What I do not accept is your blanket statements about vegans. — andrewk

I've not made any blanket statements about vegans (at least not intentionally). I'm making what I think are rational inferences based on the criteria of group membership. If I made the claim "all vegans try to eliminate meat from their diet" you could not reasonably deride that as a disagreeable blanket statement, it just follows from the definition of vegan. I'm saying that if vegans were to make moral claims about their veganism (as some clearly do) I would dispute those moral claims on the grounds I've talked about (primarily uncertainty about net suffering, which I take to be a moral axiom in this context).

What I'm objecting to here is primarily the equivocation around the moral claim that we should live our lives in such a way as to reduce the suffering of sentient creatures without reducing our own quality of life below a fair standard. That claim as stated I can broadly agree with (although I have issues with it). Veganism, however, by definition, is a theoretical means of achieving this objective, not this objective itself.

For instance they might say that it is immoral to eat a product the consumption of which leads to a net increase in animal suffering. — andrewk

No, they could not, not as a vegan claim. They might, as people, make such a claim, but that would be unrelated to their veganism, which is the topic of discussion here. As I said, Hitler claimed that the Jews were an inferior race, and he was a vegan. His views on Jews have no place in a discussion about veganism because they are completely unrelated to his being a vegan. Vegans can make all sorts of claims, but the only ones relevant to a discussion about veganism are the ones related to the elimination of animal products.

A moral relativist is as capable of making a moral claim to another person as a moral absolutist is. If they share the same moral axioms (which seems to be the case here, as most participants in this thread appear to be approaching it from a utilitarian base) — andrewk

This is exactly my issue. We need to share the same moral axioms (I agree that, in this case its theoretically possible that a moral relativist might have posted on the off chance of talking to another relativist who happens to share their axioms, but it makes no difference to my issue).

If the shared moral axiom is reduction of suffering to a point where it does not impose an unfair hardship, then veganism has work to do that it has not done to present itself as the only rational solution. Namely, how do we best manage the long-term uncertainty in the degree of harm caused. Which is how this whole bit of the debate got started.

Is it arrogant to assume other animals have the same distaste to sadness, after all it is equally important to experience as happiness. — Xav

Soooo, you think causing sadness is okay? Causing suffering is okay? I can kick you in the shins now cause I have some esoteric and paternalistic notion that it'll be good for you?

I agree that its no reason to stop doing anything good, but not actively doing bad being the same as doing good is something I'm unsure on. I would be inclined to disagree. — Xav

I didn't say it's the same as doing something good. You're just doing less bad. Doing less bad is better than doing more bad, but that doesn't make it good.

Like, if these were numbers, negative numbers being bad, and positive numbers being good, we could put omnivorism at a -10. Then veganism would be like a -5 or a 0. And maybe saving hurt and/or homeless animals could be at a +5 or something.

Vegans can make all sorts of claims, but the only ones relevant to a discussion about veganism are the ones related to the elimination of animal products. — Isaac

No.

The aim of the suffering-based version of ethical-veganism is to reduce animal suffering. Veganism is simply a practical means to do that. It happens that it is also the only practical means available to most urban dwellers at a reasonable financial cost.

I see no support for your claim that the only moral claims by a vegan that are relevant to a discussion of veganism are those that relate to elimination of animal products. Again your assertion is too strong. If you want to keep it at that level of strength, you need to provide an argument as to why claims by ethical-vegans, that people ought to live in a way that minimises the net increase of animal suffering, are not relevant to a discussion of veganism. Your Godwin-exemplifying diversion above doesn't come close.

The aim of the suffering-based version of ethical-veganism is to reduce animal suffering. — andrewk

This is just getting ridiculous. The aim of ethical-veganism is to is not just to reduce animal suffering and it is to reduce animal suffering through eliminating animal products. Otherwise it wouldn't be veganism, it would just be negative utilitarianism. I don't quite know what else to do short of buying you a dictionary. Vegans try to eliminate their use of animal products, it's the definition of the word.

one thing all vegans have in common is a plant-based diet avoiding all animal foods such as meat (including fish, shellfish and insects), dairy, eggs and honey - as well as products like leather and any tested on animals.

From the vegan society website.

They're not just people who want to reduce suffering, they're people who want to reduce suffering in a specific way, and therein lies the problem. What if the best way to reduce suffering overall in the long term included using some animal products? That would make it impossible to be vegan and claim to desire the maximum reduction in suffering, hence the contradiction with which I started this whole thing.

The aim of ethical-veganism is to is not just to reduce animal suffering and it is to reduce animal suffering through eliminating animal products. — Isaac

You are confusing the end with the means.

What if the best way to reduce suffering overall in the long term included using some animal products? — Isaac

And here you are confusing the societal with the individual. A vegan could easily recognise that for society in its entirety, an ideal configuration may involve some aggregate consumption of animal products. That doesn't necessarily imply anything about what an individual should eat in this far-from-perfectly-configured society, where the majority of animal products available to urban dwellers are produced in a tremendously cruel way, and it is very hard for an urban dweller to have any confidence in the extent to which the production of a given animal product did not involve unnecessary cruelty.

What if the best way to reduce suffering overall in the long term included using some animal products? — Isaac

It's not, though.

It's not, though. — NKBJ

Great, perhaps you can tell me this week's lottery numbers too.

You are confusing the end with the means. — andrewk

No, that's what I'm accusing those vegans who make moral claims of doing. The claim is that veganism is moral, not that reducing suffering is moral (and that veganism may well be a means of achieving it). It comes down to the issue about certainty. There is a different sense of uncertainty about moral goods than there is about means. That's why no one seriously argues whether murder is wrong but plenty of very committed and intelligent people argue about how best to reduce it.

The claim is that veganism is moral — Isaac

Even if that were the claim, it would not follow that the vegan making it also believes that not being vegan is immoral.

Let's go back to basics:

• 1. A vegan is a person who does their best to avoid consuming animal products, or buying them for their own use.
• 2. An ethical vegan is a vegan that believes it is ethical to seek to minimise the net suffering of animals, and that their remaining a vegan helps towards that goal.

How does it follow from 1 and 2 that an ethical vegan must believe that anybody who is not either a vegan or needs animal products to survive is acting unethically?

Further, how does it follow from the bulleted points that a claim made by an ethical vegan about the ethics of a certain act of consumption of animal products, or about a type of consumption by a group of people, is irrelevant to their being an ethical vegan unless the claim matches the one underlined above?

It is not enough to show that some ethical vegans have made claims like the underlined one. You need to show that it is a necessary consequence of being an ethical vegan that one believes that claim.

You won't be able to, because I know ethical vegans that do not believe the claim.

Animal agriculture is known to harm animals. Uses more plants. Causes more damage to the environment. Is more harmful to workers. Is more harmful to the health of consumers....

It's not even remotely like the lottery. To assert that is just showing your willful blindness to the facts.

How does it follow from 1 and 2 that an ethical vegan must believe that anybody who is not either a vegan or needs animal products to survive is acting unethically? — andrewk

It doesn't follow because (2) is just an assertion. I make the opposite assertion, that an ethical vegan, by virtue of bringing veganism into the realm of ethics, elevates what should be a pragmatic method for achieving a moral good to the status of a moral good itself. Again, since you haven't answered the key question. What would an ethical vegan (someone who thinks it is a moral good to avoid meat) do if it were demonstrated that avoiding meat entirely caused more animals to suffer in the long term. Are you suggesting that ethical goods them selves are subject to scientific investigation. That Science might one day discover that in fact causing unnecessary pain to innocents is actually a moral good?

You need to show that it is a necessary consequence of being an ethical vegan that one believes that claim.

You won't be able to, because I know ethical vegans that do not believe the claim. — andrewk

You're mistaking logically necessary for linguistically necessary. The fact that you know ethical vegans who claim not to believe the claim has no bearing whatsoever on its logical necessity. People do make false claims, people do make incoherent claims.

It doesn't follow because (2) is just an assertion. I make the opposite assertion, that an ethical vegan, by virtue of bringing veganism into the realm of ethics, elevates what should be a pragmatic method for achieving a moral good to the status of a moral good itself. — Isaac

2 is a definition, not an assertion. If you want to define 'ethical vegan' as somebody that believes it is always immoral not to be a vegan unless one's life depends on consuming animal products, go ahead.

If your complaint is against such people then I have no interest in contesting it as I do not agree with the underlined claim.

I just want to point out that large numbers of people who are vegan for ethical reasons do not fit your definition of 'ethical vegan', and that there is nothing inconsistent or incoherent about being a vegan for ethical reasons and rejecting the underlined claim.

Animal agriculture is known to harm animals.Uses more plants. Causes more damage to the environment. Is more harmful to workers. Is more harmful to the health of consumers.... — NKBJ

Show me the data proving that over the next millenia the entire global consequences of an elimination of animal agriculture will cause less suffering to all sentient creatures.

I'll need to see all the data on the long-term ecological consequences (including all the possible scenarios they've explored), all the data on the economic consequences (stock prices, market fluctuations, impact on third-world farmers, changes in agricultural land prices), all the data on the pedological impact (fertiliser sources, increased ploughing, soil erosion), all the data on the hydrological impact (increased irrigation needs, changes in the catchment absorbance and consequent flood lag times), all the data on the impact on the grazing ecology (dung beetles, grassland wild flowers, rare fungi like wax caps), all the data on the demographic impact (will the increased productivity per hectare lead to population increase, because of course we could halve the suffering but if it leads to a doubling of the population we'll have achieved nothing).

When you've totted up the total number of animals and measured the pain they're in, compared that to the next millennia under organic animal agriculture as part of a mixed system, then come back to me with the unequivocal figures for both, agreed on by every scientist working in the field. Until then have some bloody humility, accept that the matter is complicated and stop presuming everyone who isn't jumping on the latest bandwagon is just less holy than you.

I just want to point out that large numbers of people who are vegan for ethical reasons do not fit your definition of 'ethical vegan'. — andrewk

Then we are in agreement. I'm sure large numbers of ethical vegans conflate the means with the moral good itself. As I said, this is an inconsistent position as most would not hold that Science can determine what is morally good in other areas of life.

The moral good is reducing the suffering of sentient creatures and that it not something which changes as scientists discover new facts.

The best method of achieving this goal is extremely complicated, widely disputed among experts, open to the vagaries of scientific research bias, and will change as new information is discovered.

The two are very different, and conflating them is dangerous dogmatism, in my opinion.

The vegan campaign, both here and in ethical philosophy (the subject matter of this forum) definitely conflates the two at times.

You're being absolutely ridiculous.

Show me all of this data for why I shouldn't just shoot the next baby I see. You can't? Oh well, guess killing anyone I want is a-okay!

The data we have shows that the suffering is greater. Right now and for the foreseeable future. The only non-humble person here is the one who refuses to give up eating carcasses despite all of that evidence.

The data we have shows that the suffering is greater. Right now and for the foreseeable future. — NKBJ

No it doesn't. That's the point. People dispute the data. Scientists disagree about the long-term implications, the consequences are complex and open to a good deal of uncertainty. And so far as killing babies is concerned things are no different. Where babies are on life support for untreatable conditions and turning the machine off would kill them, this level of complexity is precisely what the doctors have to deal with. In tribes when disabled children are born, this level of complexity is exactly what the parents have to deal with. Ethics is more complicated than bandwagon jumping.

Arguing from extreme cases now to justify killing any baby or anyone?

But you're just shifting the argument. You wanted an impossible amount of proof. And I showed that this demand is clearly ridiculous, because that would justify killing ANYONE.

There's also a few scientists who claim climate change isn't real. We shouldn't listen to the kooks when the consensus is that animal agriculture is destroying the planet. And it's an undisputable fact that animals die in animal agriculture. Also that more plants are used for it.

I am not against human rights, but I don't pretend to be a champion for human rights either, nor do I harbor any illusions about being morally superior to others. So whatever point it is you're making, I think it misses its mark. — Tzeentch

What are you talking about? It's very simple.

You are not against human rights.
I am not against animal rights.

You don't pretend to be a champion for human rights.
(You're not donating all your time to homeless shelters and helping impoverished people)
I don't pretend to be a champion for animal rights.
(I am not donating all my time to rescuing animals or stopping animal cruelty)

I would argue that you do "harbor the illusion" that you are morally superior to a rapist or child molester. In the same way I "harbor the illusion" that I am morally superior to someone who supports animal cruelty.

You claim I missed the mark, yet your criticism to vegans not only misses the mark, but it is an exact reflection of how you feel about human rights. Vegans extend those rights to non-human animals, while you keep it restricted to humans.

I don't having any such illusions, since that would make me delusional. Even worse, having illusions that one knows to be false would make one delusional by choice. And feelings of moral superiority I find similarly distasteful, no matter who has them towards who.

I posted this earlier in this same thread:

Behind a thin veil of careful wording it is becoming apparent that there exists a sense of moral superiority in some of these people with regards to their veganism. A sense of moral superiority which is blatantly hypocritical, because they choose to voluntarily participate in a society the faculties of which inevitably cause suffering to living beings, both human and animal.

Unless one is perfectly dedicated to the reduction of suffering, it is hopelessly hypocritical to judge the moral fibre of others. — Tzeentch

And I guess you proved my point, except for the 'thin veil' part.

That's an ignorant thing to quote. You're essentially saying, unless someone is perfect, they cannot judge others who are also not perfect.

So as I have asked somebody before, if your daughter gets raped, are you going to tell your daughter that she is no better than the person who raped her, since you believe moral decisions don't make you any worse than the next person, correct?

Also. Here are some analogies so you can better understand.

1: My morals are superior to a person who condones rape.
2. My health is superior to a person who smokes, drinks and eats fast food every day.
3. My work ethics are superior to a person who shows up late every day.

Just because I am not perfect in my work ethics, doesn't mean I cannot judge someone who had poor work ethics. Just because I am not perfectly healthy, doesn't mean I cannot judge someone who is unhealthy. And just because I am not perfectly moral, doesn't mean I cannot judge someone who is acting immorally.

For some reason, people are completely content in labeling their actions as better (or superior) when it comes to most subjects, expect for morality. And anybody who does is an apparent hypocrite who should never judge the moral 'fibre' of others.

So as I have asked somebody before, if your daughter gets raped, are you going to tell your daughter that she is no better than the person who raped her, since you believe moral decisions don't make you any worse than the next person, correct? — chatterbears

First of all, there's no reason to tell my daughter that she's morally superior to anyone. And if you believe that to be a proper way to console rape victims, well I don't know what to tell you.

Secondly, one doesn't know whether one is a morally superior person. If one were to be put in the exact same position as that person, perhaps one would be doing the same thing. Perhaps not, but one simply doesn't know.

And any self evaluation on this subject has proven to be generally inaccurate. Ordinary people who participated as prison guards in for example the Stanford Prison experiment must've undoubtedly thought themselves of (at least) average moral fibre, yet were confronted with their own ability to do extremely immoral things and all it took was a scientist to give them a bat and tell them they were a guard. That's why a lot of those people now have PTSD-like trauma; because it completely shattered their illusions of having moral fibre. The Milgram experiment showed much the same thing.

Though, I believe I've made this point to you once before. In your own thread, no less:

Feelings of moral superiority serve no other purpose besides inflation of the ego. Are such feelings common? Undoubtedly. But they are also highly dangerous, both when cultivated in individuals and in communities.

I'd say I am also morally superior to a husband who cheats and/or beats his wife. — chatterbears


This is where the mistake lies: This illusion of moral superiority stems from one instance, in which one attests that under the same circumstances one would have made a different decision.

Firstly, unless one has been in the same situation, one cannot be sure of this. How many people judge themselves to be morally superior to Nazi concentration camp guards? However, we also know that it is very likely that the average person would, under such circumstances, act in much the same manner.

Secondly, it is a mistake to judge the merit of a person on one example. Feeling morally superior to another means one has the illusion of being able to judge the entirety of another's moral being, and the entirety of one's own moral being, compare the two, and conclude one is superior.

Now, either of these could very well be true, but it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to find out. However, even if one were to gain, by some miracle, an accurate insight of one's own moral being compared to another, what is the use of blemishing this achievement with feelings of moral superiority? Why can one not congratulate oneself for being on the right path, and pity the poor fool who isn't? — Tzeentch

You never responded to this. Perhaps you care to do so now.

Now, on the judging of others. I believe it is only fair that if one chastises another for showing up late at work, one had best always be on time themselves. Otherwise that would indeed make one a hypocrite and one lose one's credibility. This applies to any situation in which one feels the need to judge others or chastise them for their behavior. Now, if one has never been in a situation as the one they are about to judge, perhaps one had best reserve judgement.

I'm reminded of an instance where a father shot the rapist of his child. The father must have thought himself to be quite morally superior to his child's rapist, and then in anger shot the man dead in court while he was handcuffed. He, in an act of vengeance, killed this man while he was in a vulnerable state, essentially committing a similar crime as the rapist, thereby proving he was in a sense no different.

Though, one must ask, what is even the point of judging others? I'd say it serves no other purpose than masturbation of the ego.

the Stanford Prison experiment must've undoubtedly thought themselves of (at least) average moral fibre, yet were confronted with their own ability to do extremely immoral things and all it took was a scientist to give them a bat and tell them they were a guard. — Tzeentch

Actually, it was a whole lot more complicated than that.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KND_bBDE8RQ

Now, on the judging of others. I believe it is only fair that if one chastises another for showing up late at work, one had best always be on time themselves. — Tzeentch

What if you have a college who is late most of the time, and you yourself are only late on rare occasions when you had no other choice or at least a really darn good reason? Then you're not being a hypocrite.

Though, one must ask, what is even the point of judging others? I'd say it serves no other purpose than masturbation of the ego. — Tzeentch

OR to urge others to try and make the world a better place.
If we never judged others or tried to change the status quo, we'd still have slavery, Jim Crow, no female vote, women wouldn't be allowed to own property, gay people would be thrown in jail...etc.

Though, one must ask, what is even the point of judging others? — Tzeentch

That's what moral discourse is all about - to encourage/influence the behaviour of others (eg peer pressure).

I'd say it serves no other purpose than masturbation of the ego. — Tzeentch

I'd say you misunderstand morality and moral discourse.

What if you have a college who is late most of the time, and you yourself are only late on rare occasions when you had no other choice or at least a really darn good reason? Then you're not being a hypocrite. — NKBJ

Indeed. There is an important nuance, though. If one is late on rare occasions for reasons out of their control, it is not hypocritical to chastise others for running late often. But if one is late, even on rare occasions, out of laziness or complacency, then they would be hypocritical.

OR to urge others to try and make the world a better place.
If we never judged others or tried to change the status quo, we'd still have slavery, Jim Crow, no female vote, women wouldn't be allowed to own property, gay people would be thrown in jail...etc. — NKBJ

Judging people doesn't help them to be better persons, helping them does. Acknowledging someone exhibits behavior that is bad for both themselves and their environment is fundamentally different from judging them. It's perfectly possible to engage in dialogue with people about their behavior without judging them, and the world would in fact be a much better place if people would realize this.

I'd say you misunderstand morality and moral discourse. — ChrisH

I'm sure your understanding of morality is vastly superior.

Why would you even bother with plebeians like me, hm?

Judging people doesn't help them to be better persons, helping them does. — Tzeentch

This is a false dichotomy. I must judge their actions to be wrong before deciding to help them change.

There's a difference between evaluating an action and passing judgement upon a person. I realize that 'to judge' and 'to evaluate' can be used as synonyms, but we have been talking about judging in relation to feelings of moral superiority, in which case they are clearly not the same, in my view.

There's a difference between evaluating an action and passing judgement upon a person. I realize that 'to judge' and 'to evaluate' can be used as synonyms, but we have been talking about judging in relation to feelings of moral superiority, in which case they are clearly not the same, in my view. — Tzeentch

What if I say that I evaluate that veganism is morally superior to omnivorism?

That'd be a curious choice of words, but I guess one is entitled to their opinion. But again, claiming to be superior is probably the worst way of convincing people of one's views.