I suppose I'd just say this asymmetry is false, then. Or, at least, I do not believe in the asymmetry between these. Preventing harm is only important if someone is there for harm to be prevented. And, even then, preventing harm is also a relative good -- causing harm can be the right thing to do, in certain circumstances. — Moliere
Ethics are a human concern, and so eliminating the agent from which they spring sort of undercuts the very basis of any ethical claim. — Moliere
However it is an absolute always good — schopenhauer1
Someone being prevented from harm is always good, period. — schopenhauer1
Guess what though, being not born is not a harm, it is not a bad. Nothing is lost by not being born for any particular person. — schopenhauer1
Nothing can be any loss or gain or anything to a "potential child." — Terrapin Station
If Jim and Janis want to have a child but do not because of social pressures (maybe even a law) against it, doesn't that create suffering for them? — Terrapin Station
Which is factually incorrect. Things are only good or bad to particular people who exist and who feel that that thing is good or bad. — Terrapin Station
Yes, there is a component that the suffering is on behalf of someone else. — schopenhauer1
If someone suffers cause they can't do an action that will cause suffering to others, — schopenhauer1
he terminus is preventing harm with no cost to any particular person. — schopenhauer1
The suffering isn't on behalf of someone else, it's their personal suffering, due to their desires not being met. — Terrapin Station
You have no idea that the action will cause suffering to others. That's speculation. Meanwhile, there are existent people who really are suffering because they can't have a kid through no choice of their own. — Terrapin Station
No I mean, the import of the argument relies on creating harm for someone else. — schopenhauer1
Then their suffering is their own and not exposing a lifetime of suffering for another- with no cost to any particular person (that is to say an actual child). — schopenhauer1
It's their own suffering and that's a cost. They ARE actual children. — Terrapin Station
So exposing a new person to all possible suffering it may incur in order to alleviate the suffering of a present person on one particular issue, is justified? That makes no sense to me. — schopenhauer1
Not in the circumstance of no person existing at all (but has a potential to ). In cases of potentiality of possible people, there is an absolute way to prevent all harm, with no relative trade-offs that affect a person. — schopenhauer1
This doesn't make sense. It again values life itself as something that must be had in the first place. Ethics is about right course of actions. — schopenhauer1
I DON'T know whether there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that neither I nor those about whom I care most are among them. By moral saint I mean a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be. Though I shall in a moment acknowledge the variety of types of person that might be thought to satisfy this description, it seems to me that none of these types serve as unequivocally compelling personal ideals. In other words, I believe that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive. — Susan Wolf
.”Ultimately, they aren’t the reason why I was born, or why I was born in a world like this one” — Michael Ossipoff
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No they WERE the reason you were born in THIS world.
.Had they not decided to have birth you could have been born into a world of immortal robots.
.They're not the reason you're born but they're the reason you were born HERE.
(I still don't really accept your premise that a person is the cause of his own birth or part of the cause…)
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You wouldn’t, if you’re a Materialist. We don’t subscribe to the same metaphysics. I propose Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism.
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.”But I suggest that there’s no reason why anyone would be born into a societal-world like this one, unless they’d gotten themselves into a major moral-snarl, over a number of lifetimes, digging themselves deeper each time.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Whoa whoa whoa there I'ma have to give you a speeding ticket. Why'd you turn Hindu so fast what the heck?
.What does one's moral actions in his current life story have to do with him reincarnating?
.You never said people reincarnate.
.In fact, according to your theory then what follows death is NOT reincarnation but the repetition of the exact same life like in Nietzsche's book thus spake zarathustra. Since you're the cause of your own life story then after death, you should cause the same life story again. You don't move on to another life story.
.Wait. Right there you’re saying a contradiction. That’s contrary to the definition and nature of hypothetical stories. There are infinitely-many, and there are all of them, including the bad societal worlds in which hardly anyone is an anti-natalist. … — Michael Ossipoff
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I might have misspoke there. What I meant was that
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P1: if THIS world turned antinatalist it would reduce the chances of someone getting born here.
.P2: there are worlds where no pain is possible
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P3: pain is possible in this world
For one thing, P2 is doubtful at best.C: this world should turn antinatalist to reduce the number of people that have to experience pain
.Your logic would still make an argument for antinatalism
.”So, I agree with anti-natalism in that sense.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Wait so you're an antinatalist now? I thought you were trying to argue AGAINST it
Aside from the fact that you're not seeing the distinction between whether a person exists or not (you're thinking of it simply as a question of whether someone is conscious--that's not the issue — Terrapin Station
believe that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive. — Susan Wolf
None of that amounts to being able to do anything, pro or con, consensually or nonconsensually, to someone who doesn't exist. — Terrapin Station
I have not claimed someone non existent is being forced to do anything. — Andrew4Handel
The problem is that no one can choose to be born and so how do you describe their existence instead other than as an act of force? — Andrew4Handel
I think things like houses are made to exist by force and when I am doing gardening or moving something around I am aware I am using force. — Andrew4Handel
Nevertheless I do think there is a puzzle about how we come into existence in term of consciousness because it seems you can mold clay into numerous different objects without it ever being aware of existence but humans are aware of existing in a profound way. — Andrew4Handel
I think one of the problems with having children is that you can do it without any skill or qualification or planning or justification. — Andrew4Handel
it is absurd that anyone can have children without showing any capacity to rear a child — Andrew4Handel
In Europe and many other places the state will take someone's child from them if they consider them an unfit parent. — Andrew4Handel
no one needs anything to begin with if they don't exist in the first place to need it. — schopenhauer1
I think creating someone is clearly an act of force on them because you are in control of the outcome which profoundly effects them. — Andrew4Handel
The DNA is not identical to S but it will become an essential part of S. — Andrew4Handel
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