Right, for the sake of argument, let's assume that reasons are "static preferences". Being static, they cannot act as a cause. It is the reasoning mind, which uses static preferences, in the process of reasoning, which causes the decision. It cannot be a preference which is the cause of a decision because the preferences are not active, they are passive. The mind is active in the process of reasoning, and it is the mind which causes the decision, not the preference. — Metaphysician Undercover

You misunderstand what I meant by static. By static, I merely meant unchanging, I didn't mean causally inert. The existence of a opportunity-preference, paired with a principled, character-building preference, leads to action.

We judge things according to principles, not goals. We look for objective principles, and we can judge our goals as to whether they are consistent with the principles which we believe are objective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hesitate to accept this idea of a perfectly rational mind, built upon sturdy, concrete principles and noble truths. For where do these principles come from, and why do we uphold them if not by a preference to uphold them?

Principles become rules in which to follow, given a framework which we adopt based upon certain preferences.

I see no reason to distinguish between preferences and reasons, as if they are two completely separate things. — darthbarracuda

I don't view them to be completely separate either. General preferences (which I've previously identified as preferences-1) are general and abstract -- they reflect rational tendencies -- while the reason why one acts (which singles out one's preference-2) are specific and sensitive to the particular circumstances in which one acts. Both of them are normative since both of them are involved in the operation of practical rationality. Someone who is practically rational must be sensitive both the the reasons why someone must generally act in such or such a way in some general class of situations (e.g. keep one's promises, or avoid engaging in harmful or overly risky behaviors) and also to the specific circumstances that bear on the applicability of such general reasons to the particular situation in which one is called to deliberate and act.

Reasons, in my view, are just static preferences. I have a reason to go for a run today, because I want to be in good shape. I may not actually prefer to go for a run (exercise is hard...), but this preference is over-ridden by the reason (preference) to be fit.

If you have both a reason to do A and a reason to do B, while A and B are incompatible actions, this means that such reasons are general rational preferences. We could label such reasons "reasons-1" There is also another sense of "reason" which is your reason to chose one particular option in a particular occasion. Practical rationality is the ability select among potentially conflicting reasons for acting (reasons-1) which one is suited or relevant to the rationally salient features of the particular situation. Failure to distinguish between the reason ("reason-2") why one acts in the way one does, and the reasons one might have to act in other incompatible ways (reasons that are overridden in the particular case) just reproduces the conflation that you were previously making between two sorts of preferences.

Thus we can have a static grouping of preferences (reasons) if we have a static goal - to be fit, to understand the truth, etc. The division between normative reasons and non-normative preferences thus, in my view, cannot be sustained.

Both sorts of reasons, (1) general, or (2) particular/specific, are normative. Neither ones are "static". That is, both are sensitive to the concerns that are rationally salient in the circumstances in which one acts. Reasons (that is reasons-1) just are the general rational considerations that guide one in the first steps of practical deliberation. When things go well, this process culminates in action (or intention) in accordance with the reason one has to favor the chosen course of action all things considered (to the extend that one is rational, which one may be to a quite limited degree).

I hesitate to accept this idea of a perfectly rational mind, built upon sturdy, concrete principles and noble truths. For where do these principles come from, and why do we uphold them if not by a preference to uphold them?

Principles become rules in which to follow, given a framework which we adopt based upon certain preferences. — darthbarracuda

Yes, these are preferences in sense #2 which Pierre-Normand brought up. When we have decided that a principle is good, and accept it, we can say that it is a preference. That is something which has occurred in the past. Now when facing the future, we have numerous preferences, preferred principles, from which to choose in making a decision. We choose one, the preference does not choose itself.

You misunderstand what I meant by static. By static, I merely meant unchanging, I didn't mean causally inert. The existence of a opportunity-preference, paired with a principled, character-building preference, leads to action. — darthbarracuda

You are missing a source of activity here. Activity is essential to causation. You have many preferences. In your example, two preferences get paired together. We need to determine a cause of these two particular preferences getting paired together, rather than two other preferences getting paired.

Your claim is that the pairing causes action, which is true, but we still need to account for, i.e. find the cause of, that particular pairing. That is the free will act. Clearly, the preferences don't pair together in a random way, nor do they cause actions in a random way. So it is not the preferences which are the initial cause of the action, it is the mind which uses the preferences.

It has been pointed out to Harris that if it is true from one's perspective, at any given instant, that what one is poised to do already had been determined at that time by one's (and the Universe's) past history then it is pointless to deliberate what to do. Harris's reply to this seemingly absurd practical consequence of his view is to claim that while we can't control the causes of our action, our actions nevertheless have consequences and since consequences matter we ought to take them into account while deliberating what to do. But this answer is completely point missing and is a garbled attempt to take in stride the central insight from compatibilism while, at the same time, denying the cogency of compatibilism. — Pierre-Normand

Simply put, he is just saying that it is the deliberation of the possible choices or outcomes before a decision is made that affects the beneficiality of the choice. That is not absurd as you say it is and is completely coherent with the determinism that he expounds on.

Just because what one is poised to do already is based on prior events does not negate the necessity of logical thought or reasoning for making a decision. Predestination works just as well if not better with a reasoning mind.

As for why you think it denies the central insight of compatibilism, I see no evidence to support your opinions here...

Sydney where a man who killed bystanders in a carpark with a samurai sword — Wayfarer

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3355584/Man-22-samurai-sword-sneaked-AFP-HQ-mingled-counter-terrorism-police-arrested-major-security-breach.html

Like Sartre said, existence precedes essence. Which I find to be entirely incoherent, since to exist is to have certain properties and qualities outside of your control. — darthbarracuda

What about if existence is meant in the sense of an objective universe that exists without witness? Then comes along an organism to add essence to the preordained existence.

you were thrown into the world from nothing-ness. — darthbarracuda

you don't know that, it may just be that you don't remember what it was.

We don't have control. And if we can't have control, then what's the point of being an individual? — darthbarracuda

Just because you don't have control doesn't mean to say life isn't worth living. That is like the argument "if life doesn't go on forever then it is not worth living". The point of living is subjective and could actually be objective albeit concealed in a grand alien design. IMO, subjectively it would be to be a witness... free will or no.

What would be the point of making something feel pain if it was 100% programmed with no free will anyway? — bassplayer

What would be the point in making something of 100% freewill feel pain anyway?

I'd like to point out the the lack of free will doesn't necessitate determinism. Also, that the mind has both conscious and unconscious counterparts. Most if not all of our decisions are made by the unconscious and leave us with the feeling that we just made a choice. The truth is the choice was made WAY before the conscious mind became aware of it. (https://www.wired.com/2008/04/mind-decision/)

Now seeing as you are only your conscious mind because it would be absurd to claim ownership over something of which you are not conscious of, lol... it means that our decisions are largely in the domain of the unconscious which is not you.

Simply put, he is just saying that it is the deliberation of the possible choices or outcomes before a decision is made that affects the beneficiality of the choice. That is not absurd as you say it is and is completely coherent with the determinism that he expounds on. — intrapersona

Yes, he is saying this... often. And when he is saying this, he is effectively endorsing compatibilist conceptions of control and of free choice. The trouble is that Harris also tries to hold on to some version of Van Inwagen's argument for incompatibilism. He indeed is very often explicitly arguing against compatibilism on the basis of such an argument (and also on the basis of Galen Strawson's "basic argument" against moral responsibility), and his endorsement of those arguments is inconsistent with his tacit endorsements of compatibilism. This is why Dennett says that Harris often seems to be compatibilist in all but name (i.e. whenever Harris isn't arguing for the contrary position!) Harris charges against compatibilists, that they are "redefining" free will, just is his attempt to extricate himself from this muddle. Compatibilists at least are consistent in their definitions of freedom and of the ability to choose; Harris himself, while consistently denying the possibility of free will, isn't endorsing consistent arguments.

Just because what one is poised to do already is based on prior events does not negate the necessity of logical thought or reasoning for making a decision. Predestination works just as well if not better with a reasoning mind.

You yourself are entitled to this compatibilist insight, but Harris isn't. You may want to replace "predestination" with "determinism" in the above, though, since Harris claims to be agreeing with Dennett that determinism doesn't entail predestination and that those two theses, as they relate to freedom of action, ought not to be confused.

As for why you think it denies the central insight of compatibilism, I see no evidence to support your opinions here...

You are misreading me. I didn't say that he was denying the central insight of compatibilism. I suggested, on the contrary, that he was tacitly endorsing this central insight while at the same time explicitly arguing for incompatibilism on the basis of arguments that are inconsistent with this insight. Harris is very explicit in his rejection of compatibilism, while being seemingly unaware that he is depriving himself of the the possibility of making his utilitarian argument about consequences that "matter".

As I was suggesting in the next paragraph of that post, pain is used as a guide. To nudge us in the right direction if you like. The point is we can still choose how we respond to the pain unlike 100% programming.

If our preferences don't causally affect our choices, then what exactly causes us to choose one option rather than another? — darthbarracuda

Ok, thanks. understood. Why is Harris making this mistake though? What is leading him to accept compatibilism in some respects but openly deny it as well? Would not understanding it correctly cause him to endorse inconsistent arguments.

As far as I understand Harris position, he believes that the mind make decisions unconsciously without freewill and therefor no moral accountability can be placed on any subject as he is just a product of his experiences, genetics and unconscious programming. He feels choices are causally determined but not fated to happen. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKv2pWZkgrI

Seems like a totally legitimate standpoint to me, especially neurologically with a lot of evidential support in favor of it (see my post above). Where is the inconsistency here?

The underlying assumption in this discussion being...our preferences as a determinant for our choices. I don't know but is that reasonable.

Sometimes the most obvious ''facts'' are wrong.

What say?