Yeah, no, I totally agree that empirically we have no evidence that there are any rational beings in addition to humans, and would not insist there necessarily are any. However, my intuition is that given the shear scale of the universe even as we have discovered it so far, it is plausible to think that (it is possible) there are non-human beings - aliens, just to call a spade a spade - who exhibit and are capable of rational thought. If you agree, then would we have to assume that the only way they could possess morality is if they developed through biological evolutionary processes similar to those humans undergo? If we don't assume that, then it would seem morality could be untethered from biological development in some cases.

If you disagree that it is possible there are non-human rational being in the universe, I'm still curious whether you think a conventional form of morality is impossible. That is, suppose we do develop certain moral intuitions as the result of our evolution and develop rules related to those intuitions that form the framework of a moral system. If we agreed to change the rules so that they were no longer consistent with our intuitions but based on rational judgments instead (about what is best, most expedient, whatever), is it unfair to still call that new set of rules a moral system? If it's not unfair to say that, then how is that conventional system related to the supposed evolutionary developments of our moral psychology?

Yeah, no, I totally agree that empirically we have no evidence that there are any rational beings in addition to humans, and would not insist there necessarily are any. However, I think my intuition is that given the shear scale of the universe even as we have discovered it so far, it is plausible to think that (it is possible) there are non-human beings - aliens, just to call a spade a spade - who exhibit and are capable of rational thought. — Mentalusion

I think it safe to assume that life occurs anywhere it can occur - and in the universe there are other places it can occur. The obstacles to the development of intelligent life however, may be more than we imagine. And in addition, the obstacles to intelligent life persisting for any significant length of time may again be quite onerous. Homo sapiens may be very unusual creatures indeed!

If you agree, then would we have to assume that the only way they could possess morality is if they developed through biological evolutionary processes similar to those humans undergo? If we don't assume that, then it would seem morality could be untethered from biological development in some cases. — Mentalusion

I imagine it's possible for biological organisms to invent intelligent machines that outlive their creators, and continue to develop. How else can one explain the Bootes void? That so, the question arises whether the machine intelligence would understand morality, but be essentially amoral - if they do not live, or die, or feel pain? Or, is morality and rationality ultimately reconcilable as some list of behavioral instructions? The literature would seem to say 'no' - because the is and the ought are fundamentally distinct realms. But while that may be true of intelligent machines, it's not true of human beings imbued with a moral sense by evolution.

If you disagree that it is possible there are non-human rational being in the universe, I'm still curious whether you think a conventional form of morality is impossible. That is, suppose we do develop certain moral intuitions as the result of our evolution and develop rules related to those intuitions that form the framework of a moral system. If we agreed to change the rules so that they were no longer consistent with our intuitions but based on rational judgments instead (about what is best, most expedient, whatever), is it unfair to still call that new set of rules a moral system? If it's not unfair to say that, then how is that conventional system related to the supposed evolutionary developments of our moral psychology? — Mentalusion

Very interesting and perceptive question to which I have definite answer. The short answer is that morality is a form of truth. The longer answer begins with imagining the structure of DNA forming in the primordial oceans. In its very structure, DNA had to be correct to the environment to survive and reproduce. It had to persist in relation to heat, light, various forms of radition, and the chemical composition of its environment. Further, it had to unzip down the middle to attract chemicals from the environment to reproduce. Thus, it's very structure is true to the reality of the environment. Jumping forward in time, consider how organisms have to be physiologically correct to reality to survive - most basically, internalizing energy and excreting waste, regulating temperature, and so on. Then consider animal behavior - how, for instance, a bird builds a nest before it lays eggs. It doesn't know and plan ahead. That behavior is ingrained by the function or die algorithm of evolution - i.e. those who were not correct to this aspect of reality are extinct.

In this context, we consider human evolution, and morality as a sense ingrained into the human organism by the necessity of tribal life - and we discover that morality is fundamentally a truth relation to reality. Thus, morality is a form of truth - where truth is a valid relation to reality, necessary to survival. Consequently, in answer to your question: insofar as those rational judgments were indeed rational, it wouldn't be changing anything; merely clarifying!

For example, it is a fact we do not acknowledge - that humankind is a single species, all occupying the same planet. Thus racial prejudice and xenophobia may be intuitive, but are an intuition based on a false conception of reality. If in order to be rational one accepts the facts into the calculus of moral reason, it makes no sense to be racist. It's morally wrong to the fact that humankind is a single species, all occupying the same planet.

This is where it gets interesting - because, consider the accused lying to the court, and assume his lies are believed. The calculus of moral reason inherent to the legal process works to an unjust end, because the information upon which the process functions is false. Even children understand this instinctively - that a false conception of reality perverts the calculus of moral reason, and they learn to lie quite early on as a natural part of the developmental process, to skew the world in their favor.