Can I change it around some -

A lot of people, like you, think not all lies are immoral - Why do you think some lies are moral ?? Can you give me an example of a moral lie ?

again to define a lie:

A lie communicates some information
The liar intends to deceive or mislead
The liar believes that what they are 'saying' is not true

Something wouldn't have to add to trust in order for it to not diminish trust. It can simply be neutral. — Terrapin Station

Using the definition of lie above - i disagree with this proposition - If your intent is to deceive or mislead it is not neutral and it is not positive - not once again not all to an equal degree.

Lying is always an immoral act
Not doing what is in your power to do to prevent harm to others is immoral — Rank Amateur

This is not what Kant is saying. He is saying that lying can never be moral for any reason, not that it is always immoral to lie. He does not directly prescribe lying as immoral.

Interestingly Kant thinks that not ling is more important than preventing harm to others. Your duty to not to lie is mandatory, your duty to save another life only something that you are supposed to do when you can.

This is not what Kant is saying. He is saying that lying can never be moral for any reason, not that it is always immoral to lie. He does not directly prescribe lying as immoral. — Jamesk

At least in my amateur mind - i am not sure I understand the distinction

I not only think that some lies are permissible, in some cases I think it's much better to lie than to be honest.

Re the neutral comment, it can be neutral with respect to establishing trust. Establishing trust is simply a matter of whether actions result in a feeling of trust towards the person in question.

One example I gave already --re "pleased to meet you." Re that, I believe that responses like that are actually more likely to build trust. But I didn't mention that earlier because I wanted to stress that you were suggesting a false dichotomy.

An example where I think it's recommendable to lie- -it would be morally worse to tell the truth--is when your wife asks you, "Do I look fat in this?" and you think she does--and basically you'd think she looks fat in anything, but you know that if you say she looks fat in it, it will affect her negatively--so you answer "No."

I think it's recommendable to lie- -it would be morally worse to tell the truth--is when your wife asks you, "Do I look fat in this?" and you think she does--and basically you'd think she looks fat in anything, but you know that if you say she looks fat in it, it will affect her negatively--so you answer "No." — Terrapin Station

What you are saying, in every example you give, has nothing at all to do the morality or immorality of the lie - what you are saying in each example is the end justifies the means.

And my argument back would be that in many of these cases the real objective of the lie is for the benefit of the liar and not the one lied to. Is it really to make the wife feel better about wearing out something she may look bad in, or just easier for the liar to avoid a truthful discussion on the way she looks. When her truthful girlfriend who she trusts tells her that dress is not flattering on her - she may love him more for trying to make her feel better or trust him less to give her honest answers on her outfits.

But what we are really talking about here is you would like morality to be relative. To be contingent on the circumstances, or the reasons. I prefer to thing morality to be more absolute.

At least in my amateur mind - i am not sure I understand the distinction — Rank Amateur

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It is a hard one to get and I suppose you don't have to accept it either. Kant is saying (in my opinion) that making a lying promise (one you know that you won't keep) can never be moral for any reason. He doesn't say that it is immoral, only that it cannot be moral. I am not sure that Kant implies that not acting morally equates to acting immorally, but I might be wrong.

If I borrowed a sum of money from you to buy life saving medicine for my child, knowing that I couldn't repay you, would you consider the act to have been immoral? The act was definitely wrong but I am not sure that Kant would have seen it as immoral.

It is a hard one to get and I suppose you don't have to accept it either. Kant is saying (in my opinion) that making a lying promise (one you know that you won't keep) can never be moral for any reason. He doesn't say that it is immoral, only that it cannot be moral. I am not sure that Kant implies that not acting morally equates to acting immorally, but I might be wrong.

If I borrowed a sum of money from you to buy life saving medicine for my child, knowing that I couldn't repay you, would you consider the act to have been immoral? The act was definitely wrong but I am not sure that Kant would have seen it as immoral. — Jamesk

thanks - My view is that there is not a space between moral and immoral - if one is making a moral judgment of an act - than the judgment is dichotomous. But I may well have not given it enough thought to find the line Kant was drawing.

In the case of the money, I am back to my point. Giving the benefit of the doubt to situation that no other alternative existed, than the father is facing a moral dilemma and is forced to chose the lesser of evils. Not sure that is any more or less semantic than ends justifying means. But to me, at least it is an important distinction.

I not only think that some lies are permissible, in some cases I think it's much better to lie than to be honest. — Terrapin Station

I think this is because as adults we have an unspoken agreement that many of our questions are not expected to be answered with honesty. This is so much part of our mentality that when we really want an honest answer we stipulate it in the question, 'Do you honestly think that these red diamond encrusted boots look good on me?' rather than just ask 'What do you think about these boots?'

If we all agree that it is preferable to lie about somethings, sometimes then those type of lies become a universal law. It works when we all do it, not just when one or a few of us do it.

In the case of the money, I am back to my point. Giving the benefit of the doubt to situation that no other alternative existed, than the father is facing a moral dilemma and is forced to chose the lesser of evils. Not sure that is any more or less semantic than ends justifying means. But to me, at least it is an important distinction. — Rank Amateur

So is choosing the lesser of two evils immoral?

And my argument back would be that in many of these cases the real objective of the lie is for the benefit of the liar and not the one lied to. — Rank Amateur

That simply depends on the liar's comment. It depends on how they're thinking about it. The liar could easily be thinking about their own benefit just as much (maybe "I don't want to have to deal with my wife being upset if I say she looks fat," for example).

The examples I gave are examples of lying, even if you parse them as not being moral issues. (I do, but you might think about it differently than I do.) If you don't parse them as being moral issues, then you need to modify your view to acknowledge that not all instances of lying are moral issues. (Or you'd need to modify your definition of lying, though it probably wouldn't be plausible as a standard usage of the term in that case.)

If we all agree that it is preferable to lie about somethings, sometimes then those type of lies become a universal law. It works when we all do it, not just when one or a few of us do it. — Jamesk

You were going good until the Kant fetish emerged. ;-)

yes

Yes the lie was and immoral act. The fact that some amount of money is the reason the child can not be cured is an immoral act. Faced with these two evils - the father chose the lesser of immoral acts.

Yes the lie was and immoral act. The fact that some amount of money is the reason the child can not be cured is an immoral act. Faced with these two evils - the father chose the lesser of immoral acts. — Rank Amateur

What's the difference between the least immoral act and the and the most moral act? If there's no difference then the least of all evils must surely be the most moral option (i.e. morally required) and lying in this instance must be both moral and immoral. Is that possible?

I think a great deal of difference. I do not think a pragmatic response to an imperfect world can elevate an act from immoral to moral.

Think of the trolly thought experiment. If I throw the switch and kill one innocent man is that more moral than not throwing it and killing 10 innocent men. It is an immoral situation that forces me to make a pragmatic choice of evils.

Your point only makes sense to me if you are viewing a range of morality on some kind on continuum, where moving from one point to another can be viewed as more or less moral or immoral depending on which direction you are moving.

If the lie had been told only injured one person but saved the lives of many others would that make the lie moral?

It is an immoral situation that forces me to make a pragmatic choice of evils. — Rank Amateur

I don't think situations are the kinds of things that can be 'immoral'.

All moral choices are essentially about choosing the least evil (however defined). Most moral decisions we make cause us little or no problem. Those that do, we call ethical dilemmas.

It's only when we insist that an action, devoid of context, is intrinsically immoral that we can get to the absurd situation where an action we deem immoral may in fact be the most moral choice (least of all evils). That action then becomes simultaneously immoral and moral!

If diminishes truth in the world – and therefor diminishes trust
If one believes truth and trust are good – things that diminish them are bad

The liar is treating those lied to as a means to an end

Lying makes it harder for those lied to to make an informed decision

Lying corrupts the liar - (a gateway moral wrong to other moral wrongs) — Rank Amateur

Lying in the real world isn't exhausted by the above. We lie to protect other people's feelings, to provide boundaries for ourselves, to protect ourselves and others from the possibility of physical harm, and as a lubricant for social interaction.

yes but Kant talks about lying promises, which are deliberate deceptions to the detriment of the person being deceived and to the advantage of the deceiver. He also makes it clear that perfect honesty is only required of yes / no questions.

All - the real discussion we are having is, is morality absolute or relative. Most would like to have morality subject to their own personal judgment. Others say there are many things that are objectively immoral

I am more the latter than the former. Primarily because I am not sure there is any evil that a motivated human can’t justify

As an example I can not believe there is such a thing as a moral war. There is such a thing as a just war, but not a moral one.

There is such a thing as a just war, but not a moral one. — Rank Amateur

In almost all systems of morality justice is considered one of it's the most important foundations. Perhaps this is a mistake and justice has little to do with it. Justice requires resort to the law and law is a fickle mistress, subject always to the whims and prejudices of those that administer the laws. In which case it could be argued that the connection between justice and morality is more tenuous than it at first seems.

Indeed this is one of the main objections to consequentialist theories of morality. Justice needs to be fair in order to be moral.

“....In any case, if Kant believes that you should ascertain whether an act is moral or not not by its consequences but by the motive or the intention of the actor (since two people may do the same act but with different intentions), then shouldn't he not judge the act of lying itself but the intention of the liar....”

This is correct. Kantian moral philosophy stipulates that a moral act is predicated solely on the premise that a person must always act according to determinations he himself deems fit. In the case at hand, lying to the murderer at the door is completely excused by the determination that any loss of human life, is his moral duty to, if not to prevent, then at least to obstruct. Which leads inexorably to the concept of an autonomous free will.

This is correct. Kantian moral philosophy stipulates that a moral act is predicated solely on the premise that a person must always act according to determinations he himself deems fit. In the case at hand, lying to the murderer at the door is completely excused by the determination that any loss of human life, is his moral duty to, if not to prevent, then at least to obstruct. Which leads inexorably to the concept of an autonomous free will. — Mww

Does this change with the nature of the act in question. Is telling the killer the lie, or opening the door and shooting him in the knee equally moral actions because they share an equal motivation.

Is telling the killer the lie, or opening the door and shooting him in the knee equally moral actions because they share an equal motivation. — Rank Amateur

By equal motivation I understand you to mean the actions deemed necessary to satisfy the requirements of the person seeking your protection. In such case, regardless of the degree of protection afforded, the ends are understood by the person answering the door as being satisfied, therefore his moral obligation is honored.

The whole “murderer at the door” scenario was constructed in 1797 by a Frenchman named Benjamin Constant. In response Kant wrote “On The Supposition of the Right to Lie From Philanthropy” in which it is explicitly stated “....To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred command of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be restricted by any conveniences...”.

The problem is, of course, that lying in the face of criminal justice, which is what Constant is referring to from his rather obscure reading of Kant’s “Groundwork for the Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals” is by no means the same as lying under the auspices of a freely determinable will that Kant was actually talking about in the Groundwork, which by it’s very nature permits the rational agent in possession of it, to lie as the means to an apodectically moral end he himself has obtained. Herein being, of course, the preservation, or even the possible preservation, of a life.

Now, to be “universalized”, from the Kantian point of view, pertains only to the possibility of a subjective principle applying equally to all subjects under any condition. The exact wording is, “act only on those maxims I canst at the same time will to be a universal law”. Even if the maxim is forever be truthful, one has not the power to will it into being universal law, because he cannot in any way oblige any other mind to be as truthful.

Truth be told, the thesis taken directly from Constant does nothing whatsoever to show the intruder is in fact a murderer, which becomes a philosophical quagmire of “what if’s”. I mean, obviously, the guy in the back room is still alive or the guy at the door wouldn’t be after him. Now we see that if the guy opening the door let the intruder in and the guy in back room ends up dead directly because of it, the guy who didn’t lie has a serious problem with his morality.

thanks and appreciate. I think this is a difficult concept to discuss, without a consensus understanding of what definition of morality we are talking about. In general terms it matters if one feels morality is relative or absolute.

As I stated above, if one is more a believer in absolute morality, one would view the killer at the door as a choice between lesser evils, and not a choice between good or bad. Although this can seem semantic, I would propose it is not. It is an important distinction that solely based on ones judgment one can make the same act either moral or immoral or relative. In the latter case one may use ones judgment to chose a lesser of evils, but the acts themselves are still immoral.

I hold to the traditional absolute morality argument that we humans make poor judgments left to our own prejudices on what is or is not moral. History seems to support this concern.

I hold to the traditional absolute morality argument that we humans make poor judgments left to our own prejudices on what is or is not moral. — Rank Amateur

Ok, fine. Pleased ta meetcha, I’m a card-carrying deontologist, myself. Kind of a moral absolutist, I suppose.

Care to elaborate on your version of how it is we humans make poor judgements? Not examples, mind you; I’ve got more than a few years experience in that, thank you very much.

Care to elaborate on your version of how it is we humans make poor judgements? Not examples, mind you; I’ve got more than a few years experience in that, thank you very much. — Mww

I think it goes something like this. When there is conflict between what we desire and some moral belief we feel, we can often find a creative way to rationalize the moral belief away, to get what we desire.

Not sure how inherent this relative stenght is between what we want and what we feel is right. Is this just another animal vs enlighten being fight, where the animal is usually a heavy favorite?

Kant argues that you should tell the truth because the maxim of lying can't be universalized. A lie is always wrong regardless of the circumstances, your intention (even if it is a good one) and the person to whom you lie. We should not create even a single exception to this rule, Kant argues, as it would make all moral duties uncertain and useless. — Happiness

Kant is right but not all the time.

Moral norms should have no exceptions as if they did then there would be no reason not to violate them as per whim and fancy.

I wonder then what use are words like ''except'', ''but'', ''however'' and what about the maxim ''never say never or always''

To me it seems that people who invented these kind of words realized that ''universalization'' isn't possible in the real world. There always are exceptions and Kant seems to have completely ignored this gem of wisdom which our linguistic forefathers knew.

What say you?

When there is conflict between what we desire and some moral belief we feel, we can often find a creative way to rationalize the moral belief away, to get what we desire. — Rank Amateur

I guess you could say that. Seems to me that kind of rationale belongs more to empirical psychology than moral philosophy: “.....on what the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology....”. The difference being the cooperation of reason from experience as opposed to the determination by reason a priori.

I’m pleased to see you mention “what we feel is right”. At the end of the day, despite what’s found in moldy tomes and dogeared textbooks, Everydayman is still only going to act in accord with his strongest feeling.