Can't you be conscious of things that are mental-only? That wouldn't be the non-local.

What's mental-only?

Thoughts, imaginings, desires, emotions, etc.

but are these not a product of mind with world/simulation?

Foi ex. I can now imagine a tree because I have seen one; it's likely I comes first, or something I-like, because it has memory.

but are these not a product of mind — kill jepetto

That's what I'm saying. Something that's a product of mind. That's not non-local if the location we're talking about is mind.

I said of the mind with world/simulation; therefore, it is always at least associated with the world.

Ah--and I just noticed that you said NOT a product of mind. (I overlooked the "not" because it's so weird ;-) )

So you don't believe that imagining is something that minds do?

something is always derived from universe.

'

"Derived from" is different than "is," no?

Peanut butter is derived from peanuts. Is peanut butter the same thing as peanuts?

ELP's "Knife Edge" is derived from Janacek's Sinfonietta. Is "Knife Edge" the same as Sinfonietta?

partially peanuts, and if we're asking the question where did consciousness arise from it clearly is the universe (rather than coming from nothing, you come from sexual intercourse that has momentum enough to create your consciousness; consciousness derives from universe, where human pairs can exist. Where do thoughts arise from; can be traced to universe interaction as well as mind; however - mind is clearly also in the picture. Mind does simulate thought process, but this thought process wouldn't happen without the stimulation from world or environment.

Even if you existed in space - you would still observe an environment - any thoughts you have are co-existent between mind and universe; even if it is just that space; what would you think?

Whoa--way too much writing as a response. I didn't read that because it's getting away form the conversation. I wanted you to answer the questions I asked. Let's try it this way: does "x is derived from y" imply "x is identical to y"? (That's a yes or no question. Answer yes or no, please, or alternately, explicitly tell me why yes or no doesn't work as an answer.)

when did i say it was identical? your original answer was disorientated.

Okay, so I want to talk about imaginings, desires, etc. qua imaginings, desires, etc. The identical stuff. Not related stuff. Let's stick to the very thing I'm bringing up.

Do you believe those things are mental-only, or do you believe they occur elsewhere?

I'm not asking you about necessary preconditions or anything like that. I'm just asking you about imaginings, desires, emotions, etc. per se.

It is the localized non-local; I am definitely experiecing an outside to sense; as well as being a sensory organism, consciousness is not, but is derived from the non-local, much like peanut butter and peanuts.

"Derived from the non-local" isn't at all something I'm asking you about. I'm not asking you about derivation. I'm asking about desires, say, qua desires. Not what desires are derived from.

Desires are mental phenomena, no?

Yes, they are; but aren't they also derived from the non-local? (You should see what I'm saying here).

Yes, they are; but aren't they also derived from the non-local? (You should see what I'm saying here). — kill jepetto

At the moment, I don't at all care what they're derived from--I'm not asking you about that. You agree that "x is derived from y" doesn't imply "x is identical to y." I'm asking you about x, as x. Not what x is derived from. So can we please stop talking about what it's derived from for a moment? If you want to go back to that later we can, but let me ask what I want to ask you first.

So if desires are mental phenomena, they're local to minds, aren't they?

Yes.

So if you can be conscious of a desire, wouldn't that just be local, and not "localized non-local"?

no.

What's the non-local part in this case?

the shape of a tree is as new to mind.

the shape of a tree is as new to mind. — kill jepetto

No idea what you're saying here.

one example of the non local aspect is the shape of a tree; you create it in mind, but before you can do this you need original environment where a tree shape can at least be theorized.

"Before you can do this". We understand that we're not talking about the preconditions for anything, right?

I don't know why you went back to "imagining a tree," but okay, let's use that. We're not talking about what imagining a tree is derived from, or preconditions necessary for it or anything like that. We're supposed to be talking about stuff that's only identical to the imagining per se.

Gallagher writes:” a set of cultural norms is learned through practice such that these become second nature. By this means common expectations that are meant to apply to all, equally, are established. By learning how I ought to behave in such and such a circumstance, I learn how you ought to behave as well. And this supplies a ready guide to your behavior in so far as you do not behave abnormally. Such learning does not take the form of internalizing explicit rules (at least not as a set of theoretical propositions), nor does it depend on applying ones that are somehow built-in sub-personally. It involves becoming accustomed to local norms, coming to embody them, as it were, through habit and practice. “ Ratcliffe(2007) suggests that “many thoughts, interpretations and viewpoints ...belong to nobody in particular and are shared products of interaction”(Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation, Palgrave Macmillan, p..175).

Notice that the claim by Gallagher and others that individual behavior in social situations is guided by narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints implies the belief that essentially the same social signs are available to all who interrelate within a particular community, that there are such things as non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency . — Joshs

I am not sure that you correctly interpreted the Gallagher and Hutto approach. As Fiebich, Gallagher, and Hutto -https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311984200_Fiebich_Gallagher_and_Hutto_2016_Pluralism_interaction_and_the_ontogeny_of_social_cognition
wrote: “people typically use folk psychological narrative practices when understanding
other people behavior in terms of beliefs and desires, are built upon socially-supported story-telling activities and are needed to be understood as skillful know-how.” Combining with their another assertion that “there is reason to think that the great balk of basic socio-cognitive processes do not obviously or necessarily rely on any kind of mental state attribution”, one could conclude that in spite using the notion of “belief”, their meaning of it is quite different from
the traditional one. Also, so far I could not find that they assume “that there are such things as non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency.” (Maybe, you referred here to Gallagher and Hutto’ book?) In the article, they write about the set of socio-cognitive skills or competencies, acquired through the three stages of ontogeny. When you write about “non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency” it is possible to understand that you assume that the meanings are originated in a kind of Being.
(I am not sure that I understood you correctly; this part is the most interesting for me)

By impersonal expressive agency I meant a meaning that could assimilated as more or less the same by multiple participants in a social enterprise. Gallagher's concept of distributed cognition captures this idea.

"In regard to planning out a long-term project or short-term joint action, prospective
deliberation or reflective thinking (e.g., in the context of forming D-intentions or planning
out how to do things) can be a social process, as in the case of my wife and I deliberating
about buying a new car. We can reflect together via communicative actions, about what we
want to do, or about how we should go about doing it. What my initial individual intention
might have been can change through this communicative process into an intention that is
not reducible to just my or your individual intention. There’s no problem here of speaking
about a collectively formed intention. But we can ask, “where” does a collectively formed
intention reside? In our individual minds? Or in what can be called a socially extended
mind, or institution (Gallagher 2013), or what Alessandro Duranti (2015) calls a socially
distributed cognition (Duranti 2015: 219). Such institutions go beyond individual cognitive
processes or habits: they include communicative practices, and more established
institutions include rituals and traditions that generate actions, preserve memories, solve
problems. These are distributed processes supported by artifacts, tools, technologies,
environments, institutional structures, etc."

"Distributed cognition(originated by cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchins) means the
distribution of knowledge throughout environments—instructions, instruments, other
people, etc., Gibsonian affordances; Goodwin’s semiotic resources; Searle’s “Background”;
Bourdieu’s habitus. Yes to all of this, but I want to add, narratives too."

"Narrative can work as part of distributed cognition, or in contexts of collective intentionality and group agency."
"Narrative practices can lead to a collective sense of joint agency (in ways that go beyond simply the
sharing of individual mental events); they can help to shape group identity; they can solve problems of
stability of intentions and projects across time; they can provide resources for problem solving; and
provide ways to track progress toward a goal."

"To the extent that the instituted narrative, even if formed over time by many individuals, transcends
those individuals and may persist beyond them, it may loop around to constrain or dominate the group
members or the group as a whole. Collective (institutional, corporate) narratives often take on a life (an autonomy)
of their own and may come to oppose or undermine the intentions of the individual
members. Narrative practices in both extended institutional and collective structures and
practices can be positive in allowing us to see certain possibilities, but at the same time, they
can carry our cognitive processes and social interactions in specific directions and blind us
to other possibilities."

As James(1978) wrote:”...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels either only on condition of feeling both together” ( p.77).

The key question is how this ‘both together’ is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, the function of a collision between a separately constituted context and present entities? Or does my dynamic ‘now’ consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange coupling of a past and present already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all? — Joshs

If one agrees with you that this is the key question, it is worth considering your answer(s):
1)“my dynamic ‘now’ consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange coupling of a past and present already changed by each other, radically interblend or interaffected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all?” 2)“the past is partially or eventually affected by the present, but that its modification is globally and immediately implied by present experience. The past is inseparable from the future, which is framed by it. Because all meanings are referential, they don't appear out of thin air but from a prior context. On the other hand, the past in its entirety is at the same time implied and transformed in present context. There is no past available to us to retrieve as an archive of presumably temporarily or partially preserved events of meaning.” 3) I maintain that what is implicated for me in an interpersonal social situation is not `the' social forms as shared homunculi, based on what Gallagher calls a ‘common body intentionality’ between perceived and perceiver, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which one could say are unique to the implicative thrust of my own construing, belonging to me in a fashion that exceeds my own calculative grasp even as it transcends strictly shared social normativity.”
Definitely, it is difficult to disagree with your comprehension of the event and its temporalities; it contains conventional and correct truths and observations.
Nevertheless, your vision of the event is still incomplete and lacking a few key components. How could one present “present”? When we write or say something about our current present, we must think of the time of the occurrence of our sentences, which is our present time. This present time cannot be grasped as such: it is not yet or no longer present. It is always too soon or too late to grasp the presentation itself and present it. Such is the specific and paradoxical constitution of the event.
Further, what stands behind the presenting present is the “duration or the opened whole, a spiritual reality which constantly changes according to its own relations. The whole creates itself, and constantly creates itself in another dimension without parts – like that which carries along the set of one qualitative state to another, like the pure ceaseless becoming which passes through this states”. What is missing in your account on the event – is the whole of our time. Indeed, there is a paradoxical situation – often, when one tries to represent the event, one actually exercises a mastery of self over self, and takes the risk of isolating himself and his representation from the whole. Indeed, the event makes the self incapable of taking possession and control of what it is. It invokes that the self is essentially passible to recurrent alterity. If one tries to get access to the event through the ready-made, pre-existing theories, and models, one can successfully protect and keep untouched his/her own identity, paying the price of isolation and illusiveness. So, to take account of our present time one should get exposed to its explosive differentials and tendencies. Uncontained and emerging, they are arising, coming passionately out of immanence, directly affecting one’s mind and avoiding any representational forms. They compose life’s field of exteriority. (This is the second key point that should be added to your apprehension of temporalities.) Further, the duration of the present has an ethical-political dimension – our institutions, quazi-institutions, and numerous
apparatuses of capture function as motional-relational knots that come to stand out as saliencies against the background activity from which they arise; they stratify and maintain the field of life, simultaneously extracting surplus value,
necessary for unlimited expansion and growth of our neoliberal capitalistic society. Without this dimension of the opened whole, any model of time would be just one more limited and artificial theory.
Brian Massumi:
“The historical task of philosophy cannot be achieved solely through empirical analysis
of actually existing formations. It must dedicate itself to the superempirical flushing out of what in-forms the very possibility of empirical analysis. It must be radically empirical. Radical empiricism is defined by the postulate that relationality is a mode of reality in its own right, and that relation can be directly perceived (if only as in-forming the immediacy of its effects).
Preemption, it is argued, is the most powerful operative logic of the present. It is the untimely force of attraction around which the field of power is bending. They are not binaries. They are divergent procession destinations. Binaries are general abstractions. They have to do with contradiction and opposition
on the level of meaning. The limits toward which a tendency tends are poles bounding a dynamic field of the process. They never come alone, and no sooner come in pairs than proliferate into a many. The multiplicity of the tendencies they orient and of the apparatuses tending the tendencies are expressions of the productive paradox of the operative logic. The paradox of the operative logic in-forms each and every tendential expression. It is everywhere immanent to the processual field, constitutive of its very problematic nature. It is the field’s constitutive immanent limit. This limit answers, at an abstract distance, across the spacing out and stringing along in the time of cases of the solution, to the field’s ulterior limits, or the ideal endpoints bounding the field’s furthest reaches. Its answer takes the form of inflection of the field’s problematic working-out, tendentially bent as by an ulterior motive. The constitutive immanence of the problematic
node—of the conceptual formula that is the engine of the process—means that it is in every iteration of a case of a solution, throughout the field, in every spacing-out that it is in every timing, everywhere, always and again tendentially inflected by its own ulterior reaching. This is why the ulterior limit is not an “outside” limit in any usual sense of the term: it abstractly folds into the operative logic’s working-out. This is also why the conceptual formula is nonlocal. It in-forms each singular event in the series with its productive tensions and resolving infections. It returns as the matrix for each iteration. “