if idealism and materialism both need to 'exclude' something to define themselves by, idealism 'excludes' parts of the world in favour of others (undermining/overmining), and materialism excludes attempts at exclusion, — StreetlightX
the whole point of idealism (in my understanding of it), is that it by definition aims to idealize one part or parts of reality over others (or, using a different topology, aims to idealize an extra-reality over reality — StreetlightX
I was just looking to understand how your view is different from Chalmer's naturalistic dualism, if it is.
I think we all agree that there are events and that events are somehow related. If there is a psychic aspect to an event, how does that work? — frank
1)What do you mean by 'idealizing one part of reality over others?'
2)What makes something 'extra-real'? — csalisbury
The assumption that creatures such as ourselves are built from particles of matter which are themselves entirely devoid of any experiential, mental of psychic quality seems much less likely than the reverse assumption. — prothero
So our concepts bring us to the realization of oneness, but fail to take us onwards into it? — frank
Well this a speculative philosophy discussion about ontology (being) and so you will not get definitive truth or proof. It is about developing concepts and language which you help you explain or approach all of your experience of the world which encompasses both the physical and the mental or experiential.
This is no finality of statement to be achieved.
For me the world is not composed of the static or the inert but is process, change and flux it is a continuous creative becoming, not a being.. There are no independent objects with inherent properties but societies or organisms with interactions and relations to the rest of the world. The entire world is an integrated, interactive system of relations. The choice between monistic materialism or physicalism and monistic idealism, is a false choice, the world is both (not as separate substances but as one substance with both properties). As to what the nature of fundamental units or substance of nature are, they are events (quantum events) not enduring particles (which are only repetitive events). — prothero
I'm also anti-realist but carry along a working scenario. I stress things you don't. — frank
what things you stress and your working scenario for dealing with "reality". — prothero
Time is change nothing more, and change is the most consistent feature of reality, not fixed or static being. — prothero
I am unsure how it's just a conceptual operation. To say reality is composed of one substance means something. You assert that all objects are decomposable or analyzable into fundamental units which, at a certain level, are indistinguishable and interchangeable with one another. Take a carbon atom from joe and a carbon atom from the tree outside your window, and, if you look at them, you will find no fundamental difference, no individual footprint. Take the electron from carbon 1 and you can replace it with the electron from carbon atom 2.I agree with this. The 'fact of the matter' is surely independent of conceptualization. But to determine whether our metaphysical ideas correspond with reality (if such a thing is possible), we have to figure out what we're saying. What does 'reality is composed of one substance' mean?
What I'm suggesting is that, if you break down the concept, you see that its not about the world at all. It's a conceptual operation that has overstepped its bounds. My interest in this topic corresponds exactly to my feeling 'the fact of the matter' shouldn't depend on conceptualization.
(We could also say the fact of the matter about whether reality is large shouldn't depend on conceptualization. That's true, I think. But it's not really clear what it would mean. It seems to be mixing something up. )
Fundamental means not decomposable. A quark or boson, more fundamentally -- the properties which define 'quark' or 'boson'. These properties -charge, mass, etc.], would be fundamental.What does 'fundamental' mean?
Is face-value difference fundamental?
Why or why not?
fundamental means not decomposable.
Face-value difference is not fundamental...the components of these objects are fundamentally the same -physical particles.
I don't think their different arrangement should matter that much. Spatial and bonding relations, which serve as the basis for difference between objects, are not fundamental or substantial, they just are ephermal states. e.g. You have a bunch of lego blocks and build a bridge and man out of it. Sure, they look different -on face value- and that's because of how you've arranged the blocks, but I don't think anyone would say the man or the bridge are their own separate substances, no the substance is the thing which is invariant and composes them.Here's the philosophical 'gotcha'. But I think it's legitimate.
Trees and bananas are, obviously, composed of physical particles, differently. No 'face-value' differentiation required. So how do you decompose the difference between the face-value difference of trees and bananas - and trees and bananas with no face-value difference.
You seem savvy, so I'm sure you anticipate this kind of thing. Nevertheless - how?
I don't think their different arrangement should matter that much. Spatial and bonding relations, which serve as the basis for difference between objects, are not fundamental or substantial, they just are ephermal states. e.g. You have a bunch of lego blocks and build a bridge and man out of it. Sure, they look different -on face value- and that's because of how you've arranged the blocks, but I don't think anyone would say the man or the bridge are their own separate substances, no the substance is the thing which is invariant and composes them. — aporiap
What I’m trying to say is that the difference between saying there’s a difference and saying there is no difference is that, in one case, you’re giving ontological status or significance to relations between parts and in the other you are not- and only give ontological status to the parts themselves — aporiap
If you say that is a conceptual operation - applying ontological status to a feature of the world- then your critique would apply to any metaphysical claim — aporiap
I think that any feature of the world is capable of having an ontological status applied to it. — csalisbury
I think you're right - and that anyone would agree that both were composed of legos. Both the bridge and the man are decomposable, in the sense you mentioned. But what is the face-value distinction - the 'looking different' - composed of? And is it decomposable? What is the 'ephemeral'?
I read through the OP again to just clarify why this is an issue [finding some way of characterizing everything] and it seems like the reason you focus in on monism here is essentially because of the plainly clear plurality we experience. But I also think it's plainly clear that commonalities underpin pluralities; and these form the basis for the search for unifying principles and substances.My critique - but it's too shoddy to be dignified by that title - is a 'critique' of any philosophical operation that tries to find some way of characterizing 'everything.' I think that any feature of the world is capable of having an ontological status applied to it.
Take a classic like discrete~continuous. And understand them as complementary limits of what could be the case - so processes which are about heading in directions rather than states of existence. — apokrisis
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.