"Das Man is that in terms of which the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, as encountered, are. So Das Man is not encountered at all, it is the constitutive of that wherein any entity is *to us*. "

If we look at the ready to hand, it is also that in terms of which entities are encountered, and of course one can say the same for the present at hand.They are modes in terms of which we encounter beings in the world.. You're right that ontically we never explicitly encounter Das Man, any more that we encounter the mode of the ready to hand or the present to hand as ontological conditions of possibility for the entities that appear to us.
But ontologically, I think that Das Man as a way in which entities appear to us is different in kind than modes like the present to hand. Das Man pertains to the mode of everyday being a self(and being with other Daseins) rather than being-with-objects.

It is true that, along with, or equiprimordial with, the ready to hand grasping of a hammer in terms of our heedful circumspective relation to it, is our understanding of it in terms of its larger relevance with regard to human activities that it is being used for . And in regard to this larger context of human activity that 'frames' the meaning of the tool in its being used, Das Man pertains to the way that Dasein initially and for the most part comports itself as this Being-with-others in ambiguity, levelling down and averageness.
But its harder to think of what this averageness, levelling down, ambiguous understanding consists in if we remain focused on our use of a hammer.

When we think of examples of Das Man such as idle talk, concern for, concern with and curiosity, the meaning of this averageness and levelling down becomes clear(not for the person in their ontic existence, but ontologically clear for the philosopher) , even if this average everydayness is implied in all situations of inauthentic existence, including solitary uses of a tool.

I'm curious, what family of philosophers do you read Heidegger in proximity with?
As you know, there are many Heidegger camps. The oldest in the U.S. and probably still most dominant is what I dub the Kierkegaardian Heideggerians. They often reside in theology deparrtments at Catholic universities , and include Hubert Dreyfus, Thom Sheehan, John Sallis, John Caputo, Mark Wrathatl. I dont agree with their reading of Hedeigger. I think they miss what is most radical about him. I much prefer Derrida's analysis.

So what's your overall point? What are you trying to say about Das Man? That Das Man pertains to our encounters with people but not that of 'things', and that Das Man is equiprimodrial with Being-in-the-world?

Das Man pertains to the mode of everyday being a self(and being with other Daseins) rather than being-witjh-objects. — Joshs

Hmm... given if I understand you correctly, this misses the mark. Das Man is already 'there' in our absorption in the world as we find ourselves along-side entities in the world. The hammer is something 'one uses for hammering', given the standard 'hammer' context of the paradigmatic 'work-shop' qua work-world. In using the hammer, and thus grasping it as a hammering tool, we have already ascribed ourselves (projected) to the possibilities of Das Man. In inauthenticity, Das Man is 'there' as the horizon for both our involvement comportments with equipment and our solicitous encounters with the Others.

I'm curious, what family of philosophers do you read Heidegger in proximity with? — Joshs

Hmm... definitely been influenced by Dreyfus and Sheehan. Also Blattner and Withy, among others.

I dont agree with their reading of Hedeigger. I think they miss what is most radical about him. I much prefer Derrida's analysis. — Joshs

Why?

Many reasons. To start with, they miss Nietzssche's critique of the will as wanting what it wants, as grasping, as present-to itself. Swecond, they don't deconstruct the notion of structre and form, seeing temporality and existence and affectivity in terms of movement form one temporary structure to the next. For Heidegger and Derrida, structures and forms are not in-themselves enclosures that are then transformed. IF you look at models of intersubjetive processes that are compatible with the Kierkegaardian-Levinasian reading of Heidegger, they rely on an irreducible polarization and violence in the way that meaning is conditioned and shaped culturally.

"Das Man is 'there' as the horizon for both our involvement comportments with equipment and our solicitous encounters with the Others."

It may be 'there' in that it is equiprimordial, but then so are all of the other modes of inauthentic Dasein.
"World gives itself to Dasein in each case as the respective whole of its "for the sake of itself," i.e., for the sake of a being that is equioriginarily being alongside what is present at hand, being with the Dasein of others, and being toward itself."(Pathmarks)
So the present to hand and the ready to hand must also be already 'there' in our absorption in the world as we find ourselves along-side entities in the world. But that doesn't mean that each of these modes is directly accessible to us simultaneously for phenomenological investigation. That's why they're called modes.

I'm simply saying what Heidegger is saying, A change in focus of investigation from the ready to hand to a different mode of being or phenomenon must take place in order to allow us to answer the question of the 'who' of Dasein as self, subject , Mit-Sein, the 'they' .

"All of the structures of being of Da-sein, thus also the phenomenon that answers to
this question of who, are modes of its being.Thus the answer to the question of the 'who' is a mode of being. By investigating in the direction of the phenomenon which allows us to answer the question of the who, we are led to structures of Da-sein which are equiprimordial with being-in-the-world: being-with and Mitda-sein. In this kind of being, the mode of everyday being a self is grounded whose explication makes visible what we might call the " subject" of everydayness, the they ."

I don't understand your analysis of modes and why it matters. Yes, readiness-to-hand names the Being of certain kinds of entities (tools, etc.). I wouldn't so much call readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand modes, per say, though ok. Das Man is that in terms of which any inauthentically-grasped, ready-to-hand entity is.

Yes, in B&T Heidegger's analysis of Dasein runs through a phenomenological investigation of entities within-the-world as grasped in average everydayness, and then proceeds to the shared social space of Dasein's situatedness as such (spatiality plus Being-with) wherein one encounters the public world and 'the Others', that is constitutive of Dasein itself qua Being-in-the-world. Our a priori openness through das Man names the 'who' of Everyday Dasein. And yes the 'who' of everyday Dasein is equiprimordial with Being-in and the world as such. But I don't see what the issue or disagreement is here.

[Das Man] may be 'there' in that it is equiprimordial, but then so are all of the other modes of inauthentic Dasein. — Joshs

Ok. I mean, I'm not saying they aren't. I mean all the existentialia are 'there' constituting our openness to the world, which is our essence as cases of Dasein. So if I am understanding you correctly, yes I agree, but I don't see what the commotion is all about.

No commotion, I'm just bored. Its a cold, grey late February here in Chicago, and parsing barely penetrable passages from Heidegger seemed like a useful diversion.
Heidegger, along with Derrida, is a very important thinker for me, though.
My reading of him is not widely shared. As I mentioned, there are a large group of theologically inclined writers who embrace him into the Kierkegaard-Levinas fold(Gadamer too). This , to me, misses everything radical in Heidegger. I'm not theologically inclined and I find Nietzsche a useful bulldog to shatere the ability of any philophical talk of good Will or God or any valuative approach in a prioritizing way, even the bliss of nothingness. Using Nietzsche (and Deleuze, Nancy, Lyotard) this way unravels the basis of most readings of Heidegger. Heidegger can be used to question the remnants of metaphysical thinking on Nietzsche and Deleuze also.

What I find radical is our a priori openness to the world, the fact that we swim in meaning, that the disclosure of the ways we already-alway find ourselves operates within some horizon of understanding, and that these things constitute what it means to be human. The world is never the same after reading Heidegger.

There are many who would argue that Sartre, Kierkegaard and Gadamer said similar things. Is Heidegger more radical than these writers, and if so, how? What does he have to offer, either affirmatively or critically, to postmodern political discourses of otherness and incommensurability informing campus radicalism? What would you say to those who celebrate Heidegger for the very traits you wrote about above but oppose themselves to many of the ideas intrinsic to a Delezian-Nietzschean-Focuaultian post-truth project?

Well, first I did not mean to say that one cannot read or discover similarly radical things from other writers or philosophers. Second, I am not sure Sartre or Kierkegaard saw disclosure as such, the fact that our Being is to be open to contexts of meaning, that we are situated all the way down, that we are an interpretive force bringing the world into a focus in finding ourselves already approaching everything from some mooded, holistic, self-projected, available-already, human angle of vision that constitutes the space of our worldly lives. And of course Gadamer was hugely influenced by Heidegger.

Good questions, but I'm not sure how to deal with them.

interesting. I agree.