Why must it be so difficult? All I said was that what you wrote, as far as I can tell, offers no reason to believe that possible world discourse can do without descriptions, definite and otherwise. It also offers no reason that I have been able to glean, as to why we should believe that definite descriptions cannot be rigid designators. I had thought that you wanted to disagree with me on these two points.

But I don't find it easy to tell exactly what you are trying to say in most of what you write, so I could have misinterpreted. If I have not misinterpreted, and you do indeed want to disagree on these two points then I am mostly interested in your reasons for disagreement, although it would also be interesting to hear whether, according to your interpretation of him, Kripke would want to agree or disagree with both those points, and what his argument, according to you, would be for such disagreement.

I don't wish to be needlessly blunt, but if you don't give me one of the two things, then I am not interested in further conversation with you. On the other hand, if you don't disagree with either of those, then we have nothing further to talk about, and we have been arguing about nothing for quite some time now! (Or at least, I have been presenting reasons and arguments in favour of what I had thought you were disagreeing with, and you have been offering explanations, asking me questions, and asking me to provide stuff, none of which I have been able to discern the relevance of, or sometimes even what exactly you are wanting to argue against, to argue for or to explain).

I gave you an account of what I thought you were saying. I also told you I disagreed with what I thought you were claiming and why I disagreed with it. In any case, If you are not prepared to correct my account (if it is wrong), then forget it; it's fine by me!

Kripke on the necessary a posteriori:

"This [lectern] looks like wood. It does not feel cold and it probably would if it were made of ice. Here my entire judgement is a posteriori … but one knows by a priori philosophical analysis … [if] the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice … we know by empirical investigation that … this table is not made of ice. We can conclude by modus ponens that it is necessary that the table not be made of ice, and this conclusion is known a posteriori, since one of the premisses on which it is based is a posteriori."

-Identity and Necessity

Why must it be so difficult? All I said was that what you wrote, as far as I can tell, offers no reason to believe that possible world discourse can do without descriptions, definite and otherwise. — Janus

I've not claimed that possible world discourse 'can do without' descriptions, definite or otherwise(whatever the hell that's supposed to mean).

Kripke on the necessary a posteriori:

"This [lectern] looks like wood. It does not feel cold and it probably would if it were made of ice. Here my entire judgement is a posteriori … but one knows by a priori philosophical analysis … [if] the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice … we know by empirical investigation that … this table is not made of ice. We can conclude by modus ponens that it is necessary that the table not be made of ice, and this conclusion is known a posteriori, since one of the premisses on which it is based is a posteriori."

-Identity and Necessity — frank

In thus snippet, Kripke isnt talking about a kind, nor a proper name whose meaning emerged from a chain of events. This is a particular lectern. Surely the conclusions Kripke draws about its essential features would be shared by the majority, but thats not the source of his conclusions (community consensus). One knows a priori that if it's not made of ice, its necessarily not made of ice.

So answer this: if the lectern has a dent from being hit by a hammer, why don't we also know a priori that if it has that dent, it necessarily has it? Why wouldn't that be part of the connotations of 'that lectern'? Quine says it can be. Why is Quine wrong?

The dent isn't an essential part of the lectern is it? It's not made of a dent. The dent does, however, help us to refer to it as opposed to other lecterns which are made of the same stuff.

With regard to Kripke's approach we could imagine that lectern without the dent, but we cannot imagine that lectern made of ice?

So answer this: if the lectern has a dent from being hit by a hammer, why don't we also know a priori that if it has that dent, it necessarily has it? Why wouldn't that be part of the connotations of 'that lectern'? Quine says it can be. Why is Quine wrong? — frank

Good questions.

Is there some special pleading happening?

As far as I can tell, all this says is that ice and wood have different attributes. The different attributes are known a posteriori. And if ice and wood are to have different attributes then it is necessary thst they have different attributes.

Seems Kripke is claiming that what we can and/or cannot say about the referent of proper nouns within possible world scenarios is not determined by the same standard as what we can and/or cannot say about the referent of common nouns within possible world scenarios.

If B is made from A, and C from D, in no possible world is B the very same as C. From a world such that B is made from A, the worlds in which B is made from D are inaccessible.

For Kripke, it's the "made from" that is missing from the table that was bruised with a hammer; hence it's the same table. But a table made from ice would be a different individual.

The answer is that Kripke does not claim that we can't fix a reference by some contingent property. In such a case, just as Quine points out, this property becomes essential by special bias.

What Kripke objects to is Quine's conclusion that there can't be contextless essential properties. He appeals to common sense.

If all context is dependent upon language, then it would follow from Quine's conclusion that there are no essential properties independent of language.

That's just plain wrong.

All knowledge of elemental constituents(essential properties?) is existentially dependent upon naming practices. Not all elemental constituents are. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon naming practices. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon our knowledge of them. That which is existentially dependent upon neither naming practice nor our knowledge cannot consist of either. Some elemental constituents consist of neither name nor knowledge.

It's by noting context that we gather connotations.

I'm merely pointing out the fact that all knowledge of elemental constituents(that something is an elemental constituent) depends upon naming practices(language, context, etc.) whereas the existence of elemental constituents does not always.

The overlap(the elemental constituents that are existentially dependent upon language) has not been properly taken into account here. Doesn't look like it can be given the frameworks in use.

Well, it's not meant to be a catalog of different kinds of essentials. The thesis is that some properties are essential without special bias (context).

The answer is that Kripke does not claim that we can't fix a reference by some contingent property. In such a case, just as Quine points out, this property becomes essential by special bias. — frank

That would be essential to successful reference, not essential to it's existence...

Can we substitute here?

Necessary for successful reference, and not necessary for it's existence?

Seems we can... the dent is necessary for successfully referring to that desk(for picking it out uniquely amongst others alike it in all the other ways noticeable), but is not necessary for the existence of that desk.

The thesis is that some properties are essential without special bias... — frank

As a result of their being known a priori?

Why must it be so difficult? All I said was that what you wrote, as far as I can tell, offers no reason to believe that possible world discourse can do without descriptions, definite and otherwise. — Janus


I've not claimed that possible world discourse 'can do without' descriptions, definite or otherwise(whatever the hell that's supposed to mean). — creativesoul

It follows from that that we've the strongest possible justificatory ground for concluding that description is not necessary for successful reference within possible world discourse involving both proper names and descriptions. — creativesoul

OK, so do you think "successful reference" in possible world discourse can do without definite descriptions, even though the discourse itself cannot? What would be left of any discourse, 'possible world' or otherwise, without successful reference, I wonder?

OK, so do you think "successful reference" in possible world discourse can do without definite descriptions, even though the discourse itself cannot? — Janus

Speaking in terms of "do without" cannot take account of what I'm saying.

So , according to you, what's the difference between something being "not necessary" for something else, and that something else being able to 'do without it'?

What's so difficult about using the language I use as a basis for questions about what I'm saying?

As a result of their being known a priori? — creativesoul

What's known a priori is that if the table is made of wood, then it's wood necessarily.

You have to look at the table to tell what it's made of.

OK, so do you think definite descriptions are not necessary to "successful reference" in possible world discourse, even though necessary to the discourse itself? What would be left of any discourse, 'possible world' or otherwise, without successful reference, I wonder?

That's one part of all this that makes me cringe, the notions of a posteriori and a priori.

OK, so do you think definite descriptions are not necessary to "successful reference" in possible world discourse, even though necessary to the discourse itself? — Janus

Well, that's much closer...

Definite descriptions are not a necessary part of successful reference within possible world scenarios. Definite descriptions are not a necessary part of successful reference in the actual world.

If that were true, then you should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definite description that is in need of no further elaboration to be exhaustively referentially comprehensible,

Well not exactly...

Rather, I should be able to outline two scenarios(examples of successful reference), one in the actual world, and one possible world scenario where definite description is not actually being used in(is not a part of) either.

That's been done already several times over...

What's known a priori is that if the table is made of wood, then it's wood necessarily. — frank

Which says nothing more than if the table were made out of something else, it would be a different table.

Nothing all that profound or mysterious.

Yes, if what you say is true, you should; so....in order to substantiate the truth of what you are saying...start outlining...

Nothing all that profound or mysterious. — Banno

That's right "nothing at all profound or mysterious" but rather, as I expected, "much ado about nothing"...