I don't understand the question.

Are we analyzing sentences spoken within possible worlds? Or with respect to possible worlds?

Which did Kripke mean?

Yes, whatever is true of the actual world is true of the actual world in all possible worlds. Conversely whatever is stipulated to be true of some possible world is true of that possible world in the actual world and in all other possible worlds.

As I pointed out there could be a conspiracy such that Trump is a CGI. He is then no more Trump than he is president. — Janus

And as Kripke argued in several places, this is not a case in which Trump is not Trump, but a case in which some other individual has taken on the name "Trump".

No, not following at all.

The actual world holds no special place in the logic of possible worlds.

Of course: Trump not being Trump is a contradiction. It is not a case where "some other individual has taken on the name 'Trump'", but a case where an individual called 'Trump' is mistakenly thought to exist.

Then your conclusion:

He is then no more Trump than he is president. — Janus

does not follow from your argument. After all,

Trump not being Trump is a contradiction. — Janus

Of course it does; it is the world in which all talk of possible worlds is carried out, the world in which possible worlds are stipulated to be as they are. Do you imagine there is a possible world in which people are stipulating what exists in the actual world? Or conversely do you believe that the possible worlds we imagine are stipulated into existence by our imaginings, and become actual worlds for their inhabitants?

...and to my eye this shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of modality.

Do you imagine there is a possible world in which people are stipulating what exists in the actual world? — Janus

Yes.

You're picking me up on a mere technicality, an infelicitously expressed thought. I think it is obvious that what I meant is that the CGI is no more Trump than it is president.

In some possible world, Clinton is president. In that World, there are a bunch of pseudo-philosophers stipulating a possible world in which Trump is president.

Nuh. It's the nub of the issue. You really should read the book.

So, you beleive that what we experience in the actual world is a result of what people in some possible world have stipulated? And following on from that you believe that the inhabitants of possible worlds that we have imagined experience the actuality of their world just as we do ours?

Here's a thing. If you think that Kripke is wrong, first explain what it is you think Kripke is arguing, then tell me where it is wrong.

Otherwise, it just looks like you haven't bothered to read him.

You're reverting back to not saying anything.

So you want to assume bad faith. Then we will get nowhere.

Try this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/241441 gives an example of a world you said could not exist:

Do you imagine there is a possible world in which people are stipulating what exists in the actual world? — Janus

Your reply?

The actual world holds no special place in the logic of possible worlds — Banno

Yet it has something to do with a cat's essential properties?

This is laughable; I have acknowledged that I am not saying Kripke is definitely wrong. I am saying that I, in reading him, have not found satisfactory answers to, for example, why definite descriptions cannot be rigid designators. If he gives such answers, and you have found them, then you should be able to provide the arguments fairly concisely in your own words.

Think that through for yourself. Set up a possible world in which cats were found to be demons. Follow through on the consequences. Think like Kripke, so you can see how his argument works.

So you want to assume bad faith. Then we will get nowhere. — Banno

I'm not assuming bad faith, perhaps you simply can't say anything cogent on this issue; your not saying anything would then not necessarily be a case of bad faith.

Which I have done.

:sad:

I think we are done, Janus. IF all you can do is attack me instead of what I said, that's it.

Well, let's go through it together....

Imagine a possible world in which, when someone first cut up a cat, it was found to be full of machinery instead of guts.

The consequences?

Try this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/241441 gives an example of a world you said could not exist:

Do you imagine there is a possible world in which people are stipulating what exists in the actual world? — Janus


Your reply? — Banno

Are you saying that world actually exists? You agree with David Lewis, then?

I'm not attacking you, Banno. I am simply asking for you to respond to argument with relevant counter-argument; then we might get somewhere.

I know this was not for me, but I can't resist asking a question about it. What would it be that determines that what they cut up was a cat?

Imagine a possible world in which, when someone first cut up a cat, it was found to be full of machinery instead of guts.

The consequences? — Banno

They might have started cutting up more cats to see if they're all full of machine parts.

and they find that all the cats they cut up have machine parts. What next?

The term "Cats" has been found, a posteriori, to refer to a machine. Yes?