You're ignoring the issues I brought up re "meaningful." — Terrapin Station

What post again? My take on something being meaningful is that X is meaningful if there is a distinction between a system with X and a system without X. A distinction other than the presence of X.

So I can assert that all hairs on my head have a virtual serial number, and sure, that is distinct from a universe without that because the hairs there don't have a virtual serial number, but there is no distinction to me. I cannot test for which universe I'm in. The serial numbers have no effect on anything. Thus they are not meaningful, in the way I mean that word.

What post again? My take on something being meaningful is that X is meaningful if there is a distinction between a system with X and a system without X. A distinction other than the presence of X. — noAxioms

This is what I wrote: "I don't really understand what you're asking there. Because I don't understand how you're using "meaning" really. If you're literally talking about semantics, meaning is subjective. It's a mental act of association. So are you asking if someone (who?) performs associative acts in that situation? "

And then you responded with something about "simulation" for some reason.

If you want to make an argument to the effect of "time can only be change if that (that=maybe time, change--whatever you'd need) has an effect on something" or "time can only be change if there is a distinction between a system with x and a system without x" or whatever you'd want to claim, then I'd check out the argument, but you'd have to make the argument.

This is what I wrote: "I don't really understand what you're asking there. Because I don't understand how you're using "meaning" really. If you're literally talking about semantics, meaning is subjective. It's a mental act of association. So are you asking if someone (who?) performs associative acts in that situation? " — Terrapin Station

OK, I think I described how I'm using the word in my prior post.

And then you responded with something about "simulation" for some reason.

Heh... I read you wrong. You said 'situation', not 'simulation'. So much for the eyes.

So are you asking if someone (who?) performs associative acts in that situation? — Terrapin Station

There is nobody performing acts in my scenario. There were only the million particles.

If you want to make an argument to the effect of "time can only be change if that (that=maybe time, change--whatever you'd need) has an effect on something" or "time can only be change if there is a distinction between a system with x and a system without x" or whatever you'd want to claim, then I'd check out the argument, but you'd have to make the argument.

I didn't really define time. I just brought up points that seem to find flaw in equating time with change.

If anything, time seems to be meaningless without change, but change is not necessarily meaningless without time, so change is arguably more fundamental. Meta might think otherwise since he asserts meaning to time without change, but I find that scenario to be indistinguishable from the same lack of change without the time.

I didn't really define time. I just brought up points that seem to find flaw in equating time with change. — noAxioms

Without an argument, it just seems like arbitrary ideas that have a non sequitur connection with what I'm claiming.

Without an argument, it just seems like arbitrary ideas that have a non sequitur connection with what I'm claiming. — Terrapin Station

I'm not proposing anything. I'm finding inconsistency in your proposal.

I'm not proposing anything. I'm finding inconsistency in your proposal. — noAxioms

My proposal has absolutely nothing to do with effects on anything or distinctions between systems.

Also, it's not a proposal. It's an identification.

My proposal has absolutely nothing to do with effects on anything or distinctions between systems. — Terrapin Station

OK, I was finding inconsistency with "I'm saying that what time is ontologically is change or motion". Your 'proposal' is perhaps something else. I was finding a counterexample to the quoted statement there.

OK, I was finding inconsistency with "I'm saying that what time is ontologically is change or motion". — noAxioms

It's not inconsistent with having an effect on anything or differences between systems, because I didn't say anything about that.

So what would it be inconsistent with?

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

I brought up effects and differences and distinctions and such. It is my counterexample.
My example showed something where change was quite measurable but time was not, and if the two were ontologically the same, then if you could measure one, you should be able to measure the other.

My example showed something where change was quite measurable but time was not, — noAxioms

How did your example show that? I certainly didn't agree that it showed that.

How did your example show that? I certainly didn't agree that it showed that. — Terrapin Station

You can measure change: A count of the particles that have decayed. You have not proposed a way to measure time from that.

A count of the particles that have decayed would not be a measurement of change, by the way. Again, comparative difference is not the same thing as change. I pointed that out with the atmospheric density example.

You can observe decay by observing the changes in a particular particle, say (whether it's just replaced by another particle or whatever). Or if you have a number of particles, you can observe their changing relations (spatial orientation for example) or whatever you like.

The way we measure time from any change is by assigning numbers to the changes in question. So that's what you'd do.

Got to go for now.
If time was distinguishable in the million-decay example, then you could distinguish the events running forwards (with half of the decays happening before the first half life) from the scenario in reverse, with most of the state changes happening near the end.

There's not really any "forwards and backwards" in time. We just imagine/fantasize about that. There are just changes that happen, and changes can relatively happen at different rates.

Again, comparative difference is not the same thing as change. I pointed that out with the atmospheric density example. — Terrapin Station

Ah, a different definition of change. Perhaps that is the fault in my example.

I think those arguments are inane. I don't understand the "if y cannot fail to have x" part of your comment, though.

We're also probably not going to agree on what meaning is. — Terrapin Station

My original point was that I cannot make sense of the notion of unchanging phenomena, so "phenomena changes" is a tautology that says nothing. One might as well have said "phenomena is phenomena" or "change is change".

So to my mind, there isn't room for two concepts, namely that of phenomena and that of temporal change. Furthermore, when we learned the meaning of the words "changing" and "unchanging" we learned it with reference to public semantic conventions, and not directly in relation to immediate experience.

My original point was that I cannot make sense of the notion of unchanging phenomena, so "phenomena changes" is a tautology that says nothing. One might as well have said "phenomena is phenomena" or "change is change".

So to my mind, there isn't room for two concepts, namely that of phenomena and that of temporal change. — sime

The two words are different. Phenomenon implies an experienced thing, whereas change does not imply experience. So two concepts, since it makes sense to speak of non-phenomenal change.

'Temporal change' is not necessarily the same as change. Perhaps Terrapin thinks otherwise, since my example of a non-temporal change was dismissed. But equating change to only temporal change seems begging the equality of change and time, not evidence of two being the same thing.

I think change is simply a difference in one variable as a different variable is altered. So one can plot the brightness of my house paint over time, but not necessarily over time, and it presumes a sort of identity of the thing labeled as 'the brightness of my house paint' that can be evaluated at different points in the variable being altered.
Then also, if my house doesn't fade, then the brightness is not a function of time, and it is meaningless to speak of the time at which the brightness of it was value X.

The two words are different. Phenomenon implies an experienced thing, whereas change does not imply experience. So two concepts, since it makes sense to speak of non-phenomenal change. — noAxioms

sorry, perhaps i should have been clearer. I'm referring to change within the context of 'phenomenal change' and it's relationship to the A series, as opposed to mathematical representations of change, and arguing that the A series deflates away.

When people say things like "time flows by" they appear to imply that the phenomena of a river is different to the passage of time, something that comes about by first distinguishing phenomena from the A series and then equivocating the A series with the B series to give time an illusion of hidden dimensionality above and beyond what is observed. A flowing river isn't merely a metaphor for time passing, for they are the same thing. "time flows by" just means "the river flows" here. This is entirely consistent with any mathematical description of physical change.

When we're talking about measuring time, we choose some changes as the basis. I already explained this.

We then measure other changes relative to the changes we chose as our measurement basis. We could use the relatively twice as fast wheel as the measurement basis. We could use any changes as the measurement basis. — Terrapin Station

If it can be proven logically that it is possible for time to pass without any changes occurring, therefore no means of measuring that time, then by the impact of that logic, this "possible" time, during which no changes are occurring, is meaningful. Logical possibilities are meaningful.

If it can be proven logically that it is possible for time to pass without any changes occurring, — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, that couldn't be proven logically.

It's very simple to prove it logically, (as logical possibilities are very simple to prove as logical possibilities). And I did prove it logically, it's in that post where you focused on what I claimed physicists have demonstrated, rather than on the content of the my post. And the fact is that logical possibilities are meaningful. So the concept of time passing without any change by which that time could be measured, as a logical possibility, is meaningful.

Obviously I don't agree that you proved this logically, but given the sort of thing you seem to be shooting for, all I'd have to do to prove logically that you didn't prove it logically would be to say that just in case I don't feel that you proved it logically, then you didn't prove it logically. I don't feel that you proved it logically. Therefore you didn't prove it logically.

What you "feel' about something is irrelevant as to whether that thing is a logical proof or not. You didn't address the proof in that post, so as far as I know you didn't understand it or perhaps didn't even read it. So what you feel about it is completely irrelevant

Man, you really, really don't understand what logic is.

I know enough about logic to know that the way you feel about a logical proof is irrelevant to it.

What would the formalization of my argument be?

You have no argument, only a feeling. That's why what you say is irrelevant to logic.

Actually it's a simple modus ponens. If p then q. P. Therefore q.

Your premise is clearly unsound so you have no argument. Sorry, form without content is not an argument.