Shawn         
         (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy.
This could mean either of the following.
(2) Ralph believes that there are spies
or
(3) Someone is such that Ralph believes that he is a spy.
The truth of (3) but not (2), to echo Quine, would give the FBI cause to be interested in Ralph (or at least this was evidently so in the 1950s). We might paraphrase (3) as follows: "Someone is such that Ralph believes of him that he is a spy." The distinction between (2) and (3) can be seen as a distinction of scope for the existential quantifier. In (2), the existential quantifier is interpreted as having narrow scope, within the scope of ‘believes'.
(2*) Ralph believes: ∃x(x is a spy).
In (3), however, the existential quantifier has wide scope and binds a variable that occurs freely within the scope of ‘believes'.
(3*) ∃x(Ralph believes that x is a spy).
The ambiguity in (1) and the simple way of distinguishing the two interpretations in (2*) and (3*) suggest that we are on to something. — SEP
Terrapin Station         
         Now, if I were to assert that:
"Wallows believes that 2+2=6, instead of 4"
, then are we talking about truth or the validity of epistemic content? — Wallows
Furthermore, what limits or broadens the scope of the existential quantifier as having a narrow or broad scope? — Wallows
Shawn         
         I'm probably not the only one confused about this. — Terrapin Station
What is the "truth/validity of epistemic content" distinction you're making, and what is it supposed to have to do with the de re/de dicto distinction? — Terrapin Station
That's defined in the article you took the bulk of your post from. — Terrapin Station
Is it that you don't entirely understand the distinction they're making? (I kind of understand it "in theory," but re the examples given, it becomes less clear to me, which is a weird dichotomy.) — Terrapin Station
Andrew4Handel         
         (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy.
This could mean either of the following.
(2) Ralph believes that there are spies
or
(3) Someone is such that Ralph believes that he is a spy. — SEP
Shawn         
         I don't think it means either of those things. — Andrew4Handel
Andrew4Handel         
         Well, those are just examples to illustrate the de re and de dicto distinction. Maybe you have a better example in mind? I can't think up any. — Wallows
Shawn         
         
Terrapin Station         
         
Shawn         
         
Terrapin Station         
         
Shawn         
         Say that there's a false belief that A.Conan Doyle based Sherlock Holmes closely on some particular, real detective. — Terrapin Station
Shawn         
         
Terrapin Station         
         
Terrapin Station         
         I won the lottery in a possible world. — Wallows
Shawn         
         The de re sense is predicating something of a particular in the real world that Ralph is familiar with--namely, Ralph's neighbor, whom he believes is a spy. He believes that his neighbor has particular properties that make him a spy. — Terrapin Station
Terrapin Station         
         
Terrapin Station         
         
Shawn         
         "The lottery" refers to an actual situation though — Terrapin Station
Shawn         
         "Someone is a spy" in the de re sense, so that Ralph says it with his neighbor in mind, etc.
Well, it turns out that his neighbor isn't a spy. Which means that it was a counterfactual. Was it not a de re proposition? — Terrapin Station
Terrapin Station         
         
Shawn         
         Why are you putting "de re" after "in his mind" and "de dicto" after "in fact"? — Terrapin Station
Terrapin Station         
         
Shawn         
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