This is silly. But I understand your focus better now. You're not really interested in animals, but in ethics. Which your thread title does disclose, so the confusion was mine.

If you were interested in animals you'd get that fake meat products which aren't appealing to meat eaters are not advancing the cause of animal rights. — Jake

Why would you conclude that I am not interested in animals? By that logic, you should say I am not interested in humans as well, correct? I am interested in how we treat our species, as well as other species on this planet. Ethics involves how you interact with the world and the things around you.

I already know that fake meat products aren't appealing meat eaters, and my point in my last reply to you, was that it should not matter if we supply them with a "just as tasty" alternative. Which is why I gave an analogy.

Caring about animals doesn't mean I need to supply meat eaters with a replacement product that will mimic animal flesh. We first need people to get it out of their head, that animal flesh is what you are supposed to eat. It is NOT what you are supposed to eat, which is why our bodies do better on plant-based diets. If people actually understand that animals are living beings who also feel pain just as we do, along with the fact that we are actually more healthy when we do not consume them, you don't need a replacement product to establish an ethical point.

Why would you conclude that I am not interested in animals? By that logic, you should say I am not interested in humans as well, correct? I am interested in how we treat our species, as well as other species on this planet. Ethics involves how you interact with the world and the things around you. — chatterbears

Yes, you're very interested in ethics, I grant that without reservation.

But, for instance, you're not very interested in factory meat, a technical solution which would end the harm to animals if it can be implemented at scale. Perhaps you're not interested in such solutions because they would also end the ethical debate?

I already know that fake meat products aren't appealing meat eaters, and my point in my last reply to you, was that it should not matter if we supply them with a "just as tasty" alternative. — chatterbears

Yes, you prefer to scold them, and position yourself as superior. My only complaint with this is that it doesn't really work that well, and tends to generate as much resistance as it does support.

Caring about animals doesn't mean I need to supply meat eaters with a replacement product that will mimic animal flesh. — chatterbears

You don't have to, agreed. But not being interested in a solution that would actually work illustrates that it's moralistic finger pointing that interests you, not animals.

Im not sure why you fail to understand this considering you have admitted a subjective basis for morality already. His subjective basis is different than yours, and his measures are therefore different as well. — DingoJones

Having a subjective basis for morality is separate from how your normative ethics work. I can agree that at the metaethcal level, moral values are completely subjective. But going a level above that (normative and applied ethics), it doesn't become subjective. One can base their ethics on whatever the law dictates.

Metaethics: I feel it is right to base your morals on the law. (subjective)

Normative ethics: What is morally right is what is legal. What is morally wrong is what is illegal. (descriptive)

Applied ethics: It is wrong to steal, because it is illegal.

Could you give an example? — Terrapin Station

If you read above this, there's your example. As Dingo already mentioned, not everybody abides by their feelings in regards to what they describe as "wrong". One person may base an immoral action on whether or not it is an illegal action. Legality is separate from what the person feels, because their feelings do not make the law. Somebody separate from them, makes the law and dictates how the law works. At the metaethical level, yes, they are subjectively assessing the law as a good basis for what is right and wrong. But their normative and applied ethical stances, DO NOT hinge upon what they feel.

One day, the law could say. Gay Marriage is illegal. That person would now think gay marriage is immoral because it is illegal. The next day, Gay Marriage could become legal. That next day, the same person would now think gay marriage is moral, because it is now legal.

And as I have been trying to tell you for countless amounts of posts now, normative/applied ethics are separate from metaethics. But all you seem to understand and respond with is, "Everybody goes with their intuition and/or feelings when making moral decisions."

I'm sorry to say, but you're just completely wrong here. You either, do not fully understand the three tiers of ethics (meta/normative/applied), or you are being dishonest.

Yes, you prefer to scold them, and position yourself as superior. My only complaint with this is that it doesn't really work that well, and tends to generate as much resistance as it does support. — Jake

Would you say the same thing if I scolded a child molester or rapist? I am superior to a rapist, and if had to create a post in a philosophy forum about how it is wrong to force yourself upon a woman and rape them, I would be saying the same things I am now in regards to animals.

You don't have to, agreed. But not being interested in a solution that would actually work illustrates that it's moralistic finger pointing that interests you, not animals. — Jake

I don't need to give a solution to child molesters, do I? Should we create child life like robots that imitate real children, and then allow child molesters to molest those robots instead, since no harm would be done to real children? This is the same thing you want me to provide meat eaters. A thing that imitates the current thing they get pleasure out of, right?

Again. If I tried talking to child molesters about how children should not be violated and are too young to consent, as well as can be easily taken advantage of. Would you just tell me, "You don't actually care about children, you need to give child molesters a solution!"

That's just ridiculous.

I'm interested in tactical arguments, you're interested in moral arguments. I'm interested in what might actually cause a person to stop killing animals. You're interested in positioning yourself as superior. We have different agendas.

Feel free to pursue your agenda, they're your posts to do with as you wish.

Again. If I tried talking to child molesters about how children should not be violated and are too young to consent, as well as can be easily taken advantage of. Would you just tell me, "You don't actually care about children, you need to give child molesters a solution!" — chatterbears

There's a severe ethical fallacy there; equivocation.

Human consumption (and killing) of animals exists on ranges of necessary to sport and humane to sadistic; moral to immoral. The molestation of children is never necessary or humane or moral.

You should be more specific about the practices you decry when making these kinds of comparisons. If killing and eating an animal is broadly akin to molestation, you should therefore support the eradication (or total incarceration) of lions and other predators who can only exist in the numbers that they do by inflicting pain and suffering on herbivores. If humans are wrong to thrive at the expense of other species, surely other apex predators are wrong as well, and even though they don't know better, we can still prevent them from doing more harm by taking action against them.

You might object and say that since lions can only exist by eating meat, they're given leave to molest slaughter innocent creatures, but this doesn't reveal the extent to which lions should be permitted to exploit other animals (there's a theoretical limit right? How do we determine it?). Furthermore, it ignores the fact that many humans do need to eat meat to survive (nearly 100% of humans living traditional lifestyles require meat as a part of a balanced diet, developing countries rely on it to make growth and development affordable, and first world nations, while theoretically capable of diverting to animal free diets, aren't yet prepared to spend the extra money to do so).

I suspect that whatever justification you employ to allow lions to continue hunting gazelles can also be used to justify the consumption of animals by humans, at least to some extent.

When it comes to industrial scale mass-farming, we're in total agreement, but I still cling to the idea that the life of an old-school farm animal is downright worth living (I realize you're an anti-natalist when it comes to the lives of farm animals). You must believe the lives of wild animals are worth living (hence your objection to our taking of them) but in reality the lives of wild animals are often filled with much greater hardship and suffering than the lives of some farm animals. What's your argument against traditional farming suited for developing countries?

If you read above this, there's your example. As Dingo already mentioned, not everybody abides by their feelings in regards to what they describe as "wrong". One person may base an immoral action on whether or not it is an illegal action. Legality is separate from what the person feels, because their feelings do not make the law. Somebody separate from them, makes the law and dictates how the law works. At the metaethical level, yes, they are subjectively assessing the law as a good basis for what is right and wrong. But their normative and applied ethical stances, DO NOT hinge upon what they feel. — chatterbears

The distinction you're trying to make here makes no sense to me. "Just in case x is illegal, then x is immoral" is the view we're proposing. You're saying that "at the metaethical level," that stance is a matter of them feeling a particular way about illegal actions. But then you're saying that . . . I don't know, simply by calling it "normative" or "applied," it's something else? That makes no sense.

One day, the law could say. Gay Marriage is illegal. That person would now think gay marriage is immoral because it is illegal. The next day, Gay Marriage could become legal. That next day, the same person would now think gay marriage is moral, because it is now legal. — chatterbears

Right, because the person in question feels that something being illegal is sufficient for it to be immoral. So how is that not a way they feel just in case we're somehow construing it as normative or applied?

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Having a subjective basis for morality is separate from how your normative ethics work. I can agree that at the metaethcal level, moral values are completely subjective. But going a level above that (normative and applied ethics), it doesn't become subjective. One can base their ethics on whatever the law dictates.

Metaethics: I feel it is right to base your morals on the law. (subjective)

Normative ethics: What is morally right is what is legal. What is morally wrong is what is illegal. (descriptive)

Applied ethics: It is wrong to steal, because it is illegal. — chatterbears

Have you seriously considered that you do not know what you are talking about? You are clearly philosophically ignorant, and unlike Terrapin I simply do not have the patience to educate someone who thinks they know what they are talking about but do not.

I'm interested in tactical arguments, you're interested in moral arguments. I'm interested in what might actually cause a person to stop killing animals. You're interested in positioning yourself as superior. We have different agendas.

Feel free to pursue your agenda, they're your posts to do with as you wish. — Jake

You can claim I am interested in positioning myself as superior, but that's your wrongful assumption.

You can claim I am interested in positioning myself as superior, but that's your wrongful assumption. — chatterbears

A way to counter my wrongful assumption would be to prove that wagging our fingers in people's faces and accusing them of moral crimes is the most effective way to convert them to vegetarianism. My complaint is only that I don't see that as a very effective tactic.

There's a severe ethical fallacy there; equivocation. — VagabondSpectre

Can you tell me exactly which word(s) I am equivocating here?

Human consumption (and killing) of animals exists on ranges of necessary to sport and humane to sadistic; moral to immoral. The molestation of children is never necessary or humane or moral. — VagabondSpectre

If you want to make a broad view of "the molestation of children is never necessary", I can pull a hypothetical out to disprove your statement. Imagine a scenario where a person has a gun to 3 of your family members, and tells you that he will kill all 3 of your family members unless you molest a child, would you not say it is then a "necessary" action to do so in order to save the lives of 3 people? You may come back and say, "This is a rare situation that will most likely never happen." - Well, let's put you on the flip side. Grains, rice, pasta, beans, corn, lentils, fruits, vegetables, avocado, mushrooms, bread, soy milk, almond milk, etc... These are all options available to you, and some of the poorest countries in the world have an abundance of some of these foods (in many countries, meat is more expensive than grains). Similar to the stance you claimed for the molestation of children, killing animals is never necessary or humane or moral. The times you will be stranded alone in a dessert or forest, is a rare situation that will most likely never happen (just as the gun to your head scenario). But if you ever did encounter that situation, to kill an animal for your survival (or the survival of others), would be necessary.

You should be more specific about the practices you decry when making these kinds of comparisons. If killing and eating an animal is broadly akin to molestation, you should therefore support the eradication (or total incarceration) of lions and other predators who can only exist in the numbers that they do by inflicting pain and suffering on herbivores. If humans are wrong to thrive at the expense of other species, surely other apex predators are wrong as well, and even though they don't know better, we can still prevent them from doing more harm by taking action against them. — VagabondSpectre

I've already debunked this point with you before. We never hold an infant or a mentally disabled person accountable for their actions in the same respect we would hold you and I accountable. Similarly, we wouldn't hold a wild animal accountable who does not have the ability to self-reflect and evaluate their actions. Plus, wild animals eat other animals out of necessity, because they are forced to for their own survival. We kill animals for pleasure, not survival.

I suspect that whatever justification you employ to allow lions to continue hunting gazelles can also be used to justify the consumption of animals by humans, at least to some extent. — VagabondSpectre

Lions also commit infanticide. If I commit infanticide tomorrow, and you called me out for it, could I respond to you in the same way you have responded to me. "But lions do it, so why can't I?"

You must believe the lives of wild animals are worth living (hence your objection to our taking of them) but in reality the lives of wild animals are often filled with much greater hardship and suffering than the lives of some farm animals. What's your argument against traditional farming suited for developing countries? — VagabondSpectre

Baseless assertions here. To claim that the lives of wild animals are worse than factory farmed animals, is absurd.

A way to counter my wrongful assumption would be to prove that wagging our fingers in people's faces and accusing them of moral crimes is the most effective way to convert them to vegetarianism. My complaint is only that I don't see that as a very effective tactic. — Jake

And as I have pointed out with my child molester analogy, do you think it is better to point out what is wrong about the actions committed by the child molester? Or should we give the child molester a replacement (robot life like child)?

I am pointing out what is wrong with our actions in regards to animal slaughter. You think it is more "tactical" to offer a replacement, rather than talk about the ethics behind it.

This is mostly to Terrapin, since Dingo thinks he is cool by announcing he doesn't have the patience to "educate" someone on ethics in a philosophy forum.

Terrapin - Do you believe everything we know about anything (health, math, logic, ethics, etc...) is all subjective?

MetaHealth: I feel it is right to base your health on scientific knowledge. (subjective)
Normative Health: What is healthy is what is scientifically beneficial to the body.
Applied Health: It is bad to smoke because it is not beneficial to the body.

My point is. At the base level, of ALL knowledge and ALL systems, you are going to have an axiom. Which is essentially an unjustified assumption at the base of your system. We all have axioms for ethics, health, logic, etc....You cannot prove logic is true. At the base of logic, you have foundational assumptions, such as the law of non-contradiction. You can't "prove" this law is true in some objective way. You have to accept it as an axiom.

Back to the original point. From what Terrapin is suggesting, everything we know about anything, is completely subjective, and nobody works off an objective criteria. Even within science. Because if you keep asking "why" and get down to the root level of any foundation, the answer will always be "because I feel this is right". But once we get past the 'meta' of any topic, whether that is ethics or logic, we have to establish what the objective(normative) goal is.

Can you tell me exactly which word(s) I am equivocating here? — chatterbears

Molestation and the consumption of animals. You're not equivocating the definition of words, you're equivocating the moral implications of two unrelated actions. (establishing/portraying one as abhorrent by associating/liking it to another which is universally agreed to be abhorrent, when they are not in fact similar.

We never hold an infant or a mentally disabled person accountable for their actions in the same respect we would hold you and I accountable. Similarly, we wouldn't hold a wild animal accountable who does not have the ability to self-reflect and evaluate their actions. Plus, wild animals eat other animals out of necessity, because they are forced to for their own survival. We kill animals for pleasure, not survival. — chatterbears

But we still need to correct the actions of children, and if a lion is like an innocent child who doesn't know better, does that give it the right to ravage innocent ruminants? We could put a stop to the endless suffering of these animals by exterminating lions, and why not? Just because lions exist, they should be permitted to terrorize and consume their prey for all time?

The existence of a prey animal who is about to be killed depends on the extermination of the predator who is about to kill it, so what's the harm in killing the lion to save the lamb? Are their lives unequal? If lions became more and more successful, driving other animals to extinction, should we intervene then? In other words, are lions aloud to exploit other animals in order to expand and thrive as a species? If so, I see no reason why humans cannot be permitted to do so, to some degree

Lions also commit infanticide. If I commit infanticide tomorrow, and you called me out for it, could I respond to you in the same way you have responded to me. "But lions do it, so why can't I?" — chatterbears

This is another false moral equivalence. Infanticide is not the same as hunting wild animals (what lions and some humans do) and what I consider to be the ethical raising of farm animals (again, NOT factory farming).

My point with the lions is that their existence (and ability to thrive) is totally dependent on the suffering of other innocent creatures. It is a mere happenstance of their nature, and if you want to say that permitting them to continue ravaging ruminants is O.K because of a mere happenstance of nature, then I can say that it's also O.K for humans to farm animals to the degree that our existence and ability to thrive is dependent on animal exploitation.

In other words, if the cessation of the exploitation of animals would cause damage to out short or long term ability to thrive, and we should do so anyway, then there is some parallel that would justify exterminating lions because it would be wrong of us to let them carry on murdering innocent creatures.

Baseless assertions here. To claim that the lives of wild animals are worse than factory farmed animals, is absurd. — chatterbears

Well, let's make the closest comparisons we can:

Cows are descended from forest roaming beasts who once lived nomadic lives in small herds (or so I've been told). They likely had relatively high infant morality given the difficulties of birth, and throughout their lives they would have to be alert and fearful of violent predators. Due to being constantly exposed to the elements year round, they were very hardy, but they still suffered, and injury/old age were death sentences. When it comes to death, they suddenly keeled over if they were lucky, else they slowly starved due to incapacitation, or were eaten alive by predators.

Cows get protection from wild predators, making them much less fearful and reducing stress. They are given food and shelter, which can make them fat and happy, and medical care which can allow them to recover from a host of ailments that would otherwise cause prolonged suffering. The actual conditions that farm animals endure varies greatly, and there are lines that we should not cross. On some farms, animals enjoy a very high quality of life, and their death is quick and painless compared with the deaths of their wild counterparts.

Terrapin - Do you believe everything we know about anything (health, math, logic, ethics, etc...) is all subjective? — chatterbears

First, keep in mind that I use the subjective/objective distinction simply to refer to whether something is mental or extramental, by which I simply mean whether something is a subset of brain phenomena (the mental subset, of course) or whether it occurs in the world outside of that subset of brain phenomena.

Given that, it should be obvious (because otherwise I wouldn't make the distinction that way) that I don't believe that everything is subjective. It depends on whether the thing in question is a mental phenomenon.

We can know about objective things. We can know about automobiles, for example. Automobiles, that is, the actual things we drive around town, aren't mental phenomena.

Knowledge itself, though, is a mental phenomenon. So in the sense that we're referring to knowledge qua knowledge, it is subjective. Propositional knowledge, for example, is justified true belief. Beliefs are mental phenomena. Beliefs are not found in the world outside of mental phenomena. But we can (subjectively) know about objective things.

Re "Normative Health: What is healthy is what is scientifically beneficial to the body." The "beneficial" assessment is subjective. "X is a benefit" only makes sense in a context of someone desiring either x itself or some state that x entails.

And so with, "Applied Health: It is bad to smoke because it is not beneficial to the body," we have two subjective assessments that are about desires/preferences--"bad" and "beneficial."

I'm not saying that what smoking does to one's body is subjective--that's not a mental phenomenon (leaving aside the mental effects of nicotine, etc.). I'm saying that preferring the state of the body sans smoking to the state of the body accompanied by smoking is subjective.

Outside of us thinking about it, outside of us feeling however we feel, desiring whatever we desire, preferring whatever we prefer, there are only possible states for things to be in. There are no preferred states, no better states, etc. outside of us making evaluations based on our dispositions, which are (at least potentially) individually variable. The world outside of us, outside of our minds, couldn't care less whether we smoke or not smoke, whether we're in one physical state versus another, whether we live or die. It's individual humans who desire one state versus another. Different humans (at least potentially) desire different things. We can't get "x is the preferred state" objectively wrong, because there are no objective facts about preferred states to get wrong (except for the objective fact that there are no objectively preferred states).

So re this:

From what Terrapin is suggesting, everything we know about anything, is completely subjective, — chatterbears

The important thing to remember, which is basically a summary of the above, is that knowledge qua knowledge has the ontological property of being subjective (because knowledge is a type of belief), but what the knowledge is about or of can be objective. However, knowledge can't be about something objective when we're talking about something for which there are no objective facts, because it doesn't occur outside of our minds, and moral judgments, moral principles, etc. are some of those things (for which there are no objective facts).

I think I mostly agree with what you are saying, but maybe I didn't ask my question properly initially.

For moral questions, you seem to say that all moral perspectives/stances/etc... are based on "feeling". Would you say the same thing about health, logic, English language, math, etc...?

In the same way that desiring a healthy body is subjective (based on feeling), making moral assessments about one's interaction with the world is also subjective (based on feeling). Maybe we should temporarily toss the word "subjective" out, as it seems to be causing minor confusion.

What I want to know is, do you think most of these things are "based on feeling" at their foundation? As we explained in metaethics, it is based on feeling at it's core. Same goes for health, logic, language, math, etc.... correct?

English: There's a rule in English that states, "I before E except after C". There's no way you can "prove" this is true/correct/right, other than saying you "feel" it is right to follow this rule.

Ethics: There could be a rule in an ethical system that states, "Maximize the well being of sentient creatures." There's no way you can "prove" this is true/correct/right, other than saying you "feel" it is right to follow this rule.

Logic: In classical logic, there is a rule called the law of non contradiction. There's no way you can "prove" this is true/correct/right, other than saying you "feel" it is right to follow this rule.

Math: A prime number is a whole number greater than 1 whose only factors are 1 and itself. There's no way you can "prove" this is true/correct/right, other than saying you "feel" it is right to follow this rule.

I think you get my point. You can use this type of thinking for pretty much everything we can know or understand. That, at the base of each area, it becomes about what you "feel" is the right thing to do. But as I have pointed out before, despite the core foundation being subjective (based on feeling), you can still make objective assessments based on the subjective criteria you agree upon. And in this instance, I am defining subjective as (based on personal opinion or preference), and I am defining objective as (not based on personal opinion or preference). Here's how that would work.

(subjective foundation) Based on personal feeling: I believe it is best to base morality on the law.
(objective assessment) Not based on personal feeling: Action X was immoral because it did not abide by the law.

Once you lay down the foundation, you can then make objective assessments based on that criteria. Meaning, it doesn't matter how someone feels that day, or if they prefer something else that morning compared to the day before, because if they base their actions on what the law says, we can assess their actions from an objective standpoint, and state that they are committing an immoral action based on the criteria of "not abiding by the law".

You can use this same line of reasoning with health, English, logic, math, etc... Would you agree?

And just to be clear, these "rules" I am referring to at the base of the systems, are called Axioms. You cannot "prove" an axiom is right, correct or true. An Axiom is something you need to accept to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments.

I think I established that in a previous post, but just wanted to be clear.

For moral questions, you seem to say that all moral perspectives/stances/etc... are based on "feeling". Would you say the same thing about health, logic, English language, math, etc...? — chatterbears

Insofar as you're making value judgments about those things. That's what I'm talking about--value judgments. Ethics and aesthetics are the two major fields of philosophy focused on value judgments per se.

Outside of making value judgments we're doing other sorts of things.

Re your examples, I'd need to clarify how you're using "right." Presumably you're not using "right" in a moral sense, are you? If you're using it in a normative sense--"One should do this because . . . (whatever the reason(s) would be)" then that's ultimately going to come down to preferences, which are "feelings" in the sense we're talking about.

You can use this type of thinking for pretty much everything we can know or understand. — chatterbears

With respect to saying that "such and such is 'right'" in either a moral or normative sense, sure. Why anyone would say that something like the principle of noncontradiction is right in a normative sense, I don't know. That's a rather weird thing to say. The crux of the principle of noncontradiction, for example, is usually conceivability/coherence. To the vast majority of people, the notion of "obtaining contradictions" seems incoherent/it's inconceivable. That's not anything about feelings/preferenes. It's about conceivability, which is different.

Other things, like spelling conventions, are just that--conventions, and we follow them for the sake of understandability.

It's important to understand the distinction between making value judgments and doing other sorts of things. "Right" seems to be a sort of value judgment in your examples, although I wouldn't guess that the sense of "right" being employed is the same in each example, and unless we're saying something pretty weird, we're not talking about a moral sense of "right."

you can still make objective assessments based on the subjective criteria you agree upon. — chatterbears

Re that, I definitely agree with it. But we don't agree on whether it's morally permissible to eat animals, especially because for me, that functions as a moral foundation. We can't go a "level down" to see if we agree on what "it's morally permissible/impermissible to eat animals" is based on in my case, because it's not based on some other moral stance (and remember that only moral stances imply other moral stances. Something that's not a moral stance can't imply a moral stance).

Outside of making value judgments we're doing other sorts of things. — Terrapin Station

Other things, like spelling conventions, are just that--conventions, and we follow them for the sake of understandability. — Terrapin Station

It's important to understand the distinction between making value judgments and doing other sorts of things. "Right" seems to be a sort of value judgment in your examples, although I wouldn't guess that the sense of "right" being employed is the same in each example, and unless we're saying something pretty weird, we're not talking about a moral sense of "right." — Terrapin Station

Whether you want to say understandability, conceivability, or livability, doesn't matter. These are still things you need to value before you can say they are useful or important to follow. That's the point. In the case of language, you point to understandability, but I could ask you, why should one value understandability? This would then come down to personal feeling. In the case of logic, you point to conceivability, but I could ask you, why should one value conceivability? This would then come down to personal feeling. Same with morality. You have asked me, why should one value the well being of sentient creatures? This would then come down to personal feeling.

Re your examples, I'd need to clarify how you're using "right." Presumably you're not using "right" in a moral sense, are you? If you're using it in a normative sense--"One should do this because . . . (whatever the reason(s) would be)" then that's ultimately going to come down to preferences, which are "feelings" in the sense we're talking about. — Terrapin Station

"Right" is the 'ought'. What one 'ought' to value as correct/right/etc... Essentially what you just said, which is "one should do this because." - In the case of noncontradiction, you are essentially saying, "One should do this because it is conceivable." - You haven't escaped the problem of feelings or preference. As I asked in the response above this one, why should one value conceivability? Also, your definition of conceivable may differ from mine, and I may not include the law of noncontradiction in what I view as conceivable. Therefore, you cannot tell me I am wrong/incorrect if I do not adopt the law of noncontradiction in the same way you do. Correct?

That's not anything about feelings/preferenes. It's about conceivability, which is different. — Terrapin Station

You're making an error here. You need to address the axiom put in place, which is the law of noncontradiction. Can you prove that following the law of noncontradiction is nothing other than personal preference? You say, "it's not personal preference, it's conceivability." - Could I not just use the same line of reasoning about morality? I can say, it's not about personal preference, it's about maximizing well-being. You would then say, "Why should one value maximizing well-being?". In which my reply would be, "Why should one value conceivability?"

Re that, I definitely agree with it. But we don't agree on whether it's morally permissible to eat animals, especially because for me, that functions as a moral foundation. We can't go a "level down" to see if we agree on what "it's morally permissible/impermissible to eat animals" is based on in my case, because it's not based on some other moral stance (and remember that only moral stances imply other moral stances. Something that's not a moral stance can't imply a moral stance). — Terrapin Station

I don't see how that would function as a moral foundation... You can down a level, and here's how.

Level 3: It is immoral to eat animals.
Level 2: It is morally right to maximize the well-being and rights of sentient beings.
Level 1: I feel that one should value the well-being and rights of sentient beings.

"Right" is the 'ought'. What one 'ought' to value as correct/right/etc... Essentially what you just said, which is "one should do this because." — chatterbears

Okay, so normatives. Normatives are preferences, yes. The problem is this:

- In the case of noncontradiction, you are essentially saying, "One should do this because it is conceivable." -

Where is anyone "essentially" saying that? Can you give an example maybe?

I want to just address this first, because I see this as a highly controversial claim. (Also, I'm not personally a fan of normatives, by the way.)

Molestation and the consumption of animals. You're not equivocating the definition of words, you're equivocating the moral implications of two unrelated actions. (establishing/portraying one as abhorrent by associating/liking it to another which is universally agreed to be abhorrent, when they are not in fact similar. — VagabondSpectre

Few problems here.

1. Explain why molestation is abhorrent but the contriubtion to animal rape, torture and slaughter is not.

2. Just because something is universally agreed upon, does not make it true/correct. At one point, slavery was universally agreed upon, but did that mean it was the right thing to do?

3. The two actions are related. Both actions (molestation & animal torture/slaughter) are causing pain and suffering to a sentient being. If you want to say that an animal's pain is worth nothing compared to a human's pain, you need to explain why. Many of the world's pet owners (who have dogs) would already disagree with you, btw.

We never hold an infant or a mentally disabled person accountable for their actions in the same respect we would hold you and I accountable. Similarly, we wouldn't hold a wild animal accountable who does not have the ability to self-reflect and evaluate their actions. Plus, wild animals eat other animals out of necessity, because they are forced to for their own survival. We kill animals for pleasure, not survival. — chatterbears

But we still need to correct the actions of children, and if a lion is like an innocent child who doesn't know better, does that give it the right to ravage innocent ruminants? We could put a stop to the endless suffering of these animals by exterminating lions, and why not? Just because lions exist, they should be permitted to terrorize and consume their prey for all time? — VagabondSpectre

More problems.

1. We correct the actions of children because they grow up and learn more about self-reflection and how their actions affect other people. Lions never have this type of learning development. Lions are essentially 2-year olds that never grow up.

2. The fact that you focus on lions so much, shows me that you are not grasping these concepts about why something is immoral, and what types of animals have moral agency. Lions have little to no moral agency, similar to an infant. Therefore, we do not hold them accountable for the harms they cause other creatures. If a 1-year old hits another 1-year old in the face, are you going to exterminate that 1-year old?

The existence of a prey animal who is about to be killed depends on the extermination of the predator who is about to kill it, so what's the harm in killing the lion to save the lamb? Are their lives unequal? If lions became more and more successful, driving other animals to extinction, should we intervene then? In other words, are lions aloud to exploit other animals in order to expand and thrive as a species? If so, I see no reason why humans cannot be permitted to do so, to some degree. — VagabondSpectre

Again, you are comparing the morality of lions to humans. And if lions can do it, humans should be permitted to do so, to some degree, correct?

Back to my original statement, which you completely dodged. If a lion commits infanticide, should humans be permitted to commit infanticide as well, to some degree?

This is another false moral equivalence. Infanticide is not the same as hunting wild animals (what lions and some humans do) and what I consider to be the ethical raising of farm animals (again, NOT factory farming). — VagabondSpectre

I never said infanticide is the same as hunting wild animals. But you don't get to cherry pick what lions do in order to justify your moral actions. If you want to claim, "Lions can kill other animals, therefore humans should be permitted to do so as well", you cannot stop at that one action. If you want to justify your actions on the basis of lion behavior, you need to be willing to accept other lion behavior.

Well, let's make the closest comparisons we can: — VagabondSpectre

Your last few paragraphs were the result of buying into propaganda and the lack of research on your part. If you want to actually know what happens in animal agriculture, watch the youtube video I linked in the original post of this thread. Or just google "Dominion 2018" and watch it.

Where is anyone "essentially" saying that? Can you give an example maybe? I want to just address this first, because I see this as a highly controversial claim. — Terrapin Station

Then correct me if I am wrong, but it seemed like this is what you were implying. This is what the line of reasoning seemed to be.

I stated: Many systems have axioms, including logic. Such as the law of noncontradiction. You have to accept these axioms as self-evidently true, before you can move forward. The only way to accept something as self-evidently true, is what you personally prefer.

You said: Accepting the law of noncontradiction as true isn't about personal preference, it is about conceivability.

I then asked: Why should one value conceivability?

Then correct me if I am wrong, but it seemed like this is what you were implying. This is what the line of reasoning seemed to be.

I stated: Many systems have axioms, including logic. Such as the law of noncontradiction. You have to accept these axioms as self-evidently true, before you can move forward. The only way to accept something as self-evidently true, is what you personally prefer.

You said: Accepting the law of noncontradiction as true isn't about personal preference, it is about conceivability.

I then asked: Why should one value conceivability? — chatterbears

First, it's not a matter of valuing conceivability or coherence. You couldn't choose to engage with something that's inconceivable or incoherent to you--by definition you can't conceive of it and/or it makes no sense to you!

Regarding axioms, with respect to fields like logic and mathematics, they're typically seen as simply stipulated--rather in the manner of setting up the rules of a game. "Here's how we're going to play this game." And there are different ways to play different games. There are different species of logics, for example, with some of them incompatible with each other. (For example, paraconsistent logics allow at least some true contradictions.) Or re mathematics, re geometry, for example, we can play the game with Euclidean axioms or with Riemannian axioms,

You do NOT have to accept the axioms as true--at least not in any "extra-systemic" way--in order to play the games in question. You're just operating with them as givens. It's just like you do not need to accept that it's true--outside of the context of the game, at least--that there is or was a Colonel Mustard to play Clue.

Finally, something seeming self-evidently true to someone isn't at all about their preferences. They might very well prefer that things were otherwise. They might prefer to believe something else. Or maybe they have no preference about it.

You do NOT have to accept the axioms as true--at least not in any "extra-systemic" way--in order to play the games in question. You're just operating with them as givens. It's just like you do not need to accept that it's true--outside of the context of the game, at least--that there is or was a Colonel Mustard to play Clue. — Terrapin Station

Similarly, you can do the same with ethics. To put it in your terms, you do NOT have to accept the axioms as true, but you are operating with them as givens.

Law of noncontradiction = A given
Maximizing the rights and well-being of sentient creatures = A given

Finally, something seeming self-evidently true to someone isn't at all about their preferences. They might very well prefer that things were otherwise. They might prefer to believe something else. Or maybe they have no preference about it. — Terrapin Station

Ok, so accepting axioms as a "given" is not about their preferences? Could I not say the same about ethics?

"I have no preference about accepting the self-evidently true axiom of maximizing the well-being and rights of sentient creatures. I just accept this as a given." [Therefore, my ethics are not based on personal preference.]

Maximizing the rights and well-being of sentient creatures — chatterbears

Again, I wouldn't even say that that is a moral stance. But sure, we can just state it as "It is morally obligatory (or whatever one would want to say like that) to maximize the rights and well-being of sentient creatures."

For one, I'd say that that can't be true. No moral stance can be. I'm a noncognitivist. Moral (and aesthetic) utterances are not the sorts of things that can be true or false. True/false is a category error for moral and aesthetic utterances.

But let's try to ignore that and imagine either that they are the sorts of things that can be true or false, or alternately, just say that "Joe could adopt 'it is morally obligatory to maximize the rights and well-being of sentient creatures' as a foundational moral stance, even though Joe doesn't actually feel that way."

One problem I have with that is that insofar as someone isn't engaging in stances that they feel are right/wrong judgments about interpersonal behavior, I wouldn't say that they're actually engaging in ethics period. It's imperative in my view, for it to be ethics/morality, for the person in question to personally endorse the stances they're espousing. That's because the whole nut of ethics is making certain types of value judgments. Well, if you're not making value judgments, then you're not engaging in it. It's just like aesthetics, which is all about making another sort of value judgment. If you're just repeating someone else's "Frank Zappa is a better composer than Mozart," you're not actually doing aesthetics.

But let's imagine that we don't require that.

Well, what's to stop Joe from instead adopting "It is morally obligatory to NOT maximize the rights and well-being of sentient creatures" as his moral "axiom"?

If you're simply making the point that people can adopt arbitrary moral axioms that they don't agree with, then okay, but why would you be making that point?

1. Explain why molestation is abhorrent but the contriubtion to animal rape, torture and slaughter is not. — chatterbears

Rape and torture not withstanding, "slaughter" serves useful purposes. Explain to me why the lion killing the gazelle is not abhorrent?

2. Just because something is universally agreed upon, does not make it true/correct. At one point, slavery was universally agreed upon, but did that mean it was the right thing to do? — chatterbears

There's no point sidetracking into a discussion about molestation...

3. The two actions are related. Both actions (molestation & animal torture/slaughter) are causing pain and suffering to a sentient being. If you want to say that an animal's pain is worth nothing compared to a human's pain, you need to explain why. Many of the world's pet owners (who have dogs) would already disagree with you, btw. — chatterbears

The two actions cause pain, but beyond that there are no other similarities. Sometimes being honest with people causes them pain, is honesty akin to rape?

1. We correct the actions of children because they grow up and learn more about self-reflection and how their actions affect other people. Lions never have this type of learning development. Lions are essentially 2-year olds that never grow up. — chatterbears

Please answer the question: why should I not kill the lions?

If a 1-year old hits another 1-year old in the face, are you going to exterminate that 1-year old? — chatterbears

Are you going to let that child continue to hit the other in the face, or will you intervene?

Your inability to answer my questions is much more revealing than my use of lion analogies.

Again, you are comparing the morality of lions to humans. And if lions can do it, humans should be permitted to do so, to some degree, correct?

Back to my original statement, which you completely dodged. If a lion commits infanticide, should humans be permitted to commit infanticide as well, to some degree? — chatterbears

We're not talking about justifications for infanticide, or molestation, or rape, or torture. The argument isn't "well since lions can do it...", it's actually "what's different about lions that makes you forbid me from killing them to save the gazelles?". I'm not saying anything lions do, we should do, I'm saying that you're a hypocrite for not caring about the deaths of wild animals by not assenting to the extermination of lions. The stupidity of lions (their amorality) isn't an excuse to let them continue to torture and slaughter their helpless prey

Ultimately, by showing that your reasoning does indeed justify the slaughter of all lions, It becomes obvious that your position is incompatible with a world view that actually embraces nature (instead of mostly romanticizing it).

I never said infanticide is the same as hunting wild animals. But you don't get to cherry pick what lions do in order to justify your moral actions. If you want to claim, "Lions can kill other animals, therefore humans should be permitted to do so as well", you cannot stop at that one action. If you want to justify your actions on the basis of lion behavior, you need to be willing to accept other lion behavior. — chatterbears

I'm attacking the consistency of your own moral view by showing it doesn't coherently forbid the eradication of lions in the name of protecting other life. You haven't once told me it would be wrong to exterminate the lions, you just offered inconclusive observations like "but lions are dumb".

Your last few paragraphs were the result of buying into propaganda and the lack of research on your part. If you want to actually know what happens in animal agriculture, watch the youtube video I linked in the original post of this thread. Or just google "Dominion 2018" and watch it. — chatterbears

If you're going to accuse me of buying in to propaganda (ad hominem) at least don't shill your own propaganda in the same paragraph.

That video is entirely about factory farming, a practice which I've already condemned. By constantly leaning back on bombastic equivocations (molestation, rape, etc), and refusing to address my actual position (re: traditional farming, not factory farming) you prevent this discussion from actually getting anywhere.

If you could answer my question about the lions, that would be very satisfying. Why should I not kill the lions to save the prey animals? (I know you will say the lion is stupid and therefore not to blame, but being stupid should not give someone or something a free pass to slaughter innocent life, should it? If it does, then the ignorance of the human race also justifies its meat consumption)...

Let me explain where I'm coming from: evolution has pitted life against life; to some degree it's a zero sum game, where the benefits of some species are the burdens of others. It's not just carnivores/omnivores causing problems either; too many ruminants can cause soil erosion, destroying habitat for many other critters; new arrivals to ecosystems generally lead to prolonged disequilibria, and even within a species there can be high stakes competition. For humans to exist in any large numbers, we MUST occupy and alter territory and ecosystems that would otherwise serve other species, and in doing so we damage them. Regardless of which individuals or species thrive, they will have likely done so at the expense (or opportunity cost) of others. Lions are a good example because they exclusively eat meat and therefore can only exist and thrive by directly and violently exploiting other forms of life. But if we wanted to, we could sterilize all the wild lions and keep a single group of them alive, in captivity, indefinitely, and feed them only lab grown proteins. In that sense lions as a species don't need to eat meat to continue existing; lions don't need to continue existing whatsoever, why should we let them? (note: this question is a paralell with "why should we let humans continue to thrive by exploiting animals?)

Summon your intuition and give me a serious answer about what you think the relationship lions have to the rest of the animal kingdom should be. Where lions have lost territory, should they be reintroduced to hunt the animals now living there free of lion related terror? Should we seek to maintain the existing lion population? Are we morally obligated to laissez faire? (to let the chips fall where they may?).

Deep down I think you realize that if you cling to the idea it is inherently/necessarily/sufficiently wrong to exploit another animal to any degree, then you would agree that the extermination of all lions is at worst morally neutral, because it preserves the lives of prey species. To avoid this, you will have to accept that some degree of exploitation of other species is acceptable (or necessary), and that is exactly what mitigates the moral guilt of humans for exploiting other animals. To exist and have thrived in the first place, we had to exploit on some level, and while it's true our increasing powers demand greater moral responsibility (we should exploit other animals less and less as we gain alternative options), there is, as yet, no widespread absolute responsibility that we refrain from exploiting animals in any way; we're not yet capable of doing so from economic and technological perspectives.

Rape and torture not withstanding, "slaughter" serves useful purposes. Explain to me why the lion killing the gazelle is not abhorrent? — VagabondSpectre

Not going to address anything beyond this until you address this point. Are you saying that anything which serves a useful purpose is morally permissible. Slavery has a useful purpose to the slave owner. Therefore, by your logic, slavery is morally permissible, correct?