"I love you more than words can say." — Wallows

..says how much I love you, and yet does so in words...

...the philosophical point, contra @Baden, being that it is a showing, not a saying, but with words.

Are you stalking me? My ancient wisdom, reincarnated in a new forum. — Banno

No, I'm just a student relishing in old wisdom.

I'm content to be the centre of attention.

I'm content to be the centre of attention. — Banno

What do you think about what andrewk said? Here's it again:

Is it self-referential?
— Wallows
No, because it is a statement of inequality, just like saying - 'I am taller than that anthill'. If it were a statement of equality it might be self-referential.

Another example might be 'I am heavier than this scale can measure'. It is not self-referential. It is really just saying something about the limitations of the scale.

Scale <-> words. — andrewk

Sentences don't literally "express meaning," you assign meaning to them. — Terrapin Station

I'd say we build meaning rather than assign it.

The underlying relationship between affect and its expression is of a mismatch of registers. Were it that I could speak only my mind, I could express the depths of my love. I always love more than words can say.

just like saying - 'I am taller than that anthill'. — andrewk

Well, no it's not like that, because that sentence is about anthills, while the other is about words.

It's not a direct self-reference, but "language cannot express my love for you" is an expression of my love for you, in language.

So it can't be read directly, but nor is it metaphorical.

So it puts the lie to the notion that language expresses some inner belief; and it puts the lie to the notion that language cannot express what is beyond or outside of language.

The use to which language is put in "I love you more than words can say" transcends language.

I always love more than words can say. — fdrake

And yet you said it.

It's not a direct self-reference, but "language cannot express my love for you" is an expression of my love for you, in language. — Banno

But, self-referentiality plays a role in expressing its meaning, no?

I'd say we build meaning rather than assign it — Banno

We might not be saying anything different there (as long as you're thinking of it as an individual feat)

The self-reference is not directly to the sentence but to the language in whcih the sentence is expressed.

Individual?

The meaning, so far as that term has any meaning, is found in the doing, which for language cannot be an individual activity.

The meaning is not assigned. It often happens that one says something that means something other than might have been intended.

So I am not sure we do agree.

The self-reference is not directly to the sentence but to the language in whcih the sentence is expressed. — Banno

That entails the sentence itself, doesn't it?

IN that the sentence is in a language, and is about language. But not in the way that "this sentence starts with 'this'" is self-referential.

IN that the sentence is in a language, and is about language. But not in the way that "this sentence starts with 'this'" is self-referential. — Banno

Then it's a matter of scope, no?

Maybe.

So, if I say, "I hate you more than anything."

Is it the same type of expression as "I love you more than words can say."?

Love belongs to the form of life rather than the sentence. A lossy presentation is a feature of every definite proposition.

What do you think?

Hmm. I think it's quite a strong thing to say; but, then again all you need is love...

Anyway, one applies the universal quantifier to its meaning, while the other is seemingly (in)directly self-referential.

You tell me.

So, @Banno, the limits of my language are the limits of my world? Has meaning been expressed adequately with "I love you more than words can say."?

...the philosophical point, contra Baden, being that it is a showing, not a saying, but with words. — Banno

It actually shows very little, if anything at all. It says "I love you more than words can say". And this is really a meaningless comparison as andrewk points out, the scale is inept. Words really can't say a whole lot about love, love is demonstrated by actions. So what words can say about love is really just an anthill compared to the mountain which love is. And saying "I love you more than..." is an action which only shows the tiniest part, if any (assuming the person speaks the truth), of one's true love.

It seems to me that to talk about intentionalities in the manner of being of greater significance/meaning than "what words can say" seems quite self-referential to me. — Wallows

Does intention need to be part of analysing the sentence? I feel I'm missing a link there somewhere.

I wonder about the self-referentiality. We know that a logical language cannot allow unrestricted reference to all its components because that allows the construction of Russell-type sentences that are syntactically valid yet lead to contradictions. So the language itself would be inconsistent. But it is not clear to me that such contradictions necessarily arise from allowing restricted reference to the language in which sentences are written. Consider for instance if there is a constant symbol in the language's alphabet that denotes the collection of all well-formed sentences that can be written in the language, but there are no symbols by which one can refer to truth or falsity of a sentence in the language. I cannot see how one would construct a Russell-type contradiction from that, yet perhaps it would allow expression of the sentence in the OP - assuming the language contains a grammar for expressing feelings, which seems a much harder ask regardless of self-referentiality.

I really don't know about expressing feelings in a formal language. For instance, does 'I love you more than words can say' really tell us anything? To me it seems to say there are no combinations of words I can say that could evoke in you the feeling that I am feeling - that would allow you to see that feeling. Could we not say the same about any feeling, ie any quale. Taking the usual example, we could say 'words cannot express to you the experience I have when I look at this piece of paper that we both say is "red" '. All it is doing is pointing at the incommunicability of qualia. If we accept that, is there any difference between the incommunicability of a powerful feeling like overpowering infatuation, and that of a banal feeling like looking at a piece of red paper? Perhaps both the statement about my love and the one about my experience of red are both just ordinary instances of the general statement 'qualia are incommunicable'.

Does intention need to be part of analysing the sentence? — andrewk

According to what I've read, yes. Most certainly.

Why?

Why? — andrewk

Because intentionality is the referent for meaning to obtain?

Do you mean intensionality?

Do you mean intensionality? — andrewk

Yes.

Philosophy is serious, and one ought not have any fun while philosophising. If it is funny, it is not philosophy. — Banno

Alright then.

the philosophical point, contra Baden, being that it is a showing, not a saying, but with words. — Banno

Alright then.