So gentlemen, a logic question. If the fetus is not a potential person, and does not have a future, how than can it be a future burden on the mother, how can it have an effect on her future life she would want to avoid, how can it be a future burden on society? — Rank Amateur

Some fetuses that were not aborted are never satisfied.

If the fetus is not a potential person, and does not have a future,
— Rank Amateur

It would be nice if you read with any comprehension; and it would be nice if you were intellectually honest. See, this is what I wrote above:

Does that preclude us from thinking usefully about the idea of a person, though he or she be not-yet, non-existing? Certainly not! But neither is it a license to grant existence to something that isn't - as pro-lifers try to do. They, I argue, are not about the efficacy of the thinking about, but rather represent that the thought about is a present fact.
— tim wood

The question throughout has been distinguishing between what is, and what you can think about. You can think about anything you like, but that does not mean that what you think about actually exists other than as the idea you're thinking about. — tim wood

Translation, the fetus can be whatever you want it to be to support your position.

Some fetuses that were not aborted are never satisfied. — Bitter Crank

Truer words....

Translation, the fetus can be whatever you want it to be to support your position. — Rank Amateur

If that's your inner seven-year-old, shame on you. If you really believe it, then I suggest you think about it a lot. The alternative is you're just a troll.

Translation, the fetus can be whatever you want it to be to support your position. — Rank Amateur

is as good a translation of this :

Does that preclude us from thinking usefully about the idea of a person, though he or she be not-yet, non-existing? Certainly not! But neither is it a license to grant existence to something that isn't - as pro-lifers try to do. They, I argue, are not about the efficacy of the thinking about, but rather represent that the thought about is a present fact. — tim wood

as anything.

It is a jumble of words without any meaning. You can think of the fetus as a possible person, but you cant think of them as a possible person if in doing so is in conflict with your opinion.

The paragraph is just a mess.

I gave up being amazed at our ability as humans to justify killing the people we want dead a very long time ago. — Rank Amateur

To justify the people we want dead? So the future value of people is what we care about, yes?

It seems to me that this point is still unaddressed by you. You claim academic authority to ignore the point about people, but even you use the plain language that makes the most sense of the arguments you're making -- that people's lives are at stake, according to yourself. So you skip the quagmire of personhood while still caring about future value in your argument because of the quagmire of personhood -- it's just unaddressed and assumed.

To justify the people we want dead? So the future value of people is what we care about, yes?

It seems to me that this point is still unaddressed by you. You claim academic authority to ignore the point about people, but even you use the plain language that makes the most sense of the arguments you're making -- that people's lives are at stake, according to yourself. So you skip the quagmire of personhood while still caring about future value in your argument because of the quagmire of personhood -- it's just unaddressed and assumed. — Moliere

you are taking that comment completely out of the context of the conversation I was having with bitter -

he said -

I may not like that arrangement, but it seems to be an exceedingly well established set up. Just about everybody approves of the properly presented war. Just about everybody agrees that killing to protect one's property is OK. Self-defense, sure -- fire away. Just like nobody doesn't like Sara Lee, nobody doesn't like certain kinds of killing. People who are opposed to abortion on the grounds that persons are being killed could at least be consistent and be committed Quakers. 99 times out of 100 they are not. — Bitter Crank

my response was

↪Bitter Crank hard to argue with that. I gave up being amazed at our ability as humans to justify killing the people we want dead a very long time ago. — Rank Amateur

it was in response to the killings of war. etc.

does that help ??

I am more than happy to address any point in any argument I have made, but on such a long and scattered thread - if you could kind of clearly state the concept or issue you want me to address. With all the scattered words over all these pages - easy to find a few to highlight and argue. But I will do my best

I am more than happy to address any point in any argument I have made, but on such a long and scattered thread - if you could kind of clearly state the concept or issue you want me to address. With all the scattered words over all these pages - easy to find a few to highlight and argue. But I will do my best — Rank Amateur

Fair enough, and sorry for that. I wasn't reading closely enough. My thought was with respect to where I responded to you here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/250860

When I said --

I don't think I quite see how it avoids the personhood issue, though. That's at least my failing in reading you. If it does I'm not understanding how it does so -- when I read you saying "people like you and me have a future that we value" and "A significant harm of killing us is the loss of that future" I cannot help but think -- well, yes, people like you and me do value our future. This is true.

And then wonder how we count "People like you and me" -- and that's where it seems to me personhood is assumed by yourself, or I'm just not understanding what it is about the future that is not personhood that makes it valuable.

Others have said the same, like @Banno, so I don't think I'm alone in my beffudlement. I'm trying to read you as charitably as possible, but I can't see why your argument is something we should care about unless it is the future of people we care about.

let me give it one more try.

The first premise of the argument is just about people like you and me. That is it. The point is to establish if is morally impermissible, without justification, to kill people like you and me, and one significant harm done to us by being killed is the loss of our future, which we value. This is the first premise because it would make no sense to argue the killing of the fetus is morally impermissible - before establishing that killing people like us is morally impermissible.

than the arguments establishes a pure biological time line between born people like you and me, and the unique human organism we were before we were born. Without break, in time and space in the world we live in you moliere can trace your existence directly back to a unique human organism that could only have ever been the thing we have come to call Moliere.

If there is a direct and unique time line to the past - each point on that line was at one point a future.

So that human organism had a future, and if without justification, taking a future is morally impermissible, abortion is morally impermissible.

The classic objections are - than this future should extend back to the sperm and egg and every possible of their combination - making contraception impermissible. That is countered back with it is concerned with a unique human organism. And there is no unique organism until shortly after conception

The next classic objection is, that because the fetus is unaware of its future, it does not value it. So abortion is permissible. That is countered with the concept of ideal desire, basically If you get hit by a car and do to the injury are unable to tell us you want medical assistance, we should assume if you were able to ask, you would desire medical treatment. If the fetus was able to tell you it desired to live, it would.

And the current twist on this last point made by David Boonin, and where it stands today is. One is not able to grant ideal desire to a being, until that being has the mental development to know what some desire is.

That is basically it.

Well, now that I know the script I can at least rehearse :D

My initial temptation was to jump down the "biological unique human organism" rabbit hole. But upon reflection I don't think I will because I can't help but feel that we don't really care about the biological facts of what constitutes an organism. We care about human beings. We don't care if the scientific world classifies such and such as an organism or not, which surely does not have in mind debates about good or evil in their classifications. Whether such and such achieves homeostasis, reproduction, or what-not is of theoretical interest only, and not moral interest.

Would you agree with that? Or not?

the argument makes no moral claim about the human organism. It only claims than it is unique, and if left to nature has a future much like ours. It make no person hood claim at all. Its only claim is it has a future much like ours, and exactly like ours at the same level of biological development and it is morally wrong to deprive a future like ours. The entire purpose of the argument is to avoid the issue of person hood.

You are objecting to a claim not made in the argument.

But to save some time will try to address your points that are outside the argument. But to be very clear - none of this has anything at all to do with the FOV argument -

But upon reflection I don't think I will because I can't help but feel that we don't really care about the biological facts of what constitutes an organism. — Moliere

Because >>>>.

definitive statements are fine, but without a basis it makes it difficult to address.

We care about human beings. — Moliere

as do I, What is your definition of a human being ? Mine is rather easy, and purely biological.

We don't care if the scientific world classifies such and such as an organism or not, which surely does not have in mind debates about good or evil in their classifications — Moliere

Whether such and such achieves homeostasis, reproduction, or what-not is of theoretical interest only, and not moral interest. — Moliere

again - because ....


I understand the concept you are putting forth. Is it pure biology or biology plus something else that makes us persons. And if it is something else, is abortion morally permissible before that something else is there. The problem is, with only one exception that I know of. All such arguments turn into

a fetus is not a person, because it does not have trait X
I give you an example of something that is definitely a person, and does not have trait X
You modify trait X so it only applies to a fetus

factoring out the middle - the logic that is left is - it is ok to kill a fetus, because it is a fetus.

All such arguments are arbitrary and variable.

The exception is, an embodied mind, that you are not really you, and only exist as a biological entity until you are an embodied mind. This is a logical argument. The only issue is you are not an embodied mind until sometime in early childhood - so this allows for infanticide.

So what we really are left with, to argue against the the fetus' right to exist you have to ignore biology, and allow for some glaring logic failures.

let me give it one more try. — Rank Amateur

In my opinion a good try, at least one we can work with!

I read out of it these premises:

1) Unjustified killing of people like us is morally impermissible.
2) "one significant harm done to us by being killed is the loss of our future, which we value."
3) Before we were "people like us," we were fetuses, before that embryos, back to the moment of conception, at which time we each came into being as a "unique human organism."
4) Being unjustly deprived of our future is morally impermissible.
5) Conclusion: Because unique human organisms have a future, it is morally impermissible to kill them.

A quick review of argumentation:
a) A valid argument yields a valid conclusion, but neither premises nor conclusion need be true, nor are necessarily true.
b) An invalid argument contributes nothing to the truth of the propositions that comprise the premises or the conclusion, the truth of any of which is incidental.
c) Each premise must bear its own weight in an argument; if not, then it should be dismissed as irrelevant to the argument. The argument itself is a kind of bridge that carries the auditor across to the conclusion. If the premise fail, the bridge falls. Each premise must be granted, or if not granted, then proved. If not proved, then the premise fails and the bridge falls.
d) Argument is either demonstrative, in the case of something to be proved, or persuasive, in the case of the question of an action to be taken. Demonstrative arguments usually concern the a priori, the persuasive, the a posteriori. Demonstrative, usually the universal and necessary - the 2+2=4, Persuasive, the contingent, that either could be , or not - shall we attack at dawn?

Premise 1). I grant it.
Premise 2) Deferred.
Premise 3) Granted.
Premise 4) Deferred.
Conclusion 5) Deferred.

Premise 2) "one significant harm done to us by being killed is the loss of our future, which we value."

Premise #2 is so composed that it needs to be unpacked and taken apart. I find in it these sub-arguments: i) we are harmed by being killed, ii) one way that we are harmed in being killed is by the "loss of our future," iii) we value our future.

#2, i) I deny it because it's ambiguous, of indeterminate meaning, and therefore of indeterminate significance and value to the argument. It carries its weight in the argument only by assuming that it does. But this needs to be clearly shown and not merely "waved through."
#2, ii) I deny it because it also is ambiguous and presumptive of that which it needs to demonstrate.
#2, iii) I deny it for presumption and ambiguity.

Premise 4) "Being unjustly deprived of our future is morally impermissible." I deny this, too. It's a sound bite that sounds good, but that is without substance. With every tick of the lock we are deprived - without justice - of a very large number of futures. It's possible something specific is meant, here, but whatever it is, is not said.

Conclusion, 5) "Because unique human organisms have a future, it is morally impermissible to kill them." Not proved. Among the problems are clear equivocation of "future."

The argument you're trying to make is just a string of propositions, problematic in themselves, and in concert without argumentative substance or force. Developing this argument would be a lot of work, and perhaps cannot be done. If, on the other hand, you give up trying to prove in favour of trying to persuade, your route is easier, if not altogether as comprehensively conclusive

Its only claim is it has a future much like ours, and exactly like ours at the same level of biological development and it is morally wrong to deprive a future like ours — Rank Amateur

I'd say that its claim is false. But furthermore, the falsity of this claim does not seem to matter for the argument. It's the future like ours that matters, not the biological description -- which is really only suited to species-level, rather than individual-level, description anyways. Biology doesn't make a descriptive claim on some individual about its status as an organism, but rather makes a claim based on the usual features of organisms generally -- and I suspect, like most scientific definitions, it is a working definition for the purposes of understanding life.

So we can put aside the biological description, I think. I'll ask again, though, just to be sure -- do you think this is true, or do you believe that biology is important to the future of such-and-such? Does the description matter at all?

To me it really doesn't seem to. I'd just say that such-and-such constitutes an organism some time after birth, so though the organ has a future like ours it still is not a unique human organism.

OK. thanks the work. Understand your objection that you are not convinced that a major harm in being killed is the loss of your future, due to its ambiguity. Although I am not completely sure what is ambiguous about the concept, but that maybe my prejudice toward the argument.

here is the entire argument from the original argument - it may or may not address your ambiguity issue - if not - then we have got to a good place to end -

A more obvious answer is better. What primarily makes killing
wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effect on the
victim's friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of
one's life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer.

The loss of one's life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future. Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim.

To describe this as the loss of life can be misleading, however. The change in my biological state does not by itself make killing me wrong. The effect of the loss of my biological life is the loss to me of all those activities,projects, experiences, and enjoyments which would otherwise have
constituted my future personal life. These activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments are either valuable for their own sakes or are means to something else that is valuable for its own sake. Some parts of my future are not valued by me now, but will come to be valued by
me as I grow older and as my values and capacities change.

When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have
been part of my future personal life, but also what I would come to
value. Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my
future. Inflicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes killing me
wrong. This being the case, it would seem that what makes killing any
adult human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his or
her future.

How should this rudimentary theory of the wrongness of killing be
evaluated? It cannot be faulted for deriving an 'ought' from an 'is',
for it does not. The analysis assumes that killing me (or you, reader) is
prima facie seriously wrong. The point of the analysis is to establish
which natural property ultimately explains the wrongness of the killing, given that it is wrong.

A natural property will ultimately explain
the wrongness of killing, only if (1) the explanation fits with our
intuitions about the matter and (2) there is no other natural property
that provides the basis for a better explanation of the wrongness of
killing. This analysis rests on the intuition that what makes killing a
particular human or animal wrong is what it does to that particular
human or animal. What makes killing wrong is some natural effect or
other of the killing. Some would deny this. For instance, a divine command theorist
in ethics would deny it. Surely this denial is, however, one of those features
of divine-command theory which renders it so implausible.

The claim that what makes killing wrong is the loss of the victim's
future is, directly supported by two considerations. In the first place,
this theory explains why we regard killing as one of the worst of
crimes. Killing is especially wrong, because it deprives the victim of
more than perhaps any other crime. In the second place, people with
AIDS or cancer who know they are dying believe, of course, that
dying is a very bad thing for them. They believe that the loss of a
future to them that they would otherwise have experienced is what
makes their premature death a very bad thing for them. A better
theory of the wrongness of killing would require a different natural
property associated with killing which better fits with the attitudes of
the dying. What could it be?

A natural property will ultimately explain
the wrongness of killing, only if (1) the explanation fits with our
intuitions about the matter and (2) there is no other natural property
that provides the basis for a better explanation of the wrongness of
killing. This analysis rests on the intuition that what makes killing a
particular human or animal wrong is what it does to that particular
human or animal. — Rank Amateur

Murder is wrong (unjustified killing = murder) because it is an affront to the community. To consent to murder is implicit consent to be murdered. The community, jointly and severally, do not consent to be murdered. Why do they not consent? Because murder involves a maximum or horror and pain and loss. If you argue that some loss is "better" than another loss, you invoke an unacceptable scale of murder.

Now, you argued. Some of your premises - the important ones - are found wanting. Time for you to fix them. I am of the view they're intrinsically unfixable. You might start by thinking about exactly what "future" means and refers to.

It cannot be wrong to the victim - maybe against him or her - because he is no-longer. Were he merely robbed or assaulted, then it's meaningful to think about his loss. To speak to how a dead person values anything is simply wild speculation. That does not mean that one cannot think about it and indeed much informal expression does run that way. But we're looking for - I'm looking for and I hope you are too - for some precision and clarity in our usage.

Try this: your claim invokes value to a corpse. How exactly does that work?

I agree it is unfixable and a good place to agree to disagree

I agree it is unfixable and a good place to agree to disagree — Rank Amateur

You're right, It's just a disagreement. People in good faith can agree to disagree. I say 2+2=4, you say it's 5, just a disagreement.

Murder is wrong (unjustified killing = murder) because it is an affront to the community. To consent to murder is implicit consent to be murdered. The community, jointly and severally, do not consent to be murdered. Why do they not consent? Because murder involves a maximum or horror and pain and loss. If you argue that some loss is "better" than another loss, you invoke an unacceptable scale of murder. — tim wood

Agree - can there only be one thing morally wrong with murder, is this and denying a future of value somehow mutually exclusive. Your point while interesting, in no way contradicts the denial of a FOV as a significant harm done by murder.

Now, you argued. Some of your premises - the important ones - are found wanting. Time for you to fix them. I am of the view they're intrinsically unfixable. You might start by thinking about exactly what "future" means and refers to. — tim wood

Futue - what Tim wood will have if he doesn't get killed

It cannot be wrong to the victim - maybe against him or her - because he is no-longer. Were he merely robbed or assaulted, then it's meaningful to think about his loss. To speak to how a dead person values anything is simply wild speculation. That does not mean that one cannot think about it and indeed much informal expression does run that way. But we're looking for - I'm looking for and I hope you are too - for some precision and clarity in our usage. — tim wood

The point that the victim of murder isn't harmed because they are dead is inane. And no where in the argument does it say a dead person values anything, quite the contrary it say the dead person loses the future they value.

I am growing weary of rehashing this argument with you ad nauseam, and was happy to stop.

So I await your next waste of bandwidth and the insult that most definitely accompany it.

To the consideration of potential future, isnt there a presumption that the future is good? Wouldnt you have to consider a horrific, pain filled future as well? Also, what about considerations of the negative effects of carrying w child to term and then having it suffer through the system or end up as a criminal cuz they arent really wanted or somesuch? I may have missed this being addressed but it seems important to consider.

I am growing weary of rehashing this argument with you ad nauseam, and was happy to stop. — Rank Amateur

the point is that there is no such thing as a future anything. There are present speculations and present assessments of present speculations, and in many, nearly all, arenas it's deemed useful to call some of these present activities future somethings, like future values, and even as a convenient fiction to suppose they're real, even though they're just present ideas.

Illustration: I have a dollar in my pocket. What is it worth? It is worth one dollar. Present value. Suppose you promise to give me a dollar one year from now. What is that promise worth? If there is such a thing as a future value, then that question is answerable. But there isn't, and it isn't. What does happen is that people now in the present make present guesses about the present value of that promise, and buy and sell and contract accordingly.

Now you hold that there is such a thing as a future value. But you have yet to make any substantive statement as to what that is. Informally, its a non-issue; we all know what we mean. But this argument hinges in part on a correct understanding of the phrase "future of value" and how it's used. And you will not go there. Either you know full well the argument will blow up, or you fear it, or you don't care and you just want to rant.

To say that anything future is real is a reification of future, and reification in argument is a major error and sin, for the simple reason that it constitutes arguing about something as if it were real, and it is not real. I'll guess that's why Marquis simply presumed without argument that the premises of his argument were true, because he knew darned well they weren't. His was a hypothetical argument, if such-and-such were true, then thus-and-so follows. No crime making hypothetical arguments; they can be useful. And Marquis, as I've noted for your benefit repeatedly, makes clear his argument is hypothetical. But you insist it's all real, and therefore the conclusion follows as a matter of fact. It doesn't, and it's not a matter of opinion. There's no "agreement to disagree." There's right and wrong, and you're wrong. You can still attempt your argument. I thought you did a good job two or three posts ago. But as long as you hang on to this FOV, your argument is DOA.

And I have forgotten, what is it you're arguing for? In the manner of posing a question for a debate, resolved:.... What is it that you're resolved on and trying to prove, in one or two sentences.

the point is that there is no such thing as a future anything. There are present speculations and present assessments of present speculations, and in many, nearly all, arenas it's deemed useful to call some of these present activities future somethings, like future values, and even as a convenient fiction to suppose they're real, even though they're just present ideas. — tim wood

Saying there is no such thing as a future is exactly the same thing as saying there is no such thing as time. Taking your point to the absurd. I can stare at the clock on the wall, and imagine and speculate that the second hand will move one more time, and 1 second of my future will turn into the present , and 1 sec later it will be in my past.

Your point would make sense, if your point was what the future will be is unsure. But in the space time reality we live in there is no speculation that tomorrow will come, and unless you die or are killed you will be apart of it. That is your future.

Illustration: I have a dollar in my pocket. What is it worth? It is worth one dollar. Present value. Suppose you promise to give me a dollar one year from now. What is that promise worth? If there is such a thing as a future value, then that question is answerable. But there isn't, and it isn't. What does happen is that people now in the present make present guesses about the present value of that promise, and buy and sell and contract accordingly. — tim wood

Can you apply this to the issue at question, please. Which is, the future is, tomorrow will happen, you, me and most everyone else in the world desires to be there for it, as opposed to not. If you want to apply an NPV calc to it. Take all the future things you are looking forward to, anticipating, all the time you will be spending with someone you love apply them year by year, give them a monetary value and than discount them back today - goodness knows what the discount rate would be.

I have done that for me, and the NPV of my future to me is priceless.

Now you hold that there is such a thing as a future value. But you have yet to make any substantive statement as to what that is. Informally, its a non-issue; we all know what we mean. But this argument hinges in part on a correct understanding of the phrase "future of value" and how it's used. And you will not go there. Either you know full well the argument will blow up, or you fear it, or you don't care and you just want to rant. — tim wood

FOV is not a difficult concept, and it is well argued in what i posted. It is as simple as you Tim Wood have a future, if you do not die, or are killed it, as a matter of pure fact it will happen. You value and desire that future for all the reasons that are important to you. I do not think the concept is very difficult.

To say that anything future is real is a reification of future, and reification in argument is a major error and sin, for the simple reason that it constitutes arguing about something as if it were real, and it is not real. I'll guess that's why Marquis simply presumed without argument that the premises of his argument were true, because he knew darned well they weren't. His was a hypothetical argument, if such-and-such were true, then thus-and-so follows. No crime making hypothetical arguments; they can be useful. And Marquis, as I've noted for your benefit repeatedly, makes clear his argument is hypothetical. But you insist it's all real, and therefore the conclusion follows as a matter of fact. It doesn't, and it's not a matter of opinion. There's no "agreement to disagree." There's right and wrong, and you're wrong. You can still attempt your argument. I thought you did a good job two or three posts ago. But as long as you hang on to this FOV, your argument is DOA. — tim wood

again - the future is real, as real as time.

Now after all that there is a major logic error in all of this, it is you only want to disallow considerations of the future as ethereal for the fetus, or where you think it helps your argument. Yet every reason some woman would consider an abortion is a projection of the future. The woman evaluating her future, she determines her future life, would be worse off with the future life she is carrying. And for what she wants her future to be, she denies the life inside her its future.

So according to you we don't have any real future, and the fetus doesn't have any real future - only the woman contemplating abortion has a real future.

It is as simple as you Tim Wood have a future, if you do not die, or are killed it, as a matter of pure fact it will happen. — Rank Amateur

Sure. But right now I do not have it. NPV (I like it!), now let's look at that. NPV is a present assessment of something not-yet, something that isn't, is not yet a thing of any kind.

The entire argument, then, concerning NPV nee FOV is that at best it supposes that "people like us" may have some certain thoughts and feelings.

Is it "morally impermissible" to kill "people like us" because we have some certain thoughts and feelings? I should like to think that the morality of murder involves more than that - in any case I don't see how it's conclusive. If it's the thinking and feeling, lots of non-human beings think and feel. The hamburger or fish & chips you may have recently enjoyed were once a thinking feeling being. So it must be the human aspect. If that then it must be something other than just thinking and feeling.

It may be that you're confusing different senses of "have." As to having in the present, that's a matter of fact. In the future, not a matter of fact. As you point out, some things are assumed or taken to be certain as if a matter of fact. For you, "future" is such a thing. But the "as if" matters. Now is substantive. The future is speculative and has present existence only in thought as an idea.

"...as a matter of pure fact it will happen." Actually, no. Maybe? Probably? Intended? Expected? Sure. Pure fact? No.

Does any of this matter in the ordinary discourse of the world? Not much. But it does here.

"...as a matter of pure fact it will happen." Actually, no. Maybe? Probably? Intended? Expected? Sure. Pure fact? No. — tim wood

the full comment was

It is as simple as you Tim Wood have a future, if you do not die, or are killed it, as a matter of pure fact it will happen

Which is pure fact.

Which is pure fact. — Rank Amateur

Which fact entitles me to what? What about this fact of yours is constitutive of any entitlement at all?

so agreed it is a fact ? The concept of future - as defined as time that has not yet happened is a fact ? We agreed that such a thing as the future is real ??

You are so busy repeating the argument that you haven't seen how it has been shredded.

"People like us". A foetus is not a "people like us". It's just human tissue. It lacks so much of what makes you and I. It is ridiculous to try to squeeze all of human dignity into a "future of value".

"A pure biological time line". What rubbish. People like us are valuable therefore the lump of human tissue from whence it grew is valuable... a butterfly is colourful therefore a caterpillar is colourful.

I guess one way this could be the last thread on abortion would be if it went on interminably...

all that shows my friend is as many times as i have repeated the argument you have never taken a second to understand it, or the logic. You know it is wrong before you have read 2 words because you know it is wrong.

SO you say. What is it I have not understood?

Or is it that I have understood it and still reject it.

Here is the key flaw: the notion of a future of value does not capture what it is to be a person ("like us").