It is like a logic problem.

If the universe is transcendent to human consciousness
then does this mean the universe must be transcendent to human consciousness?

No, this is not like a logic problem.

You are not grasping the difference between the meaning of transcendental and the meaning of transcendent as it relates to Immanuel Kant's epistemology.

Transcendental means necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics exhibited by the objects of HUMAN perception (Euclidian space and time) which enable said objects to be objects of HUMAN perception.

Transcendent means an entity which lacks the necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics (Euclidian space and time) which would make it an object of HUMAN perception.

My question, then, is whether, or not, matter and energy exhibit any necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics. Are matter and energy objects of HUMAN perception? Or, do they fall outside of HUMAN perception? Are they transcendent?

If something is TRANSCENDENTAL to human consciousness (e.g., Euclidian space, time, and the categories), then does this mean that what is EMPIRICAL to human consciousness (e.g., matter and energy) must be TRANSCENDENT to human consciousness? — charles ferraro

On the face of it, this is a contradiction of terms. The transcendent is what is beyond all possible experience, I.e. it transcends the empirical.

My question, then, is whether, or not, matter and energy exhibit any necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics. Are matter and energy objects of HUMAN perception? Or, do they fall outside of HUMAN perception? Are they transcendent? — charles ferraro

Matter and energy are phenomena, so they are empirical and not transcendent. What is transcendent is objective reality in and of itself, since we can never experience it in and of itself.

Apologies, was just a poor attempt at a joke.

From my perspective no knowledge is unobtainable.
Any system, biological or otherwise that is able to detect and/or extend the senses of an observer is valid.

The better a life form is able to capture and use information the more successful it will be. Advance can be in any of many ways including the detection manipulation storage and use of information. Biological entities develop towards ever increasing complexity in order to better access or use information which then results in better survival for themselves. Different unique and novel ways will always be developing that constantly increase the reach of existing senses and information management. This then results in ever increasingly complexity and results in better information management in a four dimension universe. All the data in the universe is available to any conscious being who is capable of retrieving it.

Energy/matter are transcendental in that they/it exist independent of a conscious mind or its ability to detect it in our 4 dimensional universe.

Transcendent implies or suggests that there is unavailable information in the universe. I reject this.

Only the ability to identify and/or use it.

The was no specific reference to Kant in the OP, but now that the reference has been made with respect to Kant and the transcendent/transcendental distinction.....

......he is talking about transcendent principles, those in opposition, not to transcendental principles, but rather immanent principles. The latter are confined to possible experience, the former do not recognize such boundaries, hence allow reason to overstep them and permit understanding to operate where it has no proper restraint. Technically speaking, it is elsewhere proved the categories of the pure understanding apply only to empirical conditions, but transcendent principles “....deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding...”


“.....transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance....” [A12/B25]
“.....mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori". [A295/B352]
“.......transcendental propositions can never be given through construction of concepts, but only in accordance with concepts that are a priori". [A720/B748]
.....the transcendental is a way of thinking, all having to do with a priori cognition in general, hence is used by Kant in many senses: to a type of deduction, to a type of exposition, to types of idealism and realism, to "content", to a way of employing the faculties of the mind, to the unity of apperception, to different types of proofs, to a type of reflection, to a special unknown "transcendental object = x", to a type of truth, to a type of knowledge, to a type of reflection, to a type of illusion, to subjects (selves), to certain ideas, to a sort of negation, to principles, to a kind of theology, to a type of hypothesis, and at the top of the heap.....a type of philosophy itself.
.....there is no such thing as “transcendental to human consciousness”, and empirical objects do not have transcendental properties.

You state that "matter and energy are phenomena, so they are empirical and not transcendent". OK, I agree with you. But, what, then, are the necessary and strictly universal (transcendental) characteristics matter and energy must exhibit which make it possible for them to become perceptual phenomena; i.e., objects of human perception, in the first place? As I understand Kant, In order to be an object of human intuition or perception, said object, not matter and energy, must exhibit spatio-temporal characteristics.

If, as you conclude, "empirical objects do not have transcendental properties," then I suspect that you disagree with Kant's contention that the empirical objects of human intuition, in order to be possible objects of human intuition, must exhibit the transcendental (necessary and strictly universal) properties of Euclidian space and time.

By the way, empirical objects and phenomenal objects are synonymous terms for Kant.

You state that "matter and energy are phenomena, so they are empirical and not transcendent". OK, I agree with you. But, what, then, are the necessary and strictly universal (transcendental) characteristics matter and energy must exhibit which make it possible for them to become perceptual phenomena; i.e., objects of human perception, in the first place? As I understand Kant, In order to be an object of human intuition or perception, said object, not matter and energy, must exhibit spatio-temporal characteristics. — charles ferraro

I think this is a misunderstanding. The transcendental characteristics are imposed by the human mind, they are not immanent characteristics. Human minds think in terms of time and space. Everything that is apprehended by a human mind therefore exhibits these characteristics. Things existing outside of human minds may or may not also have spatio-temporal characteristics, and either the human mind imposes these characteristics on what it perceives, or it only perceives that which already has those characteristics (or both).

OK. But, again, what am I misunderstanding when I ask whether, or not, the human mind imposes Euclidean space and time on matter and energy?

Furthermore, even if it is granted that the human mind imposes Euclidian space and time on matter and energy, would this be all that is required to explain the production of the empirical, phenomenal objects that we actually perceive about us and interact with every day?
Arthur Schopenhauer did not think so and he explained what he considered to be missing from Kant's epistemology in his critique of it.

If something is TRANSCENDENTAL to human consciousness (e.g., Euclidian space, time, and the categories), then does this mean that what is EMPIRICAL to human consciousness (e.g., matter and energy) must be TRANSCENDENT to human consciousness? — charles ferraro

Seems like a complete non-sequitur to me.

In most of your posts in this thread, you seem to be asking whether matter and energy need to have transcendental characteristics (where we're assuming Kant's view of the same). But what does any of this have to do with the distinction as you're defining it re:

Transcendent means an entity which lacks the necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics (Euclidian space and time) which would make it an object of HUMAN perception. — charles ferraro

??

Not to mention it being mysterious that you asked as if any of this follows from something.

OK. But, again, what am I misunderstanding when I ask whether, or not, the human mind imposes Euclidean space and time on matter and energy? — charles ferraro

You're misunderstanding that space and time are the output, not the input of that process. That is to say matter and energy are what you get after the mind imposed time and space.

Furthermore, even if it is granted that the human mind imposes Euclidian space and time on matter and energy, would this be all that is required to explain the production of the empirical, phenomenal objects that we actually perceive about us and interact with every day? — charles ferraro

Kant does not claim that this is all that is required to explain phenomena.

Arthur Schopenhauer did not think so and he explained what he considered to be missing from Kant's epistemology in his critique of it. — charles ferraro

I don't know Schopenhauer's work so if you want me to engage with that claim, you'd have to repeat it for me.

“.....In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But a thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon....”

Follow the bouncing ball, so to speak. What is herein called “object” is matter external to us. If it is external it is empirical, hence these objects without qualifiers are empirical objects. The definition of “phenomenon” is given, and it is itself an object but carries the qualifier “undetermined object of empirical intuition”, to distinguish it from an empirical object of the senses. An empirical object and a phenomenon are related, because the phenomena we call intuitions will eventually represent the empirical object of sense as soon as the “undetermined” part goes away, or, as soon as understanding cognizes what it is, but they are not synonymous, insofar as they are not interchangeable.

A lot of times Kant will put something in print, then paranthesize something right after, as if one is meant to equate to the other. This is not the case, for he means the one relates to the other directly, as in “....(the raindrops of course are not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical objects)...”. Here he means rain drops are empirical objects in the world.....obviously....but they are phenomena to the faculty of representation.

And here: “...Although all these principles, and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself, are generated in the mind entirely a priori, they would nevertheless have no significance if we were not always able to exhibit their significance in and by means of phenomena (empirical objects)....” This is working backwards, that is, instead of external sense of objects then inwards to understanding, working from a priori understanding through intuition to outward objects of sense. The science is mathematics, and he’s talking about figures, lines and points and such, the principles for which lie a priori in the mind but are worthless and unprovable until we draw the figures, or do the math, etc., at which time the phenomena become empirical objects of sense.

On space and time:
They are not transcendental properties, and it is shown they are not properties of any kind. Instead they are pure intuitions a priori, thus not derived from experience. The means for arriving at the conceptions of space and time is the transcendental exposition, which is the ground for the truth of synthetic a priori propositions with respect to natural phenomena, and therefore our knowledge of them. For these to be the ground of something like that, they must be unconditioned, and are shown to be those unconditioned intuitions upon which the possibility of experience itself rests.

But wait!!! There’s more, so much more.......always more.

You say: "Matter and energy are what you get after the mind imposed time and space." And I would ask: ON WHAT???

I do not agree with this statement at all. If anything, Kant claims that PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS are what you get, not matter and energy, when the forms of intuition are applied to raw sense data, or, as he refers to it, to the manifold of sensation.

I know that Kant claims other variables are involved in explaining the process of empirical perception. But here I am focused, instead, primarily and narrowly on Kant's explanation of the initial conditions which make possible the perception of empirical objects as presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

I think you would get more out of reading Schopenhauer yourself. He's a much easier read than Kant.

I do not disagree with your comments. I'm not necessarily being as clear as I ought to be. Please make room for the fact that the focus of my thinking can shift as I think about things and entertain the comments of others. So, then, let me first set forth some presuppositions of Kant's epistemology, as I understand them, and then restate my original question.

Space and time are not empirical objects; instead, they are a priori (i.e., necessary and strictly universal) forms of sensible intuition.

The spatial and temporal characteristics exhibited by empirical objects originate in the human mind, not in the objects.

The human mind uses the a priori forms of sensible intuition to transform raw sense data, or the manifold of sensation, into empirical objects. This is not a deliberate, but a spontaneous activity.

All empirical objects must exhibit spatial and temporal characteristics in order for human beings to perceive them.

Given the above assumptions of Kant's epistemology, why can it, or why can it not, be argued that matter and energy are empirical objects?

Or, what precisely is the meaning of matter and energy from within the context of the Transcendental Aesthetic?

You say: "Matter and energy are what you get after the mind imposed time and space." And I would ask: ON WHAT??? — charles ferraro

On noumena, or objective reality. We don't know what exactly Noumena are.

I do not agree with this statement at all. If anything, Kant claims that PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS are what you get, not matter and energy, when the forms of intuition are applied to raw sense data, or, as he refers to it, to the manifold of sensation. — charles ferraro

How are matter and energy not perceptual objects?

Matter and energy can only be experienced and studied in an a posteriori way and in accordance with the principles of non-Euclidean geometry.
Matter and energy are empirical, but not perceptual, objects because, as Einstein showed and as physical experiments verified, they do not conform to the principles of Euclidean geometry or to the Newtonian notions of absolute space and time. In fact, from the frame of reference of quantum physics, matter and energy even seem to defy certain principles of logic.

Matter and energy can only be experienced and studied in an a posteriori way and in accordance with the principles of non-Euclidean geometry. — charles ferraro

People experienced and studied matter and energy before Einstein. That spacetime can be better conceptualized as a non-euclidean space doesn't change the everyday experience of the world as euclidean.

Matter and energy are empirical, but not perceptual, objects because, as Einstein showed and as physical experiments verified, they do not conform to the principles of Euclidean geometry or to the Newtonian notions of absolute space and time. In fact, from the frame of reference of quantum physics, matter and energy even seem to defy certain principles of logic. — charles ferraro

This logic is backwards. Matter and energy are obviously perceptual objects since we can perceive them. If non-euclidean spaces can be perceived, it means Kant was mistaken about the nature of space.

If indeed Kant meant to say that space must be euclidean and did not simply assume it was since he did not know about non-euclidean geometry.

Locke considered matter to be a "something, I know not what."
Berkeley considered matter to be synonymous with "Nothing," and
Hume claimed that experimental observations can be conducted without any assumption of the existence of material objects.

So, then, I guess the logic of each of these thinkers was also "backwards" and they, too, were blind to your "obvious."

Locke considered matter to be a "something, I know not what."
Berkeley considered matter to be synonymous with "Nothing," and — charles ferraro

Perhaps their definition of matter was not the current, physical interpretation of the term?

Hume claimed that experimental observations can be conducted without any assumption of the existence of material objects. — charles ferraro

Kant explicitly disagreed with Hume. I find Kant more convincing, despite some issues with Kant's understanding of mathematics and geometry.

If you want to talk about energy and matter in the sense that a physicist understands the terms, then those are phenomena in Kant's system.