So to (3). One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

I'm not sure why he even bothered to point this out — Banno

The discussion on P.83 goes towards explaining this, perhaps.

It seems that we can know who Einstein is, and also that he created the theory of relativity. The Descriptivist theory of reference seems to result in some sort of vicious circularity here, and yet this is the sort of thing we do every day. One could talk about Einstein without being able to present a belief that picks him out uniquely.

If, as (3) proposes, one of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely, then the reverse should follow; the name ought pick out the thing described, uniquely.

But it doesn't. See p.84 for the 'Godel' example. "The creator of the incompleteness theorem" does not serve to pick out, uniquely, Godel, but instead, Schmidt.

Yet when we are talking about Godel, we are not talking about Schmidt.

And to show that this is not as rare an occurrence as might be thought to dissipate the point, Kripke suggests it might actually be the case, for Peano and Deadakind.

Next an example that might reflect on what @frank is thinking. Suppose that most people - or even everyone - thought that Einstein had invented the Atomic Bomb. Would that make Einstein the inventor of the Atomic Bomb? Of course not. Nor does "Columbus" refer to a Greek mathematician or Norse explorer.

But it doesn't. See p.84 for the 'Godel' example. "The creator of the incompleteness theorem" does not serve to pick out, uniquely, Godel, but instead, Schmidt.

Yet when we are talking about Godel, we are not talking about Schmidt. — Banno

This was the argument that cinched the whole book for me.

It's interesting how it shows that, by looking at only a few limited examples, a generation of philosophers took on a theory that is simply wrong.

Suppose that most people - or even everyone - thought that Einstein had invented the Atomic Bomb. Would that make Einstein the inventor of the Atomic Bomb? — Banno

:rofl:

Has it been all too much for you, Frank?

Hey, @Banno, what does Kripke have to say about "counterfactuals"?

It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it.

I read without much interest.

I suspect that there may be some lack of finesse in the use of description as against definite description in

It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it. — Banno

I think we should adopt the term here from henceforth to dispell he metaphysically of what @creativesoul has been wallowing about/'Over.

But he's gone anyway - except when he comes back.

So, to talk about counterfactuals, we have definite descriptions that we can stipulate about over and over, Nixon is Nixon and Banno had cornflakes this morning. What else can we say here?

It is really important to keep our terms clear. "Nixon" is not a definite description, it is a name. Nor is it essential that the stipulation used to suggest a counterfactual be a definite description.

So, "What if Nixon had blue eyes?" stipulates a counterfactual without using a definite description.

So, "What if Nixon had blue eyes?" stipulates a counterfactual without using a definite description. — Banno

I see. Now, I am enlightened.

Has it been all too much for you, Frank? — Banno

You came up with the Consensus Theory of Truth. Very American of you.

Look back at all the examples given either by Kripke or yourself that show that a definite description can't be exactly the same thing as a rigid designator. Which example is like this:

The name Prothobis is used by community X. By way of your amazing detective skills, you discover that all definite descriptions used by this community in regard to Prothobis are wrong. Nobody in this community knows anything true about Prothobis and they never have. They don't even know that it's actually a piece of software. They think it's a guy who frequents a coffee shop.

So help me out: how were you able to determine the true identity of Prothobis? Why isn't Prothobis the guy who frequents the coffee shop?

I think obscure questions help flesh out what's at stake. If you don't, just ignore my posts.

Thanks!
Prothobis

It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it.
— Banno

I think we should adopt the term here from henceforth to dispell he metaphysically of what creativesoul has been wallowing about/'Over. — Wallows

I'm actually pointing out what Kripke's lectures do not cover. Nothing I've said here contradicts anything Kripke says about proper names as they apply to possible world scenarios and/or our ability to use proper names across them as an exclusive means of identity.

I agree with Kripke regarding all of his points - as they apply to what's going on in possible world talk(semantics). I simply disagree that that warrants concluding that proper names are both necessary and sufficient for identity in all circumstances. Possible worlds talk? Seems so.

Ok. I'm over it. This is more inline with Kripke's lectures...

Are there specific circumstances that are essential to making Nixon who he is? What's left of Nixon when we posit a possible world where everything that makes Nixon Nixon is changed(when we stipulate alternative circumstances that quite simple cannot produce Nixon)? Is there a point in continuing to call this hypothetical person by the same name?

How would it not be a case of mistaken identity? Are there such cases in possible world semantics?

There most certainly are specific circumstances which influence who people are, what people are, and how people are. We know that circumstances influence one's thought/belief system(worldview). We know that one is born without a worldview. We know that one's worldview influences one's decision making and behaviour.

Nixon ordered illegal behaviour. We know that presenting himself in the best possible way to the American public was very important to Nixon. We know that Nixon did not want to be thought of as a crook. These are all things that made Nixon Nixon.

Can we imagine a possible world where Nixon had no political aspirations? Can we imagine a possible world in which Nixon did not care if people thought he was a crook? Can we imagine a possible world in which Nixon did not look like, nor act anything like Nixon - and yet still somehow maintain that we're talking about the same person?

At what point are we stipulating circumstances which contradict the essential circumstances that are a part of what made Nixon who he was/is?

Under what possible world circumstances would we have a clear-cut case of mistaken identity? Surely our hypothetical meanderings are prone for such. It seems to me that Kripke's account cannot take that into account.

The name Prothobis is used by community X. By way of your amazing detective skills, you discover that all definite descriptions used by this community in regard to Prothobis are wrong. Nobody in this community knows anything true about Prothobis and they never have. They don't even know that it's actually a piece of software. They think it's a guy who frequents a coffee shop. — frank

Yes. This is a case of mistaken identity. That is, everyone who uses "Prothobis" think that it identifies a guy who frequents a coffee shop; this guy.

All possible world scenarios regarding the above are cases of mistaken identity, unless they include circumstances where Prothobis is not a guy at all, but rather is a piece of software.

Nixon is a golf ball.

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.

One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely. — Banno

Why the "uniquely"?

If Kripke is simply granting another's notion to show it's flaws, then that's fine. However, if that is the case, then there are other issues with that.

Some 'properties'(scare-quotes intentional) make people who they are, but do not pick them out uniquely, for many folk share such 'properties'. It doesn't follow from the fact that some property is not necessarily unique to an individual that that property is not an essential part of who that person is... of that person's identity.

I can say that I imagine a world in which Richard Nixon did not do any of the things that he is infamous for. I can use the name Nixon, and stipulate all sorts of circumstances that are contrary to Nixon's. I can say all sorts of things about Nixon that simply are not true within my hypothetical possible world scenario surrounding Nixon. I could, in fact, deny every specific circumstance that Nixon was ever involved in, and yet we would still know who I am talking about...

How? Not because proper names are both necessary and sufficient for identity. Rather, because we already know who Nixon is by virtue of knowing the circumstances that he was involved in.

That is what makes possible world talk possible.

If, as (3) proposes, one of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely, then the reverse should follow; the name ought pick out the thing described, uniquely.

But it doesn't. — Banno

I do not think that Kripke's examples have what it takes to dismiss essential parts/properties wholesale. He uses another's false belief about both Einstein and Godel to show that the description is false. It does not show that the description does not identify Einstein and Godel to the believer.

The believer does not know that the description is false.

It does not follow from the fact that one holds false belief about Einstein that that false belief does not identify Einstein. Descriptions are sometimes about an individual, and as a result they can and do pick out a unique individual regardless of whether or not they are true.

"The first man who walked on the moon" picks out Neil Armstrong. If someone other than Neil Armstrong was the first man who walked on the moon, then the description which picks out Neil Armstrong is false. It still picks out Neil Armstrong and will continue to do so until the believer no longer believes that Neil Armstrong was the first man to walk on the moon.

Kripke wants to say that we can talk about Neil Armstrong in a possible world scenario without losing his identity even when we stipulate that he did not walk on the moon.

So...

He's ok with falsehood being used as a means to deny that true descriptions are necessary and sufficient for identity.

He's not ok with using falsehood as a means for identity.

:worry:

I read ↪Terrapin Station without much interest. — Banno

t least we have some similar sentiment about each other.

Seems that Kripke - for some inexplicable reason - is demanding that a description about someone be true in order to identify the person. Names are not even truth-apt. Why ought descriptions be true in order to identify an individual? He also has no issue with positing false descriptions as possible world stipulations.

The man who invented the atomic bomb was not Einstein. Someone who believed that he did will use that description as a means to identify Einstein. As long as the listener either also believes that Einstein invented the atomic bomb, or knows that the speaker's belief about Einstein is false, the identification will succeed. Both will be talking about Einstein.

This shows that a description need not be true in order to successfully pick out(identify) an individual.

Kripke knowingly posits a falsehood(Nixon was not president) in order to support the idea that being president does not(is unnecessary in order to) identify Nixon. He further posits another falsehood based upon the first(that someone else won the election) in order to support the idea that winning the presidency is also insufficient for identifying Nixon. So, according to Kripke, the fact that we can and do posit falsehoods(false descriptions) consititutes warrant for holding that true descriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient for identity.

But...

On the other hand, he uses true descriptions in order to support the idea that false descriptions do not identify an individual uniquely. He uses true descriptions to identify someone uniquely other than Einstein and Godel.

Seems fishy...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/233693

Re the post you're referencing there, it just depends on how you think about the name. If you take "Nixon" to refer to "Whatever was born on January 9, 1913 in Yorba Linda, California, to Hannah (Milhous) Nixon and Francis A. Nixon . . . and became the 37th president of the United States," then a golf ball could be Nixon (if Hannah had given birth to the golf ball, etc.) while "that guy" (previously picked out by "Nixon") would no longer be Nixon.

You're missing the point because I have yet to have made it clear.