well, along as universities are publicly funded I don't want my taxes to go to something that will ultimately lacks usefullness. Science is about solving problems, but Marxism nor Creationism solve problems: they merely provide explanations taken directly from their ideological framework (which is essentially a set of conclusions). Basically, their work festers in confirmation bias, which I think would be dangerous for academia and civilization as whole — Pelle
There is: The Criterion of Demarcation. — Inis
This would be against the Scientific Method, and ruled out by the criterion of demarcation. — Inis
considering the surge of popularity attributed to both Kuhn and Feyerabend (who where fierce anti-Popperians). I wouldn't say it's a banality. — Pelle
But in distinction to Feyeraband, these research programs are not incommensurable; they do not differ in terms of a conceptual scheme; they can differ in scope of application; and scientific inquiry admits research programmes that, strictly speaking, have contradictory hard cores. — fdrake
But you can answer the question too. Suppose the criterion of demarcation does not hold, and not only that that there is no such criteria. What would be the more honest approach? To invent a more elaborate theory of science with better fidelity, or to point out that there is no such theory? — Moliere
Popper, who is deservedly admired, set out a logic for science that is pretty neat. But the problem with logic, as Feyerabend showed, is that people are only occasionally logical. — Banno
Charles Sanders Peirce spelled out the scientific method (as outlined here) the year after Popper was born.Popper argued that it is logically impossible to verify or falsify a scientific theory. He sets out a Method, based on certain epistemological truths he discovered. That's why it's called the Scientific Method. — Inis
Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the vaguest, he managed to communicate to some fellow, we are building a cantilever bridge of induction, held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every plank of its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason. — Peirce (1908)
At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible."
However, because of the Popperian influence of the sciences, these people are criticised beyond belief and noone takes their theories seriously. — Pelle
If we were to apply Feyerabend’s doctrine of science to the academies however, we would have a problem. The poor scientific performance of these pseudoscientists could be rationalized by ”pluratiy of method” and ”anything goes”. Science would infected by improductive forces. That is my primary concern — Pelle
Also, I feel as if you’re being very uncharitable about what could be considered useful. In my opinion, anything that brings us closer to the truth is fundamentally useful, which includes philosophy, language study and the Humanities. — Pelle
That is to say it is logically impossible for Popper's criterion of demarcation to be false? Or do you mean to say that because it plays a prescriptive role it does not make sense to say his criterion is true or false? Or what? — Moliere
...an urgent practical problem: under what conditions is a critical appeal to experience possible - one that could bear some fruit?
(Realism and the Aim of Science, 1983)
Peirce's favorite example was Kepler's series of hypotheses regarding the orbit of Mars. After only a few unsuccessful conjectures, he tried an ellipse, which not only fit the data that he had from previous observations, but also led to predictions that were subsequently corroborated by further observations. — aletheist
At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible." — aletheist
Yes, the hypothesis that Neptune exists (A) would make the surprising anomalies in the orbit of Uranus (C) a matter of course; therefore, we have reason to suspect that Neptune exists.Is that a fair representation of Pierce's method? — Inis
Immediately after what I quoted previously, Peirce added that "this acceptance ranges in different cases--and reasonably so--from a mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to believe."Rather, 'plausibility' looks more like high conditional probability ... — fdrake
Immediately after what I quoted previously, Peirce added that "this acceptance ranges in different cases--and reasonably so--from a mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to believe." — aletheist
What is the observed surprising fact that would be a matter of course if Vulcan exists? — aletheist
The existence of Neptune/Vulcan was a valid retroduction--a plausible explanatory hypothesis for the observed (and surprising) anomalies in Uranus's/Mercury's orbit--but again, that is only the first step in any scientific inquiry. The second step was deduction, deriving other necessary consequences of the hypothesis. The third step was induction, making additional observations to ascertain whether those predictions were corroborated or falsified. In the case of Neptune, they were corroborated (repeatedly). In the case of Vulcan, they were falsified, resulting in abandonment of that particular hypothesis.The anomalous orbit of Uranus/Mercury becomes normal when the statement "Neptune/Vulcan exists" is true, which gives us the good reason to believe that "Neptune/Vulcan exists" is true. — Inis
The existence of Neptune/Vulcan was a valid retroduction--a plausible explanatory hypothesis for the observed (and surprising) anomalies in Uranus's/Mercury's orbit--but again, that is only the first step in any scientific inquiry. The second step was deduction, deriving other necessary consequences of the hypothesis. The third step was induction, making additional observations to ascertain whether those predictions were corroborated or falsified. In the case of Neptune, they were corroborated (repeatedly). In the case of Vulcan, they were falsified, resulting in abandonment of that particular hypothesis. — aletheist
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