Nothing all that profound or mysterious. — Banno

I thought you were confident earlier that Nixon could have been a golf ball. What persuades you otherwise?

Yes, if what you say is true, you should; so....in order to substantiate the truth of what you are saying...start outlining... — Janus

Why ought I?

There have been more than enough examples here in the thread and in the lectures which satisfy those conditions. I've drawn my conclusions based upon those. Do you not see that?

Point to one of those, then...or I will assume that you cannot back up what you have been claiming.

Turns out that Kripke disagrees. Nixon could not be a golfball. If he were, it turns out he would not be Nixon.

But remember the specific point being made in that conversation was that "What if Nixon were a golf ball" is about Nixon.

But I have some concerns still with the idea of an essence. For Kripke one part of essence is to do with whaat an individual is made from. It occurs to me that someone might dig up his corpse and rubberise it... Would he then be a golf ball?

Why? First of all, I'm not confident that you even know what I'm saying. Therefore, offering an example which proves the point(and they most certainly do) wouldn't be rightly understood to begin with. Second of all, I'm not even sure of what you're asking me to do, but I'm almost certain that your request is grounded upon the earlier confusion that I already remarked upon, and have posted several different times elaborating upon it. You know, that bit about the distinction I accused you of neglecting and you subsequently accused me of not having made it clear to start with. Here's our big chance!

So, to help clarify all of this, I ask you to answer a question regarding the following snippet of your request...

...you should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definite description... — Janus

To avoid any possible further misunderstanding as a result of the ambiguous language use in the above quote...

Are you claiming that I should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, because that's precisely what was written? Seems that at face value your expressing your opinion about what my(or 'the') ability to outline takes. The steps I must take(what's necessary for me) to outline cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description are utterly irrelevant to whether or not there are cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description.

My ability to outline the two scenarios for you is necessarily dependent upon definitive descriptions. So, I cannot outline without resorting(using?) to any definite description. Now, the astute reader will realize and certainly agree that it does not follow from that that definitive descriptions are a necessary part of the scenarios themselves, unless one conflates what's necessary for my outline with what's necessary for what's being outlined. That - of course - is absurd.

To quite the contrary, if my account is true, it will consist of true descriptions about actual cases of successful reference that do not include definitive descriptions. So, when you say that I should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires?

:worry:

But I have some concerns still with the idea of an essence. For Kripke one part of essence is to do with whaat an individual is made from. It occurs to me that someone might dig up his corpse and rubberise it... Would he then be a golf ball? — Banno

Quine continued to deny Kripke's contextless essentials. Kripke saw Quine as defying common sense. Surely Nixon couldn't have been a month of the year. He couldn't have been a number.

My common sense is silent on the issue of Nixon's rubberized corpse. Even if you squashed it with a hydraulic press, it would still be too big to play golf with. Curling maybe?

You write so much to say so little!

Just answer the question...

When you say that I should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires?

One can easily outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description. One cannot outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description without one using definite description.

Even if you squashed it with a hydraulic press, it would still be too big to play golf with. — frank

OK, golf balls...

Aren't you two at all concerned about where the consequences are leading?

@Janus is like a chess player who refuses to keep his bishop on the one colour. Not worth playing the game with him.

Like what...

I actually think that Janus fails to meaningfully draw and maintain the distinction between what our report of cases of successful reference takes(what's necessary for those reports) with what certain cases of successful reference takes(what's necessary for certain cases of successful reference). That seems to be a consistent oversight of his expressions here.

I think Kripke kept that in mind.

He appears to continue to think that we must be able to give a description of whatever we wish to name, in order to be sure that names fix an individual. As if predicates were simpler than proper names - as if "Fortieth President of the USA" were simpler to understand than "Ronald Reagan".

Well, I'm not so sure that the consequences of Kripke's take on what counts as essential parts are unacceptable. However, it does seem to be a possible case of special pleading for it does not allow one to stipulate circumstances within a possible world that are contrary to those concerning the essential parts, but he does allow a broad range change of circumstances involving people and proper names.

Then it should take far less effort to produce such an outline than it does to keep giving excuses for why you won't.

Talk is cheap even, or especially, when it is bullshit...
I've been asking the same questions from the start, have received no cogent or relevant answers to them, or explanations laying out why they are not relevant questions.

Here's a brief summary of what I think has been going on in N&N.

Kripke developed a complete semantics for formal modal logic. In N&N he is examining its implications for a workable grammar for modal statements in English. This had been such an intractable issue that it had pretty much been rejected as hopeless by most analytic philosophers - Quine and Russel as cases in point.

But for at least a very large number of modal sentences in English, Kripke has shown how to parse them in a consistent, coherent fashion.

One of the costs involved is that individuals are more fixed than was thought, across our modal musings. Specifically, a proper name fixes one individual across all accessible possible worlds in which that individual exists. An implication of this is that, since a definite description that fixes an individual in the actual world might turn out to be false, or be stipulated to be false, then the theory that the meaning of a name is given by an associated description is bunk.

Rather, in so far as the referent of a proper name is fixed at all, it is by what Kripke calls causal chains, but what I might call shared use.

This analysis can also be applied to kinds. Considered extensionally that seems reasonable to me. If "Dog A" refers to a placental mammal, as does "Dog B" and "Dog C" and so on, so that we conclude that all dogs are placental mammal, we also conclude that being a dog involves being a placental mammal. SO something we come across that is dog-like but not a placental mammal, ought not be considered as a dog - the Thylacine being a case in point. The extension of "Dog" includes only placental mammals, in all accessible possible worlds.

It seems to me that it is the notion of accessibility that pushes this point. In our world, dogs and Thylacines evolved quite separately, so that their common ancestor was neither dog nor thylacine. So the possibility of both dog and thylacine lies open - is accessible - to that common ancestor. But since both developed along quite distinct evolutionary lines, it is no longer possible for a dog to become a thylacine, or vice versa. The two lines have split forever.

Note that this is nothing more than a grammatical stipulation. It remains (perhaps) possible for a scientist to take a dog and modify it genetically so that it has the attributes of a marsupial. Such a creature would not be a thylacine, indeed, it would not be a marsupial, since it did not evolve from other marsupials. At best it would be a marsupial-like creature.

Such esoteric considerations probably will interest no one else but philosophers.

It seems to me that all that is being offered is a grammar that might help us avoid some confusion. The philosophical tool being used here is to ask, when modal musings start to look confused, if we are better off talking about distinct individuals, or distinct kinds.

Should we accept this grammar? SO long as it helps, why not?

I've been asking the same questions from the start, — Janus

OK, let's try again. I just summarised in my own terms. What do you see are problematic here?

...it should take far less effort to produce such an outline than it does to keep giving excuses for why you won't. — Janus

Just answer the question...

When you say that I should be able to produce an outline of a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires?

Yes.

When you say that I should be able to produce an outline of a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires? — creativesoul

Yes. — Janus

Then you're aiming at the wrong target.

This bears repeating:One can easily outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description; one cannot outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description without one using definite description. You're asking me to describe cases of successful reference that do not include definite description without using definite description as a means of proving that definite description is not a necessary part of successful reference.

What an account of those cases necessarily requires is not equivalent to what those cases necessarily require.<--------That is what you're conflating.

The proof that definite description is not a necessary part of successful reference are cases of successful reference by false description. My own case in point was Jane.

The steps I must take(what's necessary for me) to outline cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description are utterly irrelevant to whether or not there are cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description.

My ability to outline the two scenarios for you is necessarily dependent upon definitive descriptions. So, I cannot outline without resorting(using?) to any definite description. Now, the astute reader will realize and certainly agree that it does not follow from that that definitive descriptions are a necessary part of the scenarios themselves, unless one conflates what's necessary for my outline with what's necessary for what's being outlined. That - of course - is absurd.

:yikes:

Turns out that what was said was not so 'little' after all...

The proof that definite description is not a necessary part of successful reference are cases of successful reference by false description. — creativesoul

If you can refer to someone with a false description, then you must know something true about them. Remember that for you to "refer successfully" is for someone else to know who (or what) you are referring to.

If I construct a counterfactual scenario involving a man named Trump, how would you know which man I am referring to?

What I have been claiming is that you would need to see the man; in person or a photo, or I would need to tell you some stories about the actual man. Stories involve descriptions, which are definite or not depending on how precisely they are specified.

On the other hand if the 'person' in the counterfactual scenario is a fictional character, then I would not be referring to any actual person, but rather constructing a fictional one.

Now, the astute reader will realize and certainly agree that it does not follow from that that definitive descriptions are a necessary part of the scenarios themselves, unless one conflates what's necessary for my outline with what's necessary for what's being outlined. That - of course - is absurd. — creativesoul

Are you merely saying that the account is not the actuality? Well, of course that is trivially true, pre-discursive actuality does not consist in descriptions, designations or ostentions, whether definite, rigid or otherwise. I don't think bringing ontology into what is meant to be an analysis of semantics will be helpful at all.

If you can refer to someone with a false description, then you must know something true about them. — Janus

Thales is the chap who thought all was water.

Suppose that he never thought anything so silly.

After all, there are so few references to him, and they come in the main from his critics.

Suppose he never fell into a hole while looking a the stars.

Suppose that nothing we know about Thales is correct.

Now, who is this post about?

Seems to me that it is about Thales. And that despite our not knowing anything about him.

One of the costs involved is that individuals are more fixed than was thought, across our modal musings. Specifically, a proper name fixes one individual across all accessible possible worlds in which that individual exists. An implication of this is that, since a definite description that fixes an individual in the actual world might turn out to be false, or be stipulated to be false, then the theory that the meaning of a name is given by an associated description is bunk. — Banno

I don't see that a proper name, by itself, "fixes one individual....". If I set up a counterfactual scenario involving a man named 'Donald Trump' how will you know which man I am referring to if you don't know Donald Trump personally, or at least know who he is?

It is perhaps true that any particular definite description of Donald Trump could turn out to be false. But all of them could not be (given that the character we know as Donald Trump is not a CGI, as per the example I gave earlier).

The other problem is that if I just start talking about someone named Donald Trump outside of any pre-established context, you might assume that I am speaking about the most renowned Donald Trump who is best known as the current POTUS, whereas I might be talking about another Donald Trump who was born a woman, but underwent a sex-change.

So, consider these alternative questions about counterfactual scenarios:

What if Donald Trump had not been POTUS?

What if Donald Trump had not been born a woman?

How do you know which Donald Trump I refer to in each case? I say you know because each implies a description.

In the first case the implied description is that Donald Trump was the POTUS; and this description is a definite description if no other man named 'Donald Trump' was ever president.

In the second case the implied description is that Donald Trump was born a woman, and again this is a definite description if not other person named 'Donald trump' was ever born a woman.

(BTW, I am not denying that they could turn out to be the same person).

I don't even know what it could mean to say that "the meaning of a name is given by an associated description". Names have references, not meanings. The references of names are determined by descriptions as I believe I showed in the examples above.

Anyway, I have provided this in good faith. I'm happy to be corrected if I have misunderstood something, but please don't just keep saying that I have not understood, and directing me to read Kripke again. Instead explain in you own words and with counterexamples just where you think I am going wrong. If you can't or won't do that then that would seem to indicate the end of the discussion.

Seems to me that it is about Thales. And that despite our not knowing anything about him. — Banno

Well of course that is trivially true just as what we say about fictional characters is about them. But what you say about Thales does not refer to anyone, if such a person never existed. And what could it possibly mean to say that Thales did exist, even though every definite description of him is false?

Every description could not be false; it must be the case at minimum that there was a man who was named Thales about whom many stories abound but nothing is known other than that he lived in some more or less definite area at some more or less definite time. That he lived in a certain place at a certain time is a description just as is that he was named 'Thales'. If even those descriptions were false, then it could not mean anything to say that Thales had actually existed.

But what you say about Thales does not refer to anyone, if such a person never existed. — Janus

But he did exist.

And what could it possibly mean to say that Thales did exist, even though every definite description of him is false? — Janus

That's not difficult. There was a chap named Thales, who people told lies about. And this is a story about Thales, despite our not having definite description of him.

Every description could not be false; — Janus

But that's just a bald assertion. Everything we know about Thales might be wrong. There's nothing impossible about that. And yet, the sentence "Everything we know about Thales is wrong" is about Thales.

Every description could not be false; it must mean at minimum that there was a man who was named Thales about whom many stories abound but nothing is known other than that he lived in some more or less definite area as some more or less definite time. — Janus

...and that contradicts your theory, because it is about Thales, and yet we have no definite description of him.

That he was named 'Thales' is a description as is... — Janus

But crucially, not a definite description. It does not single him out, at least not without the circularity of "Thales" is the man named Thales.

If even those descriptions were false, then it could not mean anything to say that Thales had actually existed. — Janus

Again, you are asserting this without argument.

It seems, piecing it together, that you want to assert that if we know nothing about Thales, then we have no reason to think that he exists. But of course, we have no reason to think that he did not exist, despite our not being correct about anything we know about him

Same goes for Job, Noah, Jonah, and so on. That what we think we know about them might be false, simple does not imply that they do not exist.

And in the end, if you continue to insist that it does, you are just wrong.

I don't see that a proper name, by itself, "fixes one individual....". — Janus

"...across all possible worlds".

If I set up a counterfactual scenario involving a man named 'Donald Trump' how will you know which man I am referring to if you don't know Donald Trump personally, or at least know who he is? — Janus

You've let "know" creep in here. What's it doing? If you set up a counterfactual scenario involving a man named 'Donald Trump', then it is about the Donald Trump to whom you refer. That I don't know him does not change that.