There are ideal instance all the time. But in order for an ideality to continue to exist as itself it has to repeat itself. What happens when you try to repeat a thought in consciousness? The very sense of its subtly changes, because time means exposure to context, and context is always changing context. This is the fundamental underpinning of time. — Joshs

I’d like to refute your point by using your own example.

The thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence;
but the feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as just gone, and it would be difficult to find
in the actual concrete consciousness of man a feeling so limited to the present as not to have an
inkling of anything that went before. — Joshs

If all my past experiences are present in my current “content”, doesn’t it mean that
I am still enclosed in the totality of my mind?

As soon as a concept is animated with the intention to say something, it exposes itself to context. — Joshs

Even my intention to say something is no more than a simple repetition of the similar past intention.

When Descartes stated “I think therefore I am,” did he breakthrough the solipsistic circle? What is the nature of this “therefore"?

This synthesis is passive because it is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in mind, which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection. — Number2018

As far as I can tell, things carried out within a mind, are carried out by that mind, so this doesn't make sense to me.

If there were not a repetition of physical stimuli in the surrounding environment, there would be just chaotic and quick changing, so that the basic living organisms would not be able to sustain any kind of the necessary stability and succession. — Number2018

Why would you say that stability is a repetition rather than a continuity. It appears to me, that things which stay the same through time do so by means of a continuity like inertia. So the continuity demonstrated by inertia, providing stability, is distinct from any repetition of moments, which is the means of change.

So, there is the external material repetition of a kind AB, AB, AB… Or, 123C4, 123C4, 123C4…we can call
this repetition “a bare material repetition”. — Number2018

There is no reason to consider this as a repetition rather than the continued temporal existence of AB. And if A and B are distinct, such that one follows the other, and the continued existence of either one is broken, then there is no reason to assume that a second occurrence of A would be the same identical A as the first.

Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the
being of the past (that which causes the present to pass).
At first sight, it is as if the past were trapped between two presents: the
one which it has been and the one in relation to which it is past. The past is
not the former present itself but the element in which we focus upon the
latter. — Number2018

I don't know where you pulled this quote from, but I find it to be off the mark. The author does not consider the role of the future here. If you look closely at the nature of time, you will see that it is the future which causes the present to pass. A new moment is always pushing in, from the future, to take the place of the existing moment, at the present, and this forces that present moment into the past. So the future is always a force, which is forcing the presentmoment into the past. We as living beings must adapt, and figure out ways to deal with this force which is always upon us. If not, we are ourselves, forced into the past (death).

Particularity, therefore, now belongs to that on which we focus - in
other words, to that which 'has been'; whereas the past itself, the 'was', is
by nature general. The past, in general, is the element in which each former
present is focused upon in particular and as a particular. In accordance
with Husserlian terminology, we must distinguish between retention and
reproduction. However, what we earlier called the retention of habit was
the state of successive instants contracted in a present present of a certain
duration. These instants formed a particularity - in other words, an
immediate past naturally belonging to the present present, while the
present itself, which remains open to the future in the form of expectation,
constitutes the general. By contrast, from the point of view of the
reproduction involved in memory, it is the past (understood as the
mediation of presents) which becomes general while the (present as well as
former) present becomes particular. — Number2018

I pretty mush agree with this part. The past consists of particulars, instances of existence. But since the mind and memory are deficient, there is a vagueness about the past so that we may look at it in terms of logical possibilities. It is possible that X or that not X is the particular thing which actually occurred, if we cannot remember it. This induces a certain sense of generality of the past. But true generality, in the sense of real ontological possibility belongs to the future. However, we reduce that general "possibility" of the future, to particular possibilities when we relate to the future logically, in the case of decision making for example.

The present and former presents are not,
therefore, as two successive instants on the line of time; rather, the present one necessarily contains an extra dimension in which it represents the former and also represents itself. The present present is treated not as the future object of memory but as that which reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present. — Number2018

I believe that there is a problem in this passage, which is a conflation of the being which is experiencing the passing of time, with the passing of time itself. It is only the conscious being which brings back the past moments of present to have them continue existing at the present. This is what creates the illusion of a double present. But if you separate the continuity of continued existence (the continuity supported by inertia), from the passing of moments, then the dual nature of the present is seen in a different way. Not only is there a succession of moments, as time passes, but there is also a continuity of existence, being, which carries through the present.

According to this comprehension of the active synthesis of memory,
each conscious act of mind has the dimensions of reproduction and
reflection. The problem now is that the activity of mind has been
pre-designed and pre-constructed, so that the Past has become
the dominating instance, so that “present” and “future” has converted into the dimensions of this time, and the active synthesis of the mind
has become the transcendental a priory of the Past. — Number2018

Yes, I see this as a problem, because what has been described is reducible to an everlasting, eternal cycle of repetition of moments. It's really a circle. The way to escape this circle is to see the future as radically different. We can begin with the assumption, for argument sake, that every new moment coming from the future is completely different, and there is nothing to make anything the same from one moment to the next. Each moment the future could be throwing us something completely new. Then, recognize that there actually is continuity, inertia, and seek the reason for this. The reason for it is that some things in the past, (massive things) have the power to act in the future. So when the future is forcing a new moment upon us, the massive existence which we've observed in the past appearing as a continuity distinct from the repetition of different moments, is acting within the imposition of that future moment, such that it acts upon us from the future, as a force from within the moment of the future which is now upon us. You can see that this requires an inversion in the concept of causation. No longer would you see a thing in the past having caused something in the present, or causing something in the future, It is always the moment of the future, coming upon us which is causative, and massive things with continued existence demonstrate that they have a causal power within that moment.

I'm using transcendental as metaphysical a-priori (not derived from experience). — Joshs

So how could there be transcendental categories then, if they're not derived from experience? Wouldn't they be completely arbitrary? Is this why Heidegger says they are invented?

I'll let Heideggerian scholar Eugene Gendlin answer this:
"The past reshapes itself in the course of the body's(and mind's) present performance. Of course the past exists and functions in and as our new present. But the present must be capable of something new, otherwise past experience could not have happened either. The past might have been based on a previous past, but at some point it had to be new. And not only at an earlier point. Present experiencing
is always capable of something new that reshapes the past.
The present living process reshapes its past by reshaping itself, reshaping what it
was. In every living process each next bit reshapes the previous. We could say that the past
reshapes itself as present living. Or, we could say that present living generates a “past” by
reshaping itself.
The past is not past because an observer determines that it happened at an earlier
position on Newton's absolute time line. The past is the living process's own past, made past by
its new present. Or, we can say the past makes itself past by functioning to shape a new
present. If one living process is both (and I agree it is), we have to say that it is a constantly
self-reshaping process."

I cannot fathom a hard distinction between memories and present experience, for i cannot see much of a distinction between memories and photographs. And in the case of a photograph, in order for it to 'refer' to the past, it must be used in a certain way.

For example the photograph must be compared to another photograph, or inspire a personal recollection from a person and so on. As with photographs, it doesn't make sense to say that the content of individual memories are past-referring in and of themselves . Rather the concept of the past is actively constructed out of memories , together with reason, current observations and experimentation, without being reducible to memories themselves. But this implies that the past is also uncertain and changing, and not merely in a dead epistemological sense but in a living sense. Therefore the psychological past and the psychological future appear to be heavily overlapping concepts that cannot be ordered using cartesian coordinates.

I cannot fathom a hard distinction between memories and present experience, for i cannot see much of a distinction between memories and photographs. And in the case of a photograph, in order for it to 'refer' to the past, it must be used in a certain way. — sime

Would you say that a photograph (and memory as well) could represent something in the past. I don't see any problem saying that. It is not a matter of how the photograph (memory) is used, it is a matter of how it is produced. The capacity to be used in a certain way is dependent on how the thing is created.

As with photographs, it doesn't make sense to say that the content of individual memories are past-referring in and of themselves . — sime

What do you mean by content of memories? In the mind, memories are content. Why are you seeking to give content to content? If you look for the content of a photograph, perhaps it is the past thing which was photographed. So if you look for the content of a memory, wouldn't that be the experience which was remembered? But can we truthfully say that the thing represented by a symbol is really the content of that symbol? Within the mind, the symbol is itself content.

Yes memories have content, in the same way that a digital image has pixel values, but it is a vacuous tautology to say that information is intrinsically past-referring. unless that content is related to other content in a particular way.

Consider false memories and deep-fake photographs. What does it mean to say that they are false, in the sense of having no referent in the past? In a causal sense all phenomena could be said to represent the past, whether the phenomena is considered to be genuine or fake, and whether the phenomena is recalled into mind or externally perceived in the world.

In practice, we verify the truth of memories and photographs and it is our process of verification that decides whether the memory is "true" or "false". Orthodox opinion interprets past-contingent propositions as being intrinsically past-referring and purely by the force of their expressed content and independently of the process of their verification. In contrast, I'm saying it is the process by which a proposition is verified that determines whether the content of the proposition is past, present or future referring.

Yes memories have content, in the same way that a digital image has pixel values, but it is a vacuous tautology to say that information is intrinsically past-referring. unless that content is related to other content in a particular way. — sime

I don't see how you can say this. To say that a digital image has pixel values, is already to relate that image in a particular way. So to say that memories have content is to already assume that they have the relationship, which you deem is necessary. Therefore they do not need to be related in any further way as you seem to be saying.

Consider false memories and deep-fake photographs. What does it mean to say that they are false, in the sense of having no referent in the past? In a causal sense all phenomena could be said to represent the past, whether the phenomena is considered to be genuine or fake, and whether the phenomena is recalled into mind or externally perceived in the world. — sime

I don't think it is possible to have a memory with no referent in the past. Then it would not be a memory at all, but an imagination. An incorrect, or false memory is to remember something incorrectly, it is not to completely invent something in an absolute way, because that would not be a memory at all, but an instance of imagining something.

In practice, we verify the truth of memories and photographs and it is our process of verification that decides whether the memory is "true" or "false". Orthodox opinion interprets past-contingent propositions as being intrinsically past-referring and purely by the force of their expressed content and independently of the process of their verification. In contrast, I'm saying it is the process by which a proposition is verified that determines whether the content of the proposition is past, present or future referring. — sime

Even this I disagree with. There is a difference between determining the meaning of a proposition, and verifying the proposition as to true or false. To determine the meaning is to determine its content, and this is the process which determines whether it refers to past, present, or future. But this is completely different from verifying whether it is true or false.

I would like to get back to this post.

in order for an ideality to continue to exist as itself it has to repeat itself. What happens when you try to repeat a thought in consciousness? — Joshs

It is a perfect question. Who or what is the agent
of repetition of a thought in consciousness? Am I the agent, the operator of this repetition? How is this repetition related to time? Is there any difference between the two repeated thoughts? Am I aware of these differences?

As soon as a concept is animated with the intention to say something, it exposes itself to context. — Joshs

Is “my intention” the source of repetition?? What is the relation between time and my thought?
Between time and “my intention”?
If ” a concept is animated with the intention to say something,” don’t we confuse between the two heterogonous presuppositions: of the concept as the part of the transcendentally determined thinking subject, and the psychologically evident reality of ”my intention, related to the content of my existence?

If you look closely at the nature of time, you will see that it is the future which causes the present to pass. A new moment is always pushing in, from the future, to take the place of the existing moment, at the present, and this forces that present moment into the past — Metaphysician Undercover

You state this truth as an evident and common knowledge!
It reminds me what St. Augustine wrote: “What, then, is time? If no one asks of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time; and if nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing were, there would not be present time. Those two times, therefore, past and future, how are they, when even the past now is not; and the future is not as
yet”?
My point is that in so far as we do not clarify rigorously the ontological status of our statements about time, we can always produce, by applying logical and dialectical recourses, contradictory propositions.

The present and former presents are not,
therefore, as two successive instants on the line of time; rather, the present one necessarily contains an extra dimension in which it represents the former and also represents itself. The present present is treated not as the future object of memory but as that which reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present.
— Number2018

I believe that there is a problem in this passage, which is a conflation of the being which is experiencing the passing of time, with the passing of time itself. It is only the conscious being which brings back the past moments of present to have them continue existing at the present. This is what creates the illusion of a double present. — Metaphysician Undercover

For me, it is not about illusion! As you write: “It is only the conscious being which brings back the past moments of a present to have them continue existing at the present” – I see this operation as the fundamental and absolutely necessary condition of any conscious act! Therefore, the conscious being has always been enclosed in the transcendental a priory of the Past. That is why comprehension, thinking, and speaking about Future have constituted a real problem.

According to this comprehension of the active synthesis of memory,
each conscious act of mind has the dimensions of reproduction and
reflection. The problem now is that the activity of mind has been
pre-designed and pre-constructed, so that the Past has become
the dominating instance, so that “present” and “future” has converted into the dimensions of this time, and the active synthesis of the mind
has become the transcendental a priory of the Past.
— Number2018

Yes, I see this as a problem, because what has been described is reducible to an everlasting, eternal cycle of repetition of moments. It's really a circle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you.

We can begin with the assumption, for argument sake, that every new moment coming from the future is completely different, and there is nothing to make anything the same from one moment to the next. Each moment the future could be throwing us something completely new. Then, recognize that there actually is continuity, inertia, and seek the reason for this. The reason for it is that some things in the past, (massive things) have the power to act in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand your “continuity and inertia” fas the fundamental power of the transcendental Past over our way of being and thought. The problem is that when we need “to recognize something, how can we differentiate, make any distinctions within ourselves?

So when the future is forcing a new moment upon us, the massive existence which we've observed in the past appearing as a continuity distinct from the repetition of different moments, is acting within the imposition of that future moment, such that it acts upon us from the future, as a force from within the moment of the future which is now upon us — Metaphysician Undercover

I like that you apply terms of forces and clash; yet, there is the same drawback of using our cognitive abilities: “observe, appearance.” To sum up: how can we realize
in our individual minds, that the radically new forces are coming from the Future? If we are constituted by pre-designed and pre-constructed cognitive, social, and habitual patterns, what should we do by ourselves to counter the Future?
According to Deleuze's comprehension of the third, active synthesis of time as the most radical form of change:
“The present and past are no more than dimensions of future: the past as the condition, the present as an agent. They possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; they turn back against the self and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth….The I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendant in the man without a name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the already-Overman.”
It looks like Deleuze wants to show how the I, the self, and the ego are produced by impersonal heterogenic forces from the future so that our identities and personalities are no more than effects.

Gendlin's solution was "The past is not past because an observer determines that it happened at an earlier position on Newton's absolute time line. The past is the living process's own past, made past by its new present. Or, we can say the past makes itself past by functioning to shape a new present. If one living process is both (and I agree it is), we have to say that it is a constantly self-reshaping process."
This is consistent with Heidegger's argument that past is "what has been as what is
still present and still determining the present and the future—this is
not a mere retaining." The past as having been, present and future are simultaneous and equiprimordial.One never occurs without the other. What is present constantly 'is' as having been.
But does this mean the past dominates the present? Not for Heidegger. The past is always a new past, a past prefigured by the present and the future. "Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes
itself out of the authentic future, and indeed in such a way that, futurally having-been, it first arouses the present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.

I see this operation as the fundamental and absolutely necessary condition of any conscious act! — Number2018

Right, I agree, but this is a defining aspect of consciousness, not a defining aspect of time. The dual present you described might be fundamental to consciousness, but if you deduce that it is therefore fundamental to time, you have an invalid deduction because you have no premise to state the relation between consciousness and time. The present may be fundamental to time. And the dual present is fundamental to consciousness. That's why I say the impression that the dual present is an aspect of time is an illusion, it's consciousness wrongly imposing itself on time.

The problem is that when we need “to recognize something, how can we differentiate, make any distinctions within ourselves? — Number2018

It think that how we make distinctions is a secret of the soul itself. No one knows exactly how we differentiate.

To sum up: how can we realize
in our individual minds, that the radically new forces are coming from the Future? — Number2018

This comes about from a logical analysis of the nature of time. Time is passing. And with the passing of time, there is past time which is coming into existence. This is a "becoming". A becoming requires a cause. The cause of past time cannot be the present, because if the present were actively creating past time there would be no future, just the present creating the past. So it must be the future which is the cause of past time. Imagine the present like a static membrane, a plane or something, The future is being forced through, or forcing itself through, the present to create the past. So unlike Deleuze, I look at the future as the agent. And although activity occurs at the present, the present is essentially passive in the sense that the activity is cause by the force of the future. So the activity at the present is like passive matter being moved by the cause which is time passing, and the future is the cause of that.

." Who or what is the agent
of repetition of a thought in consciousness? Am I the agent, the operator of this repetition? How is this repetition related to time? Is there any difference between the two repeated thoughts? Am I aware of these differences?"

Let me construct a model of consciousness based on the work of Merleau-Ponty and contributors to 4ea approaches(embodied, embedded, enactive, affective ) to cognition.
The mind functions as an inseparable interaction with environment and body. It is nothing but this interaction. There is no self-identical self in this model. Self is a bi-product of the constant constructive interactive activity of the organism-envirnmental interaction. Consciousness is not self-conscious in the sense of being able to turn back on itself and grasp itself identically. To reflect back on the self is to alter what one turns back to. The impression we get of consciousness as the commander of decision, as unfolding meaning as a linear causal sequence of nows (one damn thing after another), is the result of the way linguistic grammar is constructed , But rather than a single linear causal intentional vector, consciousness can more accurately de described as a site of competing streams of fragmented perceptions and conceptualizations jostling for attention. Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness. So the notion of agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I' . But the unfolding of time for this constructed 'I' is always a bit disjointed, a past that is always reconstructed by the present that it is supposed to frame, and a futuring that pulls the present into an anticipative orientation ahead of itself. There is no room for the transcendental in this model.

But let's use the perception of the bug. Considering that it is really small compared to us, do you think that it sees us moving slowly? — Paul24

I don't know about bugs, but my cat is pretty small and she seems to move in hyper speed, so that would support your theory that maybe she sees me moving really slow so she's able to swat me faster than I can swat her. On the other hand, I find that worms are really slow, so I can't really find any rhyme or reason to this other than maybe some things are fast and some slow and some have quick perception and some are dull and dimwitted, like a worm.

this is a defining aspect of consciousness, not a defining aspect of time. The dual present you described might be fundamental to consciousness, but if you deduce that it is therefore fundamental to time — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, nevertheless it is fundamental that the subjective time occurs in mind.

you have an invalid deduction because you have no premise to state the relation between consciousness and time — Metaphysician Undercover

.
During our discussion, I tried to lay out the philosophy of time, based on the three syntheses of time. Accordingly, consciousness is born, develops, lives and dies in the subjective time; and conversely, this time exists through consciousness.

The present may be fundamental to time. And the dual present is fundamental to consciousness. That's why I say the impression that the dual present is an aspect of time is an illusion, it's consciousness wrongly imposing itself on time. — Metaphysician Undercover

The relations between “objective, idealized time,” and “the subjective time of mind”
are incredibly complicated, and cannot be clarified unless we comprehend the latter one.

how we make distinctions is a secret of the soul itself. No one knows exactly how we differentiate. — Metaphysician Undercover

If so, instead of philosophy, we need to go to wizards, magicians, or augurs.:smile: :smile:

This comes about from a logical analysis of the nature of time. Time is passing. And with the passing of time, there is past time which is coming into existence. This is a "becoming". A becoming requires a cause. The cause of past time cannot be the present, because if the present were actively creating past time there would be no future, just the present creating the past. So it must be the future which is the cause of past time. Imagine the present like a static membrane, a plane or something, The future is being forced through, or forcing itself through, the present to create the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a perfectly logical analysis; nevertheless, I entirely disagree! Logical analysis of time lays out the past, the present, and the future at the same plain, created by few
founding presuppositions, axioms, norms, and a few more discursive means. The main problem with this kind of analysis that it does not allow us distinct and differentiate between the different times in which we live and think. And, by applying just logic-discursive means, one is able to show that the past and the future do not exist (as St. Augustine did), or to state that” the future which is the cause of past time.”(as you did) So, if we assume (with a great caution, and after doing all preliminary work), that there are three different times, functioning differently
and even coexisting in the same mind, we can try to understand the nature of
“the becoming”, and the forces of the future, knocking to our doors.
There are no causal(predictable) relations in the becoming! Whatever is causal, logical, discursive, etc. – all of these are already existing! On the contrary, the future forces
are not recognizable or known(yet!). So, “becoming” is the transition from known to unknown, or existence in between the two knowns. Probably, to think of future requires from us not just to leave what is already known and take the risk of failure,
but also to change the ways we are. That is what Deleuze wanted to say:
“The present and past are no more than dimensions of future, of the third active synthesis of time: the past as the condition, the present as an agent. They possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; they turn back against the self and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth.”

The past is always a new past, a past prefigured by the present and the future. "Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes
itself out of the authentic future, and indeed in such a way that, futurally having-been, it first arouses the present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. — Joshs

I am not sure if the whole notion of the authentic temporality presupposes a kind of transcendentalism. Could you clarify it?

The mind functions as an inseparable interaction with environment and body. It is nothing but this interaction. There is no self-identical self in this model. Self is a bi-product of the constant constructive interactive activity of the organism-envirnmental interaction. Consciousness is not self-conscious in the sense of being able to turn back on itself and grasp itself identically. To reflect back on the self is to alter what one turns back to. The impression we get of consciousness as the commander of decision, as unfolding meaning as a linear causal sequence of nows (one damn thing after another), is the result of the way linguistic grammar is constructed , But rather than a single linear causal intentional vector, consciousness can more accurately de described as a site of competing streams of fragmented perceptions and conceptualizations jostling for attention. Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness. So the notion of agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I' — Joshs

I agree with all this, I just want to add to your definition of self and consciousness, that our bodies and unconscious processes are far more complicated, than it can be understood from biology or from classical psychoanalysis. We take part, often without knowing about it, in numerous technical and social assemblages, so when you write: “Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness”, it is absolutely necessary to describe the nature of terms used.
I think that these “interactions and shaping consciousness outside of its awareness,” are entirely different from Merleau-Ponty's comprehension.
“So the notion of an agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I.'”
Good point! I think it is entirely matching to what Deleuze wrote about the active
synthesis of future: “The I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendant in the man without a name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the already-Overman.” The future has already arrived!

Yes, nevertheless it is fundamental that the subjective time occurs in mind. — Number2018

I thought we were talking about time itself, not "subjective time".
\

The relations between “objective, idealized time,” and “the subjective time of mind”
are incredibly complicated, and cannot be clarified unless we comprehend the latter one. — Number2018

I disagree, I don't think there is any such thing as "the subjective time of mind". I think that this route of inquiry is therefore misleading, because "subjective time" is an illusion.

If so, instead of philosophy, we need to go to wizards, magicians, or augurs.:smile: — Number2018

Why would that be? It is philosophy which deals with matters of the soul.

The main problem with this kind of analysis that it does not allow us distinct and differentiate between the different times in which we live and think. — Number2018

There is no such thing as "the different times in which we live and think". Our entire lives are lived at the present, everything we do, we do at the present. But just because our lives are at the present, this does not mean that the past and future are not real parts of time. That's the problem with the premise of "subjective time", it provides us with a misunderstanding of time right from the beginning. We place all of our past experiences in the past, as if they occurred in the past, but they really occurred at the present. This produces a very confused way of looking at time which can only be resolved by removing this "subjective time" from our perspective, and starting with a new premise, to look at time itself.

So the notion of agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. — Joshs

I could not open this link.

So the notion of agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I' . But the unfolding of time for this constructed 'I' is always a bit disjointed, a past that is always reconstructed by the present that it is supposed to frame, and a futuring that pulls the present into an anticipative orientation ahead of itself. There is no room for the transcendental in this model. — Joshs

A few things remain unclear in this model. First, its explanatory power is not evident: can it be applied to explain the known theories of consciousness and memory? Second, the role of time looks like a metaphorical description instead of a rigorous elaboration. When one describes the present as the interface of the interaction between the past and the future (or “the place of the clash between the forces of the future and the past”), one makes a mistake of confusing and equaling the ontological status of both. As a result, there won’t be any place for the creation of the new, and there will be just repetitions and reiterations, obeying the casual patterns. Therefore, the transcendental as an external creator (or as a universal casual principal) could have imposed again.
Another approach is based on the distinction between the actual and the virtual, the duality of actual individuation and of virtual subjectivation. The movement of actualization, involving stable forms and organizations, occurs in the field of intensive singularities, so that chance is reintroduced at every moment. As the result, there is the emergence of self, or its ceaseless re-emergence and reconstitution. This process happens in the zone of indiscernibility, of indeterminacy, of the becoming, where the future is just coming into itself

i like Deleuze. He understands the idea of radical temporality, the way that time as difference inserts itself into every stability of meaningful being and transforms it into becoming. He understands it in a different way than Merleau-Ponty does. If youve never read him, he was bot5h a philosopher and psychologist. His Phenomeology of Perception offers a detailed account of memory, language , consciousness, perception and affect. There are currently a host of psychological writers who are using his ideas in their embodied, enactive approaches to cognitive phenomena. Its a burgeoning field. Check out the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
As to the question of the role of the new in the structure of time, the new is the place where an inside is exposed to an outside to challenge, destabilise and transform that inside. Bodliy affect serves that role for Deleuze in relation to linguistic consciousness. It exposes a self-enclosed schematism to a radical otherness. Merleau-Ponty's position isn't that different, except that for him inside and outside are not so easlliy determined, because each inflitrates the other(when my left hand touches the right, which is the perceiving and which is the perceived? Future present and past interprenetrate in the same way.
The past is repeatedly recast by a future that can never be anticipated in a
present that cannot be fixed. Anticipation re-figures recollection as much
as recollection shapes expectation.

But let's use the perception of the bug. — Paul24

Well, shucks. That’s easy. Smashee and smasher are in the same reference frame, smashee is obviously not in a gravity well, smasher’s smashing device is not moving anywhere near the SOL.....wait.....what’s the sense of a bug’s perception again? What’s it like to be a bug?

No wonder there’s a dearth of paradigm-shifting thinkers these days. (Sigh)

Kidding, of course. It’s fun reading you guys, witnessing the current state of philosophy. That you understand each other is just short of amazing, if you ask me.

Anyway.......carry on.

He understands it in a different way than Merleau-Ponty does. If youve never read him, he was bot5h a philosopher and psychologist. His Phenomeology of Perception offers a detailed account of memory, language , consciousness, perception and affect. There are currently a host of psychological writers who are using his ideas in their embodied, enactive approaches to cognitive phenomena. Its a burgeoning field. Check out the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. — Joshs

Thank you for your advice! Definitely, Marleau-Pontu is a great thinker.
Yet, I am not sure that his phenomenology can be applied to some things that I am interested in. I mean that our time has become the “cinematographic, telecommunicational Time”, so that “the momentary synthetic synthesis of competing streams of fragmented perceptions and conceptualizations “ as well as “a community.of interaffecting agents” that you wrote about occur in a radically novel environment. Therefore, our memory, consciousness, perception, and language have been entirely transformed. Has the nature of these momentary syntheses, determining the ways of our being and thought, changed since Marleau-Pontu laid out his philosophy?

the new is the place where an inside is exposed to an outside to challenge, destabilise and transform that inside. Bodliy affect serves that role for Deleuze in relation to linguistic consciousness. It exposes a self-enclosed schematism to a radical otherness./quote]
As far as I know, Deleuze avoided using opposition of terms “inside,” and “outside.” So, he did not just propose that “the bodily affect exposes a self-enclosed schematism to radical otherness,” but he went much further.
For him, the “inner,” (intimate subjective qualities of self), constituting a person, is no more than effects, produced by “a community.of interaffecting agents.” Accordingly, this is how I understand this quote: ”The active synthesis of the future results in the I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendant in the man without a name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the already-Overman.”
The I, the self is no more than an assemblage of interacting impersonal instances (agents). For me, it has precisely the same meaning as yours “the momentary synthetic synthesis of competing streams of fragmented perceptions and conceptualizations.“ I was wondering if the future that Deleuze wrote about in 1968 has already become our reality?
— Joshs

Future present and past interprenetrate in the same way.
The past is repeatedly recast by a future that can never be anticipated in a
present that cannot be fixed. Anticipation re-figures recollection as much
as recollection shapes expectation. — Joshs

It is an impressive model. Is that possible to assume that we exist in different temporalities? (You described one of them). Nevertheless, does the newest one prevail the others?

Deleuze’s translator Brian Massimi gives the following account of the relation between affect and perception-language:

"Formed, qualified, situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling functions of actual connection or blockage, are the capture and closure of affect. Emotion is the intensest (most contracted) expression of that capture – and of the fact that something has always and again escaped. Something remains unactualized, inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored perspective. That is why all emotion is more or less disorienting, and why it is classically described as being outside of oneself, at the very point at which one is in most intimately and unshareably in contact with oneself and one's vitality. If there were no escape, no excess or remainder, no fade-out to infinity, the universe would be without potential, pure entropy, death. Actually existing, structured things live in and through
that which escapes them. Their autonomy is the autonomy of affect.”

"The escape of affect cannot but be perceived, alongside the perceptions that are its capture. This side-perception may be punctual, localized in an event (such as the sudden realization that happiness and sadness are something besides what they are). When it is punctual, it is usually described in negative terms, typically as a form of shock (the sudden interruption of functions of actual connection). But it is also continuous, like a background perception that
accompanies every event, however quotidian. When the continuity of affective escape is put into words, it tends to take on positive connotations. For it is nothing less than the perception of one's own vitality, one's sense of aliveness, of changeability (often signified as “freedom”).

One's
“sense of aliveness” is a continuous, nonconscious self-perception (unconscious self-reflection or lived self-referentiality). It is the perception of this self-perception, its naming and making conscious, that allows affect to be effectively analyzed – as long as a vocabulary can be found for that which is imperceptible but whose escape from perception cannot but be perceived, as
long as one is alive."

"Simondon notes the connection between self-reflection and affect. He even extends the capacity for self-reflection to all living things– although it is hard to see why his own analysis does not constrain him to extend it to all things (is not resonation a kind of self-reflection?). "At this point, the impression may have grown that affect is being touted here as if the whole world could be packed into it. In a way, it can, and is."

Notice that the “inside” here is the self-consistent pattern of perceptual perspective that is disrupted from without. You could say that the ‘without’ as affect is already alongside as background, keeping perception from being purely self-enclosed, and therefore the inside is already outside itself.

Question: when Deleuze talks about the effect of cinema on our understanding of time, does he mean that it makes us realize what was always already true about time that we just never realized before, or does he mean that technologies like cinema create an absolutely new experience of time?
I think he means the former.

"Simondon notes the connection between self-reflection and affect. He even extends the capacity for self-reflection to all living things– although it is hard to see why his own analysis does not constrain him to extend it to all things (is not resonation a kind of self-reflection?). "At this point, the impression may have grown that affect is being touted here as if the whole world could be packed into it. In a way, it can, and is."

Notice that the “inside” here is the self-consistent pattern of perceptual perspective that is disrupted from without. You could say that the ‘without’ as affect is already alongside as background, keeping perception from being purely self-enclosed, and therefore the inside is already outside itself. — Joshs

I agree with all this, and I do not see how the quote and your commentary contradict with what I wrote about “inside” and “outside.”
I do not think that Massumi intended to isolate affect and then to elevate its status up the level
of the universal explanatory principle. When he wrote: “there are affect modulation techniques accessible in the event. They become accessible
to the event through reflex, habit, training and the inculcation of skills –
automaticities operating with as much dynamic immediacy as the event…
Affective techniques of thinking-feeling improvisationally are relational
techniques that apply to situations more directly than to persons,” he followed the strategic approach which was laid out by Deleuze and Guattari:
“There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only
a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together.
Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all
of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any
meaning whatsoever.”
Therefore, when you wrote: “The mind functions as an inseparable interaction with environment and body. It is nothing but this interaction. There is no self-identical self in this model. Self is a bi-product of the constant constructive interactive activity of the organism-environmental interaction. Consciousness is not self-conscious in the sense of being able to turn back on itself and grasp itself identically”, I agree with all this. I just want to add that the meaning
of notions “environment,” “body,” and “interaction” has changed.

Question: when Deleuze talks about the effect of cinema on our understanding of time, does he mean that it makes us realize what was always already true about time that we just never realized before, or does he mean that technologies like cinema create an absolutely new experience of time?
I think he means the former. — Joshs

I agree with you. The fundamental question is whether “an absolutely new experience of time” should be attributed to someone, watching a movie at the cinema, or the Deleuze’s cinematographic time-image
has also unfolded at our offices, schools, medical institutions, etc.?
I think that just a few scholars support a more radical version of the answer.
Maurizio Lazarotto writes: ”Enslavement does not operate through repression or ideology. It employs modeling and modulating techniques that bear on the “very spirit of life and human activity.” It takes over human beings “from the inside,” on the pre-personal (pre-cognitive and preverbal) level, as well as “from the outside,” on the supra-personal level, by assigning the certain modes of perception and sensibility and manufacturing an unconscious. Machinic enslavement formats the basic functioning of perspective, sensory, affective, cognitive, and linguistic behavior”.
Should this approach be considered as too militant and far-reaching?

as long as Mazarotto doesn’t end up letting a form of behaviorism back in (which I doubt very much unless he wants to protect the sources of this enslavement from the effects or machinations of the enalavemwnt itself),
I can see his approach as Nietzschean in spirit. There is a critique of Deleuziam thought on affect and body that I agree with. Ruth Leys argues “Deleuzian affect theorists tend to put everything that is not a question of “meaning,” defined in some highly limited sense, over against the body or affect. What seems wrong or confused about this is the sharpness of the dichotomy, which operates at once with a highly intellectualist or rationalist concept of meaning and an unexamined assumption that everything that is not “meaning” in this limited sense belongs to the body. This too is a false dichotomy, one that—in spite of a professed hostility to dualism—threads its way throughout much of the new literature on affect.”
Ruth Leys says Massumi argues the affects must be viewed as independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology—that is, prior to intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs—because they are non-signifying, autonomic processes that take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning. Affects are “inhuman,” “pre-subjective,” “visceral” forces and intensities that influence our thinking and judgments but are separate from these. Whatever else may be meant by the terms affect and emotion, the affects must be noncognitive, corporeal processes or states. Affect is, as Massumi asserts, “irreducibly bodilyand autonomic”(PV,).

Merleau-Ponty’s chiasmatic intertwining approach to affect is a corrective to this dualism.
He and the enactivists recognize a certain self-consistency to the organism in its interaction with environment that is missing from Deleuze. How does Deleuze explain stable personality features?

You seem to have a good understanding of Deleuziam thinking. I’m wondering what other philosophers and approaches you find particularly relevant to you. What’s your attitude toward paychoanalytically influenced positikns(Lacan, Zizek)?
What about use of theological tropes by writers like Zizek, Vattimo, Jean-Luc Marion, Caputo?
Or Marxist influenced approaches(Habermas, Adorno)?
Some would argue that Deleuziam thinkiking deconstructs theological , psychoanalytic and Marxist critical theory.

Ruth Leys says Massumi argues the affects must be viewed as independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology—that is, prior to intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs—because they are non-signifying, autonomic processes that take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning. Affects are “inhuman,” “pre-subjective,” “visceral” forces and intensities that influence our thinking and judgments but are separate from these. Whatever else may be meant by the terms affect and emotion, the affects must be noncognitive, corporeal processes or states. Affect is, as Massumi asserts, “irreducibly bodilyand autonomic”(PV,). — Joshs

For me, Massumi is one of the leading thinkers of our time, but one should read his texts with great caution.
I think that a few distortions and misrepresentations allowed to Ruth Leys (as far as I see from your note)
to misinterpret Massumi’s project. I would challenge a few things that could change the whole meaning of Leys’s assertions. First, I do not think that Massumi insists on independence and autonomy of “the affects,” from one side, and “ideology,” from another. Both are irreducibly social, technological, and vital. Second, both are not merely separated and isolated but interrelated in a much more complicated way. Third, to better understand how they work together, one should apply much more appropriate concepts. Fourth, mentioned terms are used not in the traditional manner. Finally, Deleuze and his followers often intentionally use a dichotomy and dualism - as a provocation, a tool for deconstruction, or just a preliminary notion that should be worked out later.

Merleau-Ponty’s chiasmatic intertwining approach to affect is a corrective to this dualism.
He and the enactivists recognize a certain self-consistency to the organism in its interaction with environment that is missing from Deleuze. How does Deleuze explain stable personality features? — Joshs

In principle, Deleuze avoided using this kind of discourse. His project was to consider things in their interdependency, endless variation, and immanence.
Don’t you think that “stable personality features,” after all, are related to keeping untouched a substantial I and a transcendental ego?
Marlo-Ponte stated that our perception is built so that we simultaneously perceive and are perceived. For Deleuze was essential to find out
the ontological and epistemological conditions of this process. It does not happen in a vacuum, just in somebody’s mind. How is that possible? Is that a universal truth? If not, what its genealogy (genesis)? What are the limits of its use? Exceptions? For solving of what problems was it designed?

What’s your attitude toward paychoanalytically influenced positikns(Lacan, Zizek)? — Joshs

I think that neither Lacan nor Zizec reflects what we deal with
in our lives. In my opinion, they have still stayed at the plain of the Signifier, which is not appropriate anymore.

What about use of theological tropes by writers like Zizek, Vattimo, Jean-Luc Marion, Caputo? — Joshs

I am not sure about Marion,I need to check it.

Or Marxist influenced approaches(Habermas, Adorno)? — Joshs

May be I will reread some texts of Adorno (is his aesthetics still working?), not of Habermas.

Some would argue that Deleuzian thinking deconstructs theological, psychoanalytic and Marxist critical theory. — Joshs

I think it is not the matter of deconstruction. (By the way, the easiest way to nullify Deleuze is to start identifying and classifying him).It is a matter of taking account of our time.

I’m wondering what other philosophers and approaches you find particularly relevant to you. — Joshs

In my opinion, Guattari is not less important than Deleuze. Also, I found that Massumi, Lazarotto, Goodchild, Raunig and de Landa are interesting. Goodchild, Smith, and Sauvagnargues are indispensable for anyone who wants to understand Deleuzian thinking. Foucault, Lyotard, Luhmann are still relevant.
I used to read some texts of Vygotsky, Blanchot, Bachtin, Baudrillard, Benjamin, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Arendt, but I am not sure that they help me now. Is Kafka a thinker?
I like him so much. Anyway, texts, reading, and authors compose a kind of a sealed universe, so that the process of the endless reading and interpretation can consume all of our time. So, I try to read just what helps me to solve a problem that currently preoccupies me.

There is an alternative way to think about the social than the via the violently arbitrary immanence of Deleuze. There is a more radical way to think about the site of sociality. My paper critiquing social constructionism also can apply tp Deleuze,
Embodied Perception. Redefining the social