I'll quote Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
"It is not God that is worshipped but the authority that claims to speak in His name. Sin becomes disobedience to authority not violation of integrity”

What I'm trying to say is that moral values can be subjective, in the western world its immoral to kill someone but in wartime it's not. In some Easter parts it is considered a moral duty to kill a Christian, so it's possible that science can detect moral values by referring to various countries' rules.

For me 'morality' in its usual form is meaningless, instead I prefer 'integrity'

Science can reasonably indicate objective goal states or purposes. Whichever standards are predicted to approach said goal states, may perhaps be considered as objective moral standards.

It must be noted that the aforementioned goal states described, perhaps don't necessarily ultimately lend to the survival of the human species, but the survival of general intelligence instead.

1. If science cannot verify the existence of X, then the best evidence tells us that X does not exist. — vulcanlogician

Modify to:
1. If everything that exists can be verified by science, and science cannot verify the existence of X, and X is known to be something that if it existed then science could verify it, then X doesn't exist.

Of course you still have to define "exists" and "existence" and "verified" and maybe even "known." But if you did any of that work, you would realize you're on a track going nowhere.

The Argument from the Scientific Test of Reality
1. If science cannot verify the existence of X, then the best evidence tells us that X does not exist.
2. Science cannot verify the existence of objective moral values.
3. Therefore, the best evidence tells us that objective moral values do not exist. — vulcanlogician

Try substituting 'subjective sensations e.g. of pain, colour or emotion' for 'objective moral values':
1. If science cannot verify the existence of X, then the best evidence tells us that X does not exist.
2. Science cannot verify the existence of subjective sensations e.g. of pain, colour or emotion.
3. Therefore, the best evidence tells us that subjective sensations e.g. of pain, colour or emotion do not exist.

In the amended argument, premise 2 is true (science can only verify the existence of physical analogues of these sensations, not the existence of the sensations themselves), and the argument is valid; yet the conclusion is false. So premise 1 must be false, and since premise 1 also appears in the original argument, the original argument cannot be sound.

The best evidence for subjective sensations is not science, it is our experiencing of those sensations. Similarly, the best evidence for the existence of objective moral values is not science, but something else - perhaps the similarity of moral values, within certain limits, across the world and throughout history. Whether this or any other evidence is strong enough to make the existence of objective moral values plausible is another matter.

Nice analysis there, Herg. That's exactly how I see it, but I don't think I could have put it so clearly.

I'd take the moral naturalist route and argue that we are justified in our scientific postulations insofar as they play an indispensable explanatory role in our scientific theorizing. Scientific and moral theorizing, though different, are sufficiently analogous in that if we are justified in our scientific postulations, then we are likewise justified in our moral postulations...but again, only insofar as those moral postulations are ineliminable in explaining moral practice, experience, etc.


Regarding your argument from scientific testability, it raises the question of why we ought to limit our ontology and only admit entities describable in terms of the natural sciences. What motivates one to limit their ontology in this way? Is it a fear of metaphysical profligacy? If so, it's unclear to me how adopting a sort of property dualism in order to admit moral properties into our ontology is any more metaphysically profligate than the postulations in the special sciences that are not amenable to strict reductions.

1. If science cannot verify the existence of X, then the best evidence tells us that X does not exist. — vulcanlogician

I'm not a moral realist, but I don't buy this first premise.

I'd change it to "If there is no supporting evidence for the existence of x, then there's no good reason to believe that x exists."

There's no supporting evidence for the existence of objective/extramental moral stances.

If science cannot verify the existence of X, then the best evidence tells us that X does not exist. — vulcanlogician

If science cannot verify the existence of X, then the best evidence tells us that science is not currently qualified to speak to the existence or non-existence of X.

The microscopic realm, the atomic realm, the quantum realm, the cosmos beyond the Milky Way...

The history of science is filled with real things which science had no evidence of.

I'd change it to "If there is no supporting evidence for the existence of x, then there's no good reason to believe that x exists." — Terrapin Station

But then, what qualifies something as "supporting evidence" ?

As any scientist would contend, evidence is validated via empirical verification. How else can evidence be validated?

If you say that "supporting evidence" is only validated by empirical verification, then there is no need for your amendments to premise 1.

If you say that supporting evidence can be validated by some other means, then we seemingly agree that the original premise 1 is false. But then your modified premise is unclear about what qualifies as "supporting evidence."

Am I missing something?

It should be open-ended, and should include logical argumentation.