I'm not sure if what I said addresses this. Could you elaborate if I misinterpreted — javra
What I mean is something like the 'I' who uses language is not exactly an 'I.' The subject that speaks this theoretical fiction of the subject is already plural in some sense, already speaking 'outward.' — sign
Language is most real, I'm tempted to say, as it rushes by. Meaning both remembers and anticipates. It's not (for me, for the most part) instantaneously present. It is 'stretched' and 'on the way.' — sign
:up: I very much like that. :smile: There is no living being that exists devoid of other living beings with which it interacts. Even the most solitary and un-evolved of lifeforms live among predators and prey. The existence of experience is not an "I" but a "we".
Though, here thinking of Sartre's play "No Exit", this can be a blessing as well as a curse. :razz: — javra
Here again, I agree. — javra
Some people are clearly in the mood to find others in error (possess the truth solely, denying any kind of mystery or darkness yet to be explored.) Others are clearly in the mood to find common ground and maybe share in the pleasure of what they both already understand. I'm no saint. — sign
There was a man with tongue of wood
Who essayed to sing,
And in truth it was lamentable.
But there was one who heard
The clip-clapper of this tongue of wood
And knew what the man
Wished to sing,
And with that the singer was content. — Stephen Crane
Yea, I share that feeling. Being anything but saintly myself, I'll gravitate toward closure in some situations. But its one thing I always admired about many of the ancient skeptics (which I've now come to nickname fallibilists): they sought open-mindedness and thereby greater understanding. The other side of things can, often enough, be all-knowning of all pertinent absolute truths. Not my cup of tee. — javra
BTW, wanted to share this since it seems to me to be pertinent to the discussion:
There was a man with tongue of wood
Who essayed to sing,
And in truth it was lamentable.
But there was one who heard
The clip-clapper of this tongue of wood
And knew what the man
Wished to sing,
And with that the singer was content.
— Stephen Crane
This in context of meaning as value and the signs we thereby produce. Beside which, I like this guys poetry. — javra
And he tries to describe the rush of meanings or 'phenomenological time.' — sign
Interesting concept, one that I might be inadvertently paralleling in my own philosophical musings. Husserl is one more person I haven't yet read. Do you recommend any particular work his that best focuses on this concept of "phenomenological time"? — javra
https://www.iep.utm.edu/phe-time/#H1For this and other reasons, Husserl, in his On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) (1991), deemed time-consciousness the most “important and difficult of all phenomenological problems” (PCIT, No. 50, No. 39). — IEP
nothing other than the living moment of being-with-one-another and in-one-another of original meaning-constitution and meaning-sedimentation. — Husserl
[C]onsciousness owes its privileged status...to the possibility of a living vocal medium. Since self-consciousness appears only in its relation to an object, whose presence it can keep and repeat, it is never perfectly foreign or anterior to the possibility of language. Husserl no doubt did want to maintain, as we shall see, an originally silent, "pre-expressive" stratum of experience. But since the possibility of constituting ideal objects belongs to the essence of consciousness, and since these ideal objects are historical products, only appearing thanks to acts of creation or intending, the element of consciousness and the element of language will be more and more difficult to discern. Will not their indiscernibility introduce nonpresence and difference (mediation, signs, referral back, etc.) in the heart of self-presence?
...
It is not in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, in the body of speech in the world, that he will recognize an original affinity with the logos in general, but in the voice phenomenologically taken, speech in its transcendental flesh, in the breath, the intentional animation that transforms the body of the word into flesh, makes of the Korper a Leib, a geistige Leiblichkeit. The phenomenological voice would be this spiritual flesh that continues to speak and be present to itself—to hear itself—in the absence of the world.
...
[W]hat is signified by phenomenology's "principle of principles"? What does the value of primordial presence to intuition as source of sense and evidence, as the a priori of a prioris, signify? First of all it signifies the certainty, itself ideal and absolute, that the universal form of all experience (Erlebnis), and therefore of all life, has always been and will always be the present. The present alone is and ever will be. Being is presence or the modification of presence. The relation with the presence of the present as the ultimate form of being... — Derrida
Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! “Have courage to use your own reason!”- that is the motto of enlightenment. — Kant
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/introduction.htm#s7-3Now if we stop at these absolutely empty forms which originate from the absoluteness of the abstract ego, nothing is treated in and for itself and as valuable in itself, but only as produced by the subjectivity of the ego. But in that case the ego can remain lord and master of everything, and in no sphere of morals, law, things human and divine, profane and sacred, is there anything that would not first have to be laid down by the ego, and that therefore could not equally well be destroyed by it. Consequently everything genuinely and independently real becomes only a show, not true and genuine on its own account or through itself, but a mere appearance due to the ego in whose power and caprice and at whose free disposal it remains. To admit or cancel it depends wholly on the pleasure of the ego, already absolute in itself simply as ego. — Hegel
If the ego remains at this standpoint, everything appears to it as null and vain, except its own subjectivity which therefore becomes hollow and empty and itself mere vanity.[53] But, on the other hand, the ego may, contrariwise, fail to find satisfaction in this self-enjoyment and instead become inadequate to itself, so that it now feels a craving for the solid and the substantial, for specific and essential interests. Out of this comes misfortune, and the contradiction that, on the one hand, the subject does want to penetrate into truth and longs for objectivity, but, on the other hand, cannot renounce his isolation and withdrawal into himself or tear himself free from this unsatisfied abstract inwardness. — Hegel
We said, with regard to thought, that there is no asking what its meaning is, since it is its own meaning; there is nothing hidden behind it – not, however, in the ordinary sense of that expression, for thought itself is the ultimate, the deepest, behind which there is nothing further; it is entirely itself. — Hegel
Thought is proper to man alone – not, however, to man only as an isolated individual subject; we have to look at thought as essentially objective. — Hegel
The temple of reason in its consciousness of itself is loftier than Solomon’s temple and others built by man.
In everyday life, of course, we have to do with opinions, i.e., thoughts about external things; one has one opinion, another has another. But in the business of the world’s Spirit there is a completely different seriousness; it is there that universality is. There it is a question of the universal determination of the Spirit, nor do we speak of this or that one’s opinion. The universal Spirit develops in itself according to its own necessity; its opinion is simply the truth.
A third conclusion to be drawn from what has been said up to this point is that we are not dealing with what is past but rather with actual thinking, with our own spirit. Properly speaking, then, this is not a history, since the thoughts, the principles, the ideas with which we are concerned belong to the present; they are ‘determinations within our own spirit.
But the heart must be dead which finds satisfaction with dead bodies. The spirit of truth and life lives only in what is. The living spirit speaks: “Let the dead bury their dead;. follow me!” If I know thoughts, truths, cognitions, only, historically, they remain outside my spirit, i.e., for me they are dead; neither my thinking nor my spirit is present in them; what is most interior to me, my thought, is absent.
— Hegel
And what is his dignity then if not in being a philosopher? Man is metaphysics, and metaphysics is time that would climb out of itself into its future (an eternity-to-be) in terms of its past as mastered memory.Philosophy, then, is one aspect of the total manifestation of spirit – consciousness of spirit being its supreme flowering, since its effort is to know what spirit is. It is, in fact, the dignity of man to know what he is and to know this in the purest manner, i.e., to attain to the thinking of what he is. — Hegel
... the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. — Derrida
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