No point moving to the third lecture if the problems in the first have not been adequately dealt with.

Yep.

Right, so if you can't adequately deal with the problems of the first, why have you moved on to the third?

If you think what I have been saying is a misrepresentation, based on a misunderstanding, of the first, or any part of Kripke's book, then why not explain just how you think it is so?

You haven't even tried, Banno. I suspect it is because you don't actually have the goods; you just want to make it appear as if you do.

Kripke would have us say... — Banno

I see it as important that we see this as the overall approach - that Kripke is offering one way to look at how we might use modal language, but not the only one. So if someone wishes to use modal language in a divergent way, let 'em go for it. It might be productive. However for my part Kripke's approach looks promising, in terms of producing a coherent and complete account.

You haven't even tried, Banno. — Janus

Curious, that you seem to think me under some obligation to you. Our conversation is now just tit-for-tat, and hence rather pointless. I don't see your contributions here as adding anything that was not dealt with in the book, which you admitted earlier to not following. The answers to what you have suggested are all there; or you could look up some secondary literature on Kripke. Sort it out for yourself.

P. 138. Kripke makes the point that science identifies more robust, necessary criteria for inclusion.

P. 139. Names for kinds - for species - are passed along a chain in much the same way as proper names. The name is not fixed to its referent by a concept.

Now that sits well with my own negative attitude towards concepts. It's the use that counts, not some inaccessible mental furniture.

SO while I suspect Kripke is thinking in terms of extension, I'm looking at the same thing in terms of use. Where he sees a need for something like a causal chain to link different instances of a name's being used, I'm lazily happy to say that it's just what we do - how the game is played.

I haven't said, or even implied, that you are "under some obligation" to me. This is a discussion forum that should proceed on the basis of good faith. If you think that I am in error, and you could easily and clearly explain the error, then it would cost you little to do so. But you are obviously under no obligation to do it. It has nothing to do with "tit for tat" either. I am merely being honest in saying that your failure to come up with the goods leads me to believe that you simply don't have them.

As an example, when you say "the answers are all there"; that is your opinion, and it is no use directing me to reread something which I have already found to be bereft of the answers. Reading any text is a matter of interpretation, so if under your interpretation, the answers are there, and you genuinely want to discuss the issues, you should explain just how the answers are there under your interpretation.

If you don't want to, then fine; it's really no loss to me.

Well, your objection is now spread over a dozen or so pages. If you cared to summarise it, I will give you a more considered answer. Perhaps we can achieve some sort of reconciliation.

I don't think my objection being "spread over a dozen or more pages" is really the issue. I haven't even made direct reference to Kripke's text; or even said i am definitely disagreeing with him. @Pierre seemed to think based on what I had written that Kripke and I are "pretty much on the same page".

You made the effort to comment on this post:

Of course common naming of kinds and attributes is necessary for description, but proper naming is not.

And as for proper names being rigid designators 'The man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' is as much a rigid designator as 'Donald Trump' because the latter must be shorthand for ' The man who was named 'Donald Trump' at such and such a time and date.'
There could be many other individuals named 'Donald Trump', so the name alone would not seem to be a rigid designator. — Janus

implying that rereading of the first lecture would disabuse me of alleged mistakes expressed in the post.

So, all I am saying is that you could have, with probably less words than you have already expended on this exchange between us, clearly and concisely explained what you think is wrong with what I wrote in that post.

OK. Something is a rigid designator only if it applies to the very same individual in all possible worlds. 'The man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' is not a rigid designator because it might have been that someone else was president on that day. It is not too difficult to set up an imagined conspiracy with that result.

But that cannot be done with "Donald Trump".

Further, supposing that "Donald Trump" is shorthand for "The man named Donald Trump at such-and-such a time" is explicitly dealt with several times in N&N. It's what (C) rules out at p.71, and what is discussed at the end of the first lecture. That other people have been named "Donald Trump" does not prevent our conversation being about Donald Trump.

As with the meter stick, it's 'as-I-am-using-the-word-right-now,' so it's not obvious why what you're saying conflicts with Kripke or that it even does. Searle agreed with you.

The man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' is not a rigid designator because it might have been that someone else was president on that day. — Banno

Indexed to actuality, it's necessarily one person. Janus is talking about a situation where it's implied that we mean actually.

Thanks for you response, but I disagree on two counts. First, I am not saying that 'the man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' necessarily rigidly designates Donald Trump. It does if Donald Trump was indeed president at that time and date.

Second, there could indeed have been a conspiracy such that Donald Trump is not current president, but there could also be a conspiracy such that Donald trump does not exist, and that the figure we know is a CGI.



Yes, I noted that Searle, as quoted, agreed with what I have been saying. Also, I have acknowledged that I am not claiming that I disagree with Kripke, although I would be if he would disagree with Searle and me that definite descriptions may be rigid designators.

I get the actual part. But I don't see that you have given any reason that someone else might not have actually been president...

After all, they do it in Hollywood.

But it's not possible that Trump not be Trump.

And the view that someone else, who is not Trump, might have the name "Trump" - well, so what?

First, I am not saying that 'the man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' necessarily rigidly designates Donald Trump. — Janus

Nor am I. Seems irrelevant.

Second, there could indeed have been a conspiracy such that Donald Trump is not current president, but there could also be a conspiracy such that Donald trump does not exist, and that the figure we know is a CGI. — Janus

SO what?

Detail. Take this back and link it to what I said. Sure, Trump might have been president. But he would remain trump. But no individual is picked out to the exclusion of all others by "President at time T". At best you have the conditional fact that it was Obama; but that's not set in every possible world.

It looks to me as if the notion of a rigid designator has been misunderstood.

I get the actual part. But I don't see that you have given any reason that someone else might not have actually been president... — Banno

Look back at the section on indexicals. We aren't analyzing sentences spoken within possible worlds. We're analyzing sentences with respect to possible worlds.

There is only one actual world. Every true sentence about the stuff in it is necessarily true.

Would Trump be Trump if he didn't exist? As I pointed out there could be a conspiracy such that Trump is a CGI. He is then no more Trump than he is president.

Also I could change the description to something like 'The person who, in this world, was almost universally believed to be president of the US at 10.42 AM EST on December 29 2018'. That would only fail to designate Trump if Trump did not exist; if he was, for example, not a person, but a CGI.



:up:

There is only one actual world. Every true sentence about the stuff in it is necessarily true. — frank

Necessity is not truth with respect to the actual world. It is truth with respect to all possible worlds (within some restricted domain).

The relevant part is that it designates the man who was president, if indeed there was such a man.

Necessity is not truth with respect to the actual world. It is truth with respect to all possible worlds (within some restricted domain). — Snakes Alive

We analyze sentences with respect to possible worlds. A true sentence which is indexed to the actual world is true with respect to every possible world. It's necessarily true and known a posteriori.

The only thing at stake in this conversation is whether "by fiat" a description can be a rigid designator.

Look back at the section on indexicals. We aren't analyzing sentences spoken within possible worlds. We're analyzing sentences with respect to possible worlds. — frank

But all words are spoken within possible worlds...

There is only one actual world. Every true sentence about the stuff in it is necessarily true. — frank

As @Snakes Alive points out, that's not right.

Is that what Kripke meant?

As Snakes Alive points out, that's not right. — Banno

I explained above why he's wrong.

No, all words are spoken within the actual world. Other words could have been spoken in possible worlds. There is a difference between actuality and possibility.

Hm.

So if P in the actual world, then, in any possible world, (P in the actual world)?