We have to be referring to Codel when we say 'Godel
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. If, in fact, we were
always referring to Schmidt, then we would be attributing the
incompleteness of arithmetic to Schmidt and not to Godel­
if we used the sound 'Godel' as the name of the man whom I
am calling 'Schmidt'

(emphasis mine)

Yeah, no shit Sherlock! Doesn't matter if you're speaking sincerely or not. Why swap back and forth between examples here? They are not equivalent.

When we say "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" we are referring to this particular man named Godel. Schmidt is not this man named Godel. That holds good regardless of whether or not we believe that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.

When we say "Peano invented Peano's axioms" we are not referring to Dedekind even if we know that Peano did not invent Peano's axioms.

If we believe that Peano invented/discovered Peano's axioms, then when we use the descriptor "the man who invented Peano's axioms" we're referring to this man named Peano. If we believe that Dedekind invented/discovered Peano's axioms, then when we use the descriptor "the man who invented/discovered Peano's axioms", we're referring to Dedekind.

If we believe that Dedekind invented Peano's axioms, we cannot sincerely state "Peano invented/discovered Peano's axioms". If we believe that Schmidt proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, we cannot sincerely state "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". We are nonetheless referring to Godel.

It does not follow from the fact that we can pick something out of this world and say stuff about it that is contrary to what we believe about it that what we already believe about it is not true.

If our belief about it concerns the existential dependency of it(what is necessary in order for it to even exist in this world), and our belief about that is true, and it is existentially dependent upon other things(elemental constituents) some of which exist in their entirety prior to becoming a part of it and some of which do not, then what we posit in a possible world scenario will always be false if that scenario posits it without all of it's elemental constituents.

If we sincerely say "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" then that is a statement of belief. We believe that that statement is true. When one speaks sincerely, s/he believes what they say. — creativesoul

Of course. And Kripke isn't denying that. What Kripke is discussing here is what it is that one professes to be believing when one sincerely utters the sentence: "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". This would not be the expression of a belief about Gödel (as opposed to its being a belief about Schmidt, say) if the person uttering the sentence wasn't referring to Gödel. And she would indeed not necessarily be referring to Gödel if "Gödel" was used by her (unlike most of us) as shorthand for a definite description to refer to whoever proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.

If we sincerely say "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" then that is a statement of belief. We believe that that statement is true. When one speaks sincerely, s/he believes what they say.
— creativesoul

Of course. And Kripke isn't denying that. — Pierre-Normand

Ah bullshit... He said we need not believe what we say in order to be sincerely say it. Read it again!

We certainly say, and sincerely, 'Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Does it follow from that that we believe that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic - that we attribute the in­completeness of arithmetic to this man? No. We have to be referring to Codel when we say 'Godel
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'.

If we sincerely say 'X', it most certainly follows from that that we attribute proving the incompleteness of arithmetic to Godel. He points out that we have to be referring to Godel. No shit Sherlock! If we're not referring to Godel when we say "Godel did such and such" then we have no idea what the fuck we're saying to begin with.

He points out that we have to be referring to Godel. — creativesoul

Of course, because otherwise (that is, if one isn't referring to Gödel with "Gödel"), saying that Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic isn't the same thing as saying "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". It is Kripke's whole point that in the case where "Gödel" would be used by someone as a definite description, and hence not as a rigid designator, then, unbeknownst to this person, her uttering the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" might not express a belief about Gödel at all.

Arrrggh. More bullshit.

It is Kripke's whole point that in the case where "Gödel" would be used by someone as a definite description, and hence not as a rigid designator, then, unbeknownst to this person, her uttering the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" might not express a belief about Gödel at all. — Pierre-Normand

Kripke's whole point is based upon bullshit. Anyone who utters the sentence "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" is making a statement about Godel. If they believe that the statement is true, then it expresses a belief about Godel. If they do not believe that the statement is true, it's still about Godel. It is impossible to sincerely state something about Godel and not be expressing one's own belief about Godel. One's own belief is a belief. It is impossible to sincerely say something about Godel and not be expressing a belief about Godel.

Kripke's whole point is based upon bullshit. Anyone who utters the sentence "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" is making a statement about Godel. — creativesoul

Well, I tend to agree with that. And Kripke would agree too, assuming only that we are correct that proper names function as rigid designators. But in the quoted passage, Kripke is examining what would be the case if, contrary to ordinary usage, and in accordance with some dubious semantic theories, a proper name such as "Gödel" would be used by someone with a meaning (or expressing a Fregean sense) that could be cashed out by means of a definite description. In that case, someone could use the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" to express a belief about someone who isn't Gödel. If that is indeed a BS claim (according to you), then it seems to be precisely the sort of semantic BS that Kripke is arguing against rather than something he is propounding. According to Kripke, proper names function as rigid designators, and so long as they are so used, then the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" is bound to express a belief about Gödel.

:razz:

Good to know. With my limited knowledge of philosophical history, it's difficult for me to ascertain which parts of Kripke's lectures are granting historical notions and which ones represent his own belief.

I suppose I ought ask prior to reacting as if Kripke is arguing in favor of something or other...

Open mouth... insert foot. Ah, you'll have that sometimes.

Thanks for the clarification. I'm going to go back and re-read those bits again, paying particularly close attention to any references and/or footnotes.

I'm not certain that I follow. It seems to me that if I began the paragraph by naming the apple 'Bob' and substituting all instances of 'it' with Bob and 'its' with 'Bob's', that would remove the anaphoric reference. If this seems illegitimate, a similar story could be written about a person's corpse, named with 'Bob's corpse' since it was Bob's. Or indeed Bob himself changing over time.

Do you see this as undermining your objection? I believe it's likely that I've just failed to understand something crucial.

I'm not certain that I follow. It seems to me that if I began the paragraph by naming the apple 'Bob' and substituting all instances of 'it' with Bob and 'its' with 'Bob's', that would remove the anaphoric reference. If this seems illegitimate, a similar story could be written about a person's corpse, named with 'Bob's corpse' since it was Bob's.

Do you see this as undermining your objection? I believe it's likely that I've just failed to understand something crucial. — fdrake

In that case, for the sake of clarity, you might need to specify whether you intend "Bob" as shorthand for a definite description or rather as a genuine proper name: that is, as a rigid designator that picks up the unique individual that contingently happened to fit the initial description (at that time). In any case, the issue of the numerical identity of the apple with itself (that is, the issue of its persistence) as picked up at different times, and while its properties evolve, seems to me to be somewhat independent of semantic theories about singular referring expressions and rather a matter of the metaphysics of substances. But I must nevertheless concede that there are some interactions between the semantic theories and the metaphysics of substances; and those interactions are especially important when the semantic theories are externalistic -- as Kripke's and Putnam's indeed are -- since the referential practices of language users rely on some of the natural propensities (and their modes of persistence) of the substances (and 'natural kinds') whom they are referring to.

@fdrake Let me try to put my main point as simply as possible. You might then tell me whether or not I myself missed your main point. Suppose you christen your (initially) green apple "Bob". You then let it ripe and rot for a few weeks or until such a time when what sits on the counter (where Bob initially was sitting) is a sorry and smelly mess barely recognizable as a rotten apple. Is that smelly mess still (numerically identical with) Bob? According to someone's metaphysical theory of fruits, it still is. According to someone else's, Bob has ceased to be. That is true (or false) whatever one's semantic theory of proper names (and of other sorts of singular referring expression) might be.

In any case, the issue of the numerical identity of the apple with itself (that is, the issue of its persistence) as picked up at different times, and while its properties evolve, seems to me to be somewhat independent of semantic theories about singular referring expressions and rather a matter of the metaphysics of substances. — Pierre-Normand

Well, let's actually have a description of Bob ageing, more importantly changing properties over time.

Bob was an especially large baby, weighing 9 pounds the day he came out of his mother. He had a distinctive hook shaped birth mark on his left cheek. Bob didn't stay unusually large forever, however, as he peaked at 5 ft 10 inches at 18 and never grew an inch more, despite increasing in weight to 60kg. The birthmark he had on his left cheek continued to fade until he was 25, the once pronounced reddish hook shape faded into regular skin.

It seems to me regardless of what metaphysics holds of Bob's numerical identity of himself to himself with respect to time, 'Bob' will still pick out Bob. The first sentence describes Bob as a baby, the last when he was fully grown. For the sake of clarity of presentation, a birthmark was present on Bob as a baby and is no longer present in his adulthood. Regardless, 'Bob' still picks out Bob.

The problem that I see this poses for definite descriptions being exhaustive and required of all reference isn't that Bob's properties change over time, it's that we can refer to Bob with 'Bob' regardless of any transformation ageing induces to him. I'm trying to give an example of the point that if we perturb a definite description slightly, changing any property within it to something else, it no longer contains the desired object in its extension, it is no longer definite. So, we either require that the definite descriptions which ground reference respond nascently to changes in their object and our interaction with the object demarcates when the space of appropriate definite descriptions updates (appropriate being contains the target object and only the target object in its extension), or that reference to an object was not founded in definite descriptions in the first place.

Given the difficulty we have coming up with definite descriptions of objects with radical property transformations, it seems unlikely to me that the task of coming up with them formulaically and automatically is as easy as required to make them nascent.

Seems to me that if one holds that the meaning of a name is cashed out by a definite description, then that person would also require that "the man who invented/discovered Peano's axioms" refer to the man that the speaker believes invented/discovered Peano's axioms.

So, it seems that Kripke's suggestion that the notion that a name is cashed out by a definite description ends in a reductio is not true unless we also say that false belief does not refer to a specific individual.

The problem that I see this poses for definite descriptions being exhaustive and required of all reference isn't that Bob's properties change over time, it's that we can refer to Bob with 'Bob' regardless of any transformation ageing induces to him. — fdrake

This just points out that once identity is established(by virtue of using definite descriptions) the name alone can sometimes suffice to retain the identity.

If it were not for those descriptions, there would be no way to distinguish between which Bob we're talking about to begin with. Once that is established, the descriptions can - and do - change over time(well... some true ones will).

The criterion for what it takes to first identify something is not the same as what it takes to retain that identity.

Given the difficulty we have coming up with definite descriptions of objects with radical property transformations, it seems unlikely to me that the task of coming up with them formulaically and automatically is as easy as required to make them nascent. — fdrake

It seems to me like you are attempting to raise for descriptivist theories of proper names (or of their Fregean senses) an objection that isn't traditionally raised for them and that they can easily accommodate (unlike Kripke's own main objection). I alluded to this in an earlier post. Definite descriptions meant to pick up an individual for purpose of reference usually are tensed. They don't merely consist in predication of properties but rather in predication of properties at a time. Hence, "Bob", construed a shorthand of a definite description picking up a unique apple would specify just a couple properties Bob had, at a time, such as its general location and color, merely sufficient to distinguish it from other apples in the vicinity. It's then irrelevant to the reference of "Bob" that Bob moves and ripens (up to a point). That's because, "Bob" picks up whatever apple was green and on your kitchen counter on December 13, 2018, say.

I do agree that this might undermine my response to Janus, though. In that post I did use that the definite description at the start and the definite description at the end (part 1 and part 2) can't refer to the same entity since they use properties which fail to obtain at some point.

I suppose what I'm trying to highlight is that designating an object doesn't seem to care about transformations in the designated object. And that the space of appropriate/possible definite descriptions changing with time is definitely a sensitivity to change rather than an insensitivity to it.

suppose what I'm trying to highlight is that designating an object doesn't seem to care about transformations in the designated object. And that the space of appropriate/possible definite descriptions changing with time is definitely a sensitivity to change rather than an insensitivity to it. — fdrake

Agreed about your first sentence. Regarding the second sentence: I don't think is makes sense to say that a definite description changes with time. Substances have (temporally) evolving states. But when a substance falls under a definite description at a time, then it falls under it at all times (including the times when it doesn't exist yet or anymore!) That's what makes it a definite description, rather than a general description. Hence the requirement that predication of states (such as being red) also be tensed in the case where there are two of more substances that would otherwise be in those states at different times.

Can you offer a definite description of Bob from that paragraph I wrote about him?

I have to say though, it is surprising to me that one would be required seeing as it's extremely easy to recognise that all the sentences are about Bob, despite that such a description isn't being used to vouchsafe that reference. As a condition for the possibility of reference, maybe, partake in the act of designation? Doubt it.

But when a substance fall under a definite description at a time, then it falls under it at all times (including the times when it doesn't exist yet or anymore!) That's what makes it a definite description, rather than a general description. — Pierre-Normand

"Falls under it"...

Does that mean that the description always applies to it, even when it is no longer true of the object? Time stamps take care of that.

Definite descriptions would have to be true of the object during it's entire existence(at all times)?

Time stamps cannot take care of that.

Can you offer a definite description of Bob from that paragraph I wrote about him? — fdrake

In that paragraph, you offered a general description of Bob. To turn in into a definite description, you would have to rephrase it as: "The especially large baby, weighing 9 pounds the day he came out of his mother, etc. etc." This definite description then would successfully function as a singular referring expression just in case there would be one and only one individual who falls under it. (See Russell's analysis of "the ...")

I have to say though, it is surprising to me that one would be required seeing as it's extremely easy to recognise that all the sentences are about Bob, despite that such a description isn't being used to vouchsafe that reference. As a condition for the possibility of reference, maybe, partake in the act of designation? Doubt it.

Yes, I think it's common ground (between you, Kripke and I, at least) that neither explicit nor implicit definite descriptions are required to secure singular reference. The challenge is to provide an alternative theory of singular Fregean senses of proper names. Kripke was claiming not to be offering a theory, himself. But he did gesture towards an account with his so-called "causal theory of reference" (thus named by others, I think).

"Falls under it"...

Does that mean that the description always applies to it, even when it is no longer true of the object? Time stamps take care of that.

Definite descriptions would have to be true of the object during it's entire existence(at all times)?

Time stamps cannot take care of that. — creativesoul

Yes, it is true at all times that Gödel was born on April 28, 1906, for instance. Of course, the sentence now being used to express this truth uses the past tense whereas a sentence used to express it prior to April 28, 1906 would use the future tense. But both sentences express the very same truth and there is no time when what it is that they express isn't true. (Put more simply: it doesn't make sense to ponder over when it will be that it might cease to be true that Gödel was born on April 28, 1906.)

This definite description then would successfully function as a singular referring expression just in case there would be one and only one individual who falls under it. (See Russell's analysis of "the ..." — Pierre-Normand

This still seems quite strange to me. Whether the description is definite or not isn't vouchsafed solely by my use of words, it's a feature of whether there's only one thing which satisfies my description or not. No matter the number of things which satisfy my description, it will still be about Bob and not about some Bob-prime. So, would just based on the information I have provided and only upon it, which candidate for the referent of 'Bob' is the subject of the sentence can't be decided... Despite that I'm referring to a specific Bob from the beginning. It's already decided which Bob I mean.

So whether my description is definite or not looks entirely incidental to how I used the words. Why would something incidental to my use of 'Bob' be required to provide a semantics of how I used 'Bob'?

This still seems quite strange to me. Whether the description is definite or not isn't produced solely by my use of words, it's a feature of whether there's only one thing which satisfies my description or not. — fdrake

Singular reference is a function of the conjunction of both, actually. In order to secure reference, generally, you must think of the object properly (and/or with the use of a proper form of words) and you also may need the world to do you a favor.

So, granted, if I ask you to give me back the apple that I gave you, then I have failed to refer to a singular apple in the case where I would have given you more than one (and forgotten that). But also, if I ask you to give me an apple, and you have many, then I didn't thereby refer to the apple that you will choose to give me even though it will thereby fall under the indefinite description: "an apple". What is more, I will not have referred to it specifically even in the case where you only had one.

No matter the number of things which satisfy my description, it will still be about Bob and not about some Bob'. It would just be based on the information I have provided and only upon it, which candidate for the referent of 'Bob' is the subject of the sentence can't be decided... Despite that I'm referring to a specific Bob from the beginning. It's already decided which Bob I mean.

Possibly. But, in case where there are more than one individual satisfying the general description, what is it, in your view, that determines which one of them it is that you are referring to? Are you making use of the fact that this individual is is the only one among them who is named "Bob"? In that case, the description seems idle except as a way to help me anchor the reference of "Bob" for purpose of future use of this name by me.

So whether my description is definite or not looks entirely incidental to how I used the words. Why would something incidental to my use of 'Bob' be required to provide a semantics of how I used 'Bob'?

Refer back to my comment above regarding an apple (versus the apple), which I gave you.

Possibly. But, in case where there are more than one individual satisfying the general description, what is it, in your view, that determines which one of them it is that you are referring to? Are you making use of the fact that this individual is is the only one among them who is named "Bob"? In that case, the description seems idle except as a way to help me anchor the reference of "Bob" for purpose of future use of this name by me. — Pierre-Normand

Perhaps this is unsatisfying, but it looks to me that the necessary and sufficient condition for my use of Bob to refer successfully is that 'Bob' is used to refer to the entity. The sense of use I have in mind for 'use' in the previous sentence is that reference to that entity by 'Bob' is ensured by the use of the reference in an appropriate linguistic community. If my description failed to be definite and all the entities which satisfy the description happened to be called Bob, that would be quite unfortunate for telling which is which based on my description alone, but the person the sentences in my description refer to is the unique one I was referring to rather than all the ones which also satisfy the description.

We could distinguish one Bob from others by applying properties to filter the description, but the application of these to better target the required entity is done with the express purpose of disambiguating the Bob I was referring to from the others, rather than providing an interpretation for 'Bob'. In order to find these properties to filter with we'd be required to examine what obtains of Bob; though I don't think the use of these properties to disambiguate the expression thereby provide the sense of the word 'Bob'. Which I imagine is quite similar to finding a definite description.

It might be the case then that 'the Bob with the blue eyes' and 'the Bob with the blonde hair' both serve to distinguish the Bob the sentences in my description were about, but only one such property is required - thus any property which has a singular extension in the implicit domain of discourse would be used to form a definite description, and the choice of property used for the expression is therefore incidental, it would just be required that one such property exists in order to disambiguate my reference.

It looks to me like definite descriptions require a search of the properties of an object in order to give a singular extension, but such a search has a target. If we can target the search to the entity in order to find a definite description for it, we must not require a definite description beforehand to do the search.

Perhaps this is unsatisfying, but it looks to me that the necessary and sufficient condition for my use of Bob to refer successfully is that 'Bob' is used to refer to the entity. The sense of use I have in mind for 'use' in the previous sentence is that reference to that entity by 'Bob' is ensured by the use of the reference in an appropriate linguistic community. If my description failed to be definite and all the entities which satisfy the description happened to be called Bob, that would be quite unfortunate for telling which is which based on my description alone, but the person the sentences in my description refer to is the unique one I was referring to rather than all the ones which also satisfy the description. — fdrake

Yes, I agree with your general account. It's the main aim of Kripke's "causal theory of reference" to explain how language users institute and hook up to linguistic practices -- naming practices, specifically -- without any need, generally, for descriptions of any kind. Gareth Evans also offers an account, more fleshed out than Kripke's simple causal/baptism theory, but broadly consistent with it, in chapter 11 of The Varieties of Reference.

It looks to me like definite descriptions require a search of the properties of an object in order to give a singular extension, but such a search has a target. If we can target the search to the entity in order to find a definite description for it, we must not require a definite description beforehand to do the search.

Yes, indeed, and hence modes of reference other than definite descriptions (such as naming practices and demonstrative reference) ought to be more fundamental.

Yes, indeed, and hence modes of reference other than definite descriptions (such as naming practices and demonstrative reference) ought to be more fundamental. — Pierre-Normand

I still haven't read more than the introduction of that book. I'll take this as a gentle reminder to read more of it.

I still haven't read more than the introduction to that book. I'll take this as a gentle reminder to read more of it. — fdrake

You might also want to check sections 10.5 (The Causal Theory of Reference) and 10.6 (The Social Character of Sense) in Luntley's Comtemporary Philosophy of Thought (which you had already begun).

I still haven't read more than the introduction to that book... — fdrake

Kripke or Evans?

Evans. I read Naming and Necessity in undergrad and haven't touched it since.

In Frege's philosophy of language, predicates are unsaturated expressions since they have empty slots that require filling with singular terms in order to constitute propositions and express thoughts. — Pierre-Normand

It sounds like they borrowed the term from chemistry then.