy term for it, but am currently using "informed self-awareness". This is when one holds a non-dualistic awareness of what one as a first-person point of view is. For example we can hold a conceptual self-awareness of being “human earthlings” which we can analyze and ascribe truth-values to; in contrast, while reading sci-fi or watching a sci-fi movie, we hold an intrinsic awareness of us so being human earthlings and not, for example, extraterrestrial aliens—this without actively entertaining concepts of so being. [One complexity with this third type is that the empirical sciences evidence that even ants hold such awareness—scratching at blue dots on themselves when in front of a mirror (reference here). So it can either be innate, as I presume it is with ants, or learned via processes such as a habitually entertained conceptual self-awareness , as I hold that most of our human self-awareness is … But this issue aside.]

To then better address the answer, not all living beings will hold the capacity for either conceptual or informed self-awareness. Amoeba and plants I take to be prime examples. However, in general, the greater the intelligence, the greater the quantity and quality of informed self-awareness.

So from where I currently stand, the closer we approach the ideal and metaphysically determinate potential of a perfect impartiality, the greater the quantity, quality, and accuracy of our informed self-awareness becomes. Were it to be possible to actualize, at such juncture this information regarding ourselves as awareness would become literally devoid of limits—though, at the same hypothesized juncture, self as a point of view simultaneously vanishes. Stated more colloquially, our informed self awareness at this hypothesized juncture would become perfect and infinite, thereby entailing that all points of view (which are by nature limited) transcend into a literally selfless awareness. What this would be, or be like, and what would be next, I’ve no idea. I venture that it this unknown regarding a perfect impartiality/fairness/beauty/etc. then leads some—knowingly or unknowingly—to not intend closer proximity to this metaphysical limitation.

I also want to mention that other so termed metaphysical “end-states of awareness” are also conceivable, and are part of what I’m working on. For example, one such conceivable, alternative end-state is that of being an ego of absolute authoritative power over all that is. I hasten to say that to many individuals, but by no means all (the majority?), this is what is addressed by the term “God”: an omnipotent psyche. Other "end-states" are also conceivable. But this is where meta-ethics come into play: there’s a mutually exhaustive list of conceivable alternatives but only one of these can be a metaphysically determinate end-state of being. Because none can be established with epistemic certainty (here skipping the details) there is a choice as to which end-state to pursue. Meanwhile, before any end-state is actualized, competition between these different end-state intentions prevail.

At any rate, no, self-awareness wouldn’t vanish but would instead become without limits, i.e. infinite—the only thing that would dissipate would be the presence of the self as something distinct from something other.

A definition of awareness would be useful, because I cannot determine whether or not "being" is used equivocally (as "subject" obviously is). — Galuchat

I have equivocated in some places for the sake of brevity. I don’t have a definition of awareness other than what can be found in most any dictionary. I can however say that iff the metaphysically determinate reality is that of perfect impartiality, I infer that the only way of finding out what ourselves as egoless awareness is would be by actualizing this end-state. Which again, even if all humans were to so intend at most times in their lives, would yet be a very, very long time into the distant future.

If your reality is all a result of your ideas, your design...

Then why the fuck are you asking anyone else anything at all? Better yet...

How?

All of which we know consciously comes from Ideas built from impressions. — Fobidium

Why would we take a perception to be an idea? What would suggest that it's an idea rather than simply a perception?

the closer we approach the ideal and metaphysically determinate potential of a perfect impartiality, the greater the quantity, quality, and accuracy of our informed self-awareness becomes. Were it to be possible to actualize, at such juncture this information regarding ourselves as awareness would become literally devoid of limits—though, at the same hypothesized juncture, self as a point of view simultaneously vanishes. Stated more colloquially, our informed self awareness at this hypothesized juncture would become perfect and infinite, thereby entailing that all points of view (which are by nature limited) transcend into a literally selfless awareness. — javra

This is roughly how I understand Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. I'm looking into Werner Marx's interpretation based on the preface and introduction, and it's just great.

There’s nonreflective self-awareness; this is for all intended purposes a redundant means of addressing the basic constituency of any awareness, no matter how small or undeveloped, for here there is an innate distinction between the point of view concerned as different from that which it regards and interacts with as other. Then there’s conceptual self-awareness; this is when a first-person point of view entertains concepts of itself as a being; the concepts are nevertheless that which the given first person point of view regards and are thereby yet other relative to itself. Then there’s a third type of self-awareness which is what we ordinarily take it to be. I’m still searching for a more adequacy term for it, but am currently using "informed self-awareness". This is when one holds a non-dualistic awareness of what one as a first-person point of view is. — javra

In other words, we start with a non-dual perception of the 'object' which is not yet an object, since it is not yet opposed to a subject. Then a distinction is imposed between what is pure object and what is added by a subject. Finally, this distinction itself as grasped as 'within' a self-differentiating subject-substance, returning us to the initial non-duality, but only after assimilating a rich system of self-distinctions. The bare or 'abstract' unity is replaced by a 'concrete' or differentiated unity. This journey strikes me as in some sense an idealized history, structured by a dialectical necessity. All positions but the final position are unstable on their own terms. They die or envelop themselves as partially negated due to an internal rather than external critique. I like the metaphor of a voice that tries to speak its own nature, a voice that overhears and remembers what it has said about itself so far, a voice with memory and intention, always directed outward, beyond itself, toward that which remains unsaid and its own ear. This 'unsaid' and this 'ear' are a kind of pregnant void.

If your reality is all a result of your ideas, your design...

Then why the fuck are you asking anyone else anything at all? Better yet...

How? — creativesoul

Have you seen this?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2bPTs8fspk

What does speech presuppose? I'd say the ear of an other, if only a self-as-other in soliloquy. And does not speech presuppose the priority of speech over silence? That it is worth the trouble to speak? What precedes any question, making any question possible? Likewise, what precedes every thesis? I think this is what you are getting at. The sign is launched at an other in the same world, it seems to me.

Before all the fundamental distinctions of thought there seems to be an opened-ness outward toward which these distinctions are sent on their way.

Perception is the act of sensory contact with an Object. The senses are not “I” rather they are “my” immediate “Objects”. The senses are useful for capturing Ideas of Objects, yet they do not serve any functional use as instruments for surveying Objective Reality (that function is reserved for Reason).

Then why the fuck are you asking anyone else anything at all? — creativesoul

While I don't believe that your comment validly applies to anyone here, I’m guessing it would be for the fuck of it—i.e., so as to facilitate the possibility of orgasmic moments of intellectual insight which can best be obtained via verbal inter-course.

In the words of Depesh Mode: “Pleasure: little treasure”.

I’m finding myself liking your metaphors.

For what it’s worth, I myself sometimes liken things to a very complex and sometimes Sisyphus-like evolution toward greater self-awareness.