I am probably just repeating points I already made in your other thread, but I'd like to answer anyways.

The biggest obstacle to libertarian free will, it seems to me, is not physicalism, but the metaphysics behind causation. An intuitive belief about causation is that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence; thus, if there is a lightning strike, one expects that there is a cause for that lightning strike. However, if that metaphysical intuition is true, then whenever we have a thought, there must have been a cause to bring that thought about and this seems to deny libertarian free will. — Walter Pound

If thoughts came about without causes, how would we experience that? Would these thoughts be unconnected to our previous thoughts, randomly popping up?

If you make a decision, that decision will be based on who you are. If it weren't, it wouldn't be your decision. But that obviously means the decision is not "uncaused", because whatever reasoning is behind the decision is determined by your personality, circumstances etc. Whatever a "free" will is, it's not based on making decisions that are uncaused.

Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible? — Walter Pound

If you use a restrictive definition of libertarian free will then yes.

Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will? — Walter Pound

I can present a theory of free will that allows for determinism. Causality is a human perception. Free will is a human experience. Neither can be said to be more real than the other.

When we look at the outside world, we organize it so that all future states are fully consistent with all past states. This is necessary for us to make predictions, which we need in order to be able to act. When we do act, though, we consider that action to be guided by the future goal, not the past state of our mind. This is also necessary to be able to act.

We simply use two different ordering principles for different functions.

Agent-causal theories sound indistinguishable from indeterminacy.
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics):
"Most events can be explained as the effects of prior events. When a tree falls, it does so because of the force of the wind, its own structural weakness, and so on. However, when a person performs a free act, agent causation theorists say that the action was not caused by any other events or states of affairs, but rather was caused by the agent. Agent causation is ontologically separate from event causation. The action was not uncaused, because the agent caused it. But the agent's causing it was not determined by the agent's character, desires, or past, since that would just be event causation.[25] As Chisholm explains it, humans have "a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing – or no one – causes us to cause those events to happen."[26]

So the agent causes a thought to occur in his mind.
But nothing within the agent causes the agent to do that.
The fact that the thought comes about seems to be without any kind of explanation.
Even determinists will accept that an agent causes thoughts to occur in his mind, but the question is why does the agent do that and here is where the libertarian free willer has no explanation. It just happens. Why does the agent do anything? It sounds similar to an event that occurs in a quantum vacuum.

Yes, it seems if causation is a universal fact, free will would be impossible. Free will is premised on the existence of a prime mover in the causal matrix. I don't know how that's possible from a materialist perspective.

However, if dualism is allowed then the mind may not be causally bound. It could very well be free. Of course what of causation in the mind plane? Could it be that the mind also is subject to causality? While one can't answer that in the negative neither can we in the affirmative and that provides enough room for the possibility of free will. Do you accept?

However, I can't disprove the possibility of causality acting on the mind. Is it that the mind and where it dwells is also subject to causality just like the physical world is? Then we'd have to look at ways of accommodating free will in a causal context.

I would say a few things in response to this topice:
1.) Mind and matter are mutually interdependent within the realm of causation (perception/phenomena)
2.) Metaphysically, there is no cause and effect, we are simply particular wills determining ourselves and worlds as conscous concepts; whose apparent causality is attributed to the relationship of ideas within each concept which is our innate ideas of self and world.

If you make a decision, that decision will be based on who you are — Echarmion

I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally "random." I do this on purpose. Sometimes I use a "random number generator" instead, but I can do more or less the same thing without a random number generator, too.

At any rate, yeah, physicalism has no implication for free will.

I can present a theory of free will that allows for determinism. Causality is a human perception. Free will is a human experience. Neither can be said to be more real than the other. — Echarmion

That's basically just saying "ontologically we don't know what's going on, which one is correct."

As Chisholm explains it, humans have "a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. — Walter Pound

You don't see the contradiction?

So the agent causes a thought to occur in his mind.
But nothing within the agent causes the agent to do that.
The fact that the thought comes about seems to be without any kind of explanation.
Even determinists will accept that an agent causes thoughts to occur in his mind, but the question is why does the agent do that and here is where the libertarian free willer has no explanation. It just happens. Why does the agent do anything? It sounds similar to an event that occurs in a quantum vacuum. — Walter Pound

God/Natural selection would be the cause for why some agent does anything.

However, if dualism is allowed then the mind may not be causally bound. It could very well be free. Of course what of causation in the mind plane? Could it be that the mind also is subject to causality? While one can't answer that in the negative neither can we in the affirmative and that provides enough room for the possibility of free will. Do you accept? — TheMadFool

How would you explain your awareness of other minds without using causation?

I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally "random." I do this on purpose. Sometimes I use a "random number generator" instead, but I can do more or less the same thing without a random number generator, too. — Terrapin Station

You can randomize individual decisions, but aren't you just deciding to let the RNG decide? After all that you use a RNG for some decisions is part of your "personality". One might add additional layers of randomness to the decision and eventually claim that one's decisions are so influenced by random numbers as to no longer be decisions at all, but what would that prove?

That's basically just saying "ontologically we don't know what's going on, which one is correct." — Terrapin Station

Yes. But given the popular notion that free will is conclusively disproven by modern neuroscience, among other things, I don't think it's a trivial step.

This is why I don't like writing long posts. Sometimes it's clear I shouldn't write more than a sentence or two.

You had written:

"If you make a decision, that decision will be based on who you are."

I said:

"I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally 'random.'"

So in other words, I make a lot of decisions that are not "based on who I am." They're phenomenally random instead.

Sometimes I use a "random number generator" instead, but I can do more or less the same thing without a random number generator, too. — Terrapin Station

Then why use a random number generator if you can do more or less the same thing?

A random number generator isn't random at all. It uses a complex algorithm to create the illusion of randomness. So, if you can do more or less the same thing, then what you are saying is that you have a complex algorithm that you use to make decisions with that creates the illusion of randomness.

So in other words, where they're not "based on who I am." They're phenomenally random instead. — Terrapin Station

The outcomes are phenomenally random. Whether or not it makes sense to refer to the operation of the RNG as a "decision" is a different and mostly semantic question.

Does this relate to my overall point in some way?

The outcomes are phenomenally random. Whether or not it makes sense to refer to the operation of the RNG as a "decision" is a different and mostly semantic question. — Echarmion

Why are you mentioning an RNG?

I said "I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally 'random.'"

That's all I said. Forget the earlier post.

Why are you mentioning an RNG?

I said "I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally 'random.'"

That's all I said. Forget the earlier post. — Terrapin Station

Ok, had a bit of tunnel vision there, sorry.

I was arguing specifically against the notion that a free will requires "uncaused decisions". I am fine with accepting phenomenally random decisions as a possibility, I just don't think they are more "free" in some sense than phenomenally reasoned decisions.

The reason why I say that physicalism is not the biggest problem for free will is that we could even grant that physicalism is false and idealism is true, but if it is the case that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence, then libertarian free will is still false.
Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible?
Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will? — Walter Pound

It's not hard to propose a theory of causation which allows for libertarian free will. It is easily done with dualist principles, and a separation between efficient cause and final cause. Final cause is what you call the "uncaused cause", and efficient cause is when one event causes another event. So a final cause is not itself an event because according to dualist principles it is not physical, yet it may cause an event.

I was arguing specifically against the notion that a free will requires "uncaused decisions". I am fine with accepting phenomenally random decisions as a possibility, I just don't think they are more "free" in some sense than phenomenally reasoned decisions. — Echarmion

Sure. I'd just say that some part of the process--somewhere from the deliberation (when that's present) to the decision has to involve some ontological indeterminateness to some extent* otherwise I don't know what "free" would be referring to ontologically (which is kind of another way of saying that I don't agree that compatibilism makes sense).

*"to some extent"=it wouldn't have to be complete, it could just be something like a probability bias.

Sure. I'd just say that some part of the process--somewhere from the deliberation (when that's present) to the decision has to involve some ontological indeterminateness to some extent* otherwise I don't know what "free" would be referring to ontologically (which is kind of another way of saying that I don't agree that compatibilism makes sense).

*"to some extent"=it wouldn't have to be complete, it could just be something like a probability bias. — Terrapin Station

I don't know how ontological indeterminateness is supposed to get us to a meaningful concept of freedom. How does such indeterminateness make the brainstates we experience as decisions more meaningful? I know meaning is a vague term here, I am getting at the "why should I care" question. My decisions are my decisions because they are connected to my larger self and my reasons. I can make them "free" by basing them on nothing else other than internal states I have.

An intuitive belief about causation is that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence — Walter Pound

I know that it's not the primary focus of this thread, but a consequence of this view of causation is that there could be no first cause/first event, because, by definition of "first," it could not have been preceded by any antecedent causes. And this would imply that the universe is infinitely old.

I've never really understood how libertarian free will could be consistent with a naturalistic view of the world. It ascribes contra causal powers to human beings (and nothing else which may populate a naturalistic ontology, as far as I can tell), powers which may as well be mystical in nature.

I can make them "free" by basing them on nothing else other than internal states I have. — Echarmion

Are you putting "free" in quotation marks there because it's not really ontological freedom?

I've never really understood how libertarian free will could be consistent with a naturalistic view of the world. — Arkady

Naturalistic views of the world haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now.

Are you putting "free" in quotation marks there because it's not really ontological freedom? — Terrapin Station

Mostly just to avoid a semantic debate on the definition of ontological freedom. What is ontological freedom, really? Is it ontological indeterminateness? Is the concept even coherent?

Yes, indeterminateness or randomness, as opposed to determinism.

I think it's worth bringing up, because we should know what we're even talking about if we're formulating positions featuring the term, no?

It's kind of hard to debate one side or the other with respect to a term like that if we don't even know what we're referring to.

Determinism is hardly a moribund view in philosophy. "Soft determinism" with regard to free will (a species of compatibilism) says that determinism is true, and that free will is compatible with it.

Determinism is hardly a moribund view in philosophy. — Arkady

That could be (that it's still alive and well in philosophy) but it shouldn't be the case due to folks being naturalists, unless they haven't cracked a science book written in the past 100-150 years.

Assuming that you're talking about developments in quantum mechanics, of course philosophers are aware of them, and have responses to its supposed indeterminacy. Even some scenarios under Newtonian mechanics pose challenges to determinism, though, so I don't think it's simply a matter of philosophers not being up on the latest science or whatever.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#QuaMec

Right, so you think that philosophers are determinists due to thinking that contemporary science has things wrong because? What would they be basing their ontological traditionalism on there?

You could ask them. I am far from an expert, or even a particularly well-informed layman, with regards to modern physics, but I suspect, as with many things in philosophy, it hinges on philosophers' interpretations of the data from physics. Even physicists are not unified in their interpretations of what results in QM even mean. One is reminded of that quote, by Feynman, I think, that if you believe you understand QM then you don't understand QM, or something along those lines.

Even physicists are not unified — Arkady

And no one suggested as much, but the widespread consensus for a long time now is that determinism is not supportable any longer. The Laplacean view is seen as a comical historical quirk, akin to a belief in phlogiston.

The point, by the way, isn't that one view or another is right or wrong.

It's that the only way that one can wonder "how can someone be a naturalist and not a determinist" is to be almost completely unfamiliar with recent science. You'd wonder "how can someone be a naturalist and not a determinist" if the widespread consensus in the sciences was that determinism is correct and Laplace's view was right on track.

You said "Naturalistic views of the world haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now," and when I pointed out that's not true, you shifted to saying something like "Naturalistic views of the world shouldn't haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now, based on the results from modern physics."

So, you are taking a position on the question of determinism, and insisting that the results of science underwrite your views. And some very smart people just as vehemently disagree with you. So, I don't know what to tell you there, except that, unlike debates in pure science, metaphysical debates (such as the one which concerns us here) are not so readily resolved.