Free will requires us to have autonomous control over our actions. Actions are initiated by mental states, specifically preferences. — darthbarracuda
We have no control over our preferences: — darthbarracuda
We like things not because we chose to like them but because these preferences were forced on us. — darthbarracuda
Because of this, any attempt at a radical metaphysical rebellious existentialism is going to be shallow as it ignores our inability to free ourselves from our preferences to begin with. The only rebellion worthy of such a name would be one in which the agent performs actions that are entirely against his own preferences - which is impossible to do without having a preference to rebel in the first place. — darthbarracuda
Part of me actually finds this to be kind of horrifying. — darthbarracuda
Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills. — schopenhauer1
Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.”
― Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms — schopenhauer1
Sometimes people feel pain, hate it and do nothing about it. Indeed, you might have acted that way. You just chose to tend to it. — TheWillowOfDarkness
"Rebellious existentialism" isn't interested in freeing anyone from preferences. It's point is one cannot free themselves from their preference-- you must choose, you must have a preference and there is no other state which can define it. Its freedom is defined in our inability to determine our preferences — TheWillowOfDarkness
Despite lacking free will, our brains tend to do what we prefer and avoid what we don't enjoy, thanks to millions of years of programming behind it — Weeknd
"Actions are initiated by mental states" looks as if it is saying something other than "we initiate actions". — unenlightened
Which is of course true.
For every action there is a preference. The act of choosing one's preferences is an act itself, which requires a preference that was not chosen. — darthbarracuda
This is a manifestation of her sensitivity to the reasons that she has to act in this or that way in such or such general range of circumstances. — Pierre-Normand
I meant preferences which would be outside of the self's grasp. I did not choose to hate tomatoes, for example. This preferences against tomatoes guides my action - without any over-riding higher-level preferences, I will not eat tomatoes. So I suppose it does look like a homunculus, but then again I suspect agency is entirely epiphenomenal. — darthbarracuda
there's always a preference lurking behind the choice. — darthbarracuda
if there is an individual, then its preferences are an imposition onto itself. — darthbarracuda
But what are these reasons, other than preferences (i.e. needs, desires, concerns, etc)? — darthbarracuda
Regardless of free will or not, we still consider the consequences of our actions... (at least if we're sane). — anonymous66
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