When I learned to drive, I learned the rule about stopping at the red light. And I can tell you what that rule is.

When did I learn the rule about using proper names?

if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual? — Banno

What does "discreet individual" mean?

one thing.

one thing. — Banno

So, how does existential qualification/quantification work for counterfactuals?

I'm Sticking to my topic.

Then what would Kripke say?

Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given proper name, if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual? — Banno

But could we back up and ask if there are rules about what kind of speaker can use words to refer? Can a parrot do it?

Just for a bit, I am being Banno, not Kripke.

If not, why not?

So, I don't have to have anything specifically in mind when I refer to, say, Aristotle? What about having something in the back of my mind? Surely I have some idea who Aristotle is, otherwise how would referring to Aristotle be anything different than merely saying the name 'Aristotle'? — Janus

I think internalists are satisfied with the information being in the back of your mind.

You can talk about Aristotle without having correct information about him.

If not, why not? — Banno

Are you saying there are no rules about that?

My opinion is that Kripke's complaints about theories of definite descriptions, and the examples he believes point to flaws in those theories, are based on an uncharitable reading of what those theories say.

I also find the invocation of possible worlds semantics an unnecessarily complex solution to what I consider to be a simple question. It is also metaphysically troublesome and hugely confusing, as is evinced by the amount of debate as to what it means.

FWIW I agree with the dilemma you set up, and I too wonder whether there is a third option, and if so what it is.

But these are just my opinions and, since some philosophers get a great deal of pleasure from reading and discussing Kripke's lectures, I don't want to spoil that for them.

Just wondering if there is a rule that includes people but not parrots.

Reference as a result of a private intent or intuition?

You can talk about Aristotle without having correct information about him. — frank

But if everything about a man who is reputed to have once existed and to be named 'Aristotle' that you think you know, including even the fact of his existence, is wrong, then on what basis could you be said to be talking about anyone other than an fictional character. Would you not then be using the name to refer to a character that exists only in your imagination, or at best the collective imagination?

It's a simple question. Can parrots use words to refer?

It's a good question. What's the answer?

Learning to drive does not consist solely in learning any set of rules. Much of the learning is simply know-how we learn by doing, just as it is with using proper names. We may learn explicit rules regarding correct use of proper names, or we may after the fact analyze what we are doing in an attempt to establish rules. There is no guarantee that we can establish a rule for everything we can do.

And, you haven't answered my question Banno! Here it is again:

Would there not need to be some rule or at least adequate conditions in order to make any distinction between successful and unsuccessful referring coherent? — Janus

That is, how do we know our use of proper names succeeds or fails to refer (if it indeed does succeed or fail) in the different situations in which we use them?

But if everything about a man who is reputed to have once existed and to be named 'Aristotle' that you think you know, including even the fact of his existence, is wrong, then on what basis could you be said to be talking about anyone other than an fictional character. Would you not then be using the name to refer to a character that exists only in your imagination, or at best the collective imagination? — Janus

I'm referring to Aristotle by proxy. Somebody else has to know or have known.

If I'm in error, it's with regard to the way the community uses "Aristotle."

Right?

My opinion is that Kripke's complaints about theories of definite descriptions, and the examples he believes point to flaws in those theories, are based on an uncharitable reading of what those theories say. — andrewk

I'm probably not as familiar with the 'definite description' tradition as you are; not enough to have an opinion about the charitably of Kripke's reading of it.

I also find the invocation of possible worlds semantics an unnecessarily complex solution to what I consider to be a simple question. It is also metaphysically troublesome and hugely confusing, as is evinced by the amount of debate as to what it means. — andrewk

I do agree with this!

But these are just my opinions and, since some philosophers get a great deal of pleasure from reading and discussing Kripke's lectures, I don't want to spoil that for them. — andrewk

Yes, rectitude is not always essential for pleasure is it?

My reading of what Wallows was asking is that he wanted to know what you meant by 'using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion'. I too am curious to know what you meant by that. — andrewk

Well, it seems that those statement amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known apriori is a necessary truth.

What I'm saying is that a rough summary of what I've read thus far amounts to Kripke using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to target those arguments/notions. His examples seem to falsify a few of those statements.

I'm referring to Aristotle by proxy. Somebody else has to know or have known.

If I'm in error, it's with regard to the way the community uses "Aristotle."

Right? — frank

Yes, I agree. So once you go beyond those who knew the man who is called Aristotle personally, descriptions are relied upon for us to have any idea who we are referring to. This was my point earlier: ostention or description.

So when we talk about Aristotle we may or may not be talking about someone who actually existed, who did what he is reputed to have done and so on. If all we know about Aristotle are the details about his life and works that are reputed to be accurate, and those details are actually not accurate at all, other than that there was a man called Aristotle (among probably many other men called Aristotle) who lived around that time and to whom by some quirks of fate the life details and works of the 'historical' Aristotle were wrongly attributed, then I suppose we would be referring to that man.

We have no way of knowing, then, who exactly we are referring to. But I guess you could say that we are correctly referring to that man Aristotle to whom the details of the life and work of the historical Aristotle were falsely attributed.

Or would you rather say that we would be referring to another man who might have existed, a man never named Aristotle, whose life and work details are those of the historical Aristotle?

In either case it would be a definite description that establishes which man we are referring to it seems.

I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim.
— creativesoul
You meant target? — Banno

Yup. I mean those are what he's arguing against. He is doing so by using proper nouns in possible world scenarios and pointing out what's going on when we do such a thing.

I think it is very important to keep that in mind.

Yes, I agree. So once you go beyond those who knew the man who is called Aristotle personally, descriptions are relied upon for us to have any idea who we are referring to. This was my point earlier: ostention or description. — Janus

Yes. It's just that an individual speaker can use the name without knowing. That's only possible because there are or have been others who knew. The notion that a proper name can pick out a particular without anyone ever having known any kind of definite description associated with it is absurd.

Or would you rather say that we would be referring to another man who might have existed, a man never named Aristotle, whose life and work details are those of the historical Aristotle? — Janus

If we found out his name was actually George, then we'd probably still call him Aristotle and sometimes point out that his real name was George. :grin:

In either case it would be a definite description that establishes which man we are referring to it seems. — Janus

Yes. Except for the people who have those blue lasers coming out of their heads that shine directly on whoever they're talking about (even if the person's been dead for 2400 years.) Time travelling laser.

Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given proper name, if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual?

that is, must there be universal rules for the use of proper names? — Banno

Yes there are, but that criterion is not Kripke's target. As it pertains to the lectures, I too have issue with the definition and theses that Kripke is arguing against. During this thread I have put forth my own views from time to time when it seemed relevant to the reading, and thus appropriate. I suspect that there will come a time when those will be revisited.

I do want to understand Kripke's position though. It seems to me to be more like a discussion of what he sees as flaws in some historical 'schools of thought'. I'm good with that, even if he and I approach those schools of thought(and their purported problems) from different 'angles'...

His approach is explaining what's going on when we use proper nouns in possible world scenarios, and using what we learn about that as grounds for arguing against historical popular notions of essentialism(I think). In addition he targets the use of a priori and necessary as synonyms. He also argues against the distinction between a priori and a posteriori.

When did I learn the rule about using proper names? — Banno

When you drew the correlation between the name and the thing being named that the community of speakers had already drawn.

Well, it seems that those statements amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known a priori is a necessary truth. — creativesoul

Those six statements may do that. But I don't think those statements fairly represent a mature descriptivist position. For example statement 5 is something that is at most believed, not known, by the speaker. Further, I don't think descriptivism requires putting it in that If...Then... form. I think a fairer rendering is that 'The speaker believes there exists an individual with name X that has most of the properties'. I don't think there's any need for the 'a priori' bit either.

It seems to me that the essentialism is an artefact of Kripke's interpretation of descriptivism, rather than a feature of descriptivism itself. So far as I know, Russell was not an essentialist.

BTW those six statements are listed on this wiki page on Naming and Necessity, which will perhaps be a more accessible reference as the above post listing them recedes further into the past of this long, long thread.

Just wondering if there is a rule that includes people but not parrots. — Banno

Parrots do not draw the correlation between the name and what's being named. The speech act theorists called that something or other, didn't they? The rhetic? No... Phatic? Cannot remember. Something like that. They pointed out that making the sound does not equal a meaningful utterance.

Well, it seems that those statement amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known a priori is a necessary truth.
— creativesoul
Perhaps. But I don't think those statements fairly represent a mature descriptivist position. — andrewk

Well, they certainly do not accurately represent my own position, which could be viewed as a form of essentialism, although I wouldn't think that it is close enough to historical ones to view it as one. Someone else certainly may. I do strongly believe that there are some things which are an emergent product of simpler things in combination. In those cases, talking about the essential parts does not equal talking about the product of their combination. Water comes to mind as before. Easy to understand. Talking about hydrogen is not talking about water.

For example item 5 is something that is at most believed, not known, by the speaker. Further, I don't think descriptivism requires putting it in that If...Then... form. I think a fairer rendering is that 'The speaker believes there exists an individual with name X that has most of the properties'. I don't think there's any need for the 'a priori' bit either.

It seems to me that the essentialism is an artefact of Kripke's interpretation of descriptivism, rather than a feature of descriptivism itself. So far as I know, Russell was not an essentialist.

BTW those six statements are listed on this wiki page on Naming and Necessity, which will perhaps be a more accessible reference as the above post listing them recedes further into the past of this long, long thread.

Yeah, Kripke seems to have an axe to grind with regard to several historical positions. I personally have no interest in his targeting the a prior/a posteriori or showing that just because something is known a priori does not make it necessary, in the sense that it must be the case in all possible worlds.

I do find the definition awkard enough to be interesting. That is statement (1).

Perhaps thinking in terms of rules, or necessary conditions, or whatever, is approaching reference in the wrong way.

What has to happen for a reference to be successful? When has one used a proper name properly?