So the object continues to exist without mind but the image is gone. — TheMadFool

Wait a minute. The specific object that I was talking about is a rock. So if you're talking about what I'm talking about, then you're saying that the rock continues to exist. So we agree. We're both realists.

And if you're not talking about what I'm talking about, then you need to explain why you changed the subject.

You're saying that some of the statements in your initial post followed from other statements, but you just didn't fill out the details that show how they follow? — Terrapin Station

Yes, I assumed that people would be intelligent enough to figure it out or to request my reasoning. The opening post was, to a large extent, to set out the positions and some of the key premises involved, and to present a thought experiment, which I am using as part of my argument. Not absolutely everything was explicit.

Okay. Could you detail the reductio argument, at least?

Part 1 is the problematic idealism of Descartes, which allows the empirical reality of physical objects, such as rocks. Part 2 is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, which allows for nothing but that which arises out of mind alone, such as rocks and meanings. Both have been sufficiently refuted by German Idealism of the late 18th century. But such philosophical refutation is not thereby unqualified support for realism in and of itself.

Is the rock still there is the same as is the light stay on in the fridge when the door is closed. There’s no reason to suppose it does, given the mechanics of the system, but no way to directly, or without some kind of material support, make a non-contradictory affirmation of truth about the light. With respect to the tautological analytic “to be is to be”, while it may well be sufficient to deflect a contradiction, it does nothing to provide an existential truth, for its predicate conceptions are always empty, equivalent to saying, “all rocks are”.

To list a set of properties or conditions conceived as belonging to an object does not confer meaning to it, but only the means to identify it, and the more conceptions and conditions the greater the precision of the identity. It follows that another intelligence, if it assigns conceptions and conditions at all, may still identify some common object but under its own correspondence system.

It seems to me, that in the event that some intelligence formulating a rational system goes defunct in totality, anything to do with that intelligence immediately becomes irrelevant. In the event of an intelligence going defunct in totality, then for that defunct intelligence to proffer scenarios with respect to itself, is irrational.

No it doesn't, but you're welcome to make that argument. — S

OK, I'll produce the argument. In order that "there is a rock" is true, it is required that a place in space and time be designated, where the rock is located. And that's what you say in the op, in your opening line "there is a rock".

So, then you remove that human capacity to designate a particular place in space and time, by saying all humans are gone. And so "an hour" is meaningless because there is no one to interpret "an hour", or to measure that hour. So your scenario is a meaningless impossibility, due to contradiction. You posit the capacity to determine an hour later, when there are no humans and "an hour" is meaningless.

Then we all die.

Then I draw logical consequences from reasonable premises and definitions, and you...?

Nothing "happens next". There are still rocks, and words still mean what they do. — S

No, your premise #1 assumes already, that "there is a rock", after the humans are gone, then proceeds to ask if there is a rock, so it's just begging the question. Of course there is a rock, the premise dictates it. But what I am trying to show you is that your premise is contradictory, so it's nonsense.

Okay. Could you detail the reductio argument, at least? — Terrapin Station

Part 1 begins with a thought experiment:

There is a rock, but no one is there to perceive it, because we all died an hour previously. Is there a rock? Yes or no?

I find one answer considerably more compelling than the other, and that's the affirmative. I suspect that this is the same for most others, which could either be a complete coincidence, which seems implausible, or it could be that there's more going on here. I further suspect that, when they aren't wearing their idealist hat, the idealists also find the affirmative considerably more compelling.

This is surely evidence of something, and a basis to present an explanation.

My thinking is that the only reason why idealists fight against this, is because their idealist logic for which they're committed holds them back. The issue then becomes, which is more absurd: rocks that suddenly cease to exist along with us, or the idealist premise which links the one and the other together?

Is a world with rocks, but no humans, just a figment of my imagination, and not a real possibility? I don't think so. Isn't that what the world was like before we existed? I think so. Isn't that what it would be like again if we all went extinct in an hour? I think so.

It's then about what explanation works best, given the above. How about that rocks are mind-independent objects?

My reasoning for Part 2 is very similar.

Part 1 is the problematic idealism of Descartes, which allows the empirical reality of physical objects, such as rocks. Part 2 is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, which allows for nothing but that which arises out of mind alone, such as rocks and meanings. Both have been sufficiently refuted by German Idealism of the late 18th century. But such philosophical refutation is not thereby unqualified support for realism in and of itself.

Is the rock still there is the same as is the light stay on in the fridge when the door is closed. There’s no reason to suppose it does, given the mechanics of the system, but no way to directly, or without some kind of material support, make a non-contradictory affirmation of truth about the light. With respect to the tautological analytic “to be is to be”, while it may well be sufficient to deflect a contradiction, it does nothing to provide an existential truth, for its predicate conceptions are always empty, equivalent to saying, “all rocks are”.

To list a set of properties or conditions conceived as belonging to an object does not confer meaning to it, but only the means to identify it, and the more conceptions and conditions the greater the precision of the identity. It follows that another intelligence, if it assigns conceptions and conditions at all, may still identify some common object but under its own correspondence system.

It seems to me, that in the event that some intelligence formulating a rational system goes defunct in totality, anything to do with that intelligence immediately becomes irrelevant. In the event of an intelligence going defunct in totality, then for that defunct intelligence to proffer scenarios with respect to itself, is irrational. — Mww

Okay, that's an interesting input from you. However, what about the big questions? Are you going to directly answer them?

Would there be a rock? And would the word "rock" mean what it does?

OK, I'll produce the argument. In order that "there is a rock" is true, it is required that a place in space and time be designated, where the rock is located. And that's what you say in the op, in your opening line "there is a rock". — Metaphysician Undercover

Your "argument" begins with a false premise that I have already rejected. I am asking you to support that premise, not to beg the question. Why is a human activity, such as designation presumably is, supposedly required at the time, in the scenario, by humans, in order for there to be a rock? Please don't go around in circles. I don't want a repeat of your reasoning following the assumption of your key premise, I want you to try to justify your key premise.

So, then you remove that human capacity to designate a particular place in space and time, by saying all humans are gone. And so "an hour" is meaningless because there is no one to interpret "an hour", or to measure that hour. So your scenario is a meaningless impossibility, due to contradiction. You posit the capacity to determine an hour later, when there are no humans and "an hour" is meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

More thoughtless begging the question. You are merely reasoning from your own assumptions. That's not a valid response to what I'm seeking from you, but it's you after all, so it is what I have come to expect.

For example, you say that "an hour" is meaningless because there is no one there to interpret what that means. This is precisely the link that I'm questioning. Your argument is therefore fallacious.

No, your premise #1 assumes already, that "there is a rock", after the humans are gone, then proceeds to ask if there is a rock, so it's just begging the question. Of course there is a rock, the premise dictates it. But what I am trying to show you is that your premise is contradictory, so it's nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh the irony. Let me clarify: that was a thought experiment. You and I are both capable of thinking about the scenario of there being a rock, but no people, in spite of the false idealist premise which you adhere to.

Man, you’re asking for answers I think would be impossible to give. I’m a reductive epistemologist, insofar as there should still be a rock without intelligent observers, following Einstein’s metaphysical rationale, because sentience is not a necessary condition for existence. More than that, re: is there still a rock, I am not equipped to know with any certainty whatsoever. Best I could do is......probably, and.....why would I care?

At the same time I classify myself as a transcendental idealist insofar as my reason is absolutely paramount, and while I am permitted by it to speculate all I want, I have to beware of contradicting myself. If I am the intelligence that assigns meaning, and then allow meaning to obtain without me assigning it, I have right then contradicted myself. As for the question on meaning then, I must say meaning would not hold outside the intelligence that assigned it originally.

I maintain not that you are irrational, but the argument requires irrational answers if such answers claim a measure of affirmative truth.

Well, "probably" is good enough. I wasn't speaking with absolute certitude, but likewise with probability, so we agree. All things being equal, there would be a rock.

I don't quite follow your argument about meaning. Can you explain it in a way that I can better understand?

If I am the intelligence that assigns meaning, and then allow meaning to obtain without me assigning it, I have right then contradicted myself. As for the question on meaning then, I must say meaning would not hold outside the intelligence that assigned it originally. — Mww

I don't get why not. You assign meaning, then for some reason, that meaning is dependent on whether you live or die? If we agree on the meaning of the word "rock", we record that meaning by writing it down, but then we die, why wouldn't it retain the meaning, in our language, that we agreed upon and set?

How do you explain hieroglyphics and the like in light of a "no" to Part 2?

There is a rock, but no one is there to perceive it, because we all died an hour previously. Is there a rock? Yes or no — S

Well, yes, as it’s your first premise.

But the idealist will say that the first premise and the second premise cannot both be true, so your hypothetical scenario can never obtain.

Well, yes, as it’s your first premise.

The idealist however will say that the first premise and the second premise cannot both be true, so your hypothetical scenario can never obtain. — Michael

Well, yes, but that was intended as a thought experiment, as I've just explained to Metaphysician Undercover. And there's more to my argument than that, as I've just explained to Terrapin Station.

So you have some catching up to do, buddy.

This seems to be the only relevant thing you said to Terrapin:

Is a world with rocks, but no humans, just a figment of my imagination, and not a real possibility? I don't think so. Isn't that what the world was like before we existed? I think so. Isn't that what it would be like again if we all went extinct in an hour? I think so. — S

All you’re saying here is that you find realism more intuitive than idealism, but that’s not an argument and says nothing about logic.

This seems to be the only relevant thing you said to Terrapin:

Is a world with rocks, but no humans, just a figment of my imagination, and not a real possibility? I don't think so. Isn't that what the world was like before we existed? I think so. Isn't that what it would be like again if we all went extinct in an hour? I think so.
— S

All you’re saying here is that you find realism more intuitive than idealism, but that’s not an argument and says nothing about logic. — Michael

Okay, well then how about this: I'm right, and that's that!

Seriously though, you guys need to learn to detect arguments that don't necessarily fit what you're expecting to see. What I'm doing is sharing what seems more plausible to me, and either suggesting or explicitly asking whether anyone can do any better. Is there a better explanation for what I've mentioned or not? Silence is not a better explanation than what I've said or suggested. It's no explanation at all!

How does idealism explain the stuff I've brought up, and how do the explanations compare? What about all of the evidence in support of rocks prexisting us? And which is more absurd: rocks that suddenly cease to exist along with us, or the idealist premise which links the one and the other together?

Where are the answers from the idealist camp? Let's see if they can fare any better.

How can you guys say that this is not an argument? It is clearly a challenge at the very least!

What I'm doing is sharing what seems more plausible to me, and either suggesting or explicitly asking whether anyone can do any better. — S

So it isn't an argument. You're just describing what realists believe and stating your support of it.

Is there a better explanation for what I've mentioned or not? Silence is not a better explanation than what I've said or suggested. It's no explanation at all!

How does idealism explain the stuff I've brought up, and how do the explanations compare? What about all of the evidence in support of rocks prexisting us? And which is more absurd: rocks that suddenly cease to exist along with us, or the idealist premise which links the one and the other together? — S

I'm not sure if this counts as an explanation:

"Is a world with rocks, but no humans, just a figment of my imagination, and not a real possibility? I don't think so. Isn't that what the world was like before we existed? I think so. Isn't that what it would be like again if we all went extinct in an hour? I think so."

Or would you accept this as the idealist's explanation?

"Is a world with rocks, but no humans, just a figment of my imagination, and not a real possibility? I think so. Isn't that what the world was like before we existed? I don't think so. Isn't that what it would be like again if we all went extinct in an hour? I don't think so."

Some people, however, believe that there isn't a rock, because that would be a contradiction.
— S

The contradiction is believing that their are external minds, but not external rocks when we basically have the same access or information to both. Idealism inexorably leads to solipsism. Solipsism is basically direct realism as the mind IS reality. So idealism defeats itself and realism has the final word. — Harry Hindu

Anyway, this looks like a good argument also. So there you go, have at it, people.

I would explain hieroglyphics by saying the author of them, even if a different culture, is still the same kind of intelligence as I am now. They rationalize in their way as I in mine, merely with distinct conventions. It follows that I should decipher their writing, hence their meanings, given enough information. With an entirely separate kind of rationality, that information would not be available.

What say you?

So it isn't an argument. You're just describing what realists believe and stating your support of it. — Michael

My goodness. I had this with Terrapin already. With each step, we can dig a little deeper. Now, obviously I am in support of it for a reason. As a whole, it is indeed an argument, but not absolutely everything is going to be explicit for all of you Aspies to immediately see.

I'm not sure if this counts as an explanation:

"Is a world with rocks, but no humans, just a figment of my imagination, and not a real possibility? I don't think so. Isn't that what the world was like before we existed? I think so. Isn't that what it would be like again if we all went extinct in an hour? I think so."

Or would you accept this as the idealist's explanation?

"Is a world with rocks, but no humans, just a figment of my imagination, and not a real possibility? I think so. Isn't that what the world was like before we existed? I don't think so. Isn't that what it would be like again if we all went extinct in an hour? I don't think so." — Michael

It's a rhetorical point, and an indication of my thinking which can be further examined. If you want to go further, then you just have to say so. I'm not going to spend ages presenting a complete presentation of my thinking with all of the workings out. It's going to be a step by step thing. That's what this discussion is for!

Now, do you, or do you not agree with me in what I said there? If so, then why bother going deeper? I want to be given a good reason for doing that. I don't want to feel like I'm reinventing the wheel.

The contradiction is believing that their are external minds, but not external rocks when we basically have the same access or information to both. Idealism inexorably leads to solipsism. Solipsism is basically direct realism as the mind IS reality. So idealism defeats itself and realism has the final word. — Harry Hindu

Not really. Just as the realist will say that our sense experiences are a response to stimulation by material things, and so evidence of external-world rocks, the idealist will say that our sense experiences are a response to stimulation by mental things, and so evidence of other minds.

The idealist will say that using sense experiences as evidence of material things is as mistaken as using sense experiences as evidence of magic or supernatural things. I don't see any contradiction or inevitable solipsism in this.

My goodness. I had this with Terrapin already. With each step, we can dig a little deeper. Now, obviously I am in support of it for a reason. As a whole, it is indeed an argument, but not absolutely everything is going to be explicit for all of you Aspies to immediately see. — S

It's a rhetorical point, and an indication of my thinking which can be further examined. If you want to go further, you just have to say so. I'm not going to spend ages presenting a complete presentation of my thinking with all of the workings out. It's going to be a step by step thing. That's what this discussion is for! — S

I'm not really interested in playing a game like that. If you have an actual argument in favour of realism or against idealism then I'd like to read it, but I shouldn't have to coax it out of you. You posted the discussion, so I would assume you'd have something more meaningful to say other than "I believe in realism".

I'm not really interested in playing a game like that. If you have an actual argument in favour of realism or against idealism then I'd like to read it, but I shouldn't have to coax it out of you. You posted the discussion, so I would assume you'd have something more meaning to say other than "I believe in realism". — Michael

I'm really not interested if you're not interested in cooperating. If you're not interested, then you can stop engaging. What we have here is my take vs. alternatives, and a challenge to the alternatives. I've given my argument, at least enough of it to work with, and we can either take it step by step and make progress, or you can throw your toys out of the pram. It's no skin off my back.

Shall we continue or not? Which part of my argument do you genuinely reject and why? Where do you actually stand on the topic? I'm not interested in playing a shallow game of devil's advocate. Why should I humour you?

For all of those who want to take a genuine stab at this and not play shallow games:

Is there a better explanation for what I've mentioned or not? Silence is not a better explanation than what I've said or suggested. It's no explanation at all!

How does idealism explain the stuff I've brought up, and how do the explanations compare? What about all of the evidence in support of rocks prexisting us? And which is more absurd: rocks that suddenly cease to exist along with us, or the idealist premise which links the one and the other together?

Where are the answers from the idealist camp? Let's see if they can fare any better.

Any questions, requests, or criticisms about my answers, fire away. I can elaborate upon request. That's the kind of back and forth you get with discussion, not that I should have to explain that.

I would explain hieroglyphics by saying the author of them, even if a different culture, is still the same kind of intelligence as I am now. They rationalize in their way as I in mine, merely with distinct conventions. It follows that I should decipher their writing, hence their meanings, given enough information. With an entirely separate kind of rationality, that information would not be available.

What say you? — Mww

I say that, with respect, that seems to miss the point. Talk of information and the ability to decipher information is relevant to epistemology, right? As in, given the information available to us, what can we know about what this means? But how is it relevant in the strictly metaphysical context of whether or not it is the case that this hieroglyph means that? At the later stage, isn't it the case that the meaning is predetermined by the appropriate language rule? The further question, in the context of realism vs. idealism, is why that would, at this later stage, require there to exist beings like us?

Your "argument" begins with a false premise that I have already rejected. I am asking you to support that premise, not to beg the question. Why is a human activity, such as designation presumably is, supposedly required at the time, in the scenario, by humans, in order for there to be a rock? Please don't go around in circles. I don't want a repeat of your reasoning following the assumption of your key premise, I want you to try to justify your key premise. — S

Consider a situation in which there are no human beings to distinguish one period of time, from another period of time. All time would exist together in an endless time period. Since a "rock", as we understand it, has a particular duration of time, there could be no rock existing for this endless time period, hence your question is meaningless. In order that there is a rock, it is necessary that someone individuates a time period in which there is a rock. Otherwise there is just an endless time period during which no particular things could have individual existence.

For example, you say that "an hour" is meaningless because there is no one there to interpret what that means. This is precisely the link that I'm questioning. Your argument is therefore fallacious. — S

OK, then explain to me how one time period, "an hour" for example is distinguished from the rest of time, without a human mind doing that distinguishing.

Oh the irony. Let me clarify: that was a thought experiment. You and I are both capable of thinking about the scenario of there being a rock, but no people, in spite of the false idealist premise which you adhere to. — S

I thought about it, and as I explained, it's contradictory, impossible nonsense. you just seem to have difficulty understanding this fact.

Which part of my argument do you genuinely reject and why? — S

You haven't given an argument. You've just said that you believe that rocks continue to exist when not being seen.

You haven't given an argument. You've just said that you believe that rocks continue to exist when not being seen. — Michael

Irrational denial that my argument is an argument is not itself a valid argument. That's what you're doing. Therefore, you're not presenting a valid argument.

How's that for an argument?

I believe what you mention I believe for a reason. That reason is part of my argument. You can ignore my argument or refuse to engage it or deceive yourself into believing that my argument isn't an argument. But how is that my problem and not yours?

It’s your problem because it isn’t an argument.

Consider a situation in which there are no human beings to distinguish one period of time, from another period of time. All time would exist together in an endless time period. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suspect that this will continue to be the case if we continue our exchange: you reply, and just a few sentences in, you've already asserted something I find controversial and do not accept, which requires further justification from you, and then it will be the same problem over again.

You seem to be assuming something along the lines that time is how time is measured. I do not agree with that. And I think that it's true to say that hours would pass, even if no one measured the passing of time, and even if no one existed to measure the passing of time. Time is objective in that sense.

It’s your problem because it isn’t an argument. — Michael

It's your problem because it is, and because it's valid, whereas the above is not a valid argument.

And remember, regarding my argument, just because you don't see (can't be bothered to investigate?) implicit premises which tie an argument together as a whole, that doesn't mean that it is invalid.

Half of it is epistemological, yes, in that there is present to our conscious attention a method known to be an artifact of communication with its intrinsic information. It is still required that the information, which would be supposed as concepts given in pictographic representation, would have to correspond to current concepts but with quite distinct representations, while attempting to retain the meaning of the original.

So, yes, meaning, re: the OP, is predetermined by the original English language rule, and may eventually be translatable to a non-English language, which is rather obvious, of course, as long as such translation uses the same perception/conception correspondence system, which is a product of mental exercise, hence rational, hence of idealistic theory.

But for the other half we’re right back where we started: if humans disappear, the information remains but is untranslatable by an intelligence that may not know how English attains to its meanings. In other words, we can translate ancient Egyptian into English, French, Swahili....whatever, because both are developed by humans, but both English and Egyptian meanings would be inaccessible to some rationality that doesn’t use a perception/conception correspondence system for its meanings. It follows logically that that of which the meaning is unknowable is therefore meaningless, which is the same as having no meaning, which is the same as concluding the transfer of information becomes impossible.

Am I properly addressing your concern?