I don't think Wittgenstein really believes that we can't say a meter stick is 1 meter long, — fdrake
This is in the context of describing the language game of (48) in which there is a pattern of coloured squares, which are given signs. So how is this a "different" way? That language game of (48) is an exemplar, sample, or standard. It is a matter of pointing to a paradigm. Is he now saying that to understand that paradigm, we must refer to a further paradigm? Of course this would be just a recipe for infinite regress.Well it was presupposed that the use of the signs in the language-game would be taught in a different way, in particular by pointing to paradigms.
the predication or its negation or complement serve no purpose in a genuine language-game, the predication and its negation or complement are judged to have violated a rule of philosophical grammar
So what's going on at 51 when he says the following?
Well it was presupposed that the use of the signs in the language-game would be taught in a different way, in particular by pointing to paradigms.
This is in the context of describing the language game of (48) in which there is a pattern of coloured squares, which are given signs. So how is this a "different" way? That language game of (48) is an exemplar, sample, or standard. It is a matter of pointing to a paradigm. Is he now saying that to understand that paradigm, we must refer to a further paradigm? Of course this would be just a recipe for infinite regress.
Or, is it the case that he is trying to lead us away from this idea of pointing to a paradigm? He hasn't yet answered what "correspondence" consists of, and maybe he has a different explanation, something other than pointing to a paradigm. — Metaphysician Undercover
I understand (I think) the references you're making, but I'm not clear what it is you're actually arguing against.
Is it the idea, made earlier I think, that there are games in which the expression "the Standard Metre is 1m in length" may be meaningful? — Isaac
There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. — Wittgenstein, PI §50
If so, how do you square that with Wittgenstein's later discussion about holding the colours as samples in our memory at some times, yet at still other times we might refer to expectation (such as mixing chemicals). It seems clear to me that he is making the point, not that there is some absolute rule about a sample such as the Standard Metre, but rather that its rule depends on the language game? — Isaac
Insofar as we find it necessary to begin testing and checking the size of the standard metre bar, the bar is thereby deprived of its special epistemic status. It is de facto no longer functioning thereafter as fulfilling the language-game criteriological role of a standard of unit length. A standard or criterion, whether of metric length, colour, or of identity conditions for an individual private sensation, is never treated in such a way while its language-game role continues, but rather with something amounting to respect for the dignity of its exceptional responsibility. — Dale Jacquette, Measure for measure? Wittgenstein on language-game criteria and the Paris standard metre bar.
Could we not follow exactly Wittgenstein's later example I mentioned above to say "the standard metre is not 1m long" and mean by it "the standard metre must be broken because it is nowhere near my memory of how long a metre is". That seems to me to be a perfectly coherent use of the expression consistent with what Wittgenstein seems to be saying. — Isaac
I wonder whether the same argument would hold against the current standard metre, defined in terms of the speed of light — Luke
Thanks for the clarification, so no one's trying to to say that one can 'never' say that the Standard Metre is or is not 1m long, — Isaac
W indicates that the teaching of the signs consists of pointing to paradigms, where the paradigms here are the colours (or the coloured squares), and associating those colours with the signs/words/letters "R", "B", etc. However, how is this correspondence maintained in the use of these signs? We would presume that it consists of something other than pointing to paradigms (i.e. something other than ostensive definition). — Luke
When he says "recall", I believe that this is a reference back to the same principle discussed at 31. So "learning how to play according to a rule" is not necessarily a matter of learning the rule. He again (like at 31) states the possibility of learning to play by the rule, simply by observing the play of the game, without actually learning the rule. In this case there would be no paradigm pointed to, in the sense of a sample pointed to as the rule.54 Let us recall the kinds of case where we say that a game is
played according to a definite rule.
An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which
it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game.
But whether it 'is a word or a proposition' depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. For instance, if A has to describe complexes of coloured squares to B and he uses the word "R" alone, we shall be able to say that the word is a description—a proposition.
But if he is memorizing the words and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we shall not say that they are propositions. In this situation the word "R", for instance, is not a description; it names an element——.
...but it would be queer to make that a reason for saying that an element can only be named! For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description.
The words of §48 ‘correspond’ to colours, but what does the correspondence consist in (‘what does “the name-relation” consist in?’)? The description of §48 merely set up this connection, but did not say what it was. The first response is that ‘R’, ‘W’, etc., would be taught by pointing at paradigms. This is correct. But this is to say something about the ‘preparation’ for the language-game. We want an explanation of what correspondence consists in in the practice of the language; i.e. we want to know how the teaching relates to the practice of using the signs. In particular, we must reveal the normative component of teaching that provides a standard of correct use. — Baker & Hacker, Understanding and Meaning Volume 1, Part II
What do you expect the paradigms would be in the case of language-game (2)? I assume that the name of each stone would be taught via ostensive definition, by being associated with a pattern; with 'stones that look like this'. For other objects, it may not be about what the object 'looks like'; it might be what it smells, tastes or feels like, or something else. — Luke
But the point is that the name is more than just a label affixed to the object. — Metaphysician Undercover
The name maintains meaning when the object is destroyed. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the "paradigm" by which the name is taught must be something other than the object. — Metaphysician Undercover
What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made.
Yes, because the name is not the object. — Luke
Yes, the paradigm is the archetypal object. Wittgenstein gives an approximate definition of 'paradigm' at §50: — Luke
An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game.
At §56, Wittgenstein challenges the notion that paradigms can be mental rather than public. — Luke
It's impossible that the paradigm is an archetypal object, because according to 55, it is impossible that the paradigm is an object. An archetypal object is an object, and therefore cannot be the paradigm. — Metaphysician Undercover
(my bolding).Let us imagine samples of colours being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "Sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not.
It makes no sense to say that the standard metre is not one metre long, — Luke
What was impossible? Making sure that the stick stayed one metre long... — Banno
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