It seems to be there are several possible points of discussion. Are you interested in discussing whether your second premise is a true assertion? Or would you focus on the first, that is, whether voluntarily chosen believes entail responsibility? Or perhaps, since you qualify the argument with "to a degree", then the question arises, "To what degree?"

But if we are able to understand and affirm--and thus voluntarily choose--a belief, then of course we are responsible for it, whether arrived at by direct or indirect means. From what I understand, there really isn't much controversy about whether indirect voluntarism is possible, and so it follows that, yes, we can be held responsible for what we believe, to the degree that our beliefs are voluntary.

Well if you were brainwashed since childhood by your parents, teachers, ministers, friends, the Government, and your employers, it is unlikely that you elected anything on your own.

Where are you with this?

Have you been able to use philosophy to rid yourself of all brainwashing yet?

I don't think that you ought to be punished for believing such or such thing, it is through beliefs that we make sense of the world and decide what to do, without beliefs we are lost, if anything could happen at the next moment then how to decide what to do? I think everyone does their best based on what they experience and what they have come to believe.

There are also many beliefs we hold that we aren't aware of, through life we come to see that some of them are false and that is how we realize we held these beliefs. So I think we should take a compassionate approach to what others believe rather than a punitive one, it's not easy to overcome false beliefs. If you punish someone for not having what you deem to be the right belief, that doesn't mean they will come to believe what you believe, but simply that they will fear what will happen to them if they don't pretend to hold your belief.

I think it's better to focus on the idea that we have the power to change our beliefs, even if it isn't easy, rather than on an idea of responsibility which to me implies accountability and then punishment, and then fear and then suffering.

Therefore, we can be held responsible, to a degree, for what we believe — Francesco di Piertro

Can? Yes, undoubtably. Should we be? Define "should." Held responsible? By whom, in what way, to what degree, to what end?

It seems that there may be some meta problems with your view. If indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, then, as you define it, we have the “ability to pass judgement, doubt, or choose when and/or what kind of evidence we seek out on the basis of confirming or disconfirming beliefs”. What concerns me, is that even under this schema, one is still restricted by beliefs that they do not have control over, even in your own view. That is to say, how does one come to the beliefs about how we should pass judgement on beliefs, what evidence is worth seeking out, when is there enough counter evidence that I should consider seeking more evidence? Even questions like what sources are reliable seems to be based upon prior beliefs.

Thus, it would seem, even if our will plays some role in our belief forming, if our will is shaped based of of pre-existing beliefs, which are formed entirely involuntarily, and not through this indirect doxastic voluntarism, if we were to look at the causal chain of why you believe what you believe, it would all be rooted in forces outside of your own control. If the nature in which you will about the criterion above is shaped through no kind of voluntarism, it would still seem you are not morally culpable for your beliefs. It could very well be the case that you could not have the correct will in regards to how to go about acquiring beliefs, because you involuntarily formed the wrong beliefs about how that process should be approached.

It would seem that premise one (1) is wrong then. It is very much possible that indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, and yet one could still not have control over their beliefs. I do, of course, as is implicit in your argument, assume that if one lacks control of their beliefs, they are not responsible for them. I also assume that one cannot willfully change their beliefs, as you have said.

1. If one’s meta beliefs about belief forming are involuntary, one cannot be held responsible for their beliefs about belief forming.
2. If one cannot be held responsible for their beliefs about belief forming, then one cannot be held responsible for the beliefs which result from those beliefs beliefs about belief forming, i.e. the beliefs formed because of indirect doxastic voluntarism.
3. One’s meta beliefs about belief forming are involuntary.
4. Therefore, one cannot be held responsible for their beliefs, even those which result from indirect doxastic voluntarism.

If the only cases in which we can be held responsible for our beliefs are in the instances involving indirect doxastic voluntarism, then, it seems, three (3) is true, as those meta beliefs cannot be formed as a result of indirect doxastic voluntarism.

Hi Francesco! This is a very interesting topic. I am inclined to think that humans have indirect doxastic voluntarism as well, but that its implications on our responsibility might be better directed towards our belief making processes. If indirect doxastic voluntarism is as you explained it, “the ability to bring about belief by more than just directly willing, but as having the ability for indirect control over one's beliefs in the sense that we have the capacity to pass judgment, doubt, or to choose when and/or what kind of evidence we seek out on the basis of confirming or disconfirming beliefs,” then our skepticism and critical analysis of beliefs is of the greatest importance. It seems that we require sufficient reason to hold are beliefs if we do not just will them into existence (i.e. we justify them to ourselves, regardless of whether they are rational in a broader sense). These justifications can be aimed towards genuine and truth seeking, or towards complacency and avoidance of critical analysis. Perhaps this is what we are ultimately responsible for, because it is what we have control over.

I would like to offer an alternative to an individual being responsible for the beliefs in themselves. Rather, perhaps an individual is held responsible for those processes which lead to the beliefs. In a sense one should be held responsible for their intentions. My argument is as follows:
1. One should only be held responsible for beliefs they have control over.
2. If indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, then humans are primarily in control of their own reasoning and truth seeking processes or their truth seeking processes are in voluntary
3. If humans are in control of their reasoning and truth seeking processes, then they should be held responsible for their reasoning and truth seeking processes
4. Therefore, if doxastic voluntarism is true, then humans should be held responsible for their reasoning and truth-seeking processes (2,3 HS)

@FordFestivaPhilosophy makes a good point about only an individual being limited by beliefs about how to choose a reliable source or obtain information. If one’ pre-existing beliefs about seeking truth not voluntary and they inform the beliefs we do hold as true, this is a problem for indirect doxastic voluntarism. I think in this case we should say that DIRECT doxastic voluntarism is true, because even if one controls beliefs by virtue of “belief making beliefs,” if they are not in control of their reasoning, they are transitively not in control of holding the belief that results from it.
Of course, in a practical sense, people’s intentions are often inaccessible to us, so “holding one responsible” in an Earthly context would be impossible to implement. However, I do think this view could offer some insight into how humans might be held responsible for their beliefs in the eyes of an omniscient God.

My question purely out of curiosity to you is: Do you feel like YOU have the right beliefs that others lack, or are you unsure of your own beliefs?

If your belief causes human harm, than that belief can have real life consequences, for than it is a breach of human rights and a breach of state law. Beliefs can turn into actions, and actions have real life consequences. If it weren't for certain beliefs murders and atrocities in history would never have happened. There are other beliefs that fall into the category as neutral, they have little effect on the integrity of a human believer.

If your belief causes human harm, — Josh Alfred

Not possible in my opinion. It's important not to conflate beliefs, speech, and other actions. Beliefs and speech can't cause harm. Other things are causal to any harm related to beliefs and speech.

At any rate, I was wondering what the TC meant by "responsible." But maybe the idea of beliefs "causing" actions was what he had in mind, I don't know.

In any event, I don't think that anyone can simply choose to believe or not believe anything, if that's what we're getting at.

I believe that you can be held responsible for your belief as a grown-up if you hold a belief higher than search for truth, search for truth in a intellectually honest way.

If you value your belief higher than truth, because it gives you an advantage such as comfort, false self-esteem etc, I can not refrain from thinking of you as a intellectual dishonest person.
Especially if that belief is used as a means to control directly or indirectly other peoples life or justify harmful actions or inactions.