It follows from the behavior of "actual" as an indexical and the definition of rigid designation. If you'd like an explanation of that, sure, but it's not a contestable point.

Yes, absolutely I'd like an explanation, that was the purpose of my post.

Sure.

Let "actual" be an indexical such that "actual P" is a property true of an individual just in case that individual is P at w@, where w@ is the actual world. Then "actual individual named Nixon" is true of any individual in the actual world who is named Nixon. Finally, "the" takes this property and returns the unique individual that instantiates it (assuming we have only one Nixon), which is the individual named Nixon in the actual world.

What happens if we evaluate this definite description at a non-actual world? Let w be an arbitrary world, then "the actual individual named Nixon" denotes at w the individual named Nixon at w@. Since this is true of an arbitrary world, it is true for al worlds – thus, at all worlds, "the actual individual named Nixon" denotes the individual named Nixon at the actual world. Since it denotes the same individual at all worlds, it's therefore a rigid designator, and designates Nixon.

But this was just Kripke's hypothesis.

That all makes perfect sense, but you started with the proposition that "it predicts a de dicto reading of "Nixon might not have been named Nixon" that is contradictory.". Its the conclusion here I'm not getting. I don't get how you go from" the individual named Nixon" to the contradictory reading. I get how if you parse Nixon as "actual individual named Nixon" the rigid designator follows, but I don't get why you think this is the only way to parse "the individual named Nixon". I mean, if you I can think of a half dozen other ways to parse that.

For anyone who's interested as to why the view is wrong, it's because it predicts a de dicto reading of "Nixon might not have been named Nixon" that is contradictory. — Snakes Alive

I was under the impression that de dicto is all that can be said. De re there is nothing that can be said. Is that correct?

One also has to deal with the thorny question of how to characterize name-bearing in a non-circular manner if one seriously adopts such an analysis – think about it seriously for five minutes, and it will dawn how utterly bizarre things become. — Snakes Alive

Through essentialism? Oh, wait I thought Kripke was against that...

The bad de dicto reading is if you don't use the indexical.

The bad de dicto reading is if you don't use the indexical. — Snakes Alive

Sorry if Im not writing clearly, I wasn't asking you to reiterate what you thought, I got that bit, I was asking why you thought it. Why does the bad de dicto reading necessarily follow from all ways to parse 'the individual named Nixon'? I get that it does if you replace 'the individual named Nixon' for both instances of 'Nixon' (leads to a non-question), I get why it leads straight back to rigid designators if you replace either instance with 'the actual individual named Nixon'. What I still haven't seen your argument for (and can't seem to work out myself) is your claim that all possible parsing of 'the individual named Nixon' lead to either contradictions or back to rigid designators, which is what would be required for you to sustain your hyperbole that such arguments were "wrong"

The point is that there is one predicted reading of the sentence that is contradictory if one thinks "Nixon" means the same as "the individual named Nixon." Insofar as that sentence apparently does not have a contradictory reading, this is a wrong prediction. You could, I suppose, argue that it does have such a reading.

The 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' sentence is a classic example of how analytic philosophy often disappears up its own fundament, by agonising over the meaning of a sentence that nobody would ever use, and claiming that the analysis is somehow relevant to how people do use language.

Consider a long discussion between friends about Nixon, encompassing his life story, Watergate, his achievements and failures as POTUS and as VPOTUS before that. After the first few sentences of the discussion nobody uses the name Nixon, except when needed to distinguish him from another person that is mentioned in the same sentence. They just use 'he' or 'him', because everybody knows who they are talking about, and will have both the name and a DD in mind.

One of the friends has a theory that Nixon experienced dissonance from being a patrician mind in a plebeian creature (in terms of ancestry, education and so on). They wonder whether he would have pursued a different life course if he had one of the names of American aristocracy, like Schuyler. So they might say:

'Just say he had been called not Nixon but Schuyler, do you think he would still have gone into politics?'

The subject of the question is not identified by the name 'Nixon' but rather by 'he', which refers to the person the friends have all been talking about. There is no de re / de dicto distinction in this sentence, because the subject is not identified by a word ('Nixon') or DD that is capable of such a distinction.

If a passer-by hears the sentence and asks who it is about, the response might be 'We are talking about Richard Nixon, the POTUS in 1969'. But being told that doesn't mean the passer-by will take that DD and substitute it for 'he' in the question. People don't think like that. They just note the explanation, conjure up their mental image of Nixon and then reconsider the question with that mental image in mind for the 'he'.

The corresponding sentence that all the analytical divagation concerns itself with would be something like:

'Just say Nixon had not been called Nixon, but was called Schuyler instead, do you think he would still have gone into politics?'

I contend that somebody would not say it that way unless they were being facetious, hoping to get a laugh from the circle with their little play on words. If they seriously wanted to consider the influence of his name on the man that in this world was POTUS in 1969, they would say it something like the first way above.

In short: analysis of whether the utterance 'Nixon might not have been named "Nixon"' has a meaning, and if so what, has nothing to do with how humans use language.

The general answer to the objector can be stated, then, as
follows : Any necessary truth, whether a priori or a posteriori,
could not have turned out otherwise. In the case of some
necessary a posteriori truths, however, we can say that under
appropriate qualitatively identical evidential situations, an
appropriate corresponding qualitative statement might have
been false. The loose and inaccurate statement that gold might
have turned out to be a compound should be replaced (roughly)
by the statement that it is logically possible that there should
have been a compound with all the properties originally known
to hold of gold. The inaccurate statement that Hesperus might
have turned out not to be Phosphorus should be replaced by
the true contingency mentioned earlier in these lectures : two
distinct bodies might have occupied, in the morning and the
evening, respectively, the very positions actually occupied by
Hesperus-Phosphorus-Venus.

N&N pp142-3

Nixon might not have been called "Nixon"...

:roll:

Nixon might not have been Nixon...

There's a difference here. The first makes perfect sense. The second is a contradiction because it is poorly worded/framed. It does not consider the difference between names and referents.

What the hell are you talking about?

Here is a live example of an English user, outside of a philosophical context, doing exactly what andrewk says one never would. We should all be so lucky to have people around telling us what we do and don't, or can and cannot say, and that any suggesiton to the contrary is 'being up one's own fundament.'

https://imgur.com/a/1D0QNp6

Please, let's move on.

Yeah. @Andrew is a bit careless with his quote marks.

Thanks for the example. It exactly demonstrates my point. The subject of the sentence is 'The capital of England', not 'London', as you seem to believe.

Now, why do you think the writer made that choice?

The difference between the two sentences is not just the quotes but also the word 'called'. I don't think anybody in this thread has written a sentence of the second sort.

My understanding of common usage is that quotes are not required around a word to indicate it is a mention rather than a use when that is already implied by the context. The word 'called', which you slyly omitted from your second sentence, provides that context.

By all means contest my idea of what common usage is - it's only an impression. But don't critique a sentence that nobody has written.

Holy shit, keep reading. There's an example with a proper name subject right there.

READ.

But don't critique a sentence that nobody has written. — andrewk

You literally invented an entire imaginary conversation in your post! Are you for real?

Are you seriously implying that no one can look at novel sentences of a language that they haven't found in an actual corpus or conversation?

Even if that were true, you're still wrong, because there are examples of these constructions! You just did not even bother to look for them before making up nonsense claims about what people do and do not say!

Take the fucking L, man.

I made a mistake re-entering this thread. Just got mad again. See you later once more.

One day, one day, people will read. I dream of that day. Til then ciao.

There's an example with a proper name subject right there. — Snakes Alive

It's later in the same sentence, and relies on the setup that is done in the first part of the sentence, which meticulously avoids using a proper name as subject.

By the way, I'm not suggesting nobody would ever say your Nixon sentence. I've already noted that somebody might express it that way facetiously. It's also possible that somebody might say it non-facetiously if they hadn't given much thought to how to express the idea they had in mind. In such a case, the likely outcome would be confusion and/or mirth, a request for clarification and a re-expression of the sentence. Which means the sentence is unclear. Which means it's a meaningless waste of time to write long dissertations about what it 'really means'.

Take the fucking L, man. — Snakes Alive

I haven't come across that idiomatic expression before. I like it! What does it mean? Is it a reference to the elevated railway, which in some US cities is colloquially referred to as 'the L'?

The 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' sentence is a classic example of how analytic philosophy often disappears up its own fundament, — andrewk

The author above uses 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' as a means for critiquing an imaginary opponent.

Nixon might not have been named "Nixon" would be an actual one.

And then that same author says the following???

But don't critique a sentence that nobody has written. — andrewk

This has already been covered here.

The 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' sentence is a classic example of how analytic philosophy often disappears up its own fundament, by agonising over the meaning of a sentence that nobody would ever use, and claiming that the analysis is somehow relevant to how people do use language. — andrewk

No, but it is an interesting thought experiment, and the sentence is perfectly well structured. Akin to the liar paradox.

Indeed, I had the liar sentence in mind as I was writing that. The similarities are strong. I also agree that it is fun to play around with such sentences. We only get ourselves into a muddle if we start to believe it tells us anything about how people really use language.

Indeed, I had the liar sentence in mind as I was writing that. The similarities are strong. I also agree that it is fun to play around with such sentences. We only get ourselves into a muddle if we start to believe it tells us anything about how people really use language. — andrewk

As much as I would want to call 'philosophy' mental masturbation, I have learned a lot and have been stimulated by this thread. It has helped me understand that analytic philosophy can be fun to entertain.

:up:

Just say he had been called not Nixon but Schuyler, do you think he would still have gone into politics?'

The subject of the question is not identified by the name 'Nixon' but rather by 'he', which refers to the person the friends have all been talking about. There is no de re / de dicto distinction in this sentence, because the subject is not identified by a word ('Nixon') or DD that is capable of such a distinction. — andrewk

You're describing that which had already been named and described.



The referent is not identified by the name "Nixon"? Really now?

Which person are we talking about again that could have been named otherwise, but was not?

:roll:

"He" is used to refer to Nixon. "Nixon" identifies the referent.

You covered nothing...

It's not about the overrated use/mention distinction...

Stop.

Which person are we talking about again that could have been named otherwise, but was not? — creativesoul

Hmm, that's a more interesting and complex question than I thought at first. The actual-world properties by which we identify the person depend on what our counterfactual is. Given this counterfactual is about them (1) having a different name - presumably at birth, since it is their surname, and (2) not entering politics, we need a way to identify him using information prior to the birth. We can try to do that via the parents, but without necessarily using the name Nixon. We could envisage them changing the name by deed poll but, given the counterfactual is about feeling that one might have aristocratic lineage, that wouldn't really satisfy the purpose of the counterfactual. The name Schuyler would have to go back a few generations into his ancestry at least.

One way to achieve it while minimising the differences from this world would be to imagine a world in which there is no surname "Nixon", and everybody with surname 'Nixon' in this world has 'Schuyler' in the other world. In all other respects the world would be identical to this up to the naming ceremony of Richard Milhous Schuyler/Nixon.

In light of that I'd say the person we are talking about is the person that, in the alternate (actual) world, was born in Yorba California as the male second child of the Quaker couple Francis A Schuyler (Nixon) and Hannah Schuyler (Nixon), née Milhous.

It's all a bit weird, but that's counterfactuals for you. Few of them make much logical sense.