What seems to work?

Well, I suppose that's the end of that line of thought.

See p.127.

Can you expand on this "modal actualizer" thing? — Wallows

In some modal logics, a world is set aside in the frame, to be the distinguished 'actual world,' sometimes symbolized @. An operator that means 'actual' then operates on a formula to make it true at any world just in case the formula it operates on is true at @.

If you write this as 'actual,' then 'the actual president of the US' denotes Donald Trump, not just at the actual world, but at any world. So, it is a rigid designator.

But this is a technical device, since the English word 'actually' doesn't work this way.

So, it is a rigid designator. — Snakes Alive

I feel as though this is just changing the axioms or premises for the framing condition to only "actualize" a certain fact into a framing condition for all possible worlds, hence rendering a description as rigid. Nice, technicality though.

This would be trivially true in a logical space that you had control over, such as the logical space of a computer or artificial language. But, you can alter the software and not the hardware of a computer, so there are limits to this concept also. A Turing machine would be a good example, to your point no?

A rigid designator picks out the very same individual in all possible worlds. But a description might change from world to world. — Banno

The reference of a rigid designator can be fixed by a description giving a contingent property of its bearer. That's what's going on with the meter stick.

A description can be a rigid designator, right? The man who won the election can be a rigid designator. — frank

The referent of the word "metre" can be fixed by "the length of that stick in Paris". But "The length of that stick in Paris" is not a rigid designator - for that stick might not be a metre long.

Today, a meter is defined as the length of the path traveled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second. A second is the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom. So in effect, we have substituted the caesium-133 atom for the standard meter bar. The same points could still be made, but we’ll stick with the meter bar for simplicity.

Yep.

It’s important here that ‘one meter’ is not introduced as a synonym for ‘the length of the standard meter bar.’ If it were, it would pick out different lengths in different possible worlds. Rather, it is introduced as the name for a particular length, the same in all possible worlds. We identify this length by pointing to the standard meter bar. The meter bar serves to fix the reference of ‘meter’, not to give its meaning. Compare: I hereby dub the island we’re standing on ‘Newlandia’! When you move on to a new island, Newlandia is still the name of the island you were originally standing on. ‘Newlandia’ does not mean ‘the island I am standing on.’ So, it seems to be knowable apriori that the standard meter (if it exists) is 1 meter long, even though this is a contingent fact.

What then, is the epistemological status of the statement ‘Stick S is one meter long at t=0 ’, for someone who has fixed the metric system by reference to Stick S? It would seem that he knows it a priori. For if he used stick S to fix the reference of the term ‘one meter’, then as a result of this kind of ‘definition’ (which is not an abbreviative or synonymous definition), he knows automatically, without further investigation, that S is one meter long. On the other hand, even if S is used as the standard of a meter, the metaphysical status of ‘S is one meter long’ will be that of a contingent statement, provided that ‘one meter’ is regarded as a rigid designator: under appropriate stresses and strains, heatings or coolings, S would have had a length greater than one meter even at t=0 . [NN, p. 56]

By rigid designator, Kripke just means that it denotes the same thing (here, the same length) with respect to every possible situation. Other examples? ‘I am here.’ ‘I am thinking.’ ‘I am this tall’ (putting your hand on your head). — John MacFarlane

First, my argument implicitly concludes that certain general
terms, those for natural kinds, have a greater kinship with
proper names than is generally realized. This conclusion holds
for certain for various species names, whether they are count
nouns, such as 'cat', 'tiger', 'chunk of gold', or mass terms such
as 'gold', 'water', 'iron pyrites'. It also applies to certain terms
for natural phenomena, such as 'heat', 'light', 'sound', 'lightning',
and, presumably, suitably elaborated, to corresponding
adjectives-'hot' , 'loud " , red' .(p.134)

I'm thinking of this extensionally. So the referent of "Elizabeth II" is Elizabeth Windsor, with no connotation, description, properties or whatever involved in resolving that reference. And the referent of "cat" is each individual cat, considered as a group, with no connotation, description, properties or whatever.

Your point?

Your point? — Banno

Not to confuse the meaning of a description for rigid designators. The two co-exist; but, can differ in meanings in other possible worlds, de re.

You're right. That's Searle, not Kripke:

"Any definite description at all can be treated as a rigid designator by indexing it to the actual world. I can, by simple fiat, decide to use the expression 'the inventor of bifocals' in such a way that it refers to the actual person who invented bifocals and continues to refer to that very person in any possible world, even in a possible world in which he did not invent bifocals. Such a use of the definite description will always take wide scope or will be in a sense scopeless in a way that is characteristic of proper names." --Searle (1983: 258)

That take makes a lot of sense to me, but it's not accepted by everyone. Note that Searle is bringing in the speaker's intentions. That's what my post was about. It appears intentions will specify essential properties. I don't think we can make a theory of essentialism beyond that.

Perhaps we can take on board Searle's point that a definite description might be indexed to the actual world to produce a sort of rigid designator. Except that it seems that, even in the real world, it might turn out that the chap we referred to as the inventor of bifocals actually stole the idea from someone else. Perhaps Franklin was not the actual inventor.

So much as I like Searle, I think he must be wrong here.

Except that it seems that, even in the real world, it might turn out that the chap we referred to as the inventor of bifocals actually stole the idea from someone else. Perhaps Franklin was not the actual inventor. — Banno

It's not a settled issue. I'd argue Searle's view does work, don't want to derail, though.

I read Searle as suggesting that we know that 'the inventor of bifocals' is a rigid designator, We know this is true, even if we don't specify who it is that actually invented bifocals in this or any other world.(Of course the caveat here is that we discount cases in which more than one person collaboratively invented bifocals in which cases it would 'inventors', or cases where bifocals did not exist[/b])

In other words, even if we don't know who it is, the phrase in question designates either some individual, or a specific lack of any individual, that invented bifocals

I fail to see the importance of that as it applies to my last couple of posts. That does not mean that it is not. It means that I have not drawn correlations between the same things as you. Help me out by connecting the dots - your dots - for me. I do not have unshakable conviction. I am certain.

Are you invoking the notion of individuation? I don't think Kripke spells that out, does he?

While paving the way to where we are... Kripke's use of the term "individual" referred to the unique 'object' picked out of this world by virtue of being given a proper name. Moreover, he clearly showed that in such cases, we can keep the name, stipulate a wide range of circumstances involving that particular individual and retain our ability to successfully refer. I do not have a problem with any of that on it's face. It is crucial, I think, to remind ourselves that Kripke was not talking about just any object. Rather, he was talking about objects that we had named by virtue of proper noun.

So, he was talking about individuals objects that we pick out by virtue of our naming practices(proper nouns, mind you). Overall, by and in large, I was left with a good impression.

However, I would strongly object to anyone who wants to use the fact that we can use a proper noun as a means for successful reference when positing hypotheticals as ground for saying much anything else aside from we cannot seem to do the same thing by virtue of using any of the particular circumstances that we believe to be the case regarding the named individual. In short, proper nouns - when used alone - seem to always allow successful reference during hypothetical discourse, whereas descriptions of the thing being named(by virtue of proper noun) do not.

I do not see adequate justificatory ground for much else. So...

What am I missing?

In short, proper names seems to always allow successful reference during hypothetical discourse, whereas descriptions of the thing being named do not. — creativesoul

Does not "the present president of the US' now unfailingly pick out Trump provided he is still president?

In short, proper names seems to always allow successful reference during hypothetical discourse, whereas descriptions of the thing being named do not.
— creativesoul

Does not "the present president of the US' unfailingly pick out Trump? — Janus

In this world, at this time... sure. That entirely misses the point though doesn't it?

No, because that can be used to pick out Trump in all possible worlds. We are always necessarily speaking in "this world, at this time" just as texts speak in this world, about the world as it was at the the time of writing...when else?

It’s important here that ‘one meter’ is not introduced as a synonym for ‘the length of the standard meter bar.’ If it were, it would pick out different lengths in different possible worlds. Rather, it is introduced as the name for a particular length, the same in all possible worlds. We identify this length by pointing to the standard meter bar. The meter bar serves to fix the reference of ‘meter’, not to give its meaning. — John MacFarlane

This is standard rubbish based upon a gross misconception of how meaning is always attributed...

The meter bar fixes the reference by virtue of a capable creature drawing a correlation between the term "meter" and it's referent(the bar).

Sigh...

:brow:

Drawing that connection is the attribution of meaning. The meter bar is not something that gives anything to anyone or anything else.

I don't understand what you are objecting with respect to the quoted text.

Can't see why that's a problem, considered extensionally. Which is what Kripke is doing. — Banno

Well, I suppose that's the end of that line of thought. — Banno

See p.127. — Banno

I read p127 and I am still no clearer on its relevance to my comments or your responses to them. What do you think the problem I postulated was? How do you think "considering it extensionally" would solve that problem?

I have no idea what you are referring to, and for me that was "end of that line of thought" unless you provide some way to advance the discussion.

No, because that can be used to pick out trump in all possible worlds. We are always necessarily speaking in "this world, at this time" just as texts speak in this world, at the the time of writing...when else? — Janus

What are you talking about Janus?

"The president of the United States" cannot be used to pick out Trump in all hypothetical scenarios because some of them specifically stipulate circumstances about the president of the United States and not all of them stipulate that that is Trump.

The manner of speaking regarding the author of that text...

I can't find anything wrong with it.

Are meter bars the sort of things that are capable of giving anything at all?

You're missing the point. Of course counter-factually Trump in other possible worlds may not be president (either now or ever) but that definite description 'the man that in this world was president of the US at 3.03 PM EST 28 December 2018' picks out Trump (if he was in fact president at that time) in all possible worlds.

You're changing targets.