That's just pushing the issue off to say it's truths about imagined things (obviously this is right). Truths about imagined things are truths about things that don't exist, so it doesn't seem to do anything to progress the seeming conflict between the intuitive correspondence theory of truth and there being truth propositions regarding non-existent or fictional entities. Surely it sounds strange that "X is true because it corresponds to an imagined Y/how Y imagined X?

I wasn't saying "truth" is only correctly captured by correspondence theory, just that since that theory of truth is a fairly normal way people understand truth, it's a tricky issue holding these without thinking it through carefully.

Why would we say that imagined things do not exist? They exist as imagined things. Saying that imagined things do not exist as imagined things is a big part of the problem. A big part of where philosophy goes off the rails. It's not glib to point this out, and it's not shallow to point out that it's stupid to go off the rails in that way.

And why would it sound "strange" to say that "X is true via corresponding to how we imagine x."

All we're saying is that the proposition "Sherlock Homes lived at 221B Baker Street" corresponds to what Doyle wrote, for example (because that's what he imagined/what he chose to construct), for example. Why in the world would there be limitations like that on what something can correspond to?

Because "imagined" is usually understood as implying non-existence. So that statement would be rendered as "Why should we say that non-existent things do not exist?". The answer seems obvious enough.

You don't want to be in the situation where you agree to existentially quantify over something and say true things about it, but you maintain that it does not exist (e.g. There exists some x such that x is Sherlock Holmes and Holmes is etc etc.). I mean what you're saying sounds like Meinongianism and I'm assuming you don't endorse that.

All we're saying is that the proposition "Sherlock Homes lived at 221B Baker Street" corresponds to what Doyle wrote, for example (because that's what he imagined/what he chose to construct), for example. Why in the world would there be limitations like that on what something can correspond to? — Terrapin Station

Well surely a true statement is not directly made true by a non-existent thing? I'm fine making a distinction between what makes different kinds of propositions true or not (those making reference to imagined things vs real things) but speaking of imagined things existing seems like a contradiction. Meinongianism isn't entirely off the table nowadays (oddly enough) but it's a bitter pill to swallow...

Meinongianism isn't entirely off the table nowadays (oddly enough) but it's a bitter pill to swallow... — MindForged

Why is that? I like Meinongianism.

Does Meinong's world correspond to ''may'' or ''might''?

If it' ''may'' then there's no difference between Meinong's world and what we call logically possible worlds.

If it's ''might'' then it contains square-circles (impossible objects) and is a different kind of world. This could be interesting.

Because "imagined" is usually understood as implying non-existence. — MindForged

I mentioned this earlier re wanting to avoid psychologism, etc. It's a big mistake that philosophy makes. Hence it turns very simple things like this into ridiculous problems.

Because "imagined" is usually understood as implying non-existence. So that statement would be rendered as "Why should we say that non-existent things do not exist?". The answer seems obvious enough.

You don't want to be in the situation where you agree to existentially quantify over something and say true things about it, but you maintain that it does not exist (e.g. There exists some x such that x is Sherlock Holmes and Holmes is etc etc.). I mean what you're saying sounds like Meinongianism and I'm assuming you don't endorse that. — MindForged

Is there a better solution than interpreting such statements as pertaining to a fictional domain? And by interpreting other related claims in such a way as to avoid a contradiction? If we're going to say that they exist in a fictional domain, then when people say that they don't exist, we should just interpret that as meaning that they don't exist in the domain of actuality. Or we could just say that they don't exist at all, but then that clashes with how you interpret logic.

Yeah, obviously what people tend to have in mind with something like "God doesn't exist" is that he doesn't exist as anything other than a fiction. Folks aren't saying the fiction doesn't exist as a fiction.

I know you mentioned it but the post doesn't say anything about why one should adopt psychologism especially given everything that mounted against it at the end of the 19th century with regards to logic and mathematical truths. (Not sure if you meant something different by psychologism so I'm guessing).

Yeah, obviously what people tend to have in mind with something like "God doesn't exist" is that he doesn't exist as anything other than a fiction. Folks aren't saying the fiction doesn't exist as a fiction. — Terrapin Station

Eh, this seems like a dubious claim about what people 'tend to have in mind'. A fiction is, colloquially, understood as something that doesn't exist. And as I don't happen to believe in God, I definitely don't think God exists and does so as a fiction. I would say God does not exist because the idea of God has no referent, it is not among the set of existing things. "Existing as a fiction" sounds like non-existing existent to my ears. There's certainly a collection of proposed attributes and actions written and believed to have been done by some being called God, but I wouldn't attributes any kind of existing to that hypothetical person.

That's probably fine. How to resolve this logically isn't clear. Maybe it was in another thread, but I've mentioned before that some have suggested adding an quantifier that is specifically for quantifying over fictional things. Don't know if that solution or any other works, I've not looked into this all that much.

Eh, this seems like a dubious claim about what people 'tend to have in mind'. A fiction is, colloquially, understood as something that doesn't exist. And as I don't happen to believe in God, I definitely don't think God exists and does so as a fiction. I would say God does not exist because the idea of God has no referent, it is not among the set of existing things. "Existing as a fiction" sounds like non-existing existent to my ears. There's certainly a collection of proposed attributes and actions written and believed to have been done by some being called God, but I wouldn't attributes any kind of existing to that hypothetical person. — MindForged

Because you're stuck in the standard, misconceived academic phil notion that fictions don't exist as fictions. If you'd just drop that crap, a lot of stuff would be far simpler, a lot of "mysteries" would disappear.

It's impressive that I'd be stuck in that mindset despite being neither an academic philosopher nor have I even read in this topic.

Again, consider the obvious objections to what you're putting forward. Pegasus is not defined as a fictional being, though we know it to be so because it does not exist. And yet under your view Pegasus both has to exist as a fiction (non-existent) and it has to have the properties of existing things that are part of the concept of Pegasus: having wings, immortal, created by Zeus, etc. This surely isn't true about the fiction of Pegasus (fictions cannot be created by non-existent beings, nor have wings, etc.), but it's part of the proposed attributes of the entity we know to be fictional.

"Pegasus was created by Zeus" being true is not equivalent to "The fiction known as Pegasus was created by Zeus" being true, but the little you've said would seem to suggest they ought to be equivalent. The former implies that Pegasus exists while the latter does not. It's like your flipping contexts or something.

Pegasus is not defined as a fictional being, though we know it to be so because it does not exist. — MindForged

With Pegasus, for example, definitions almost always mention that it's from mythology.

I'm not sure why you're seeing it matter if a definition specifies this though.

It's not my view that Pegasus "has to" exist as a fiction. It's a contingent fact that it does.

All that means is that people imagine Pegasus. The imagining exists. This is a very, very simple and straightforward thing. There's no mystery to be solved unless we go to pains to create some mystery, or to interpret things as if we're robots or something like that.

The process of imagining existing is not equivalent to the content of the imagination existing. Pegasus is not conceived of as an imaginary horse that flies. Pegasus is conceived as a horse that flies, and it may be that we imagine it. My imagination of Pegasus does not have wings, it doesn't exist in the first place. The content of the imagination, if real, would have wings. But since it's a fiction, it doesn't exist at all.

My imagination of Pegasus does not have wings, it doesn't exist in the first place. — MindForged

if you imagine Pegasus, whatever you imagine exists as something you imagine.

No one said what you imagine has to have wings.

And it's like a learning-disabled level confusion--maybe because we're playing a game where we're trying to create problems to solve because we're bored? (and we unfortunately do not want to tackle more challenging but practical problems like making sure that everyone has housing, health care, etc.)--to be confused whether we're talking about what we're imagining existing as something other than something we're imagining.

You're not making any sense and using snark to bolster it is more funny than compelling. If I imagine Pegasus, that doesn't make Pegasus exist at all. An imagination of a thing does not give the thing any more ontology than it did before, it's just a representation of something that might or might not exist. By this standard a statue of Pegasus would make Pegasus more real.

After all, it's just as true to say "Pegasus does not exist" before I imagine it as it is during the process of imagination. Would you honestly go up to someone and say, "Well of course Santa Claus did not exist but now that I've brought him to your mind he exists in your imagination"? You might as well have said he doesn't exist at all, imagination or not.

You're not making any sense — MindForged

Then specify something I'm saying and point out exactly what part(s) you don't understand. I'll explain those bits in other words so you can understand.

Which I already did in the very post you quoted the beginning of.

I didn't notice you quoting me

@banno

Banno started a very long discussion on the old Philosophy Forum about whether Pegasus was real. It seems to me that many were agreed that Pegasus, wingéd horse, was real. How can that be?

Characters in fiction are not real in the same way my cup of coffee is real, (or maybe they are) but the fictional story is as real as the cup of coffee once it is told. That is so whether the story is told around a campfire or printed, bound, and sent to you from Amazon by under-paid and abused proles, slaving away for the greater glory of Jeff Bezos.

Someone reading this thread can not be 100% sure that Terrapin, MindForged, and Bitter Crank exist in the flesh, but he can be sure that we at least exist as characters in a thread. (Terrapin, MindForged, and Bitter Crank are in bigger trouble if they are not sure they are real either as flesh or as characters in this thread.)

Perhaps if you read you'd notice I responded to the things you said, quoting or not. It's not hard to read.

And it's like a learning-disabled level confusion--maybe because we're playing a game where we're trying to create problems to solve because we're bored? (and we unfortunately do not want to tackle more challenging but practical problems like making sure that everyone has housing, health care, etc.)--to be confused whether we're talking about what we're imagining existing as something other than something we're imagining. — Terrapin Station

We should all just keep reposting this post. This would've been a great modbot response in the old PF.

:rofl:

People can debate that but it ends up coming across as Meinongianism at a certain point. And that's not totally indefensible (though it may come at some steep costs), but most don't want to be committed to that view.

Perhaps if you read you'd notice I responded to the things you said, quoting or not. It's not hard to read. — MindForged

Again, what I'm requesting, if I'm not making sense to you, is for you to quote something I'm saying--just quote a short bit that doesn't make sense, and point out specifically what words don't make sense to you and why.

You said you were doing that. You weren't. So could you do that if I'm not making sense to you?

There the old horse is! He exists.

if you imagine Pegasus, whatever you imagine exists as something you imagine.

No one said what you imagine has to have wings. — Terrapin Station

This was all you had to say before so I thought it was very obvious what I was responding to (the rest was more a screed than anything related to this topic).

The proposition "Pegasus is a flying horse" and "Pegasus is an imaginary flying horse" are not identical. If one is not careful (i.e. in how they regard existential quantification), the former implies existence while the latter does not ("imaginary" is understood usually as entailing non existence).

What you're missing is that imagining that Pegasus has wings is not the same as Pegasus having wings. What is true of a thing that is real is not the same as what's true of a thing that is imaginary. If Pegasus were real the property "is imaginary" would not apply, while that property would apply to what I'm imagining. In other words, what one imagines can't have the same properties as a physical instantiation of what I'm imagining.

That's a picture, what it represents doesn't exist. ;)

Ding an sich?

That's a picture, what it represents doesn't exist. — MindForged

If it represented nothing, how could it exist?



One could object that a hot dog is actually a sausage, but that wouldn't help you when ordering your food.

This reminds me of the James Thurber story about the Unicorn In The Garden:

Once upon a sunny morning a man who sat in a breakfast nook looked up from his scrambled eggs to see a white unicorn with a golden horn quietly cropping the roses in the garden. The man went up to the bedroom where his wife was still asleep and woke her. "There's a unicorn in the garden," he said. "Eating roses." She opened one unfriendly eye and looked at him.

"The unicorn is a mythical beast," she said, and turned her back on him. The man walked slowly downstairs and out into the garden. The unicorn was still there; now he was browsing among the tulips. "Here, unicorn," said the man, and he pulled up a lily and gave it to him. The unicorn ate it gravely. With a high heart, because there was a unicorn in his garden, the man went upstairs and roused his wife again. "The unicorn," he said,"ate a lily." His wife sat up in bed and looked at him coldly. "You are a booby," she said, "and I am going to have you put in the booby-hatch."

The man, who had never liked the words "booby" and "booby-hatch," and who liked them even less on a shining morning when there was a unicorn in the garden, thought for a moment. "We'll see about that," he said. He walked over to the door. "He has a golden horn in the middle of his forehead," he told her. Then he went back to the garden to watch the unicorn; but the unicorn had gone away. The man sat down among the roses and went to sleep.

As soon as the husband had gone out of the house, the wife got up and dressed as fast as she could. She was very excited and there was a gloat in her eye. She telephoned the police and she telephoned a psychiatrist; she told them to hurry to her house and bring a strait-jacket. When the police and the psychiatrist arrived they sat down in chairs and looked at her, with great interest.

"My husband," she said, "saw a unicorn this morning." The police looked at the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist looked at the police. "He told me it ate a lilly," she said. The psychiatrist looked at the police and the police looked at the psychiatrist. "He told me it had a golden horn in the middle of its forehead," she said. At a solemn signal from the psychiatrist, the police leaped from their chairs and seized the wife. They had a hard time subduing her, for she put up a terrific struggle, but they finally subdued her. Just as they got her into the strait-jacket, the husband came back into the house.

"Did you tell your wife you saw a unicorn?" asked the police. "Of course not," said the husband. "The unicorn is a mythical beast." "That's all I wanted to know," said the psychiatrist. "Take her away. I'm sorry, sir, but your wife is as crazy as a jaybird."

So they took her away, cursing and screaming, and shut her up in an institution. The husband lived happily ever after.

Moral: Don't count your boobies until they are hatched. — James Thurber