“..... for objective morality to exist in my view:.....”

In your view, apparently, the possibility for objective morality is predicated on the ability of both mental and non-mental machinations, such that both are embedded with a moral stance. Given that for mental existents, or as we know them, moral agents of a rational nature, the primary requirement, the absolutely necessary condition, for the determination of any moral stance is reason, and given that non-mental existents by definition have no such absolutely necessary condition.......how would any rational agent recognize a non-mental agent’s stance as moral? Granting that it is not required that a stance taken by one kind of entity conform to the congruent stance of another kind, it remains that the difference in the ground of each respective stance negates the possibility of equal consideration of their value. A non-mental existent may be morally inclined, but mental existents will have no means to understand it as such, hence will never know of it, which makes “objective morality” of this fashion moot.

Such is not the case if objective is meant to be that which is not subjective. If the qualifier is merely a “moral stance” in general, without regard to what volitions that stance actually exhibits, a rational agent with a determinable will is immediately presupposed, in order that there be a moral stance at all. Hence it is clear that from the perspective of each and every separate and distinct agent observing an action predicated on a determinable will, warrants the claim for objective moral stances, or, which is the same thing, objective morality.

The argument that by objective morality it is meant that any and all moral stances absolutely require precisely equitable volitions for a particular event, is absurd, at least under the common conditions of regular human life. Still, it is conceivable that relatively small groups of rational agents in a common culture may invoke equitable volitions in response to an administrative code affecting them all, but we might just call that ethics, not morality.

Yes? No? Maybe?

If these two are required for objective morality to exist, and they do seem to be required for it, then as long as there is one human or sentient animal suffering or going to suffer, it makes no moral difference to help others. — Atheer

The cancer cell is not separate from the body that carries it, nor are individuals separate from the whole. The cancer cell is not equal to the whole body, nor is the individual equal to the whole. In both examples what is important is the health of the whole. Our moral objective needs to be the health of the whole. It makes a moral difference that we consider the whole and think of poverty like a cancerous cell that needs to be eliminated.

Education is perhaps the best way to eliminate poverty but this is not education for technology preparing the young to be products for industry. A liberal education is for free people who carry the responsibility of governing themselves, the whole. Free radicals that lead to cancer need to be eliminated.

I haven't the faintest friggin idea what you're saying in just about any sentence there. It would take some work to convince me that you have any idea what you're saying as well.

Just for example:

In your view, apparently, the possibility for objective morality is predicated on the ability of both mental and non-mental machinations, such that both are embedded with a moral stance. — Mww

First, I don't know why it would appear to you that I'd be saying that objective morality would be predicated on anything about mental machinations.

Second, I'm not sure "the possibility for" adds anything to the sentence semantically.

Third, "X is predicated on the ability of y" seems to be missing a clause to the effect of "to such and such." In other words, what ability?

Fourth, "embedded with a moral stance," seems ontologically to suggest that you're thinking of moral stances as being something independent of both the mental and non-mental states in question.

Every sentence in your post has multiple issues like that.

The whole problem of morality arises with the haphazard nature of evolution. I've heard of people saying "X was far ahead of his/her time." or "The world wasn't ready for it".

We're carnivores biologically and have predator instincts. Unfortunately or fortunately we also have evolved a moral compass. We have empathy and can reason. We see gentle deer and bunny rabbits torn to pieces and feel something is wrong. At least some of us if not everyone.

To bring it closer to home the vast majority of us are non-vegetarians. You see. We haven't, as yet, grown out of our predatory heritage biologically but our minds are centuries ahead of us.

In a sense we're like Buddha trapped in a tiger's body. We want to be good but hey, we have fangs, claws and a taste for blood.

As for objective morality we haven't found common ground. There are things that are bad everywhere and at all times Are these cases of objective morality or are we confounding mere consensus for objectivity?

“.....First, I don't know why it would appear to you that I'd be saying that objective morality would be predicated on anything about mental machinations....”

That’s not how it appeared to me, that you said objective morality would be predicated on anything about mental machinations. It appeared to me you said objective morality must be predicated on both mental and non-mental machinations, to whit: on the one hand the machinations we know about (the use of reason) and the machinations we don’t know about (the use of “....fields or whatever...”).

“Second, I’m not sure “the possibility for” adds anything to the sentence semantically”.

You brought up the possibility for objective reality by expounding the conditions under which it would be evident.

“Third: “.......what ability....?”

In general, it doesn’t matter what ability. The proposition “X is predicated on the ability of y” presupposes y has some ability from which X would follow. In this particular case, X (the possibility of objective morality), the abilities are predicated on (y) the properties of fields or whatever.

Fourth: “....."embedded with a moral stance," seems ontologically to suggest that you're thinking of moral stances as being something independent of both the mental and non-mental states in question...”

I have nothing whatsoever to say about non-mental states with respect to a moral stance as you said with “...the world apart from minds must somehow have moral stances embedded in it...”. Nevertheless, in the state of affairs with which I do have an opinion, that being the condition of rational agents with a determinable will, a moral stance is given necessarily and can not be independent of the mental state from which it arises.

How do I edit a comment after it’s posted? Hey.......I gotta ask somebody, right?

Well, not objective as of yet, but I say we strive for a certain code of ethics. You don't want to live your life mistaken. Eating your dead father is ok in some cultures but I'd say they are pretty mistaken.

Even in science the Law of Gravity is tentative, until something better comes a long. So morals are definitely human relations, so they can be tentative. It's really hard to call it objective when there are exceptions to the rules, but that doesn't mean the rules are useless.

Like the moral of the boy who cried wolf... you lie a lot people wont believe you when you really need it. Whether you call that objective is kind of hard, but in general it is true. I strive not to lie because I'll need people in my most time of need.

But for them to be relative is kind of an anything goes so it doesn't matter and "I'm the judge of me." and it doesn't allow you to improve your morals. We are just perfect the way we are belief which is sill because we have laws too. Moral relativism becomes absolute anyway... so would that be objective then too? It's really a play on words.

There is a reality outside of our own heads.

That’s not how it appeared to me, that you said objective morality would be predicated on anything about mental machinations. It appeared to me you said objective morality must be predicated on both mental and non-mental machinations, — Mww

What in the world?

If it appears to you that I said that O is predicated on m and n, then it appears to you that I'm saying that O is predicated on something about m.

Fill in those variables for a couple other examples:

If it appears to you that I said that working automobiles are predicated on carburetors and pistons, then it appears to you that I'm saying that working automobiles are predicated on something about carburetors.

If it appears to you that I said that toast is predicated on bread and toasters, then it appears to you that I'm saying that toast is predicated on something about bread.

At any rate, I am not saying that objective morality has anything whatsoever to do with mind/mental machinations.

That is, could morality be somewhere between objective and subjective/relative? — Atheer

I don't think so. Either a statement states an objective fact or it doesn't. Facts are facts; they don't have gradations.

Here's what's required for objective morality to exist in my view: the world apart from minds has to somehow have moral stances embedded in it. They'd have to be properties of some non-mental existents, maybe some sort of field or whatever. — Terrapin Station

I don't think so. Many people, myself included, regard morality as being essentially about the way we behave towards beings with a mental life (which probably means humans and other animals); it would follow from this that objective morality only appears in the universe once beings with a mental life evolve. Thus objective morality, if it exists, is not a feature of the extra-mental, but is a by-product of the evolution of mind.

I am guessing that "objective morality" means morality that exists as a real feature of reality and not just as part of human aesthetic preferences or cultural preferences?

I am still a moral skeptic and I am not sure if morality exists.

I don't think so. Many people, myself included, regard morality as being essentially about the way we behave towards beings with a mental life (which probably means humans and other animals); it would follow from this that objective morality only appears in the universe once beings with a mental life evolve. Thus objective morality, if it exists, is not a feature of the extra-mental, but is a by-product of the evolution of mind. — Herg

Okay, but I'm telling you something about the way I use the terms.

You'd have to explain to me better how you're using the terms for your distinction to make sense to me.