A word of warning.

Many years ago I met someone who genuinely believed in a deterministic universe and that everything was fate and we had no free will.

He used it as an excuse for his actions.

This is why I was saying rebellious existentialism is sort of incoherent, since it takes a preference (that of being an individual) and forgets where this preference came from (not from the individual!). — darthbarracuda

But that's an entirely false dichotomy. Preferences are an expression of the individual. They are not somebody else's preferences, nor are they community 'property'. They are, by definition, what makes me me! No matter how they came to be what they are, their source is always me. They were not transferred to me from any external source.

One can be a determinist and still acknowledge the responsibility they have for their actions. If one doesn't do that, however, it just makes them a conceited prick. And not very wise.

Fortunately for the human race moral and legal codes concern themselves much more with the consequences of actions than the cause of them. Determinism may provide all the excuses you could ever need but it doesn't get you out of trouble with those you have harmed.

There's something similar that has appeared in legal cases in the last few decades: appealing to temporary insanity or 'underlying psychological causes' or brain disorders during criminal trials, to absolve an accused wrongdoer of responsibility. Such cases often revolve around very difficult questions of intentionality, i.e. did the accused really intend to do harm, etc. There are cases where such a defense is valid - there was one in Sydney where a man who killed bystanders in a carpark with a samurai sword was acquited because he was undergoing an acute psychotic episode. But there are obviously many opportuties for exploiting such arguments to absolve the genuinely guilty, too.

See my brain made me do it.

Depends what you mean by not getting out of trouble. In some peoples minds, being punished by being put into jail (for example) just makes them feel like martyrs.

Anyway, shouldn't we be more concerned about the cause of actions rather than the consequences? Maybe this is where things are going wrong...

But that's an entirely false dichotomy. Preferences are an expression of the individual. They are not somebody else's preferences, nor are they community 'property'. They are, by definition, what makes me me! No matter how they came to be what they are, their source is always me. They were not transferred to me from any external source. — Barry Etheridge

They characterize you but they aren't the product of your will or anything like that. One morning you woke up and found that you wanted orange juice. You didn't decide that you wanted orange juice.

A lot of the existentialists were all about radical freedom, and anti-essentialists. Like Sartre said, existence precedes essence. Which I find to be entirely incoherent, since to exist is to have certain properties and qualities outside of your control.

So say you wake up one day and want orange juice. You get orange juice and it makes you satisfied. But reflecting upon all this you can come to realize that, since you didn't choose to have this preference, you're merely following the rules the universe programmed into you.

So then perhaps in disgust you throw down my glass of orange juice and decide to rebel. But your life is filled with preferences, and this would require a massive undertaking to resist all these preferences. You didn't choose to make the smell of lavender soothingly calming, dammit! You don't want to be a posh resident of the universe, pampered (insulting to the dignity of the ego), and neither do you want to be a pawn of the universe, thrown around without your consent (also insulting)!

But eventually you will realize that all of these preferences are meant to keep you alive - that's the universe's game, to keep you alive until you can procreate and defend the clan. Therefore, in order to rebel, you must discontinue living.

However you then also immediately realize that the preference to live seems to be more important than being an individual - in fact, you realize later, that the preference to be an individual is itself a preference. You didn't get to decide if you wanted to be an individual, you were thrown into the world from nothing-ness.

This leads me to believe that the self has absolutely no causal relevancy here. And it also leads me to believe that existentialism, with its focus on freedom and rebellion, fundamentally falls short because it doesn't realize that our preferences, who we are, are not a product of ourselves at all. We don't have control. And if we can't have control, then what's the point of being an individual?

The answer is usually in the middle. We are a product of those we come in contact with during our lives. However, we do choose which traits to pick up. Some good for the propagation of nature and others bad.

We also feel pleasure and pain. I doubt we will ever be able to program a robot to really 'feel' pleasure and pain. What would be the point of making something feel pain if it was 100% programmed with no free will anyway?

It seems that we are more guided by stick and carrot than programmed. After all, isn't that how we bring our children up?

doesn't allow for creativity, innovation, much of ethics, altruism...apart from that, it's OK.

But eventually you will realize that all of these preferences are meant to keep you alive - that's the universe's game, to keep you alive until you can procreate and defend the clan. — DarthBarracuda

I think it is probably true that you don't feel you have any control over why you are so cynical about existence, but it might be mistaken to believe that this is therefore a general truth or a philosophical principle.

To be fair I wasn't trying to cover everything...lol.

Actually just to mention that I don't pretend to know any answers (that would be dangerous). I am just on a journey, like many of you, to get closer to the truth. Whether I'll ever get there is another matter. :)

fair enough too, but I was reacting to that particular point about 'carrot and stick'. If you think about that it really means 'reward and punishment' - which are basically physical stimuli. So in respect of the question 'why we do what we do', to say that we act according to those principles is to treat humans as, well, donkeys.

We do choose our preferences, we can examine any particular preference and choose to kick the habit. The fact that we are given preferences at a very young age, through training, moral and otherwise, to fill the void which we are born with (the very void which allows us to choose) does not negate this. Even instinctual inclinations which are given prior to birth may be overcome by the power of moral training. The void allows us suspend activity, will power. This is how human existence has bettered itself, over the many years it's been around, to become more intellectual for example, through training.

But eventually you will realize that all of these preferences are meant to keep you alive - that's the universe's game, to keep you alive until you can procreate and defend the clan. Therefore, in order to rebel, you must discontinue living. — darthbarracuda

Even those habits which you are born with, instincts which keep you alive, may be overcome through the power of choice, this is demonstrated by the hunger strike.

Your argument fails to dismiss free choice, because you would need to produce a human inclination which could not be overcome by the power of the will, in order to prove your point. But each and every activity of the human being may be overcome through the power of choice, as is demonstrated by suicide.

Yes, I agree that the carrot/stick analogy doesn't sit well on it's own. It does blomin' feel like it sometimes though.

I think inspiration is also a massive driver. Again we can choose whether to act on it or not.

Many years ago I met someone who genuinely believed in a deterministic universe and that everything was fate and we had no free will.

He used it as an excuse for his actions. — bassplayer

You sound like Dennett. I'm not aware of Harris or any of his followers blaming the universe for their own inappropriate behavior, are you?

I guess I'd have to say, that IF we are in a deterministic universe, then technically any free will we think we have would probably look like programming, to an outside observer. BUT, even if we are in a deterministic universe, THEN we still have to consider the consequences of our actions, SO we do have free will. It's virtually impossible for me to convince myself that I don't have free will.
That being said, I do consider my background and previous conditions when I think about my and other people's behaviors.

I think that's where Searle is coming from, as well. I think he concedes that IF a deterministic universe, then not really technically free will. But, when we go into a restaurant, it's still up to us to order a meal. The universe isn't going to do it for us. That's free will - and it's a free will that is independent of the type of universe we're in.

So, are we just supposed to have faith that we are in a deterministic universe? Or hope we're not in one? Be agnostic about it?

Can one claim to know that one does have free will, and not also make a claim about the type of universe we're in? The two topics look to be inseparable.

Your argument fails to dismiss free choice, because you would need to produce a human inclination which could not be overcome by the power of the will, in order to prove your point. But each and every activity of the human being may be overcome through the power of choice, as is demonstrated by suicide. — Metaphysician Undercover

The power of the will? What is the will, if not the manifestation of the most prominent preference, or the conglomeration of a multitude of compatible and cohesive preferences?

The power of the will? What is the will, if not the manifestation of the most prominent preference, or the conglomeration of a multitude of compatible and cohesive preferences? — darthbarracuda

This is the power to not choose, to decline or deny any preference. Since it can decline any preference whatsoever, it cannot be a preference itself. To say that will power, which is the power to deny any preference, is itself a form of preference, is contradictory.

A lot of the existentialists were all about radical freedom, and anti-essentialists. Like Sartre said, existence precedes essence. Which I find to be entirely incoherent, since to exist is to have certain properties and qualities outside of your control. — darthbarracuda

Well, it's a long time since I read Sartre and Camus, but this isn't how existentialism lives on in my memory. In one sense all you seem to be saying is that you yourself are some sort of essentialist: you deny responsibility for your acts, you think you have a set of things called 'preferences' that arise in you unbidden. Well, that certainly is anti-existentialist, but it seems odd. Where do these 'preferences' come from? Why are they insensitive to rationality? And how do you know they are? Is there empirical evidence to back up your claim?

My neo-Sartreian existential take would be different. There is the inauthentic life. This is lived when you have thought a reasonable amount about what makes you tick, and understand the well-springs of your choices pretty well, but you go on conforming to conventionality by living a life you have seen through. Or you can live the authentic life by your actions, which may be absurd, lack rational explanation or defy reason, but are actions which you make happen and which then, make you: you are no longer the product of a conformity you have seen through, you are your own person. Onwards, to freedom!

The years take their toll of such a view, and Sartre himself came to sympathise more in later life with the Marxists he originally opposed - there are more deterministic pressures on how to live than one might suppose in one's youth. But I still feel it has some thing going for it. Indeed I went and read some Kierkegaard properly for the first time this summer and found, lo! - the immediate, the life lived and leapt into - this is what defines us by our making it happen. (A strange and tortuous leap in Soren's case, but there you go) We begin where Heidegger begins (and Heidegger is where Sartre begins) with our ordinary sense of ourselves alive, among things ready to hand and present at hand, we don't begin with abstractions about so-called essentials but with existence/Existenz...whence the leap, freedom, the joy of authenticity...

This is the power to not choose, to decline or deny any preference. Since it can decline any preference whatsoever, it cannot be a preference itself. To say that will power, which is the power to deny any preference, is itself a form of preference, is contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. We can see will-power as a kind of illusion. In any case, what exactly is going on when we choose, if not the process of evaluating our preferences? If our preferences don't causally affect our choices, then what exactly causes us to choose one option rather than another?

...then what exactly causes us to choose one option rather than another? — darthbarracuda

The free will!

If you understand that there is a process of evaluating preferences, how can you conclude that a preference is the cause of the choice. Whatever it is that carries out the act of evaluating preferences must be something other than a preference itself, or else it could not evaluate, it would always choose itself, as the preference with power over the others.

But whatever it chooses, it must choose. It doesn't make sense to have a strong preference yet pick the route of least preference satisfaction, otherwise what exactly would a preference even be? There's nothing free about the will here. The will must choose a certain route of action depending on how strong the various preferences influencing it are.

But whatever it chooses, it must choose. — darthbarracuda

Why would you say this? It appears as contradiction. How can you say that "it chooses", if whatever it chooses it must choose? How is that a choice at all?

It doesn't make sense to have a strong preference yet pick the route of least preference satisfaction... — darthbarracuda

Yes, it absolutely does make sense. This is how we proceed to kick our bad habits. We just face the fact that certain things are not good for us, and force ourselves not to choose those things, even though they are our preferences.

The will must choose a certain route of action depending on how strong the various preferences influencing it are. — darthbarracuda

I don't think you understand the way that the will works. Do you understand the concept of "will power"? This is the capacity which we have to resist from following our natural preferences, habits, and things like this which give us pleasure. Once we apply the will power to prevent ourselves from engaging in these unwanted activities, produced by unwanted preferences, we give ourselves the freedom to choose other things. So the will acts to negate all preferences, resist any activity, giving the rational mind time to consider many options. The choice produced by the rational mind is not one of "preference", but one of reason. Then the will releases the suspended choice, allowing the individual to act according to reason rather than preference.

But whatever it chooses, it must choose. It doesn't make sense to have a strong preference yet pick the route of least preference satisfaction, otherwise what exactly would a preference even be? There's nothing free about the will here. The will must choose a certain route of action depending on how strong the various preferences influencing it are. — darthbarracuda

Your view that every practical choice that we make is governed by "preference" isn't false but it needs to be qualified. There is a liability to run together two different senses of "preference". In the first sense, a preference-1 is an antecedent desire or inclination. It is manifested in an agent's tendency to chose to engage in some sorts of behaviors, to tend to some specific sorts of needs, or to favor the achievement of some specific ends (e.g. enriching herself financially or fulfilling her promises). Preferences of that sort are general dispositions that get manifested in circumstances appropriate to them, and which may, but need not, be irrational. This sense of "preference" (that I here label preference-1) is roughly equivalent to "desire"; but labeling it such isn't very useful since the conflation that I wish to warn against also applies to two distinct senses of "desire".

In the second sense, an agent's prefered-2 action is what this agent effectively choses to do in the specific circumstances in which she is called to deliberate and act. That the two senses of "preference" are different is displayed in the fact that they often conflict with one another, as I had hinted in a previous post. What an agent choses to do, in response to rational considerations and evaluation of the salient features of her practical situation (e.g. her opportunities, obligations, general concerns, etc.) manifests, by definition, her preference-2, but often goes against some of her preferences-1. (The phenomenon of akrasia, or weakness of the will, highlights a further complication regarding the concept of preference-2 that I am leaving on the side for now.)

On a crude Humean conception of practical rationality that has been popular in analytic philosophy (but has found much disfavor in more recent Anscombe inspired philosophy of action), and that may not be entirely fair to Hume, preference-2 -- what an agent effectively "prefers-2", or choses, to do -- always is the result of some intrinsically stronger preference-1 (brute desire, or habit) winning out over other preferences-1 that it potentially conflicts with.

On that view, reason always is the slave of passions, as Hume would say, since its scope of operation is entirely restricted to instrumental deliberation: finding means to achieving antecedently determined ends. But once the distinction is properly kept in mind in between preferences-1 and preferences-2, the Humean slogan admits of two readings: only the first one of which supports the crude conception of practical rationality as being governed by preferences-1 that we are passively straddled with and have no control over. Under the second reading, the always present "passion" or "motivational state" that leads an agent into action can be, and indeed always is, sensitive to reason. Habits can be molded and they can be overridden. Preferences-2 are rational, although Hume avoids qualifying them thus since he himself is attacking a crude intellectualist conception of rationality.

What Hume can thus be justly taken to be objecting to is a crude conception of reason that portrays is to be entirely independent of habit and motivation. The second reading of Hume's dictum is defended and elaborated upon by David Wiggins in his Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality. The distinction that I have stressed between two sorts of preferences (two sorts of "imperatives") has been stressed in a similar spirit by John McDowell in his paper Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?. Although those texts focus on issues of meta-ethics, they are centrally relevant to the philosophy of action and of practical rationality, generally.

In the second sense, an agent's prefered-2 action is what this agent effectively choses to do in the specific circumstances in which she is called to deliberates and act. — Pierre-Normand

This preference #2, is only determined after a choice is made, posteriorly, it describes the choice which has been made. "She choose X, therefore it was her preference". Since free will is directed toward choices which will be made, this preference #2 is irrelevant to the free will/determinism issue. Preference #2 cannot act as a cause, and to introduce this sense of "preference" is to create ambiguity with the possibility of equivocation.

This preference #2, is only determined after a choice is made, posteriorly, it describes the choice which has been made. "She choose X, therefore it was her preference". Since free will is directed toward choices which will be made, this preference #2 is irrelevant to the free will/determinism issue. Preference #2 cannot act as a cause, and to introduce this sense of "preference" is to create ambiguity with the possibility of equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, that was exactly my point. The two concepts, however, are frequently run together, and Darthbarracuda seems to be relying on running them together in order for his anti-free-will argument to run through. At the same time the concept of preference that singles out what a person effectively choses to do when faced with a range of alternatives that she has deliberated over is a perfectly good concept that reflects a quite normal use of the word "preference". ("I prefer to order the salad because I am dieting" is consistent with "I much prefer eating apple pie to eating salad"). It is thus quite useful to distinguish this concept of an 'all things considered preference' precisely to avoid the equivocation with the other concept of an antecedent and merely general preference -- or desire, or habit of choice -- that may conflict with an agent's assessment of what it is that she deems that she ought to do, or with what it is that she effectively chooses to do precisely because she judges that she ought to do it.

Why would you say this? It appears as contradiction. How can you say that "it chooses", if whatever it chooses it must choose? How is that a choice at all? — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, it's not a choice at all. It's like a compass pointing to north - it is forced to point north, but nevertheless we need the needle to know where north is.

Yes, it absolutely does make sense. This is how we proceed to kick our bad habits. We just face the fact that certain things are not good for us, and force ourselves not to choose those things, even though they are our preferences. — Metaphysician Undercover

But to kick our bad habits requires us to have the preference to be rid of these bad habits. An override.

The choice produced by the rational mind is not one of "preference", but one of reason. Then the will releases the suspended choice, allowing the individual to act according to reason rather than preference. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does reason accomplish if not goals, and where do goals come from if not preferences?

What does reason accomplish if not goals, and where do goals come from if not preferences? — darthbarracuda

Practical reason is an ability to arbitrate between potentially conflicting goals. Some specific goal may be judged to take precedence over another goal, in a particular practical situation, when there is a good reason for it to do so. Practical reason is the ability to understand such reasons and to be motivated by them to act accordingly. Reasons themselves, unlike raw desires, baby squirrels or meteorites, do not come from anywhere. It's a category mistake to ask where a reason comes from. One can ask where the human ability to reason practically (i.e. to be sensitive to reasons) comes from, but reasons themselves stand on their own. If someone's reason to do, or to believe, something is bad, what is required in order to show this reasons to be bad, and thereby motivate an agent to abandon it, isn't a story about the causal origin of that reason (or the causal origin of the specific goal that it recommends one to act upon), but rather a good counterargument.

But to kick our bad habits requires us to have the preference to be rid of these bad habits. An override. — darthbarracuda

This is where you are incorrect. The "override" is a judgement that the habit is bad. It is only a "preference" to be rid of the habit in the second sense of "preference", as Pierre-Normand has argued. So your conclusion is one drawn from equivocation.

The fact is, as I have argued, and Pierre-Normand now agues, that we use reason to judge conflicting preferences, and this is called making a choice. The process which judges preferences cannot itself be a preference. Only after the judgement is made can we say that the chosen one was the preferred one. But if the chosen one is called "the preference", this uses "preference" in a different way from the "preferences" which are judged. The chosen one, as "the preference", comes about as an effect of the choice, and cannot be the cause of the choice.

So you have not addressed the process which judges the preferences to make a choice. You have simply asserted that a "preference" causes the choice, so it is not a choice at all. But this is simplistic nonsense because clearly different preferences are judged, and not a single one of them actually causes itself to be chosen. They are judged as passive possibilities, not active causes. The active cause of the choice comes from that which is judging.

Practical reason is an ability to arbitrate between potentially conflicting goals. Some specific goal may be judged to take precedence over another goal, in a particular practical situation, when there is a good reason for it to do so. Practical reason is the ability to understand such reasons and to be motivated by them to act accordingly. Reasons themselves, unlike raw desires, baby squirrels of meteorites do not come from anywhere. It's a category error to ask where a reason comes from. One can ask where the human ability to reason practically (i.e. to be sensitive to reasons) comes from, but reasons themselves stand on their own. If someone's reason to do, or to believe, something is bad, what is required in order to show this reasons to be bad, and thereby motivate an agent to abandon it, isn't a story about the causal origin of that reason (or the causal origin of the specific goal that it recommends one to act upon), but rather a good counterargument. — Pierre-Normand

I see no reason to distinguish between preferences and reasons, as if they are two completely separate things. Reasons, in my view, are just static preferences. I have a reason to go for a run today, because I want to be in good shape. I may not actually prefer to go for a run (exercise is hard...), but this preference is over-ridden by the reason (preference) to be fit.

Thus we can have a static grouping of preferences (reasons) if we have a static goal - to be fit, to understand the truth, etc. The division between normative reasons and non-normative preferences thus, in my view, cannot be sustained.

The fact is, as I have argued, and Pierre-Normand now agues, that we use reason to judge conflicting preferences, and this is called making a choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

But to what standard do we judge conflicting preferences, if not the goals we have in mind to accomplish?

So you have not addressed the process which judges the preferences to make a choice. You have simply asserted that a "preference" causes the choice, so it is not a choice at all. But this is simplistic nonsense because clearly different preferences are judged, and not a single one of them actually causes itself to be chosen. They are judged as passive possibilities, not active causes. The active cause of the choice comes from that which is judging. — Metaphysician Undercover

We choose an option depending on what our overarching goals are. Do I go to the movie theater, or donate to a charity? In both cases, I have a preference to have fun, and a preference to be moral. And this is where we get into the idea of character, or the static preferences a person has. The character is what ultimately decides between two or more preferences, based on what the person's higher-order goals are and a deliberation as to which of the possible routes of action helps attain this goal the best. But of course none of us decided what our character would be, or who we would fundamentally be as a person.

I see no reason to distinguish between preferences and reasons, as if they are two completely separate things. Reasons, in my view, are just static preferences. — darthbarracuda

Right, for the sake of argument, let's assume that reasons are "static preferences". Being static, they cannot act as a cause. It is the reasoning mind, which uses static preferences, in the process of reasoning, which causes the decision. It cannot be a preference which is the cause of a decision because the preferences are not active, they are passive. The mind is active in the process of reasoning, and it is the mind which causes the decision, not the preference.

But to what standard do we judge conflicting preferences, if not the goals we have in mind to accomplish? — darthbarracuda

We judge things according to principles, not goals. We look for objective principles, and we can judge our goals as to whether they are consistent with the principles which we believe are objective.

We choose an option depending on what our overarching goals are. Do I go to the movie theater, or donate to a charity? In both cases, I have a preference to have fun, and a preference to be moral. And this is where we get into the idea of character, or the static preferences a person has. The character is what ultimately decides between two or more preferences, based on what the person's higher-order goals are and a deliberation as to which of the possible routes of action helps attain this goal the best. But of course none of us decided what our character would be, or who we would fundamentally be as a person. — darthbarracuda

No, I don't believe that these are "higher order goals" at all, they are principles. You make the decision of whether to go to the movie, or donate the money to a charity, based on the principles you hold, not on some preference. Your preference is dependent on you principles. So I think that you misrepresent principles as preferences. But a principle is not the same thing as a preference. We know, and believe that preferences are subjective and vary from one individual to another. We know and believe that principles can obtain a high degree of objectivity, as is the case with mathematical principles. And we often employ mathematical principles when deciding what to do. So we know and also believe that principles are completely different from preferences. Now we only need people like you to understand and believe, that it is principles which a rational human being uses to make decisions, not preferences.