“what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. For what is cannot come to be (because it is already) and from what is not nothing could have to be (because something must* be present as a substratum)." — Walter Pound

Interesting. So, change is impossible.

There are only two possibilities:

1. Something is
2. Nothing is

Change can't come from 1 because it already is

Change can't come from 2 because there's nothing there to change

Perhaps the Megarians mean something different to what we understans by change. For me change means a difference in an or all attribute(s) of a thing. In a broad sense change can be alteration of quality or quantity.

It isn't necessary for the thing itself to transform into something entirely different.

We're all made of atoms. That never changes. However, atoms may configure into different forms with different properties - a block of ice, a deer, a sheet of glass, etc.

So, the Megarian argument works at the atomic level but not at levels of experience. We are born, we grow old and eventually die. This is an instance change that can't be denied at a human level. But at the atomic level this is not change at all because nothing has happened to the atoms that constitute the human form.

Perhaps the Megarians, known for sophistry, were trying to pull a fast one on us.

In reformulating their argument I'd say

Change occurs from only ONE possibility

1. Something is NOT

A baby is not an adult. So change is possible and does happen when it becomes one.

A drop of water is not ice. So, it can become ice and does under the right circumstances.

What I'm saying is Megarians ignore a level of reality that we experience - the one in which live.

Basically the Megarians here seem to not be differentiating essential and accidental qualities which Aristotle does later on.

I would say that the Megarians are right but ONLY with regard to essential qualities. Something cannot change its essential qualities or it would cease to be itself. What do you guys think?

As the MadFool articulated so well, the Megarians view seem to be somehow ignoring the obvious reality that a baby becomes an adult but a baby is not an adult.

Another option beyond sophistry (which MadFool mentioned as well) is that the Megarians were operating with a different ontological framework. It seems like their denial of change would result in a single-substance framework perhaps? Basically, if you wanted to believe that change didn't exist but a baby becomes an adult, you would have to say that a baby is an adult. And people dissintigrate eventually into the ground when they die, right? So the ground and the person would have to be equated as well.

This situation results in a single substance with infinite attributes (similar to Spinozian metaphysics, interestingly).

What's most fascinating to me is that, correct me if I am wrong, this is operating within a materialist framework, right (since he is a pre-socratic).

Thanks for your reply. Would you like to help answer some of my questions? You seem pretty smart so I hope you may help me.

In the first part of the dichotomy, we have something that IS and we ask where did it come from. The first option is that it came from what IS. But then there's nothing that came to be. — Πετροκότσυφας

The issue I have with this statement is that it seems like the "is" that the Megaric school is referring to needs to be defined and I am guessing that the "is" that the Megaric school is using depends on their metaphysics.

It seems like one could agree with the Megaric school that what IS never comes into being and one could agree that from nothing nothing comes, but it isn't clear how the conclusion, that nothing changes, is cogent.

One example of how this dilemma could be a false dilemma is if mereological atomism is true. In mereological atomism, the atoms may have never come into being, since they are eternal, and they can still change location. So change is still possible and the Megaric school's dilemma does not undermine that possibility.

Of course, this is not a defense of mereological atomism, but I think that this is why I had a hard seeing why the dilemma must lead to the conclusion that change is not real.

I am reading Theaetutus and wondering the same. I am perplexed by our inability to change, really.

I know people have changed, but they think they have more than they have. Brain injury changes people. Drugs change people, that is true.

But people just willing to change without any additional feature? I have not seen it and not sure it's possible other than entropy. Change from bad to good? I have not seen it. If you have, that's awesome.

I think Euclid of Megara founded the school you are speaking about. (Not the geometry guy).

are all things one substance—one man, one horse, or one soul—or quality and that one and the same—white or hot or something of the kind? These are all very different doctrines and all impossible to maintain.

This just seems like hasty thinking. Clearly, they will reject Aristotle's essentialism and so they can easily answer Aristotle's reductio ad absurdum.

We, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion—which is indeed made plain by induction". — Πετροκότσυφας

This too seems like a weak argument. The obvious reply would be to make an analogy with space. We are only aware and experience our present location and while we experience our present location in space we are not aware of and experience other locations in space; however, it does not follow that the only location of space that exists is the location we experience. The same can be said of time. The fact that we seem to experience change does not mean that change is a real feature of the world- at least not any more than our experience of our current location demonstrates that that location is more real than other locations in space. Eternalism would save the Megaric school from Aristotle's experience based argument.

they treat being as if it had just one meaning — Πετροκότσυφας

They sound like monists and Aristotle's disagreement can be seen to stem from his different metaphysical framework; I am guessing this is the real issue between the two?

Aristotle employs the actuality-potentiality pair, through which he defines change as "the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such". The unmusical man is potentially musical and the fulfillment of this potentiality counts as change (from being unmusical to being musical). — Πετροκότσυφας

The thing is how does introducing potentiality and actuality solve the issue of whether change is real or not?

To play devil's advocate, one could respond to Aristotle and say that X could potentially be in such and such way, since it is a logically possible state of affairs, and that X is actually in such and such way by virtue of X being a part of the real world. In this case, potentiality is nothing more than an acknowledgment that things could be different; Trump is actually president, but Hillary Clinton potentially could have been president. How is it that by pointing out that the actual state of affairs could have potentially been different demonstrate the change is a real feature of the world?

Aristotle provides a similar argument to the one you make. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well, I try to answer the dilemma by positing the possibility of mereological atomism and it seems like Aristotle answers it differently.

While this is true, what it says is merely that Eleatic monism and immobilism are false if you assume the opposite positions. You just assume plurality and and then you just assume locomotion. The things that the Eleatics deny. This amounts to "if Eleatism is false, then it's false", or, more correctly, it amounts to "if plurality and locomotion are true, then they're are true and, therefore, by consequence, Eleatism is false". — Πετροκότσυφας

I see. Well, I wasn't trying to say that Eleatism is false simply if we assume that mereological atomism is true.

What I am saying is that both wings of the dilemma, that the Megaric school offer, can still be true if mereological atomism were true; thus, if we granted them that from nothing nothing comes and that what IS never came into being, then their own metaphysical beliefs don't necessarily follow since mereological atomism can satisfy both those wings of the dilemma.

The incompatibility between being and becoming had been demonstrated by Plato. Aristotle formalized it. I understand the argument as presented by Aristotle like this. Our descriptions are always of what is, being, a static state. We describe what is at one moment and then what is at the next moment, and if there is a difference we infer change. Change is the difference between what is now, and what was then. To account for the change we could describe an intermediate state. But the intermediate state would be different from each of the first two states, so there would be changes between the intermediate, and the other two. We could introduce two more intermediate states, but this just leads to infinite regress. Change cannot be described in terms of being.

The thing is how does introducing potentiality and actuality solve the issue of whether change is real or not? — Walter Pound

We must account for change as real because it is supported by observation, there is difference. As per the infinite regress, it cannot be accounted for under the terms of what is and is not. So Aristotle introduced a new category, which neither is nor is not, and this is potential. He argues that we must allow an exception to the law of excluded middle for the reality of potential, otherwise the law of non-contradiction will be violated, which he is opposed to.