What's an example of them occurring mind-independently in society?

Norms are intentional, for they are goals. So, they are not independent of mind in the sense of being physical states; however, they they exist in nature, as actual intentional states found in other natural persons, independently of us knowing or positing them.

No one is denying the role of experience or of beliefs in the decision making process. Practically everyone knows, intellectually, that drunk driving involves grave risks. The question is not about acquired knowledge, but about how the agent weighs the incompatible factors that motivate driving drunk or not. There is no numerical trade-off between the relevant factors, so despite utilitarian objections, no algorithmic maximization can determine the decision. I think we can agree, further, that the decision is made in light of a subjective weighting process -- one that is neither algorithmic nor syllogistically conclusive.

Can't we also agree that how a person weighs such factors is not merely backward looking, not merely a matter of past experience and belief, but also forward looking -- a matter of what kind of person the agent wishes to be? And, if that is so, then the past is not fully determinative. We know, as a matter of experience, of cases of metanoia, of changes in past beliefs and life styles. While this does not disprove determination by the past, it makes it very questionable.

As for being "random," that depends on how you define the term. If you mean not predictable, not fully immanent in the prior state, free acts are random in that sense. But, if you take "random" to mean "mindless," no account of well-considered decisions can hold they are random in that sense. Personal beliefs, dispositions, and impulses all enter proairesis, but they alone cannot be determinative because they are intrinsically incommensurate. They are materials awaiting the impress of form. It is not what we consider, but the weight we give to what we are consider, that is determinative. And, we give that weight, not in view of the past alone, but in view of the kind of person we want to emerge in shaping our identity. — Dfpolis

This is a very nice account of practical reason, and a nice explanation of the sense in which past circumstances can't be held, even in conjunction with universal principles or laws, to uniquely determine the actions of rationally autonomous agents. It also seems broadly consistent with the account of practical reason that David Wiggins provides in his papers Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism and Deliberation and Practical Reason (both reprinted in Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd ed, OUP, 1998) and in his book Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality, HUP, 2009.

Thank you for the kind words. I will look into Wiggins.

Society without responsibility is anarchy.

Society without responsibility is anarchy — Jamesk

Is it? I think that's a separate issue. In Nazi Germany we had a highly structured society in which no one seemed to take responsibility. Famously, most were "just following orders."

Nazi Germany was the very definition of state anarchy. The criminal elements took over all positions of power and they took responsibility very seriously, most top Nazi's were extreme animal lovers.

I am sorry, but I do not see loving animals while killing innocent people as "taking responsibility seriously."

Anarchy is defined as "a state of disorder due to absence or nonrecognition of authority." We may not like the authority wielded in Nazi Germany, but it is a hallmark of all forms of fascism.

The SS functioned as a state within a state and an army within an army.

Yes, it did.

Can't we also agree that how a person weighs such factors is not merely backward looking, not merely a matter of past experience and belief, but also forward looking -- a matter of what kind of person the agent wishes to be? And, if that is so, then the past is not fully determinative. We know, as a matter of experience, of cases of metanoia, of changes in past beliefs and life styles. While this does not disprove determination by the past, it makes it very questionable. — Dfpolis

No, it's not just beliefs - it's also due to dispositions and can be influenced by impulsiveness. These are also consistent with determination. Questionable? It's questionable either way.

The coherence of compatibilism shows that a determinist's ontological commitment is not falsified. Still, I agree that the coherence of compatibilism doesn't falsify a libertarian's belief either.

I don't think the arguments given do this. They begin by noting that we feel responsible, and show how this plays a role in our behavior -- none of which is in dispute. The question of why would we have a false belief in responsibility if we are not responsible is simply not addressed. Why couldn't we reprogram the drunk driver with prison or a scarlet "D" because reprogramming works (if it does), and not because of an irrelevant responsibility narrative? — Dfpolis

I suggest that you are defining responsibility from a libertarian's point of view, and observing that my account is inconsistent with it. The account I gave has the explanatory scope needed to show that moral accountability is still a coherent concept under compatibilism, even though it is not the identical concept to that of LFW.

Using Nazi Germany as an example is extreme. It was a one off thing and does not represent anything but insanity.

Norms are intentional, for they are goals. So, they are not independent of mind in the sense of being physical states; however, they they exist in nature, as actual intentional states found in other natural persons, independently of us knowing or positing them. — Dfpolis

I wasn't saying anything about whether they exist in nature (whatever distinction you'd be using for natural/artificial or whatever term you might be making a distinction with). If normatives are only mental, then there are no facts about them aside from the fact that a particular mind is thinking about them however that mind is thinking about them.

No, it's not just beliefs - it's also due to dispositions and can be influenced by impulsiveness. These are also consistent with determination. Questionable? It's questionable either way. — Relativist

It seems to me that your view precludes metanoia/conversion experiences. I am thinking of one of the great proponents of free will, St. Augustine. Before his conversion, he lived a very hedonistic life -- one driven by disposition and impulse, I think you would say if you'd met him. Then he decided that was not the kind of person he wished to be, and entirely re-ordered his life -- breaking with his former disposition and impulsive, hedonistic behavior. His is not a solitary case. Thus, experience shows that the past need not determine the future.

The coherence of compatibilism shows that a determinist's ontological commitment is not falsified. — Relativist

Coherence is not the primary criterion of truth. Adequacy to reality is. We need to look beyond self-consistency to see whether a position agrees with experience -- whether it "saves the phenomena" as Aristotle said. Redefining free will to make it compatible with determinism is little more than a bait and switch tactic. What experience tells is that mutually exclusive lines of action are equally in our power. What analysis shows us (I am thinking of Hume) is that there is no reason to believe that successive events follow necessarily.

I suggest that you are defining responsibility from a libertarian's point of view, and observing that my account is inconsistent with it. The account I gave has the explanatory scope needed to show that moral accountability is still a coherent concept under compatibilism, even though it is not the identical concept to that of LFW. — Relativist

The fact that one can re-define "responsibility," "free will" or any other term is not in question. Of course you may. They problem is that the concepts expressed by the common (pre-redefinition) use of these terms are elicited by the shared experience of those having those concepts. The redefined terms do not have this basis in common experience/reality.

I am not comparing anyone to the Nazis. I am simply pointing to a well-known counterexample to the thesis that lack of responsibility implies anarchy.

If normatives are only mental, then there are no facts about them aside from the fact that a particular mind is thinking about them however that mind is thinking about them. — Terrapin Station

This forgets that thoughts are formal signs, often pointing to actual states of affairs. Here, what is signified is the potential fact that some physical state would not be, save for the initiation of a line of action by the responsible person. The norm's basis in reality is that the state of affairs so engendered would either advance or retard the self-realization of various people.

The norm's basis in reality is that the state of affairs so engendered would either advance or retard the self-realization of various people. — Dfpolis

What's an example of mentally-independent advancement or retardation of self-realization?

For all of those not in the Nazi party it was anarchy.

The way we are is not our choice. Hmmm.

What do you make of people who change the way they are through education, reflection, experience, insight, etc?

The way we are is a condition of our worldview which is definitely shaped by knowledge which is constantly changing. We update ourselves don't we?

For instance, people used to believe that sickness was caused by evil spirits. Now we don't. So, we're NOT the way we were.

What's an example of mentally-independent advancement or retardation of self-realization? — Terrapin Station

For retardation: being killed, being inadequately fed, sheltered, clothed, educated, etc.

For advancement: having adequate food, shelter, medical care, education, etc.

I am thinking of Maslow's hierarchy of values as reflecting the ordering of intermediate goals toward the attainment of self-realization. The values in Maslow's hierarchy can be examined empirically for their relevance to bio-personal development. As for self-realization as the high order goal, it is recognized in a number of traditions, Eastern and Western, as the goal of a well-lived life.

I agree that it was a horror, but I do not think that the definition of "anarchy" fits the kind of horror it was.

he way we are is not our choice. Hmmm. — TheMadFool

This is not my position. I think that we are able to choose the kind of person we wish to be. I am unsure why you are addressing your questions to me, as I think we agree.

I agree that it was a horror, but I do not think that the definition of "anarchy" fits the kind of horror it was. — Dfpolis

Agreed

What I'm asking for is the mentally-independent assessment that one state versus another counts as advancement.

I may be missing something, but a more mature, educated, moral, healthier person, seems objectively more fully realized to me than one who is not. What am I missing?

Something seeming some way to you isn't a mind-independent assessment is it?

Any assessment has to be done by a mind, so, it seems that what you want, "a mind-independent assessment," is a contradiction in terms.

For what it’s worth, you’ve at least convinced me to be agnostic about LFW.

Thanks. There is nothing wrong with an open mind.

Any assessment has to be done by a mind, so, it seems that what you want, "a mind-independent assessment," is a contradiction in terms. — Dfpolis

Hence "If normatives are only mental, then there are no facts about them aside from the fact that a particular mind is thinking about them however that mind is thinking about them."