So you see now its purpose? — Pussycat

Anyway, what do you make out of this exchange so far? Does it seem like Fooloso4 is doing a good job no?

I think that he is doing a good job, but partly. For the other part, its really bad: he makes his own views pass as W's, most commonly they appear at the end of a paragraph.

I think that he is doing a good job, but partly. For the other part, its really bad: he makes his own views pass as W's, most commonly they appear at the end of a paragraph. — Pussycat

What do you disagree with?

Lots, like the last comment, "not discursively, but experentially", what the heck is this, where on earth did W say that, or even hinted??

What are your thoughts about the following propositions?

6.362 What can be described can happen too: and what the law of causality is meant to exclude cannot even be described.

6.363 The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences.

6.3631 This procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized.

6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

I am attempting to follow the Tractatus step by. What W. presents is already a distillation, which I have further reduced to a set of quotes followed by my own brief comments. In what follows I will first restate those comments and then tie it all together. — Fooloso4

Fooloso4 - You have been doing an excellent job of moving the discussion forward.
You have persevered with patience under the most trying of circumstances.
You have my full support and appreciation.

I think that he is doing a good job, but partly. For the other part, its really bad: he makes his own views pass as W's, most commonly they appear at the end of a paragraph.
— Pussycat

What do you disagree with? — Wallows

Disgraceful. Continuing false allegations against Fooloso4. And the ignoring of same.

Disgraceful. Continuing false allegations against Fooloso4. And the ignoring of same. — Amity

I never said anything against Fooloso4. I even said in my previous comments that I think he is right.

Anyway, I hope Fooloso4 might be able to contribute more to these issues. Quite interested in his input.

Once again: the term metaphysics is used both in the sense of a science and a subject area that may or may not be addressed via science, that is, as something that can be known discursively. What is now called Aristotle’s metaphysics, the question of being qua being was not addressed a priori. First philosophy was not for Aristotle an a priori science. The question is whether metaphysics is for Wittgenstein a priori. My answer is: no, it is existential and experiential. It has nothing to do with science. That is the point of setting the bounds of science.

As to Kant: he holds that there can be no knowledge of anything outside of experience, and so it follows that there can be no knowledge of God or the soul. Some have taken this to be a rejection of the existence of God and soul since they are not objects of experience. But that is not the case. From the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason:

Just the same sort of exposition of the positive utility of critical principles of pure reason can be given in respect to the concepts of God and of the simple nature of our soul, which, however, I forgo for the sake of brevity. Thus I cannot even assume God, freedom and immortality for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative reason of its pretension to extravagant insights; because in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of experience, then they would always actually transform it into an appearance, and thus declare all practical extension of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic. - Thus even if it cannot be all that difficult to leave to posterity the legacy of a systematic metaphysics, constructed according to the critique of pure reason, this is still a gift deserving of no small respect … (B xxix-xxx). — Kant

Kant rejects a priori arguments attempting to prove the existence of God and soul. They are not objects of knowledge a priori but matters of faith. For a detailed discussion see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/

↪Wallows I think that he is doing a good job, but partly. For the other part, its really bad: he makes his own views pass as W's, most commonly they appear at the end of a paragraph. — Pussycat

I have already asked you to point out where I have made a mistake or questionable move. Where specifically do my own views differ from his? What textual evidence points to that difference? I do not make my views pass as his. I set his statements in quotes and then comment on them. The two are easily distinguished.

Lots, like the last comment, "not discursively, but experentially", what the heck is this, where on earth did W say that, or even hinted?? — Pussycat

The following are direct quotes from the text. I cited them in my post.

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

— T 6.421

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — T 6.43

What do you think about Wittgenstein's answer to Hume's problem of induction in the Tractatus?

Disgraceful. Continuing false allegations against Fooloso4. And the ignoring of same.
— Amity

I never said anything against Fooloso4. I even said in my previous comments that I think he is right.

Anyway, I hope Fooloso4 might be able to contribute more to these issues. Quite interested in his input. — Wallows

You missed out the relevant part of the quote by Pussycat. I will bold it.

I think that he is doing a good job, but partly. For the other part, its really bad: he makes his own views pass as W's, most commonly they appear at the end of a paragraph.
— Pussycat

You didn't say anything against Fooloso4 but by ignoring the accusation against him you failed to support him.

Yes. His contributions are valuable. You keep asking questions of him and others. It's a good way forward. He keeps on giving. So generously.

Well, I don't think there are any issues anymore. So, let's wait to hear from @Fooloso4...

Well, I don't think there are any issues anymore. So, let's wait to hear from Fooloso4... — Wallows

I am not a participant in the reading, and that is what should matter. Carry on...best wishes.

I think the larger issue has to do with his claim that the laws of nature and the law of causality are not necessary laws. It follows that there can be no law of induction. I am generally in agreement. I see the laws of nature as descriptive rather than prescriptive or proscriptive. They mark regularities, but I am not certain that things must always follow the same patterns as they do now. I am by temperament not a determinist, but I do not know enough to take an unyielding stance.

I do not know if this is what you are inquiring about though. What do you think about Wittgenstein's answer to Hume's problem of induction in the Tractatus?

See:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/249463

How does that answer the question about induction?

I included several of those statements in my discussion of 6.

What does W mean by the following?

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

What does logical necessity mean here?

So, you ask questions but do not answer them?

Logic determines what is possible. It tells us nothing of what is actual.

I do not know if this is what you are inquiring about though. What do you think about Wittgenstein's answer to Hume's problem of induction in the Tractatus? — Fooloso4

Well, according to this website, answers the question about why Wittgenstein denied Russell's empirical claim that "there is no rhinoceros in the room". How does this relate to the issue about Hume's problem of induction is that Wittgenstein basically affirmed the issue of the problem of induction by the assertion that empirical claims like Russell's rhino in the room are just as untenable as knowing that the sun will rise the next morning, which according to Hume is just a psychological belief, not a certainty.

Do you agree with all this or not?

Logic determines what is possible. It tells us nothing of what is actual. — Fooloso4

So, with the above in mind, does Wittgenstein ever make the claim that, logic and the world, are one and the same? Or is there some distinction drawn between the two? Or in other words, how does logic relate to the world, if as we've discussed the metaphysical self lies beyond it?

I cannot comment on the rhino. I do not know what was said. I do not know, as the link assumes, that it had something to do with induction.

Here’s the problem:

2.223
In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224
It cannot be discovered from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225
There is no picture which is a priori true. — T

How can we determine whether the proposition that there is a rhino in the room is true or false? How can we compare it with reality if we reject empirical evidence?

Hume’s problem of induction is not about what can be verified empirically here and now, such as whether there is a rhino in the room, but about what we infer will be the case based on prior experience. For example, if every time I walk into Russell’s room there is a rhino I might after numerous times infer that there will be a rhino in his room the next time I visit. There might, but then again, there might not. That is something I cannot know until I visit. It does not follow logically that because there has been a rhino in the past there will be one in the future

So, with the above in mind, does Wittgenstein ever make the claim that, logic and the world, are one and the same? Or is there some distinction drawn between the two? Or in other words, how does logic relate to the world, if as we've discussed the metaphysical self lies beyond it? — Wallows

They are not the same. The world is made up of objects. Objects have logical form and combine to make facts. Logic is the structure, the scaffolding of the world, not the world itself. If you read my posts you will find that I have addressed all of this.

If you read my posts you will find that I have addressed all of this — Fooloso4

I'm a little slow, please bear with me. Here is a good paper on the issue of there being a rhino in the room.

Hume’s problem of induction is not about what can be verified empirically here and now, such as whether there is a rhino in the room, but about what we infer will be the case based on prior experience. For example, if every time I walk into Russell’s room there is a rhino I might after numerous times infer that there will be a rhino in his room the next time I visit. There might, but then again, there might not. That is something I cannot know until I visit. It does not follow logically that because there has been a rhino in the past there will be one in the future — Fooloso4

I have my contention with this due to Wittgenstein explicitly stating in proposition 5.1361:

The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present.

Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. — Wittgenstein

Although he does change his views later in the Investigations.

@Fooloso4

I think I got sidetracked with the whole Rhino and induction thing. Let me know where we left off.

Sorry and thanks.

I have already asked you to point out where I have made a mistake or questionable move. Where specifically do my own views differ from his? What textual evidence points to that difference? I do not make my views pass as his. I set his statements in quotes and then comment on them. The two are easily distinguished.

Lots, like the last comment, "not discursively, but experentially", what the heck is this, where on earth did W say that, or even hinted??
— Pussycat

The following are direct quotes from the text. I cited them in my post.

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

— T 6.421
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.
— T 6.43 — Fooloso4

From which you extract:

Philosophy sets boundaries. The boundaries of language exclude the metaphysical, but this is not a rejection of the metaphysical but rather means that the metaphysical is misunderstood and only leads to nonsense if one attempts to treat it as if it were within the bounds of language. Thus the right method of philosophy leads to silence about such things. There are not known discursively but experientially. — Fooloso4

Now where exactly does W. say explicitly in the Tractatus that the things that are not within the bounds of language "are not known discursively but experentially"? Particularly the second.

Amity, amity
why show you such enmity?
after all
there's no calamity

But I am just trying to be honest here, you understand honesty, right? Honesty's form I mean, its logical form, irrespective of its content.

From which you extract:

Philosophy sets boundaries. — Pussycat

I do not extract that from the quote. He explicitly states that this is what philosophy does. I quote it and reference it in a post on the section of the Tractatus where he says it.

Now where exactly does W. say explicitly in the Tractatus that the things that are not within the bounds of language "are not known discursively but experentially"? Particularly the second. — Pussycat

If they are not within the bounds of language then by definition they cannot be known discursively. As to the experiential, I discussed this in my post on part six, specifically with regard to the will and the world of the happy man. What do you think he means by the world of the happy man?

What do you think about Wittgenstein's answer to Hume's problem of induction in the Tractatus? — Wallows

Mind you that Wittgenstein's friend David (Hume) Pinsent was a descendant of David Hume. A coincidence? But there are no coincidences in logic.

I do not extract that from the quote. He explicitly states that this is what philosophy does. I quote it and reference it in a post on the section of the Tractatus where he says it. — Fooloso4

I see no problem with this one, I was referring to your last sentence.

If they are not within the bounds of language then by definition they cannot be known discursively. — Fooloso4

But what does "discursively" mean? Rational thinking? So that pure reason or rationalism cannot reveal the truth about what is outside the bounds of language? Most likely this is what W meant, but by saying that "these cannot be known discursively", it endangers that we leave and throw reason completely out of the game. In a similar tune in stanford's article on Kant that you shared, it says somewhere:

If, for example, propositions about the supersensible were incoherent according to Kant, then he would not need his Antinomies or Paralogisms. Rather, he could sweep them all away quite simply through the charge that they fall short of the conditions for meaning.

Why would Kant deal with reason with what is outside the bounds of language, if the latter - the unreasonable - were unknowable? (but neither with this I have a problem)

As to the experiential, I discussed this in my post on part six, specifically with regard to the will and the world of the happy man. What do you think he means by the world of the happy man? — Fooloso4

Now with this, I have a problem. I don't see anywhere in the Tractatus Wittegenstein:

a) say explicitly that what is outside the bounds of language can be known experientially.

b) even imply or hint that such is the case.

I read your comments on part 6, where you repeat this claim, but again I cannot see how you came to this conclusion. So if you could, for my sake, answer whether there are excerpts in the Tractatus containing a) and b) above, and which are those.

As to the world of the happy man, we can take the usual example of the half-full/half-empty glass: how can we use language and science to describe the situation? one way is this: we say that this glass can hold a maximum of 100 ml of water, and it now holds 50, this is a scientific proposition, a proposition of natural sciences, expressing a definitive fact, which cannot be changed no matter how hard we try. Now, the happy man says: "oh what joy, this glass is half-full, and I will get to drink some water! :smile: ", whereas the unhappy man says: "oh what a bummer, this glass is half-empty, couldn't it have been full! :sad: ".

(If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language).

So the worlds of the happy and unhappy man are quite different. For the first his world waxed, as optimism shined in, for the second it waned, as pessimism caved in.

(In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole.
The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy).

But what does "discursively" mean? Rational thinking? — Pussycat

It is related to the term discourse, thus to language and the expression of thoughts.

Most likely this is what W meant, but by saying that "these cannot be known discursively", it endangers that we leave and throw reason completely out of the game. — Pussycat

That depends on the game. When the game has to do with the facts of the world, what is the case, or natural science then reason plays a role, but if we are talking about ethics and aesthetics then, according to W., it plays no role; such statements would have no propositional sense because it does not refer to the facts of the world.

In a similar tune in stanford's article on Kant that you shared, it says somewhere: — Pussycat

Above the passage you quoted, in the same paragraph:

Kant does not reject the thinkability of the supersensible … — Stanford

Wittgenstein does.

Why would Kant deal with reason with what is outside the bounds of language, if the latter - the unreasonable - were unknowable? (but neither with this I have a problem) — Pussycat

Your question is pretty jumbled. Kant uses reason to set the limits of reason, of what can be known via speculative reason and what illusions the non-critical use of reason leads to.

Now with this, I have a problem. I don't see anywhere in the Tractatus Wittegenstein:

a) say explicitly that what is outside the bounds of language can be known experientially.

b) even imply or hint that such is the case. — Pussycat

5.641
There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject,
the limit—not a part of the world.

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world. — T

The sense of the world, its value lies outside the world. It is what is experienced by the happy man.

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — T

The world of the happy man as well as the world of the unhappy man is the world as they experience it.

As to God:

Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
— T 6.42

How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
— T 6.432

Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)
Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — W