So, for the folk in that world, anything that is not a machine is not a cat.

You say that they were, in this possible world, cutting up cats. On what basis are you able to say that it was cats that they were cutting up? Is it because they called what they were cutting up 'cats'? Or was it because what they were cutting up looked identical to cats? Or something else?

(Notice the detail in the argument here. That's much better than the shit in the last few pages @Janus. I'm not too sure where this discussion with Frank will go. But I have an idea. Much better.

And again you want to go off on a fucking tangent. Answer the question for yourself.

The term "Cats" has been found, a posteriori, to refer to a machine. Yes?
5m ReplyOptions — Banno

Maybe. They might also conclude that an animal can have machine parts. Depends.

So, for the folk in that world, anything that is not a machine is not a cat — Banno

I can imagine a world where that happens.

Maybe. They might also conclude that an animal can have machine parts. Depends. — frank

OK. I don't see how that fits, but let's keep it as moot.

I can imagine a world where that happens. — frank

SO taking that as agreement, lets call this world "Katworld" for convenience.

Every cat in Katworld is a machine. What would the take of Kripke, were he in that world?

Wouldn't he say that, in every possible world, if it is a cat, then it must be a machine?

Wouldn't he say that, in every possible world, if it is a cat, then it must be a machine? — Banno

Yes.

So it's a necessary fact, for the folk of Katworld, that cats are machines.

And if it is a necessary fact, for the folk of katworld, that cats are machines, then it is a necessary fact for us that...

That cats are animals.

Yep. Because...

But for us, the folk of katworld think that cats are machines in every possible world.

So are cats machines or animals?

OR is it that the folk of Katworld are not talking about the same thing as we are, when they use the word "cat"?

Depends on what world you're in.

I'm not going to pursue showing you that you agree with Searle, although I think you do. I want to get to the Puzzle of Belief, so lets move on.

The actual world holds no special place in the logic of possible worlds
— Banno

Yet it has something to do with a cat's essential properties? — frank

This is where we came in.

SO now we have two possible worlds. In one, the word "Cat" refers to a type of animal, and in every possible world, cats are animals. In the other, the word "Cat" refers to a type of machine, and in every possible world, cats are machines.

Neither world has a special place in the logic of possible worlds.

Just to make it explicit, we have a choice. We might claim that "cat" refers to the very same thin in the actual world and in KatWorld, and hence that there is a contradiction: cats are both necessarily animals, or necessarily machines.

Or we could follow Kripke and say that the folk of Katworld do not mean the very same thing as we do by "cat".

You choose.

Neither world has a special place in the logic of possible worlds. — Banno

I'm not sure what you mean by that. Kripke thought of the actual world as a member of the set of all possible worlds, right? If you're wanting to say Kripke did not recognize actuality as an important concept, you're wrong.

Do you think the analysis concluded here works?

Sure, the actual world is a possible world. And we and Kripke happen to live in the actual world.

What further role do you suppose it might have?

And we and Kripke happen to live in the actual world. — Banno

The actual world is an abstract object like possible worlds.

Is it? Ok. But you agree that we do live in it?

@frank, I wold really like to know what you think of the analysis of Katworld I offered. Do you find it agreeable?

No. Not as Kripke uses the terminology.

wold really like to know what you think of the analysis of Katworld I offered. Do you find it agreeable? — Banno

I appreciated it very much.

How's that?

Cheers.

Because that's the point of this approach to modal logic; to give coherent accounts of modal issues that might otherwise seem intractable. And that's why the detail is so important. And that's why so much of this thread is confabulated mush.

How's that? — Banno

That we're not inside the actual world? The actual world is like a history book. Napoleon isn't really in there.

Can you give me some more? A reference?

Can you give me some more? A reference? — Banno

Yes, tomorrow. I have to go to sleep. Thanks for the discussion!

The general answer to the objector can be stated, then, as
follows : Any necessary truth, whether a priori or a posteriori,
could not have turned out otherwise. In the case of some
necessary a posteriori truths, however, we can say that under
appropriate qualitatively identical evidential situations, an
appropriate corresponding qualitative statement might have
been false.(p.142)

Not all that clear, eh?

"Loose and inaccurate" statements can be parsed in such a way that the issue is made clear while removing shadows of contradiction.

In the Katworld example, one might be misled to think that a contradiction had been shown. For Katworld folk, that cats are necessarily machines is an posteriori necessity. For us, that cats are necessarily animals is just as discovered, and just as necessary. A too casual philosopher might conclude that there is a contradiction here. But what we have found, on closer examination, is that cats are necessarily animals, while some other thing - we might call them Kats, to make it clear that they are not cats - found in Katworld, is necessarily a machine.

have not found satisfactory answers to, for example, why definite descriptions cannot be rigid designators. — Janus

Definite descriptions can be rigid designators, and Kripke acknowledges this. However, ordinary descriptions used in natural languages are typically not.

Definite descriptions can be rigid designators, and Kripke acknowledges this. However, ordinary descriptions used in natural languages are typically not. — Snakes Alive

Where does he acknowledge this in Naming and Necessity? Quite interested.

Look at the distinction drawn between de jure and de facto rigidity in the Introduction.