I guess "every soul is a world apart", if you will, because self-awareness is sort of private?
I don't experience your self-awareness, you don't experience mine, we can't (unless we become the other) - we're apart (in that respect).
Self-awareness is essentially indexical, a kind of self-knowledge, and bound by ontological self-identity, like a kind of noumena.
Perhaps, by Leibniz, self-awareness is (implicitly or explicitly) integral to "soul", and thus inherently private (in part)? — jorndoe

Not all monads possess self-awareness. Monads are immaterial, immortal unities. There are an infinite number of them and each one has a unique perspective on the same world.

Both monads and the world are God's creation. It may be that Leibniz believed God stands in a causal relationship to the universe in the same way that Shakespeare does to things and events in the life of Othello.

Unfortunately, there is much that is unclear about Leibniz's outlook. Jolley leads his readers through a maze of candidates for his view about material objects, for instance. In some ways, it appears that he did philosophy backward. He started with conclusions and worked to support them. The insight I gather from that is more about me than him, though. It makes me realize the extent to which I assume philosophy ought to be like science (ideal science, that is).

Once the Derrida reading group is over - in a couple of weeks - would anyone be up for a Monadology and/or Discourse on Metaphysics reading group? (The two books can be purchased as one). Together they run up just under a hundred pages, and even smaller separately (obviously).

*The Monadology is 13 pages give or take actually!

Sure. That would be cool.

I am perplexed by the mind-body thought. I lean toward the mind being the consciousness of the body but yet the body might have a consciousness of its own? curious

Yes the body has a consciousness of its own, it is an animal, an organism. You are a multi-layered being.

How does the body consciousness work, with the mind as well or by itself? What is a multilayered being? curious

How does the body consciousness work, with the mind as well or by itself? What is a multilayered being? curious

I guess "every soul is a world apart", if you will, because self-awareness is sort of private?
I don't experience your self-awareness, you don't experience mine, we can't (unless we become the other) - we're apart (in that respect).
Self-awareness is essentially indexical, a kind of self-knowledge, and bound by ontological self-identity, like a kind of noumena.
Perhaps, by Leibniz, self-awareness is (implicitly or explicitly) integral to "soul", and thus inherently private (in part)? — jorndoe Well said. curious

A turbo-summary:

"Since Plato a recurrent theme of western philosophy is the contrast between appearance and reality: the nature of reality can be grasped only by turning away from the senses and consulting the intellect. This theme is present in Descartes's philosophy, but it is developed much further by Leibniz in his theory of monads, the metaphysics of his final years. The first section argues that Leibniz's theory of monads can perhaps be best understood as a form of atomism. Like traditional atoms monads are the basic building-blocks of reality, but unlike them they are spiritual, not physical in nature: the basic properties of monads are perception and appetite. The second section addresses the nature of Leibniz's monism by way of a comparison with Spinoza. Leibniz's final metaphysics is monistic in the sense that, although monads are hierarchically ordered, there is only one basic kind of substance. Spinoza's metaphysics, by contrast, is monistic in the sense that it recognizes the existence of only one substance, God. Indeed, Leibniz's theory of monads can be regarded as an attempt to refute Spinoza's objections to a plurality of substances. If successful, Leibniz's refutation of Spinoza's objections thus creates conceptual space for monads – monads are at least possible – but it still leaves open the question of why monads are actual. It is shown that Leibniz's arguments for monads turn on the need for basic substances which are not mere composites, and on the infinite divisibility of matter. The next section addresses a pressing question: if, as Leibniz says, there is strictly nothing in the universe but monads or simple substances, what is the status of bodies or physical objects? It is clear that Leibniz opts for a reductionist rather than an eliminativist approach to this issue: there are bodies, but they are not metaphysically basic entities. The nature of Leibniz's reductionism about bodies is controversial. Although Leibniz flirts with it in places, phenomenalism is shown not to be his preferred solution to the problem; instead Leibniz's official position is that bodies are aggregates which result from monads: the concept of resulting here is best analysed in terms of Leibniz's technical concept of expression. Leibniz's preference for the aggregate thesis over phenomenalism is probably best explained by his desire to provide a metaphysical foundation for his physical theory of force."

Jolley, Nicholas. Leibniz (The Routledge Philosophers) (pp. 90-91). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

The middle section of the above, with 'subjects' in place of 'substances':

Leibniz's final metaphysics is monistic in the sense that, although monads are hierarchically ordered, there is only one basic kind of subject. Spinoza's metaphysics, by contrast, is monistic in the sense that it recognizes the existence of only one subject, God. Indeed, Leibniz's theory of monads can be regarded as an attempt to refute Spinoza's objections to a plurality of subjects. If successful, Leibniz's refutation of Spinoza's objections thus creates conceptual space for monads – monads are at least possible – but it still leaves open the question of why monads are actual. It is shown that Leibniz's arguments for monads turn on the need for basic subjects which are not mere composites, and on the infinite divisibility of matter. The next section addresses a pressing question: if, as Leibniz says, there is strictly nothing in the universe but monads or simple subjects, what is the status of bodies or physical objects? It is clear that Leibniz opts for a reductionist rather than an eliminativist approach to this issue: there are bodies, but they are not metaphysically basic entities.

The transposition is not perfect but I think it conveys the intention.

The problem is that though it's not too hard to nail down what Leibniz means by "substance" (it's just a signal that we're doing ontology), I don't know exactly what you mean by "subject."

Leibniz believed that the basic building blocks of the universe are immaterial. His reasoning involves infinite divisibility of the material on the one side and unity of consciousness on the other.

"SubjectIve" is a kind of narrative. The philosophical subject is one pole of an opposition. That opposition is superficial to ontological questions, to my mind. Maybe you mean the word differently. Don't know..

Well, explain to me what 'immaterial substance' might be, then.

As I said, 'subject' doesn't quite transpose correctly, but 'substance' is not right either.

The original Greek (not that I know Greek) was 'ouisia', which is nearer to 'being' than what 'substance' now means.

It's valuable to compare Leibniz to Descartes and Spinoza. Descartes proposed two substances where Leibniz allows only one. Can we substitute subject for substance there? No.

There's a good article on the topic here http://www.iep.utm.edu/substanc/

'In contemporary, everyday language, the word “substance” tends to be a generic term used to refer to various kinds of material stuff (“we need to clean this sticky substance off the floor”) or as an adjective referring to something’s mass, size, or importance (“that is a substantial bookcase”). In 17th century philosophical discussion, however, this term’s meaning is only tangentially related to our everyday use of the term. For 17th century philosophers the term is reserved for the ultimate constituents of reality on which everything else depends. ...

...at the very deepest level the universe contains only two kinds or categories of entity: substances and modes. ...Following a tradition reaching back to Aristotle’s Categories, modes are said to exist in, or inhere in, a subject. Similarly, a subject is said to have or bear modes. Thus we might say that a door is the subject in which the mode of rectangularity inheres. One mode might exist in another mode (a color might have a particular hue, for example), but ultimately all modes exist in something which is not itself a mode, that is, in a substance. A substance, then, is an ultimate subject. ...

...In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. Given that there are only substances and modes, and that modes depend on substances for their existence, it follows that substances are the most real constituents of reality.'

But they're not objective constituents, in the way atoms are conceived to be; Leibniz posited monads in opposition to the purported 'material atom'; they're souls, rather than objects, in an ultimately mental or spiritual universe, of which this material world is only an appearance.

A substance, then, is an ultimate subject. ... — Wayfarer

Yea. This definition wasn't sufficient for Leibniz. I think I explained that earlier (or did I hallucinate that?)

But they're not objective constituents, in the way atoms are conceived to be; Leibniz posited monads in opposition to the purported 'material atom'; they're souls, rather than objects, in an ultimately mental or spiritual universe, of which this material world is only an appearance. — Wayfarer

Close, but not quite, Wayfarer. Monads are immaterial objects. It is entirely correct to think of them as atomic in character. Some partake of mind, some don't. There's a hierarchy.

Leibniz explicitly stated that he was not eliminative about materiality. So if you mean by "only an appearance" that Leibniz declared the material world to be illusory, you are wrong.

Given that there are only substances and modes, and that modes depend on substances for their existence, it follows that substances are the most real constituents of reality.'

But they're not objective constituents, in the way atoms are conceived to be; Leibniz posited monads in opposition to the purported 'material atom'; they're souls, rather than objects, in an ultimately mental or spiritual universe, of which this material world is only an appearance. — Wayfarer

I think the very idea of substance is problematic. Substance cannot be material if the material is infinitely divisible. And if substance is not material then reality cannot be fundamentally material either. The idea of constituents of reality is also problematic if reality is thought as one thing. Leibniz' monads are indivisible and utterly separated from one another, so it is not clear how they could ever be combined to constitute a unified reality; or in other words how they could be constituents of such a reality.

This seems to be a problem for any theory of multiple substances that wants to posit one reality; and that is precisely why Spinoza posited that there could be only one substance. Can Leibniz plausibly avoid thinking of his monads as substances, even if only as the indivisible substance of each monadic life?

In a mental or spiritual universe can there be but one reality, instead there must not be a plurality?

Except they cannot be like the atoms we know, because they cannot be combined together in causal relations. That begs the question as to how they can be combined. It doesn't seem very helpful if they can only be combined from the perspective of God. And is it even right if we say that, are they really combined even there, rather than merely synchronized? How can we understand this; it seems an insuperable difficulty?

I must read Leibniz again to see if I can find where he addresses these questions. I have both Discourse on Metaphysics and Monadology on my shelves so I'll be up for a group reading if it happens.
:)

It could be a unity that is reflected in, or embodied in, the plurality of smaller wholes; not that the parts are components of the whole, but embodiments of it. That is why I mentioned the idea of the holographic image before: if broken into smaller parts, each part still contains the whole image albeit at a lower resolution.

The reason I referred to the IEP article is because it addresses the question of how the philosophical idea of substance differs from the common-sense idea of it. Here 'fundamental substance' is understood not in terms of 'indivisible units', but in terms of 'proximity to the origin or source'. The origin is 'the uncreated', i.e. God. From the IEP article:

To be a unity for Leibniz is to be simple and without parts, and so the ultimate constituents of reality are not composite or aggregative beings. That substances are simple has metaphysically significant consequences; Leibniz infers in the Principles of Nature and Grace and elsewhere that “Since the monads have no parts, they can neither be formed nor destroyed. They can neither begin nor end naturally, and consequently they last as long as the universe.”

Atoms were also presumed to have these qualities, but Leibniz argued against atomism.

They are "like atoms" in the sense monads are substances distinct from each other. The monad of my body is not the same as the monad of my mind. Combination isn't a question of causality, but of being or presence.

With me, there is the monad of my body, my experiences, each atom which makes me up, and so on and so on. Every object we might think of has it's own monad. They are immaterial (i.e. not involved in casualty) but present in any instance of an object. An expression running parallel to material objects of causality.

No matter how many times we divide my body into its constitutes, it remains my body. A unity which cannot be broken. Even destroying my body cannot touch it, for the moment my body ceases to exist, it's no longer there to break a part. Anything remains whole in logic, for eternity.

Leibniz is (alas)reversing Spinoza insight. His monads pretty much correspond to Spinoza's mode of thought. They infinite logical meanings expressed everywhere which the emergence and destruction of the finite world cannot touch.

Spinoza (correctly) identifies these meanings in having no role in forming the world. The mode of thought might be expressed in every states of the world, but it's not the mode of thought on which states of the world (the mode of extension) dependent. Existing states come and go one their own terms. Their presence or absence is not governed by modes of thought.

Leibniz is arguing the opposite: states of existence are derived from eternal monads. Logical truth is argued to necessitate what exists in the world (i.e. PSR).

I'm not sure the hologram analogy works, though, because as you say each 'part' of the hologram embodies the same image as the whole, each part is identical to the others and to the whole. In the case of monads though, each part is precisely not identical with all the others. If we think of the experience of each nomad and also the experience of God as an 'image', then we might say that God's experience is the 'master image'. But the experiences of the monads experience do not reflect God's experience, which is the totality of all the monads' experiences, but only one tiny disparate, albeit synchronized, part of it.

"To be a unity for Leibniz is to be simple and without parts, and so the ultimate constituents of reality are not composite or aggregative beings. That substances are simple has metaphysically significant consequences; Leibniz infers in the Principles of Nature and Grace and elsewhere that “Since the monads have no parts, they can neither be formed nor destroyed. They can neither begin nor end naturally, and consequently they last as long as the universe."

I can't remember whether Leibniz thinks of the monads as being substances or not (it's a fairly long time since reading). Mongrel seem to have said not. This excerpt seems to be saying he does so think of them. It also seems odd to say that monad's last as long as the universe. If human souls are monads, that would seem to make their continued existence dependent on the existence of the universe. But form the point of view of the universe, it would seem that a monad goes out of existence when it appears no more on the stage.

What you are saying does not seem to be consonant with Leibniz: the body cannot be a monad because it is composite.

The material body, sure (i.e. the existing body). I wasn't talking about that. My point was about the "soul" of the body. The logical meaning of my body. That's a monad.

Anything can be said to be a composite. Experiences? I can divide those in to parts. The mind? I can divide that in to parts. The only thing that can't be divided into parts is unity. No matter how much division I do, every part of the would has a unity. A book is still a book no matter how much I divide it into pages. A page is still a page, no matter who many words I split it into. The world is still the world, no matter how many objects, beings, monads or substances we say belong to it.

An existing "body(i.e. present existing state)" might not be a monad, but those are not what Leibniz is talking about in positing a monad.

But Leibniz does not say that we consist of more than one monad; one for the body and one for the mind. When you said that the monad of the body is not same as the monad of the mind you seemed to be suggesting that.

Maybe... but is it consistent with the rest of his arguments?

What of the unity of things other than our experience? Are we not made of atoms, fingernails, toes and teeth? If our mind (self-awarness & awareness) is our only monad, we do not have bodies.

My point here is the distinction Leibniz is trying to get is frequently misunderstood. People jump on it for not being a causal connection of the mind and body, even though Leibniz is trying to point out it doesn't make sense to posit such a relationship.

That's a good question; whether his monadology is consistent. I can't answer that.

It's true that our bodies are made of the things you mention; or at least that we can understand them to be. I don't know that Leibniz would say that our minds are monads; perhaps rather our souls (which would be the form, not merely of the body, but of the body/mind)? But that kind of language may be alien to Leibniz. We would need to investigate it.

I agree that Leibniz, like Spinoza, but in a very different way, is seeking to circumvent the difficulty posed by postulating any causal relation between the two substances that Descartes' philosophy introduced. Did he succeed, though?

You're correct. Though the human species, for instance, is a pile of monads, there are no causal relationships.

It all sounds good to me, but does he say what a monad is? All we can see is a myriad of colours and shapes and ideas, we can't actually see a monad, subjectively.

In my model my body is a result of many monads cooperating with my single monad to act out my being. Also I am cooperating with other single monads to act out the being of our planet, for example.

It all sounds good to me, but does he say what a monad is? All we can see is a myriad of colours and shapes and ideas, we can't actually see a monad, subjectively. — Punshhh

Probably the most immediate evidence of your monadness is the unity of your consciousness. I was going to start a thread on that topic. but it's still percolating. Unity of consciousness (UOC) is supposed to be in evidence anytime you compare things... relate A to B... Some argue against UOC. And then there are brain diseases in which UOC is missing... don't know what to do about that. :)

Nevertheless, nobody ever experiences consciousness in anything but the singular - even those who have had a split-brain operation.