Antinatalism appeals to those who’ve suffocated the hero within. Suffering of any kind is utterly unjustifiable... when you’re a pussy.

I don't think it's at all clear that most people have adversity as their dominant experience or that makes them miserable, etc. — Terrapin Station

If you look at my last paragraph you'll see that I said it is a difference in values between the antinatalist and pro-birth position. If someone does not exist and there will be adversity- anitnatalists think creating adversity for someone that didn't need to take place, is an unnecessary and harmful step to take. The fact that it is on behalf of another person makes it more egregious (and quite arrogant). The imperfect (but still important) other reason is the amount of adversity that was envisioned. The parent might think only a little flaw will ensue (like your artist example), when in fact more adversity than was anticipated might ensue instead. You don't know that outcome of how much adversity will be faced.

Thus the axiological position is that causing any adversity for someone (when it is not needed), is bad.

The second axiological position is that you are causing this adversity for someone else.

The imperfect secondary consideration is that since life presents unknown outcomes for each individual as to how much adversity they will face, it compounds the original axiological position.

What would make one moral consideration primary over other moral considerations?

In other words, what makes "whether we're creating (the opportunity for) adversity" the trump card and not something else?

Don’t get me wrong, I think antinatalism is dumb, but I think people who try to act tough by calling others “pussies” are repressing their homosexuality.

This is a good question. I think the justifications for the original axiological settings get murky. Some use "intuition", for example.

Harm seems to me a good place to start for moral considerations. Causing harm seems to be bad to do in general. You can counter that sometimes it is needed. I can then use Benatar's argument to say that there is a difference in moral considerations for those who already exist and those who don't exist yet. The threshold for causing harm is much lower for those who don't exist yet. Since no on exists that needs there to be harm, why cause someone to experience harm when they didn't exist in the first place to experience it?

I would agree that inuition is what people rely on, but we have differen intuitions, and really, there's nothing to get correct or incorrect. It's only intuitions, only the way we feel.

My intuition isn't at all that "harm" is a good place to start, for example. For one, "harm" is way too broad and/or vague in my intuition.

Not that I advocate a "principle"-oriented approach to morality, anyway. I think that tends to lead to absurdities instead.

Not that I advocate a "principle"-oriented approach to morality, anyway. I think that tends to lead to absurdities instead. — Terrapin Station

That's fine, but I am giving you the reasonings for antinatalism. You can choose to agree with the principles are not as they are laid out. I think it is similar to veganism. They can lay out their reasons and you can agree or disagree. Similar to veganism, since this is on the fringe of beliefs in society at large, no one should force the view on anyone through force or legislation. Rather, like other beliefs in the larger society, it should be laid out and you can decide from there. Rarely does any philosophical argument have a slam dunk case. You don't automatically say "Yes, Socrates.. you are the golden god of reason and logic.. I shall now change my ways" when hearing an argument. It usually accord or doesn't accord with your sensibilities. Perhaps it is objectively true.. I wouldn't be able to prove it to you but that is an epistemological issue. How do I prove to you that harm is the basis for morality? It's pretty much where we have to depart ways.

Don’t get me wrong, I think antinatalism is dumb, but I think people who try to act tough by calling others “pussies” are repressing their homosexuality. — Noah Te Stroete

I shouldn’t have called antinatalism “dumb”. I disagree with it and think it’s irrational. I apologize.

Perhaps it is objectively true.. I wouldn't be able to prove it to you but that is an epistemological issue. How do I prove to you that harm is the basis for morality? It's pretty much where we have to depart ways. — schopenhauer1

Well,. no moral stance is true/false or objective. Morality is noncognitive/subjective.

I'm pretty sure I pointed out before that antinatalism doesn't work very well, from the perspective of arguing for it, if one doesn't assume some sort of objective morality.

I'm pretty sure I pointed out before that antinatalism doesn't work very well, from the perspective of arguing for it, if one doesn't assume some sort of objective morality. — Terrapin Station

Are you always on disagreeable mode? I'm trying to reconcile the fact that the basis for axiological considerations in morality are hard to prove one way or the other. Yes, like most moralities, it starts with an idea (coming into existence is a harm, and thus people should not procreate). If you don't think harm is sufficiently bad enough a reason to prevent birth, it will not convince you. If you are inclined to think that indeed preventing harm is good, and that preventing pleasure is not bad, then you will agree with Benatar's version of antinatalism. Perhaps someone who did not consider this idea before about preventing harm and preventing pleasure would agree with Benatar. However, if someone does not think preventing harm is good, then I cannot do much else to convince you. Only if you think preventing harm is good (especially in the situation of someone not being born yet), would you agree with this argument.

I would think that to agree with antintalism, someone would have to think that either:

(A) preventing harm/suffering/lack etc. is good and warranted regardless of how minor the harm/suffering/lack might be, while no pleasure metric can override the merit of preventing any level/degree of harm/suffering/lack,

Or:

(B) preventing harm/suffering/lack etc. is good just in case there's a good chance that harm/suffering/lack will outweigh pleasurable experiences, and the person believes that indeed it's the case that the weight would fall on the "harm" side.

It's probably far more unusual to find people on the (A) side, there.

I'd be on the (B) side if we were talking about a huge imbalance, but I don't believe that that's the case.

(A) preventing harm/suffering/lack etc. is good and warranted regardless of how minor the harm/suffering/lack might be, while no pleasure metric can override the merit of preventing any level/degree of harm/suffering/lack, — Terrapin Station

Counter: You can never know how much there will be, why take the chance? If you predict wrong? Even if you think it is a low chance, is that worth it for the collateral damage?

Also, what's the point of even causing a little harm to someone who doesn't need it? What even constitutes little harm? Maybe you are the golden god and don't go through annoyances large and small throughout the day, but even minor annoyances don't need to be created for someone. Your threshold for creating harm for someone is just higher than mine. We will always disagree then.

Also, you didn't seem to answer the question about you always being in disagreeable mode. Is there ever agreement with you or do will you always focus on what is the difference. I'd just like to know so I know what to expect from these discussions with you.

Counter: You can never know how much there will be, why take the chance? — schopenhauer1

I don't think that's true though. The only reason to think that would be to think there's a good reason to believe that future people will be radically different than present people, but there's no good reason to believe that.

Also, what's the point of even causing a little harm to someone who doesn't need it? What even constitutes little harm? Maybe you are the golden god and don't go through annoyances large and small throughout the day, but even minor annoyances don't need to be created for someone. — schopenhauer1

That's the (A) stance.

That's the (A) stance. — Terrapin Station

Ok, so now what? We agree to disagree.

Sure.

The final output would be classical utilitarianism. Negative utlitarianism is the sum of suffering — khaled

I'm going to drop the other part because I think it is less persuasive and somewhat obtuse.

The part I'm saying is not obvious is that the negative utilitarian should rely upon the function of a sum to characterize the negative utilitarian function. Delving into the math aspect of the negative utilitarian we could characterize the NU-function differently.

So in the setup where NU-function is a sum we have three persons with a, b, and c suffering. The negative utilitarian chimes in that a fourth person will have d suffering, and since d is non-zero (part of the agreement in our conversation) the net suffering increases.

My point here would be to say -- why is sum the obvious function to character the NU-function? It does not seem obvious at all.

Say we have our above world with three persons, and we designate that they all have a suffering of 5, respectively. If we characterize the NU-function as an average rather than as a sum, then the anti-natalist argument does not go through universally. It would depend upon the context. In fact, if we are negative utilitarians, and we have a reasonable belief that our child's suffering will be 4 -- in the above world -- then having a child will actually lower the suffering in the world, since the average was previously 5.

It's not self-evident that the sum is the best way to characterize negative utilitarianism. So the anti-natalist would have to provide some kind of reason why, even under the pretense of accepting the negative utilitarian ethic, we should characterize the NU-function as a sum.

It's not self-evident that the sum is the best way to characterize negative utilitarianism. So the anti-natalist would have to provide some kind of reason why, even under the pretense of accepting the negative utilitarian ethic, we should characterize the NU-function as a sum. — Moliere

I would not characterize it as a sum of all persons or potential persons. Rather in the scenario of choosing whether to procreate, when considering if a new person should exist, not having someone who experiences pleasure is not incumbent. Pleasure creation is not an obligation, especially if no one exists yet. However, as long as one is preventing someone from experiencing harm, it is always good, especially in the case of someone not existing who never has to compromise short term harms for long term gains in the first place or who never has to experience the collateral damage of harm above or beyond what that person would want to contend with in any way had they been able to prevent it.

Not considering harm in the procreation scenario or only calculating an estimate of possible future harms would be putting adversity as a premium as you know you are creating a scenario where the child will have to overcome adversity in a life we know that will challenge the future person. If the person does not exist already, why create and setup this “gauntlet of adversity” situation for a new person who otherwise would not have been deprived (being nonexistent), who would sever have been harmed.

Fair enough, it seems like your argument is now somewhat different to that of Benetar and I don't particularly disagree with it. Unlike Benetar who seems to be making an asymmetry of consequence, you seem to be implying an asymmetry of merit. There are 2 asymmetries of merit that you seem to imply in your last comment that are not ever mentioned by Benetar: The Blameworthiness Asymmetry and The Praiseworthiness Asymmetry.

1. Blameworthiness Asymmetry: While creating harm can be said to be blameworthy, preventing benefit is only blameworthy if someone is deprived of that benefit.

2. Praiseworthiness Asymmetry: While preventing and alleviating harm can be said to be heroic and praiseworthy, creating benefit is only praiseworthy or heroic if someone is alleviated or protected against some harm by the benefit.

The act of reproduction can be categorized by creating harm and creating benefit that doesn't avoid or alleviate harm. If we accept the asymmetries above then we would have to conclude that reproduction can be blameworthy but it cannot ever be praiseworthy. Similarly, the act of avoiding or preventing reproduction is categorized by preventing harm and preventing benefit without deprivation. Given this, we would conclude that preventing reproduction can sometimes be praiseworthy but it can never be blameworthy.
I'm not sure if the above argument is the position you were implying in your previous comment but I actually find it convincing for now. I think it solves many of the problems that Benetar's argument has and it is compatible with my X Being argument since good results do not imply a morally praiseworthy action under this asymmetry.

If we accept the asymmetries above then we would have to conclude that reproduction can be blameworthy but it cannot ever be praiseworthy. Similarly, the act of avoiding or preventing reproduction is categorized by preventing harm and preventing benefit without deprivation. Given this, we would conclude that preventing reproduction can sometimes be praiseworthy but it can never be blameworthy. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes I can agree with this conclusion. I think your formulation of the argument makes sense. To add to this, I'd like to throw the idea out there that if anything other than harm of the future child consideration is given as a reason for reproduction, it can be considered non-moral or immoral decision and can fall into two general camps of thought- one is egoistic or self-interest and the other is Nietzschean. The egoistic group is less sophisticated in reasoning than the Nietzschean.

The egoistic group has two flavors. The first is the party of procreators that have sexual relations that lead to children by accident. Putting abortion aside, these cases have little planning or forethought and often it is quickly decided that no abortion will take place (for various reasons) and indeed, the child should be brought forth in the world. Usually post-facto reasonings of why the child being born would be a good thing ensues. They will then defer to the reasonings in the second egoistic party of procreators or in some rarer cases become indifferent to parenting all together (thus often leaving the child in harsh, uncared for conditions, unless quick adoption takes place).

The second kind of egoistic group would be ones that have children for the benefit of the idea of family itself. This cultural preference and/or biological drive (though questionable as a biological drive other than the pleasure of satisfying personal preferences or having group acceptance) is to raise a family/have children of one's own/make the grandparents happy/make a contribution of continuing the tribe/seeing one's own progeny and teaching them one's own ideas/companionship/making a family of one's own, etc. These reasons are a variety of preferences that have to do with living a certain lifestyle and revolve around happiness-through-lifestyle-choice (that of being a parent). It also has to do with the social preference and expectations to have children at a certain stage of life. Of course, the actual consideration of the new person is not in question. The child itself is not really thought about in terms of whether it would be a benefit to be brought into existence in the first place (if the alternative is that the child did not have exist at all). Rather, this type of reasoning is completely overlooked. Most people simply would not think in these terms and when presented with the idea, would consider it as not legitimate or irrelevant considerations in relation to their own lifestyle goals and the acceptance of reproduction as a desirable preference by the greater society. Whatever the case may be, the child itself is not really in the consideration of values.

The second camp is the Nietzschean camp. In this view, possible considerations of the future harm/benefit of the child have taken place beforehand. However, the conclusion is that experiencing life is beyond the idea of being harmed or not harmed. Rather, experience is put at a premium (whether it contains adversity/harm or not). Here the idea that people get to live out a story of their own is considered most valuable- even if there is harm. You see, future people in this scenario are seen as "having a chance". They have a chance to build their own life-narrative story, the argument goes. They can be that guy who writes commentary about Wittgenstein's ideas of language in a philosophical work or on a philosophy forum! They can be that guy who skis on weekends. They can be that guy who finds meaning in work. They can be that guy who updates spreadsheets, lays down concrete and rebar building structures, adventures across the world, obtains and loses love, lives a mildly uninteresting, mediocre, anxiety-inducing life for 60 years. Whatever the case may be, the parent thinks that the child will be given a chance to experience life, and write its own narrative. Thus, life is seen as a gift bestowed simply because of the opportunity to experience in the first place. You get to be the advanced ape making a show of yourself and relating with the other advanced apes in intertwined life stories!

What isn't considered in any of this is what the cost would be to a future child if it didn't exist. In all cases, the cost is obviously nothing. No person is deprived of living a life story if it didn't exist. Rather, that is something that results from being born after the fact, but doesn't have to take place. There is nothing writ-large that a being needs to exist to write a life story for itself- that something needs to be in order to experience anything at all. By preventing birth, harm is avoided for a future being with no cost. The universe doesn't weep for non-existence of consciousness. That is of course a projection from the side of the already conscious. The idea that someone needs to exist to have experiences of its own, doesn't make sense in light of the fact that no one needs to go through anything, and no actual person is harmed from not going through anything. Rather, it is more the case that humans are as uncomfortable with the idea of nothingness.

Love doesn't have to be pursued, accomplishments don't have to be won, a life story doesn't have to be lived out and shared. In fact much of life is overcoming adversities, getting over anxieties, dealing with various aspects of the givens of survival-in-a-cultural setting, maintenance of comfort levels, and alleviating boredom with entertainment. Individual preferences based on biological/socially-derived personality and broader cultural cues, fit into this framework of simple survival, comfort maintenance, and boredom-aversion. Why does someone have to live this out though in the first place? What does it matter whether someone exists to push that boulder?

No one needs to go though adversities and life experiences of overcoming-to-get-stronger, if they don't exist in the first place to need it. Why create this need for need? Why create a situation that exposes new people to lacking something that they need to fulfill? Why create a situation that exposes new people to adversity that needs to be overcome? This impulse to create these situations on behalf of someone else is more an indication of the already-living person's inability to cope with the idea of nothingness. Our restless, willful natures prevents creates the notion that a non-existent person is a sad future.. That nothingness is sad. Nothingness is nothing. A philosopher once said, the nothing "noths". Whats wrong with noth-ing? Let non-existent people stay non-existent. Why do people feel we are bearers of some Promethean fire of being that needs to be carried forth and spread? Why use future people as "bearers of knowledge" or "bearers of experience" in such a matter? Is non-existence this scary to people? Is the blessed calm of nothingness seen as a blithe that must be eradicated with the strum und drang of life? What about survival-comfort-relief-boredom-relief needs to be lived out by a future person? What pleasures need to be had, if there was no person there in the first place to care? Certainly we can see the logic that preventing harm is a good thing, and no one loses out who doesn't exist in the first place.

It’s really a repugnant philosophical position. There are an infinite number of ways to conceptualize the world but they’re not all equal.

Surely the antinatalist must concede that they simply don’t have access to the experience of others. It is the pinnacle of arrogance to prescribe extinction by extrapolating one’s own misery, which of course is already nested in this particular existential orientation.

As I see it, the antinatalist is caught in an inbent spiral of self sustaining cynicism. There’s nothing ‘true’ about it unless you’ve already fallen in. Is it a good place to be?

Being a pussy is not good for you. I’m not being flippant. I don’t take it lightly. This sort of hypersensitivity to suffering is absolutely pathological. I was trying to stir something that I suspect is already known at a much deeper level than articulated sophistry - just a well intentioned shot in the dark.

Okay. I just don’t appreciate that word because it’s often used to denote the feminine qualities in a disparaging way. I agree that fear is not the right way to live. I struggle with being a pussy at times, as fear can take ahold of me, but I must remember that fear is ungodly and keeps me from doing good deeds.

Thank you for the clarification.

In regards to the egoistic reasons for reproducing, I think a similar critique could be made for non-reproducers. Certainly, having children could inflict you with a variety of psychological stresses and other types of emotional suffering. In addition, it deprives you of time, money, and freedom. I think most people choose to reproduce or not to reproduce for largely egoistical reasons. That's because humans, in general, are egoistic or egocentric by nature. I don't think there's anything particularly wrong with egoism or egocentrism; as long as nobody is harmed in the process. This is where the antinatalist position has an advantage for me; most people think that egoistical behavior is only wrong when someone else is exploited or harmed for someone else's selfish benefit. That implies that selfishly choosing not to have children is not wrong, but selfishly choosing to have children can be wrong. Having said that, I'm not convinced that selfishly having children is always wrong(although it can never be right or good to do).

he second kind of egoistic group would be ones that have children for the benefit of the idea of family itself. This cultural preference and/or biological drive (though questionable as a biological drive other than the pleasure of satisfying personal preferences or having group acceptance) is to raise a family/have children of one's own/make the grandparents happy/make a contribution of continuing the tribe/seeing one's own progeny and teaching them one's own ideas/companionship/making a family of one's own, etc. These reasons are a variety of preferences that have to do with living a certain lifestyle and revolve around happiness-through-lifestyle-choice (that of being a parent). It also has to do with the social preference and expectations to have children at a certain stage of life. — schopenhauer1

The second type of egoism that you described really sounds more like egocentrism to me. Unlike egoism which concerns itself purely with self interest, egocentrism concerns itself with the interest of the individual and the interests of the loved ones that the individual has. A person that wants to reproduce to benefit his family, tribe, or country is more accurately categorized as egocentric. Although, I don't think benefiting your family necessarily justifies harming someone and it could never be praiseworthy to harm someone to benefit your family(unless you are also alleviating harm with the benefit).

he second camp is the Nietzschean camp. In this view, possible considerations of the future harm/benefit of the child have taken place beforehand. However, the conclusion is that experiencing life is beyond the idea of being harmed or not harmed. Rather, experience is put at a premium (whether it contains adversity/harm or not). Here the idea that people get to live out a story of their own is considered most valuable- even if there is harm. You see, future people in this scenario are seen as "having a chance". They have a chance to build their own life-narrative story, the argument goes. — schopenhauer1

I agree that this argument isn't particularly convincing. I think if someone can't specify what makes life itself or experience itself special, then it's hard to see what point they are trying to make. It's obvious why we love pleasure and hate suffering. It isn't so obvious why we should assume that life or experience is valuable for its own sake.

Love doesn't have to be pursued, accomplishments don't have to be won, a life story doesn't have to be lived out and shared. In fact much of life is overcoming adversities, getting over anxieties, dealing with various aspects of the givens of survival-in-a-cultural setting, maintenance of comfort levels, and alleviating boredom with entertainment. Individual preferences based on biological/socially-derived personality and broader cultural cues, fit into this framework of simple survival, comfort maintenance, and boredom-aversion. Why does someone have to live this out though in the first place? What does it matter whether someone exists to push that boulder? — schopenhauer1

I agree that we should look at the bad side of many common human ambitions. Ambitions like having lots of love and having lots of accomplishments have a dark side to them. Love usually eventually leads to heartbreak when it goes poorly and if it goes well it leads to bereavement(you will either watch your loved ones die in the end or they will watch you die). I don't think that it's obvious that the warmth and bliss of love is worth the immense grief that it can cause. Accomplishments have a different problem; once you accomplish something, you feel good about it for a little while but then life continues and you continue to feel inadequate. Similarly, how you feel about an accomplishment has to do with your surroundings. If you are always around people who are successful, then you will always undervalue your accomplishments. If you are always around drug addicted failures, then you feel proud of yourself simply because you're not that bad of a failure. In conclusion, if you want to feel accomplished just hang around losers all the time :).

Leading antinatalist nowdays is Les Knight, I don't think he was mentioned.

http://www.vhemt.org/les.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voluntary_Human_Extinction_Movement

Apparently he was voluntarily vasectomised at the tender age of 25, and it seems that he campaigns a lot.



So I think we should see what he has to say, as he is an active antinatalist, not some theorist.

This is where the antinatalist position has an advantage for me; most people think that egoistical behavior is only wrong when someone else is exploited or harmed for someone else's selfish benefit. That implies that selfishly choosing not to have children is not wrong, but selfishly choosing to have children can be wrong. Having said that, I'm not convinced that selfishly having children is always wrong(although it can never be right or good to do). — TheHedoMinimalist

If the children are harmed by being brought into existence when the alternative is nothing, then nothing is better alternative as it is always good not to be harmed.

. Although, I don't think benefiting your family necessarily justifies harming someone and it could never be praiseworthy to harm someone to benefit your family(unless you are also alleviating harm with the benefit). — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, exposing someone to all the forms of harm life has to offer for a lifestyle choice of being a parent is at odds with the principle of preventing harm is always good, especially if there is no one there to be deprived.

I agree that this argument isn't particularly convincing. I think if someone can't specify what makes life itself or experience itself special, then it's hard to see what point they are trying to make. It's obvious why we love pleasure and hate suffering. It isn't so obvious why we should assume that life or experience is valuable for its own sake. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, somehow the idea is that people need to go through the "gauntlet of life". They need to experience their own versions of suffering.. but there is no real justification other than life is somehow inherently better than non-existence. It is a weak argument. It also disregards collateral damage of people who aren't perfectly attuned to the "right" kind of adversity that is just challenging enough to be fun to overcome. That is to say, people may have undo suffering of mental and physical illness, anxieties that exceed "normal parameters", life experiences that are fare more stressful than would be desired by that person. But even if we were to take ALL that collateral damage out, even adversity itself, in its "normal" limits doesn't NEED to be something to go through if the alternative is nothingness. That is to say no actual person who is denied or who cares in the first place.

I think we've had a pretty good conversation about this topic. I definitely learned something new in our discussion and perhaps we can future discussions that are just as good. I'm thinking about potentially writing a long philosophical essay on antinatalism and you have given me a potential new idea for one of the arguments. I think we've said everything that needs to be said about this topic for now though so I have nothing more to contribute. Feel free to contribute more if you have something else to say about this topic though. I would love to hear if you have any other ideas or considerations on the topic of reproduction

However, as long as one is preventing someone from experiencing harm, it is always good — schopenhauer1

I guess I'd go along with the other line of thought I dropped with @khaled with you, then. This seems to be the central belief by which you are appealing to anti-natalism here. I'd say to you that you are directing your actions towards nothing, in the event of anti-natalism, and so it hardly counts as a good. There must be some other belief at play other than the preventing harm from someone -- maybe this is where your thinking starts, and in taking stock of the world you note that we all are suffering. But the belief changes from what is a fairly commonplace belief to something else that rejects the entirety of the world because of suffering.

Surely the antinatalist must concede that they simply don’t have access to the experience of others. It is the pinnacle of arrogance to prescribe extinction by extrapolating one’s own misery, which of course is already nested in this particular existential orientation. — Roke

You do not need direct access to a persons experiences to make a plausible claim about other peoples suffering.

Also there are peoples own reports of their suffering, suicide attempts and successful suicides, statistics on depression and famine etc. I don't know of any antinatalists who does not measure their position only using their own personal suffering and their own speculation and intuitions.

I think the real pinnacle of arrogance is assuming you deserve to be able to create someone else, to force him or her into existence and control them and to decide standards for them and decide how much suffering and dysfunction they should tolerate.

to force him or her into existence — Andrew4Handel

You're not doing anything to anyone prior to them existing, hence you can't "force someone into existence."

You are causing them to exist. Combining your DNA and you partners is using physical forces to make someone exist.
Like the way a potter forces preexisting matter i.e. clay.