What are you talking about?

Well yes, to an observer. But this is trivially true and the author didn't seem to state otherwise.

The original description under our mutual consideration was "the president of the United States".

No it was the president of the united states as of now. Of course 'now' always refers to the present, and the present, obviously, does not stand still; but I have no doubt you knew what I meant. But in any case, to avoid possible misunderstanding I added the time and date. I can't see what is hard to understand or problematic about that. It doesn't change the fact that true definite descriptions can be understood to be rigid designators; I mean they just are rigid designators. We know that without even needing to know who exactly they designate.

Well yes, to an observer. But this is trivially true and the author didn't seem to state otherwise. — Wallows

Ah, whatever...

Keep talking like that. My chair gave me a splinter. The splinter gave me pain. The meter bar does not give me either. My chair does not give me meaning. Neither does the splinter. Nor does the meter bar.

Why?

Because meaning cannot be given to someone, even by a creature capable of giving things away. Rather, meaning is attributed and emerges onto the world stage within thought and/or belief formation itself. That's too far out of the scope here, so don't ask me to elaborate or what I mean. If you are sincerely interested, click on my avatar and look at any one of several different topics. They will answer any question you may have. If not, post there about it.

Furthermore, inanimate objects have nothing in their possession to be given away to begin with. Such language use is utterly inadequate for understanding meaning... That was why I objected.

I'm confused creative. What's the problem with first person reports and third person descriptions here?

Since you seem to have more time than earlier... I'm curious about the other stuff.

That makes two of us. What's their relevance?

I already gave the short answer. If you respond to that first then the discussion may continue.

That reply did not answer the question. It was straightforward.

That said, that reply did skirt around some interesting things that Kripke does. Can you further elaborate?

I'm not sure. I will have to sleep over it.

Rest well. I hear ya. I think all of it is much more simple than these accounts make it seem to be.

Can you tell me what question it did not answer, and why you don't think it answered it? Then I would be happy to elaborate on what I said, and consider how it might have 'skirted around some interesting things that Kripke does' once I know what you are referring to with that. I don't want to move onto other topics or really discuss anything until I am clear about what exactly it is that we agree we are discussing.

What is that additional something that all designation has that no other successful reference by ostension and/or description does? I mean what does reference by designation include that reference by ostension and/or description does not?

Being a marsupial includes but is not limited to being one of things that we have named "marsupial". All things we call "marsupials" share a set of common denominators. That common set includes but is not limited to the name "marsupial". The commonalities also include that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness, and thus prior to naming practices.

Anyone here care to take this to task?

It's sorely needed.

Could that which is called a "marsupial" have been called by some other name? Sure, but it wasn't. Could marsupials have a different set of common denominators than the ones they all shared prior to our discovery of them, prior to our calling them by the name "marsupial"?

Surely not, for the same reason that water could be nothing other than hydrogen dioxide.

You see the difference here... right everyone?

Now, I think Kripke's claim is that all designation requires a designator. Both names and descriptions count. Proper name usage during hypothetical discourse retains our ability to successfully refer by virtue of still being able to pick out the specific individual even though we can stipulate wide ranging circumstances(all of which are descriptions), whereas descriptions can and do change. Thus, proper names are called "rigid designators" on Kripke's view because they always retain the ability to pick out the referent despite stipulating a wide range of different circumstances. He always left room for certain versions of essentialism/elemental basic constituents.

Lecture three seems to begin the long awaited subsequent demarcations...

Maybe you're right Banno... lecture three looks like we're getting into the good stuff.

:wink:

Descriptions consist in describing and categorizing the entity being referred to.
Ostention consists in pointing to or at the entity being referred to.
Designation consist in naming the entity being referred to.
Three distinct functions, of which only ostention can be completely independent of the other two.
Designation relies on ostention and/ or description, depending on the circumstances.
Description also relies on ostention at least, but if ostention is not possible then it relies on designation (which in turn relies on description if ostention is not possible)..

So it would seem that description and designation (of the object itself only, mind) can do without each other when ostention is possible (i.e. when the entity being named or described is present)..

He says that it is not the case that cats could turn out to be robots. That if it turned out that cats were automata, we should say that what we had thought to be cats were not cats, but robots.

TO be a cat is necessarily to be an animal. — Banno

I'm a bit skeptical regarding this use of "necessary". Is Kripke showing and/or arguing that acceptable cases of essentialism can be adequately exhausted, and thus properly accounted for, by possible world semantics or by what we're doing during such hypothetical discourse?

So, reference by designation includes naming but reference by description and/or ostension does not?

Ok.

Seems agreeable enough.

Designation includes naming but ostension and/or description does not. All cases of successful reference are dependent upon one or more of these three 'kinds'.

So, naming is not necessary for successful reference. "Necessary" in the sense of existential dependency which is not determined by how we posit hypotheticals...

Is that what you're claiming?

Of course common naming of kinds and attributes is necessary for description, but proper naming is not.

And as for proper names being rigid designators 'The man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' is as much a rigid designator as 'Donald Trump' because the latter must be shorthand for ' The man who was named 'Donald Trump' at such and such a time and date.'
There could be many other individuals named 'Donald Trump', so the name alone would not seem to be a rigid designator.

Seems to me you need to go back and read Lecture one.

For species, as for proper names,
the way the reference of a term is fixed should not be regarded
as a synonym for the term.

Again, this looks to me like a rejection of intensional meaning in favour of mere extension...

Then the essence of a kind can be thought of in terms of accessibility.

If B is made from A, and C from D, in no possible world is B the very same as C. From a world such that B is made from A, the worlds in which B is made from D are inaccessible.

So given that a Thylacine is a marsupial, the we cannot access any possible worlds in which a Thylacine is a dog.

A notion that is at least worth considering.

That is, if there evolved from the line of the canines a creature with all the characteristics of a thylacine, Kripke would have us say that it is nevertheless not a thylacine because it has a different origin to our thylacine.

The trouble with any extensional definition is always the stuff around the edges. So 'Heat =
that which is sensed by sensation S'; but it is 28º outside; is that hot? It will be 38º in a few hours. The edges are never as clear cut as logicians might wish.

Why would you say that? If you think you found something mistaken in what I had written, that you are responding to with this unhelpful comment, why not instead try to explain clearly in your own words what you think the mistake is? If you can't or won't do that, why should I take you seriously?

'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth. (p.138)

But not a priori; we may have found that cats were demons, but we didn't, we found that they are animals. So the possible world demon-cats are not cats.

Because there are better fish to fry in the third lecture.