But they are definite descriptions if they determine which Thales we are referring to, which you seemed to be claiming that they do, when you used them to specify which Thales we have been referring to. — Janus

Well, if there is only one individual that satisfies some given description, then that is a definite description. Do you agree?

My point is that there need be no such thing for us to talk about Thales. Indeed, the sentence "There is no definite description that singles out Thales" is itself about Thales. It's the very same person that Aristotle described, incorrectly.

I have been thinking that it is not really the name 'Thales' which is a rigid designator, but rather something like 'that man'. Which man? 'The man called Thales who.....' — Janus

No, it's the name that is a rigid designator. Again, a rigid designator has as its referent the very same individual in any possible world in which that individual exists. The rigid designator is not the individual, but the reference - the name.

Interestingly, 'The man called Thales' is a description but not a definite one, until you specify exactly when and where he was first dubbed 'Thales', and/or add other identifying descriptions about him and his doings. — Janus

But "The man called Thales" is never a definite description, since there may be - indeed, are, - other folk named Thales.

And it is plane that we can talk about Thales despite not knowing anything of his dubbing, or any other definite descriptions of his life and times.

SO it seems to me that this line of reasoning is off track.

So, I haven't been claiming that any description uniquely determines the referent of a name, although of course it could determine the unique referent of the name, which is a different thing.
— Janus

So it might be worth your setting this out in more detail. — Banno

What if Donald Trump had been born a woman? — Janus

'I wonder whether, if Donald Trump's parents' fourth child had been a girl, they would have continued to have children in the hope of having a second boy.' — andrewk

Actually my example was 'What if Donald Trump had not been born a women" , and the point was to show that there is an implicit description, something like; "Donald Trump, although now identified as man, was born a woman" which would show, given that we have no evidence that the current POTUS has had a sex change, that another Donald trump is being spoken about.

But I do agree with what you say about contextuality. I have referred to that as 'networks of description'; they are both explicit and implicit, but nonetheless essential, in our discourses, because without them there would be no context, just names without referents floating around in the void.

Actually my example was 'What if Donald Trump had not been born a women" — Janus

Oh, sorry. I thought the 'not' was a typo and removed it in a misguided attempt to be charitable. The sex change possibility (or it could just be a woman posing as a man) provides grounds for another useful example. We consider the complete speech act:

"I wonder whether, if Donald Trump had not been born a woman, he would have made that appalling comment about 'grabbing by the pussy'"

The reference is fixed in this world by the implied DD that Trump is POTUS. The context of the speech act is that the speaker believes Trump was born a woman and either has had a sex change or is impersonating a man. The possible worlds being considered are those that split from this one at some time between the birth of the current POTUS and the time Trump made that revolting comment. Given the speaker's beliefs, it seems reasonable that they hypothesise that the comment was made in order to bolster Trump's credentials as a man, in order to head off inquiries that might reveal Trump's sex at birth - since either a sex change or transvestitism would be a liability to a presidential candidate in a conservative country like the US.

Again, analysis of the complete speech act, rather than a fragment thereof, dispels all ambiguity.

My point is that there need be no such thing for us to talk about Thales. Indeed, the sentence "There is no definite description that singles out Thales" is itself about Thales. It's the very same person that Aristotle described, incorrectly. — Banno

But again the obvious question to "There is no definite description that singles out Thales" is (unless you know by description who Thales is) 'Who is Thales', which translates as 'But which man exactly does this single out?' It's interesting that you add the description "it's the very same person that Aristotle described, incorrectly". This description may or may not be a definite description, because Socrates may have misdescribed more than one person, and even if you add 'called Thales' to 'the very same person' Socrates may have misdescribed more than one Thales.

No, it's the name that is a rigid designator. Again, a rigid designator has as its referent the very same individual in any possible world in which that individual exists. The rigid designator is not the individual, but the reference - the name. — Banno

Again, I disagree. 'That man' is a truly rigid designator because (in usage as opposed to principle) it can only refer to one man, whereas multiple men might have been called 'Thales'. I understand that it is not the individual who is the rigid designator; of course not, because the individual is the rigidly designated

.

That's a nice imaginative extrapolation of the example!

It's been interesting, but gotta go!

'Who is Thales' — Janus

Around and around. Who is the question 'Who is Thales' about?

It's about Thales.

This, despite the fact that the person asking the question cannot give a definite description that singles out Thales.

Therefore, one does not need a description that singles out an individual to the exclusion of all others, in order to refer to that individual.

Around and around. Who is the question 'Who is Thales' about?

It's about Thales. — Banno

Well, I don't interpret it that way: I say the question "Who is Thales" is equivalent to the question "Which individual does the name Thales (in this particular case) refer to?"

And this question may be answered by pointing, showing a photograph or describing the characteristics, actions and life events of the individual being referred to.

To say that the name 'Thales' refers to Thales is to tell me nothing; it's merely a tautology.

so for you the name “Thales” in the question is an empty placeholder.


But if I were to answer that Thales is a Disney character, would that answer your question? No, you want to know who Thales was, so not just any answer will do.

So the word “Thales “ is not empty. Rather it already has a roll in the conversation- or speech act, as @Andrew called it.

And it has this roll despite there being no definite description available.

I think we are talking about two different things. I have said that a definite description does not need to be wholly true to refer uniquely to someone. I think the question about whether successful reference is possible by false description is related, and as I have already said, I am not convinced that it is possible without the person referring knowing something true about the person being referred to, even if that is nothing more than knowing what they look like — Janus

We were. Much of that is on my part as well... My apologies.

The answer that Thales is a Disney character would do if Thales was a Disney character. I don't know where you are going with this.

I agree that 'Thales' is not, in the case that the name is being used to refer to the famous Presocratic philosopher, merely an empty placeholder; it does indeed have a role in the conversation or speech-act in those kinds of cases.

But it has this role only because people know who Thales was (or at least is thought to have been) on account of the stories they have read that describe what is known (or thought to be known) about the purportedly having-existed individual called 'Thales'. So there are definite descriptions available (and that are implicit in all our discourse about Thales) and the fact that some of them may be apocryphal is not problematic for our talk about Thales. Only in the extreme case that there never was any such person would our talk fail to refer to any actual individual.

I can't see any problems, paradoxes or mysteries associated with this account.

Yes, likewise.creativesoul, as they say "it takes two to tango", and I admit that I can jump to conclusions, be impatient and rude sometimes.

I agree that 'Thales' is not, in the case that the name is being used to refer to the famous Presocratic philosopher, merely an empty placeholder; it does have indeed have a role in the conversation or speech-act in those kinds of cases. — Janus

Then you agree that when it was asked "Who is Thales?", the question was about Thales. So the questioner made reference to Thales without themselves being able to provide a definite description.

That is, it is possible to refer without having access to a definite description.

Now you say there must be a definite description which is somehow remote form the speakers:

So there are definite descriptions available (and that are implicit in all our discourse about Thales) and the fact that some of them may be apocryphal is not problematic for our talk about Thales. — Janus

And if all of these descriptions of Thales are all of them wrong, but there was such a person? Then no one in the conversation can produce a definite description of Thales. And yet, again, the conversation is about Thales.

"But there must be some sort of chain of conversation back to Thales..."

...and now you would be agreeing with Kripke. That chain does not require that definite descriptions be available in order to talk about Thales.

Ah I wasn't worried about anything like that. That stuff is nearly inevitable. I just realized that my own analysis here was treating false descriptions as though they could not be definite descriptions, and that that seemed to be a large part of our misunderstanding.

That problem was on my end...

I agree that 'Thales' is not, in the case that the name is being used to refer to the famous Presocratic philosopher, merely an empty placeholder; it does have indeed have a role in the conversation or speech-act in those kinds of cases. — Janus


Then you agree that when it was asked "Who is Thales?", the question was about Thales. So the questioner made reference to Thales without themselves being able to provide a definite description.

That is, it is possible to refer without having access to a definite description. — Banno

Well, if a conversation is about Thales,the famous Presocratic philosopher, then right there is a definite description of who the conversation is about.

In a merely tautologous sense a conversation about Thales is about Thales, just as a conversation about Humpty Dumpty is about Humpty Dumpty, or a conversation about Baktrianwartweasel is about Baktrianwartweasel. Is that all you want to claim?

In any such conversation of course a novice who is asking 'Who is X?' is asking for the definite descriptions they lack due to not knowing who X is. This seems trivially obvious to me.

And if all of these descriptions of Thales are all of them wrong, but there was such a person? — Banno

If every description of Thales were completely wrong, including that there was such a person living where and when we thought Thales lived and who was involved with philosophy, then what could it mean to say that there was such a person? Or alternately, what if there were a hundred Thales that had lived in Ancient Greece, but none of them ever had anything to do with philosophy?

These kinds of questions seem to make any claim beyond your merely tautologous sense in which talk about Thales is about Thales incoherent if the function of descriptions that determine who Thales was (or is reputed to have been) in any "Chain of conversation back to Thales" is denied.

Oh, OK, I see what you mean now. :smile:

I agree that 'Thales' is not, in the case that the name is being used to refer to the famous Presocratic philosopher, merely an empty placeholder; it does have indeed have a role in the conversation or speech-act in those kinds of cases. — Janus

Then you agree that when it was asked "Who is Thales?", the question was about Thales. So the questioner made reference to Thales without themselves being able to provide a definite description.

That is, it is possible to refer without having access to a definite description.
— Banno

Well, if a conversation is about Thales,the famous Presocratic philosopher, then right there is a definite description of who the conversation is about. — Janus

Yeah you and Banno are talking about different things as well.

He's pointing out that the questioner successfully refers to Thales without themselves being able to provide a definite description. That is, he's pointing out what's not included in that case of successful reference. It does not include a definite description. Thus, not all cases of successful reference include definite description.

You're pointing out what's included in a completely different scenario.

I don't see it that way. As I said, in asking "who is Thales?" the questioner is assuming that there is a definite description of just who he is, and is asking for it.

Think about it, if you don't know who is being spoken of in a conversation, how could those who do know (or purport to know) answer your question about who is being spoken of without giving any definite descriptions?

...in asking "who is Thales?" the questioner is assuming that there is a definite description of just who he is, and is asking for it. — Janus

All questioners asking that??? Some perhaps could be. Definitely not all. You're assuming precisely what's at issue here. Seems that all definitely assume that the person they are asking can answer the question. Not all answers to that question include definite description. So, your comment above is found wanting...

The questioner did not use definite description. The questioner successfully referred to Thales nonetheless.

Think about it, if you don't know who is being spoken of in a conversation, how could those who do know (or purport to know) answer your question about who is being spoken of without giving any definite descriptions? — Janus

What's at issue is not what an answer to the question includes. What's at issue is whether or not the question itself can be used as a means for successful reference. It certainly can, and it does not include definite description. The fact that another can set out the referent of "Thales" by virtue of definite description proves this point beyond any and all doubt.

The questioner did not use definite description. The questioner successfully referred to Thales nonetheless. — creativesoul

Isn't it a moot point whether or not the questioner 'successfully referred to Thales'? I can't see that any tangible difference follows from a Yes vs a No answer to the question 'was a successful reference made?' Rather, it's just a question of what words one uses to describe the speech acts. It's what David Chalmers calls a Verbal Dispute - something about choice of words with no actual import.

FWIW I regard 'who is Thales?' from an eavesdropper to the conversation as shorthand for:

"Your conversation sounds interesting and, If you don't object, I'd like to join in. I note that you keep on using the word 'Thales' as if it were a name of a person. Is it the name of a person? If so, could you please tell me a little about the person whose name it is, so that I can enjoy your conversation more, and maybe even participate?"

The meaning of that is quite clear, and whether or not the questioner has 'successfully referred to Thales' seems to have no significance.

Isn't it a moot point whether or not the questioner 'successfully referred to Thales'? I can't see that any tangible difference follows from a Yes vs a No answer to the question 'was a successful reference made?' Rather, it's just a question of what words one uses to describe the speech acts. It's what David Chalmers calls a Verbal Dispute - something about choice of words with no actual import. — andrewk

What counts as successful reference underwrites this entire thread.

Seems to me that that is not established and/or determined solely by the words we choose to talk about it. Rather, we successfully referred long before our ability to take an account of what we had long since been doing. As a result, we can be mistaken in our account thereof. So...

Not just any words will do.

The question "who is Thales?" does not include definite description. It can be used as a means for successful reference. That much is undeniable, and proven beyond all reasonable doubt by the cases where the question gets correctly answered. The correct answer is not a part of the question. The question successfully refers to Thales. The correct answer is not a part of the successful reference. It only follows that not all successful reference includes description(definite or otherwise).

The only true answer to the question of whether or not that is a case of successful reference is "yes". That's of utmost importance.

FWIW I regard 'who is Thales?' from an eavesdropper to the conversation as shorthand for:

"Your conversation sounds interesting and, If you don't object, I'd like to join in. I note that you keep on using the word 'Thales' as if it were a name of a person. Is it the name of a person? If so, could you please tell me a little about the person whose name it is, so that I can enjoy your conversation more, and maybe even participate?"

The meaning of that is quite clear, and whether or not the questioner has 'successfully referred to Thales' seems to have no significance. — andrewk

That is a very charitable attribution of underlying meaning to the question. While it most certainly may be true when some people ask the question, it cannot be true when everyone asks the question. The question can be asked by people with different personalities and/or world-views and in a number of different scenarios besides the very polite and considerate eavesdropper scenario you've put forth.

I pretty much agree with @andrewk that the notion of "successful reference" is moot or irrelevant.

Say in our hypothetical conversation the novice has not been able to tell whether Thales is a man or a women, or even a domestic animal or a place. In then inquiring 'What does "Thales" refer to?", would you say she or he has "successfully referred", or even simply referred, to Thales?

I pretty much agree with andrewk that the notion of "successful reference" is moot or irrelevant. — Janus

Well, in that case, you're both sorely mistaken.

:wink:

Say in our hypothetical conversation the novice has not been able to tell whether Thales is a man or a women, or even a domestic animal or a place. In then inquiring 'What does "Thales" refer to?", would you say she or he has "successfully referred", or even simply referred, to Thales?

"What does 'Thales' refer to?" is a case of successful reference if "Thales" has a referent. The questioner is asking about the referent of the name.

Well, in that case, you're both mistaken. — creativesoul

'Mistaken' is not a relevant concept in this field. There is no correct and incorrect. There are no proofs of correctness. If there were, Kripke's opinion would either have been proven correct and thereby accepted by everybody that is capable of following logic, or it would have been proven incorrect, in which case no logically competent person would accept it. Since neither of those is the case, it must not be amenable to proof, so 'right' and 'wrong', 'mistaken' and 'correct' are not applicable concepts.

What really matters is 'Is it useful?' Does it better help us to understand the psychology and history of language? Does it help us to better understand what went wrong when people misunderstand each other - as they so frequently do? Does it give us clues as to how to communicate more effectively? Does it help us understand how children learn language, so that we can better aid them in that task? Would it help us in a situation where we encountered people with a different language, with no interpreters?

My impression is that Kripke saw his mission as coming up with a theory of language that explained hypotheticals and counterfactuals ('modal discourse'), while still allowing him to say that the hypothetical/counterfactual is about the same person as in this world, rather than an imaginary avatar thereof.

If so, then asking about whether a reference was successful is not relevant to Kripke's purpose, and that may be why he does not talk about 'successful reference', at least not using those words.

I pretty much agree with andrewk that the notion of "successful reference" is moot or irrelevant. — Janus

Well, in that case, you're both mistaken.
— creativesoul

'Mistaken' is not a relevant concept in this field. There is no correct and incorrect. There are no proofs of correctness. If there were, Kripke's opinion would either have been proven correct and thereby accepted by everybody that is capable of following logic, or it would have been proven incorrect, in which case no logically competent person would accept it. Since neither of those is the case, it must not be amenable to proof, so 'right' and 'wrong', 'mistaken' and 'correct' are not applicable concepts... — andrewk

Being mistaken is relevant to everything ever written, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered. Being mistaken is not existentially dependent upon formal logical proof nor the ability thereof to properly account for it. It quite simply does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be. Rather, it only follows that formal logical proof is inadequate for showing that and/or how different positions can be and/or are mistaken.

Being mistaken is not just a matter of being true/false. It's also a matter of being adequate/inadequate for taking proper account of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account thereof.

Successful reference is one such thing amongst many.

You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to Kripke's lectures and/or many of the historical positions that he targets. You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to philosophy of language. You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant for being useful and/or helping us out in all of the ways that you've implied philosophy of language is.

It quite simply does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be. — creativesoul

Sure, if all 'mistaken' means is 'has an opinion that I do not agree with'. If the difference between being mistaken and having a different opinion is not the presence of a proof, then what is it?

You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to Kripke's lectures and/or many of the historical positions that he targets. — creativesoul

Do you not find it strange then, that Kripke does not mention 'successful reference' in N&N? If you think he mentions it but calls it something different, what does he call it?

Had the Axis powers won the war, then what? Nothing can be said about the axis winning. It would seem an impossibility; but not so.

I think that's the heart of what Kripke is concerned with. My account of such a counterfactual is that The Man in the High Castle imagines a world that was identical to this up to about late 1941 and then started to differ, to the extent that the Axis powers won.

My feeling is that Kripke finds it unsatisfactory to say it is about 'a world that was identical to this' and wants to say that the key protagonists in the novel are the same entities as in this world, rather than simulacra thereof. That, as I understand it, is why he ventures into modal logic and possible world semantics. It appears that, to him, it feels more natural to say that it is the same Winston Churchill in the novel as the one in this world. To me that feels weird. But who can argue feelings?

Putting the notion of successful reference to good use...

The impasse between Banno and Janus is a direct consequence of incompatible frameworks attempting to take account of the same thing... successful reference.

Banno looks at what the specific examples of successful reference include and draws conclusions about what's needed or not based upon what's included or not within the example. So, he's working from the presupposition that what's necessary for a specific case is equivalent to and/or determined by what's included within that case. I do not know if he would agree with this summary of his method, but it seems clear to me and the evidence in the thread(his examples and their explanations) support it.

Janus works from the notion that all examples of successful reference are existentially dependent upon the same core set of things, and draws conclusions about what's needed or not based upon that core regardless of what may or may not be included within the example.

Hence, when Banno points out that "who is Thales?" successfully refers to Thales and yet does not include definite description, he concludes that there is no need for definite description, because that is a prima facie example of successful reference that does not include definite description. If definite description need not be included in an actual case of successful reference, it most certainly is not necessary for that case. If it is not necessary for that case, then it is not necessary for all cases.

However, Janus points out that definite description for "Thales" has already been provided somewhere else along the line, and if it were not for that being so, then "who is Thales" would fail to successfully refer as a result of "Thales" having no referent.

The underlying issue is that there's a gulf between what all successful reference is existentially dependent upon(the basis of Janus' position), and what all cases of successful reference include(the basis of Banno's position).

That gulf, I would strongly argue, is a direct result of inadequate frameworks. That's plural on purpose. The bridge would be a framework that can take account of the fact that some cases of successful reference do not include that which they are existentially dependent upon.

Janus offers no direct concerted attempt to bridge that gulf, although skirts around it when claiming that all cases of successful reference are dependent upon descriptions even when and if those descriptions are not always used within the successful reference.

Banno also offers no direct concerted attempt to bridge that gulf. I suspect it is because he does not see the need to do so. However, I do think that Kripke's notion of a causal chain of reference, and Banno's invocation of shared meaning also skirt around it.

We do not have to argue about feelings. It's a real possibility that the Axis powers might have won WWII. The nuances in which our reality has been shaped by the acts of noble people is worth memorizing. Hence, what?

It quite simply does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be.
— creativesoul
Sure, if all 'mistaken' means is 'has an opinion that I do not agree with'... — andrewk

That's not what I mean. Let me clarify...

Having an opinion that I do not agree with is having a different opinion. Having a different opinion is equivalent to and/or the result of having different belief. I do not always disagree with different beliefs. All opinions that I disagree with are different.

Being mistaken is the result of having false belief. Two people can have different false beliefs. They are both mistaken. Two people can have the same false belief. They are both mistaken. Two people can have different true beliefs. Neither is mistaken. Two people can have the same true belief. Neither is mistaken.

So, having an opinion I disagree with requires having different belief. Having different belief is not equivalent to being mistaken.

And...

It's still does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be. It follows that a formal logical proof is an inadequate means for showing the mistakes.

If the difference between being mistaken and having a different opinion is not the presence of a proof, then what is it? — andrewk

See above.

You're both mistaken if you think and/or believe that successful reference is moot and/or irrelevant to Kripke's lectures and/or many of the historical positions that he targets.
— creativesoul
Do you not find it strange then, that Kripke does not mention 'successful reference' in N&N? — andrewk

It's not at all strange to me.

It still does not follow from the fact that there is no formal proof adequate for showing how you're both mistaken, that you're not, that you cannot be, or that different positions in the field cannot be. — creativesoul

It is possible that there is such a thing as absolute truth, whereby something can be the case even if nobody can ever know it. I tend not to believe in absolute truth, but let's adopt the concept for the sake of furthering discussion. Then, I can be mistaken if I hold a belief that contradicts the absolute truth. But if that absolute truth is not knowable then nobody is in a position to say definitively that I am mistaken. The only way to demonstrate that a belief contradicts absolute truth is to show that it leads to a contradiction.

If person A believes in absolute truth, she can have a belief that person B is mistaken in their belief that proposition P is true. However A cannot know that B is mistaken unless she has a proof of the falsity of P. In the absence of such a proof, at best A can have a hunch or suspicion that B is mistaken. To state definitively that B is mistaken cannot be justified and smacks of hubris.

Some might complain that such an analysis implies we cannot do most philosophy at all, and so it must be rejected in order to save philosophy. I say that we can still do all the philosophy we have been doing just fine. It's just that, except in those rare cases where we are dealing with items that are amenable to formal logical proof, we should have the humility to restrain ourselves from saying that others are mistaken. It should suffice to say 'I don't agree' or 'It doesn't seem that way to me' or 'I doubt that'.

I note that both Kripke and Russell suffered from the hubris of saying that other people were mistaken, or wrong, on topics where, even if there were an absolute fact of the matter about it (which in most cases I suspect there isn't), that fact would not be knowable by mere humans, and certainly not by Russell or Kripke.