"In physics, a theory is proposed and then tested by experiments to see whether their results agree with the theory. The only thing demonstrated is the correspondence of the experimental results to the theory. It is not demonstrated that the theory is simply the knowledge of nature. The experiment and the result of the experiment do not extend beyond the framework of the theory. They remain within the area delineated by the theory. The experiment is not considered in regard to its correspondence to nature, — Joshs
Maybe you should take up the issue with Lee Smolen , who recognizes the dependence of physics on its own worldview(Heisenberg recognized this too), and argues that the presuppositions that have dominated the field concerning the understanding of time are holding it back.
His argument for giving time a core postilion in physics as it has has in evolutionary biology sounds a bit like Heidegger. — Joshs
and downright dismissive of the notion that those mechanics, or lack thereof - can be imported into the macroscopic world we inhabit. — karl stone
When you say you're a philosopher, what do mean by that? What is it that you understand a philosopher to be?I'm not a physicist - I'm a philosopher, — karl stone
What I am confused about is whether, in raising this question, Heidegger is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality, or rather (merely) with the reality of the human experience/condition. That is to say, is Heidegger concerned with what reality is like, in the sense that a physicist can be said to be, or is he concerned with what it is like to be a human being, more in the sense that an existentialist can be said to be? — philosophy
When you say you're a philosopher, what do mean by that? What is it that you understand a philosopher to be? I'd add the further constraint that real philosophers get paid for their work in philosophy, but while that is indicative, it is not conclusive. — tim wood
To say that quantum mechanic doesn't work or doesn't apply in the world of the big is simply to say you do not know what you're talking about. Real philosophers, it seems to me, attempt to know when they don't know, and as well not to talk nonsense. — tim wood
Not sure I follow this. I don't see Heidegger allowing for a conditioning model of social shaping in his earlier work. — Joshs
Mine too, but there's is merely misuse.To quote Richard Feynman, if you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics. I don't - but I do understand the philosophy of science, and I'm not willing to accept that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is a relevant factor, or that it applies to macroscopic phenomena. This desperate latching onto quantum mechanics by every crackpot metaphysical hack makes my skin crawl. — karl stone
When you say you're a philosopher, what do mean by that? What is it that you understand a philosopher to be? I'd add the further constraint that real philosophers get paid for their work in philosophy, but while that is indicative, it is not conclusive.
— tim wood
Do you not know what the word philosopher means? You've got google - look it up! REAL philosophers get paid - do they? Okay then. Socrates wasn't a philosopher! Funnily enough, that's what the town elders thought - only, history doesn't record their names. — karl stone
Mine too, but there's is merely misuse. — tim wood
And here. I asked you a question, one that only you could answer - and you took care to avoid answering it. — tim wood
When you say you're a philosopher, what do mean by that? What is it that you understand a philosopher to be? I'd add the further constraint that real philosophers get paid for their work in philosophy, but while that is indicative, it is not conclusive. — karl stone
What do you think 'nature' means for Heidegger? What on earth is 'natural temporality'? Don't you think he wants it in scare quotes the way he puts 'reality' in scare quotes? That is to say, the notion of 'nature' as something that has any meaning or coherence outside of the structure of temporality seems to me to be something that Heidegger would argue against. — Joshs
Being is always the Being of an entity. The totality of entities can, in
accordance with its various domains, become a field for laying bare
and delimiting certain definite areas of subject-matter. These areas, on
their part (for instance, history, Nature, space, life, Dasein, language,
and the like), can serve, as objects which corresponding scientific
investigations may take as their respective themes. Scientific research
accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of
the areas of subject-matter. The basic structures of any such area have
already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of
experiencing and interpreting that domain of Being in which the area of
subject-matter is itself confined. The * basic concepts' which thus arise
remain our proximal clues for disclosing this area concretely for the first
time. And although research may always lean towards this positive
approach, its real progress comes not so much from collecting results and
storing them away in 'manuals' as from inquiring into the ways in which
each particular area is basically constituted [Grundverfassungen] — an
inquiry to which we have been driven mostly by reacting against just
such an increase in information.
In other words, in our process of destruc
tion we find ourselves faced with the task of Interpreting the basis of the
ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of Temporality. When
this is done, it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the
Being of entities is oriented towards the 'world' or 'Nature in the widest
sense, and that it is indeed in terms of 'time' that its understanding of
Being is obtained.
The person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an object. Here Scheler
is emphasizing what Husserl v suggests when he insists that the unity of
the person must have a Constitution essentially different from that
required for the unity of Things of Nature. 1 What Scheler says of the
person, he applies to acts as well: 'But an act is never also an object; for
it is essential to the Being of acts that they are Experienced only in their
performance itself and given in reflection. ' vl Acts are something non-
psychical. Essentially the person exists only in the performance of inten-
tional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object.
Even if it were feasible to give an ontological definition of "Being-in"
primarily in terms of a Being-in-the-world which knows, it would still be our
first task to show that knowing has the phenomenal character of a Being
which is in and towards the world. If one reflects upon this relationship of
Being, an entity called "Nature" is given proximallyas that which becomes
known. Knowing, as such, is not to be met in this entity. If knowing 'is* at
all, it belongs solely to those entities which know. But even in those entities,
human-Things, knowing is not present-at-hand.
The thread's clearly supposed to be about Heidegger exegesis and criticism, specifically about the relationship of his account in Being and Time to nature. While there is a relationship to physics (which Josh provided uncommented quotes for and perpetuated the myth that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle has anything to do with uncertainty rooted in perspectival variation), the ontology of nature, and how scientific understanding constrains and enables metaphysical speculation, your discussion isn't really on any of these topics. — fdrake
dude, metaphysics and epistemology both suck. — bloodninja
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